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Abstract
This work, published over a five-year-period, focuses upon the availability of mental 
condition defences to vulnerable offenders. The question addressed is ‘to what extent do 
mental condition defences adequately accommodate the circumstances of vulnerable 
offenders within the criminal justice system?’ The publications are timely in charting a 
pathway for the interpretation and application of the (then) recently introduced partial 
defences to murder, and recent reviews/reforms to mental condition defences across 
England and Wales (‘E&W’), Scotland, New South Wales (‘NSW’), Victoria, New 
Zealand (‘NZ’), and the United States (‘US’), before advancing optimal reform solu-
tions. The publications fall under four themes, each addressing essential aims and objec-
tives of the study. The overarching aim is to provide optimal reform solutions to prob-
lems faced by vulnerable offenders in claiming mental condition defences. The objec-
tive is to provide a critical exposition of these problems before advancing reform pro-
posals based upon the experiences of the jurisdictions identified. The research method is 
largely doctrinal 'black-letter', comparative, and reform-focused. The nature of the re-
search means that socio-legal factors also play a significant role.   
This collection provides a leading point of reference in the field of mental condition de-
fences, which represents one of the most important and sensitive criminal law areas; this 
work reveals significant problems in the operation and application of the law. The cen-
tral conclusion reached is that in the context of mental condition defences, a rebalancing 
exercise must take place, which ensures vulnerable offenders are at the centre of dis-
course, policy, and reform initiatives. In this regard, these publications provide insights 
into the interpretation of proposed, new and existing law as it applies to vulnerable of-
fenders. This focus upon making mental condition defences more accessible to the vul-
nerable offender, and the optimal reform framework advanced demonstrates the extent 
to which this can be achieved, without risking the integrity of mental condition defenc-
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1 
Introduction 
This collection, published over a five-year-period, provides a leading point of reference 
in the field of mental condition defences. The law relating to mental condition defences 
is one of the most important and sensitive areas of the criminal law; this published work 
reveals significant problems in the operation and application of the law to vulnerable 
offenders. The publications are timely in charting a pathway for the interpretation and 
application of the (then) recently introduced partial defences to murder, and recent re-
views and reforms to mental condition defences across E&W, Scotland, NSW, Victoria, 
NZ and the US (‘key jurisdictions’), before advancing optimal reform solutions. 
Impact 
The research underpins the ‘Vulnerable Suspects and Offenders Impact Case Study’, 
which will be submitted under the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2021 exer-
cise.1 Publications (i)-(ii), (v)-(vi), and (viii) were reviewed and submitted under REF 
2014.2  The remaining publications form part of a REF 2021 selection. Northumbria 
Law School was the most improved law school in the UK in terms of internationally 
recognised research provision; half of all research outputs in law were assessed as either 
world leading or internationally excellent. The case study includes two Higher Educa-
tion and Innovation Funded (HEIF) projects, focused on identifying recognised medical 
conditions in vulnerable offenders, and developing a conference programme between 
the Centre and the Institute. This initial link was generated through a conference 
organised by the author.3 The research has been presented at Sydney University, and 
national and inter-national conferences/events.4 HEIF funding was used to organise the 
'Age of Criminal 
1
 These edited collections include: Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System; Perspec-
tives from Law and Medicine (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015) (ISBN: 978-1-4438-7161-7); and, 
General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2014) 
(ISBN: 978-1-4724-3335-0). Forthcoming edited collections in this area include: Consent: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2016) (under contract); and, Consent and Control; Legal 
Perspectives on State Power
; 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016) (under contract). Forthcoming spe-
cial edit ions in this area include:  ‘The Age of Criminal Responsibility; Domestic, International and 
Comparative Perspectives’ (2016) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly; and, ‘Criminal Justice and Society’ 
(2016) Journal of International and Comparative Law. 
2
 Four publicat ions were submitted to the REF exercise by this author, and one was submitted by a co-
author. A number of publications written or co-authored by this author, relating to the theme of this col-
lection, but not contained within the main body of the work are provided within the appendices. 
3
 Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice (Northumbria University, 2013). 
4
 Selected conferences and events include: Nicola Wake, ‘Responding to the NZ Law Commission: A 
New Part ial Defence (for primary vict ims)?’ (De Montfort University, 2016); Nicola  Wake, 'Loss of Con-
 
2 
Responsibility' conference 2015, which immediately preceded Lord Dholakia's 'Age of 
Criminal Responsibility Bill', and was timed to coincide with (and respond to) the gov-
ernment’s recent announcement it will review the youth justice system in E&W.5 Sever-
al institutions have contacted the organisers to express an interest in collaborating. The 
work undertaken has been cited extensively by academics6, the Law Commission7, web-
site users8 press reports,9 and has supported successful funding applications.10 The au-
                                                                                                                                               
trol and Extreme Provocation; Anglo-Australian Perspectives' (University of Sydney Institute of Crimi-
nology, 2015); Nicola Wake and Natalie Wortley, 'Principal aggressors and primary v ictims: The inade-
quacy of extreme provocation and loss of control’ (Fighting Femicide: Cultural and Legal Interventions, 
Queen Mary University, 2015); Nicola  Wake, 'Partial Defences and Primary Vict ims; Anglo-Australian  
Perspectives' (IALMH, Sigmund Freud University, Vienna, 2015); and, Nicola Wake and Natalie Wort-
ley, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009; Then and Now' (The Royal College of Psychiatrists Thirteenth 
Annual Grange Conference, 2014). 
5
 Details regarding the conference, speakers and papers are available  via the following link: 
http://newsroom.northumbria.ac.uk/events/the-age-of-criminal-responsibility-acr-conference-55837. The 
Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill is available: <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015- 
16/ageofcriminalresponsibility.html? accessed 2 February 2016. The Ministry of Justice Interim Report, 
Review of the Youth Justice System (MoJ IR, 2015) for the Youth Justice Review is availa-ble via the 
following link: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/review-of-the-youth-justice-system> accessed 2 
February 2016. 
6
 See, for example, Arlie Loughnan, ‘From Carpetbag to Crucib le: Reconceptualising Diminished Re-
sponsibility Manslaughter’ in Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System (Cambridge 
Scholars publishing, 2014); Thom Brooks, ‘Involuntary intoxicat ion; a new six-step procedure’ Journal of 
Criminal Law 2015, 79(2), 138-146; Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Homicide Law Reform and the Provocation De-
fence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave, 2015); David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013); John Child and David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Es-
sentials of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015); Jonathan Herring, Great Debates in Criminal 
Law (Palgrave Publishing, 2015);  Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Texts Cases and Materials (Oxford  
University Press, 2014);  Nico la Padfield, Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014); AP Simester, 
JR Spencer, GR Sullivan and JG Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 
(Hart  Publishing, 2013); and, Andrew Ashworth, ‘Homicide: Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.54 - loss of 
control - qualifying trigger’ Criminal Law Review [2012] 7, 539-544; Amanda Clough, Mercy Killing: 
Three’s  a crowd’ Journal of Criminal Law (2015) 79(5), 358-372; Tony Storey and Natalie  Wortley, 
‘More than merely more than min imal: the meaning of the term "substantial" in the context of diminished 
responsibility’ (2014) Journal of Criminal Law  78(5), 373-378;  Tony Storey, ‘Loss  of control: sufficient 
evidence’ (2015) Journal of Criminal Law 79(1), 6-8 (note); Adam Jackson and Natalie Wortley, ‘Loss  of 
control and the "normal" person: the relevance of self-induced intoxication’ (2013) Journal of Criminal 
Law 77(4), 292-295 (note); Natalie  Wortley ‘Reasonable belief in  consent under the Sexual Offences Act 
2003’ (2013) Journal of  Criminal Law 77(3), 184-188 (note); Chris Morgan, ‘Loss  of self-control: Back 
to the good old days’ (2013)  Journal of Criminal Law 77(2), 119-135; Amanda Clough, ‘Sexual infideli-
ty; the exclusion  never was?’ (2012) Journal of Criminal Law 76(5), 382-388;  Matt Gibson, ‘Intoxicants  
and Diminished Responsibility: the impact of the coroners and justice act 2009’ [2011] Criminal Law 
Review 12, 909-924. 
7
 Law Commission Discussion Paper, Insanity and Automatism (Law Com DP, 2013). See, Adam Jack-
son, Natalie Wortley and Nico la Wake, ‘Insanity and Automatism: A Response to the Law Commission 
Part 2’ (2012) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly, 176, 51/52, 752-754 (ISSN: 1759-7943); Adam Jack-
son, Natalie Wortley and Nico la Wake, ‘Insanity and Automatism: A Response to the Law Commission 
Part 1’ Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (2012) 176, 50, 731-733 (ISSN: 1759-7943). Please see Ap-
pendix A for these publications. 
8
Available: <http://www.aic.gov.au/lib rary/alerts/homicide/201401.html> accessed 11 January 2016; 
Available: <http://news.sclqld.org.au/Newsletter/display.php?List=4&N=68#> accessed 11 January 2016. 
9
 Selected reports include: North News, ‘UK Youth Justice-Out of Step and Unacceptable’ availab le at: 
<http://newsroom.northumbria.ac.uk/pressreleases/uk-youth-justice-out-of-step-and-unacceptable-
1223258> accessed 14 October 2015; Your Psychology, Medical News Today, and Web4Professionals 
3 
thor is first supervisor to a PhD student and second supervisor to two university-funded 
PhD students researching in this area. Several posited reform options are currently un-
der consideration by the New Zealand Law Commission.11 
Advancement of the field of study 
A new approach to the issue of mental condition defences that suggests a rebalancing 
exercise must take place, ensuring vulnerable offenders are at the centre of discourse, 
policy initiatives, and reform in relation to this sensitive area of the criminal law is the 
central premise of these publications.12 This prima facie controversial approach to men-
tal condition defences provides an original focus on the impact of the law on vulnerable 
offenders. It is common for discourse to focus on vulnerable victims or witnesses;13 vic-
tims are by definition a vulnerable category of individual; the witness to a crime might 
be regarded vulnerable; but it is rare to speak of vulnerable offenders. In many cases, 
the offender ought not to be considered vulnerable, yet a number of offenders are vul-
nerable. This collection focuses upon offenders vulnerable by mental ill health and/or 
family violence.14 In creating mental condition defences, the law (and literature) recog-
nises a need in vulnerable offenders, but the focus when reforming the law frequently 
‘Northumbria Legal Experts and Psychiatrists Grapple with Changes to the Law on Partial Defences’; 
Medical Net, ‘Law experts, psychiatrists discuss legal changes  affect evidence in murder cases’ availa-
ble: < Availab le: <http://www.news-medical.net/news/20141008/Law-experts-psychiatrists-discuss-legal-
changes--affect-evidence-in-murder-cases.aspx> accessed 18 August 2015; 
Times North, ‘Top QC Says Law on Mental Health Needs to Be Clarified’ available: 
<http://timesnorth.org/2014/10/09/top-qc-says-law-on-mental-health-needs-to-be-clarified/> accessed 18 
August 2015; Psys.org ‘Changing perceptions of mental disorder’; Availab le at: 
<http://phys.org/news/2013-10-legal-perceptions-mental-d isorders-defendants.html> accessed 18 August 
2015. 
10
 Selected applications include: Society of Legal Scholars Research Activit ies Fund (SLS, £1,000); HEIF 
Impact Fund (£2,700, and £1,500); Modern Law Review seminar series fund (£5,000); Mental Disorder 
and Criminal Justice Research Conference (University of Sunderland, £1,500); and the Northumberland 
NHS Trust Tyne and Wear (£299). 
11
 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (NZ 
Law Com IP 39, 2015). The full response is available in Appendix F. 
12
 For example, Cairns discusses feminising provocation for the purposes of assisting those who respond 
to family  abuse with lethal force to claim an  appropriate defence; Ilona CM Cairns, ‘‘Femin ising’ provo-
cation in Scotland: the expansion dilemma’ (2014) Juridical Review 4, 237-261. 
13
 See generally, The Crown Prosecution Service, Victims and Witnesses (CPS) available: 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/> accessed 14 October 2015. 
14
 This is clearly  not an exhaustive list of the categories of o ffender who might be regarded as vulnerable 
within the criminal justice system. This collection does briefly consider additional categories of offender 
who are vulnerable  by virtue of youth, given the particularly low level of criminal responsibility operating 
in E&W, and  ‘offenders’ who, though not the victim of family violence, are vulnerab le because they 
have been subject to attack, for example, householders who act to defend themselves from an intruder. 
For an  analysis of the nature  of family v iolence see, Thom Brooks, Punishment (Routledge, 2012) ch 10, 
and Jennifer Youngs, ‘Family v iolence and the criminal law: reconceptualising reform’ (2015) Journal of 
Criminal Law 79(1), 55-70. 
4 
shifts to inappropriate claims, and the ‘bad’ offender. For example, emphasis on the 
primary victim is often used to highlight gender bias in provocation, and to lobby for 
abolition.15 Extensive debate regarding the exclusion of mental condition defences often 
results in restrictive proposals/reforms that preclude the defence in genuine cases. Pre-
venting unmeritorious claims is fundamentally important, but vulnerable offenders 
should be adequately accommodated.16 The explicit focus on vulnerable offenders ren-
ders this collection an original point of reference for researchers, members of the legal 
profession and law reformers. The work demonstrates how a shift in emphasis would 
ensure vulnerable offenders have access to defences without risking their abuse; reform 
recommendations are advanced in this regard. 
Methodology 
The research is largely doctrinal 'black- letter'17, comparative, and reform-focused. The 
nature of the research means that socio-legal factors also play a significant role. The re-
search utilises primary sources: legislation and case- law from hard copy held in North-
umbria and Sydney University libraries, and electronically via Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, 
Heinonline, BaiLII, NZLII, and AustLII; and, secondary material drawn from library 
collections, inter- library loans, the identified databases, and official websites.18 This in-
ductive, qualitative methodology engages in 'ascertaining the precise state of the law on 
a particular point', and exploring the ‘implications of the state of the current law',19 
providing a 'more useful understanding' of the present law and its operation.20   
15
 See, Adrian  Howe, ‘Provocation in crisis-Law’s  passion at the crossroads? New direct ions for feminist 
strategists’ (2004) The Australian Feminist Law Journal (21). 
16
 Simon Parsons, ‘The loss of control defence-fit for purpose?’ (2015) Journal of Criminal Law 79(2), 
94-101. 
17
 See, Mike McConville and W ing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 
2010) 3-4. 
18
 For example, <http://www.parliament.uk>, <https://www.gov.uk>, 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au>,  <http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk>, 
<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>, <http://www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au>, 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk>, <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz>, and 
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au>. 
19
 Glanville Williams, Learning the Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) 206-7. 
20
 D Ezzy, Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation (Allen and Unwin, 2002) 5. See, positivist legal 
theory advanced by HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2012, Oxford University Press). 
5 
A comparative approach provides 'suggestions for future development', 'warnings of 
possible difficulties', and critical exposition of the national system.21 Despite the diffi-
culties attendant to policy transfer, considered further below, the experience of other 
jurisdictions allows for advancement of reform solutions based upon tried and tested 
methods.22 NSW, Victoria, Scotland, NZ, and the US have attempted to address prob-
lems inherent within mental condition defences. As part of the Commonwealth (barring 
the US, considered below), these jurisdictions provide a useful point for comparison.  
Of the six Australian states, the law in NSW, Victoria, and South Australia remains 
common-law based, rendering them apt for comparison with E&W.23 The focus is on 
the law in NSW and Victoria where significant reform to the partial defences has taken 
place. South Australia recently joined the provocation debate.24 The Criminal Law Con-
solidation Act (Amendment) Bill 2013 designed to prevent same-sex advancements 
from founding a basis for the defence was rejected in 2014, but reintroduced last year 
post the controversial Lindsay25 case, where the High Court ruled the defence should be 
left to the jury where D killed in response to an unwanted homosexual advance. Given 
South Australia’s recent entry into the debate, limited reference is made to the state.26  
Scotland reviewed the defences of diminished responsibility, provocation and insanity 
at the time that the partial defences were reviewed in E&W. Diminished responsibility 
21
 Geoffrey W ilson, 'Comparat ive Legal Scholarship' in  Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh Universi-
ty Press, 2010) 89. See, R Sacco, Legal Formats: A Dynamic Approach to Comparat ive Law (1991) 39 
American Journal of Comparative Law 1.   
22
 ‘The method of comparat ive law can provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal sci-
ence devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world can offer a greater va-
riety of solutions than could be thought up in a lifet ime by even the most imaginative  ju rist who has cor-
ralled in his own  system’; K Zweigert and H Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011) 15. 
23
 The law in Queensland, Tasmania, and Western Australia has been codified. There are also ten Austral-
ian territories  outside the borders of the states.. Two main land territories (the Australian Capital Territory  
(ACT), and, the Northern Territory (NT))) and  one offshore territory ( Norfolk Island) have been provid-
ed limited rights of self-government by federal government. Given the population of the ACT and the NT, 
they are often treated as though they are independent states. Nevertheless, they have been excluded from 
evaluation because they are not governed by Commonwealth law. The other territories  are governed by 
the Commonwealth law, but are significantly s maller in size to the states, and, as such, the states identi-
fied  remain the focal point of the research. For further information see: australia.gov.au:< 
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-government/how-government-works/state-and-territory-government.> 
accessed 22 March 2016. 
24
 Fitz-Gibbon (n 6). 
25
 [2015] HCA 16 (6 May 2015). 
26
 The position in South Australia will form the basis of a future publication. 
6 
originated in Scotland, before adoption in England.27 In Scotland, provocation may be 
based upon a violent act or sexual infidelity.28 The difference between the Scottish posi-
tion and English law where sexual infidelity is excluded as a qualifying trigger allows 
for an assessment of the efficacy of automatic exclusion.29 During this period of review, 
NZ elected to abolish provocation, and is now assessing whether to reintroduce a partial 
defence.30 The abolition of the defence shortly after the introduction of the loss of con-
trol defence allows for an assessment of the ramifications of abolition, given the E&W 
Law Commission identified that support for the partial defences would be reduced 
should the mandatory life sentence be repudiated.31  
The US is not part of the Commonwealth, but remains an apt comparator due to its 
common-law basis.32 Rather than codification of the law as has occurred in many conti-
nental jurisdictions, the 'Anglo-American Legal Family' evolved through a mutual inter-
est in precedents and case law.33 Each State represents an independent authority, result-
ing in several common-law provocation variants. A caveat applies in that consideration 
is given to the extreme mental and emotional disturbance defence (‘EMED’) operating 
in MPC Reform States.34 The E&W Law Commission considered the MPC ‘provoca-
tion equivalent’ as a reform option.35 Assessment of the partial defences rightly includes 
this comparator. Comparative analysis divides the US approach into ‘Traditional Re-
form States’ and ‘MPC Reform States’.  
The predominant focus of comparison is on common-law rather than civil law systems 
(excepting the hybrid system in Scotland and the MPC EMED defence). The reason for 
this approach is two-fold: as the research has progressed, relevant Law Commissions 
27
 James Chalmers, ‘Part ial Defences to Murder in Scotland’ in Loss of Control and Diminished Respon-




 See, Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2. See also, (v). 
30
 See, Crimes Provocation Amendment Act 2009 No 64 s4 (7 December 2009) (NZ). Abolition of the 
partial defence meant that any de facto fo rm of diminished responsibility that existed was also abolished; 
Warren Brookbanks, ‘Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand’ in Loss of Control and Diminished 
Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) Chap-
ter 14.  
31
 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, 2004) paras 5.12-5.14. A lthough cf. 
paras 1.7-1.9 in relation to the provocation defence. 
32
 See generally, Paul H Robinson, ‘Murder, Mitigation in the Fifty Two American Jurisdictions: A Case 
Study in Doctrinal Interrelation Analysis’ (2014) 47 Texas Tech Law Review 19. 
33
 Zweigert and Kotz (n 22) 181. 
34
 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1981) §210.3 (1) (b). 
35
 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 31). 
7 
have utilised these jurisdictions as comparators, providing critical observations on the 
law in E&W; and, a common-law focus renders it possible to consider more jurisdic-
tions. A comparison between civil and common-law requires a different approach to 
materials, methodologies, and organisational/procedural issues.36 Civil law systems rely 
on codes and legislation, necessitating an assessment of treatises and commentaries in 
preference to case law. 37 Absent of the rule of precedent and stare decisis, judicial deci-
sions are not the binding authority they represent in common-law.38 The judge in civil 
cases has greater discretion than a common-law judge who is bound by common-law 
authority.39  
The demarcation between black- letter doctrinal analysis and socio- legal study is not al-
ways an obvious one.40 Comparative research is ‘rightly affected by non- legal factors’,41 
such as, operational contexts.42 A systematic approach is required to identify political, 
cultural and social factors impacting legal developments.43 The selected jurisdictions 
categorise homicide in different ways; some have no mandatory life sentence, allowing 
for sentencing discretion (although sentencing presumptions may impact on that discre-
tion);44 others have abolished partial defences.45 In terms of relevant political, cultural 
and social factors, an in-depth analysis of individual responses to public consultations 
published through Parliamentary and Law Commission websites was undertaken.46Ac-
cessing newspaper articles, and discussions with relevant contacts supplemented this 
36
 Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common-law: Some Points of Comparison’ (1966-7) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 15 (3), 419-435. 
37






 A feminist legal approach is outside the parameters of this particular collection. The research does in-
clude some gender issues, particularly  in  the context  of family vio lence, but the focus is not limited to  
women who kill their abusers. Primary v ictims are identified as a vulnerab le category of offender, and the 
term is applicable  to both sexes. The study is broader than the focus adopted in feminist legal research 
with its emphasis on how existing legal concepts have the potential to disadvantage women. This study 
explores the extent to which the law relat ing to mental condition defences has the potential to disad-
vantage vulnerable offenders. See, Howe (n 15). 
41
 Wilson (n 21) 93. 
42
 Zweigert and Kotz (n 22). 
43
 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (2011, Hart Publishing) 37. Discussions with 
national and international experts have assisted the research, providing access to material in draft form or 
in working papers, in addit ion to provid ing clarificat ion on issues. This dialogue resulted in collaborative  
mental condition defences projects, several forming the basis of these publications. As a Ross Parson’s 
Visit ing Fellow, the author was able to liaise with personal contacts, and access materials available  via  
the University of Sydney library.  
44
 NZ Law Com IP 39, 2015 (n 11) 117. 
45
 New Zealand and Victoria have abolished all general partial defences; see Parts Three and Four. 
46
 See, generally, M Van Hoecke, Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind Of Discipline (Hart 
Publishing, 2011).   
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understanding. It is also essential to consider aspects of psychology and psychiatry to 
appreciate how medical conditions ‘fit’ the legislation. This interdisciplinary approach 
to researching mental condition defences is vital to advance workable reform options. 
The research is ultimately reform-focused; by considering divergent approaches to simi-
lar problems, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of diverse legal frameworks in re-
sponding to vulnerable offenders. This methodology contributes to understanding of the 
law within E&W, and assists in identifying avenues for future reform.47   
Literature review 
The publications draw on a number of different sources, as referenced and cited 
throughout the publications. Official governmental reports48, parliamentary debates49, 
and Law Commission reports50 across the jurisdictions identified have been utilised ex-
tensively. The author also read a number of submissions to Committee,51 Governmental 
and Law Commission consultations52, and hansard debates, that were not included in 
final reports.53 The original analysis of these responses provides a valuable insight into 
key stakeholder concerns, providing alternative views to the ones supported by the 
Commission and governmental bodies.   
In many cases the stated focus of the relevant Law Commissions,54 government55 and 
other organisations56 is on vulnerable offenders, but that focus often becomes blurred. 
47
 Wilson (n 21) 92. 
48
 See, for example, Min istry of Justice Consultation Paper, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Pro-
posals for reform o f the law (MoJ CP, 19/08, 2008); NSW Legislative Council, Select Committee on the 
Partial Defence of Provocation (NSW LC, 2013); Victorian Department of Justice Consultation Paper, 
Proposals for Legislative Reform (VDoJ CP, 2013). 
49
 See, for example, House of Commons, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 4 March 2009 (HC Deb 4
March 2009) (E&W); and Legislative Council, Hansard Parliamentary Debates: Crimes Amendment 
(Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second reading 7 August 2014 (LC Debates 2014) (Vic). 
50
 Law Commission Consultation Paper, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com CP, No  173, 2003); Law 
Com DP, 2013 (n 7); Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 306, 
2006); Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 31); and, Law Commission, Unfitness to Plead (Law Com, 2010-2016) 
available: <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/unfitness -to-plead/> accessed 28 January 2016. 
51
 See, for example, Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, ‘Ending an excuse for murder: Rev isiting the part ial 
defence of provocation in NSW’ (2013). 
52
 See, for example, Helen Gibbon, Alex Steel, Julie Stubbs and Courtney Young, ‘Submission to the 
NSW Government on the Exposure Draft Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ (2013); WEL, 
‘The Exposure Draft Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ (2013). 
53
 Leg islative Assembly, Hansard Parliamentary Debates: Crimes Amendment (Abolit ion of Defensive 
Homicide) Bill 2014, second reading 3 September 2014 (LA Debates 2014) (Vic). 
54
 See, for example, NZ Law Com IP 39, 2015 (n 11). 
55
 In the context o f householder cases, see, Chris Grayling, ‘A Tory government would seek to protect the 
rights of the victim’ Telegraph 19 December 2009. See also, Collins [2016] EWHC 33. 
56
 Family Violence Death Review Committee, Fourth Annual Report (FVDRC, 2014). 
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For example, the NSW Parliament retained the controversial loss of self-control re-
quirement and introduced a clause mandating the victim’s conduct amount to a serious 
indictable offence before extreme provocation could be raised, 57 despite the NSW Se-
lect Committee’s (the ‘Committee’) observation that loss of self-control disadvantages 
primary victims.58 The NZ Law Commission’s recent Issues Paper59, which is limited to 
primary victims who commit homicide, to the exclusion of other vulnerable offenders in 
analogous situations, but for the familial link, provides another example.60 This work is 
not limited by such terms of reference, and the focus is on optimal reform avenues.  
The publications complement61 work published during the course of this research, for 
example, ‘Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System; Perspectives 
from Law and Medicine’;62 ‘General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Com-
parative Perspectives’; 63  ‘Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, 
Comparative and International Perspectives’;64 ‘Homicide law reform, gender and the 
provocation defence: A comparative perspective’;65 ‘Mental Disorder and the Criminal 
Justice System’66; and, ‘Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in the Criminal Law’.67  
As indicated within the publications, other articles68 and book chapters69 focusing upon 
mental condition defences have informed this study.  
The author also relies on case law, 70  and commentaries. 71  Commentaries published 
57
 Considered in  (vii). Section 23 Crimes Act 1900, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) 
Act 2014 (NSW). 
58
 Considered in (v)-(ix). NSWLC, 2013 (n 48).  
59
 NZ Law Com IP 39, 2015 (n 11). 
60
 Considered in Appendix F. 
61
 The work is also included within key edited collections. 
62
 Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine (n 
1). 
63
 General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (n 1). 
64
 Loss o f Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2011). 
65
 Fitz-Gibbon (n 6). 
66
 (2014) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(2). 
67
 Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
68
 See, for example, Graeme Coss, ‘The Defence of Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ 
[2006] Current Issues in Criminal Justice 18(1) 51;  
69
 Brookbanks (n 30). 
70
 For example, Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157; Clinton (n 29); Dowds [2012] EW CA Crim 281; 
Golds [2014] EW CA Crim 748; Gurpinar and Kojo-Smith [2015] EWCA Crim 178; Majewski [1977] 
AC 443; O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; Rihia [2012] NZHC 6720; Wihongi [2012] 1 NZLR 755. 
71
 See, for example, Barry Mitchell and Ronnie Mackay, ‘The Golds standard of substantial impairment’ 
(2015) Archbold Review, 4, 7-9 (note); Rudi Fortson, ‘R v  Brennan (Michael James): manslaughter-
dimin ished responsibility’ [2015] Criminal Law Review 4, 290-294 (note); Jonathan Rogers, ‘The 
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shortly after cases are decided are valuable in providing an important analysis of the law 
and related context; their currency means they can often be relied upon before articles 
are published, but they are limited in detail compared to articles because they are de-
signed to provide an update.  
Structure 
There are nine publications. Labelled (i)-(ix), the publications are divided between four 
key themes, each addressing an essential aim of the study. These contributions form a 
coherent whole, connected by the overarching research question: ‘to what extent do 
mental condition defences adequately accommodate the circumstances of vulnerable 
offenders within the criminal justice system?’72 The objective is to provide a critical ex-
position of the problems vulnerable offenders face in claiming mental condition defenc-
es, before presenting future reform options predicated upon the experiences of the iden-
tified jurisdictions; to meet this overarching objective several secondary aims/objectives 
are outlined. 
Parts One-Two consider the inter-relationship between intoxication and mental condi-
tion defences, focusing upon offenders vulnerable due to a recognised medical condi-
tion. Part One aims to investigate whether partial defences are capable of accommodat-
ing offenders with co-morbidity; the co-existence of mental illness and substance abuse. 
The objective is to provide an in-depth review of the application of partial defences to 
these offenders across key jurisdictions. A shift in focus from mental condition defence 
exclusion towards ensuring these defences are available is required. Amendments that 
would legislatively exclude voluntary intoxication from the parameters of the partial 
defences, prevent unnecessary litigation, and assist in dealing with offenders with co-
morbidity are advanced. Predictions made regarding potential litigation were borne out 
in practice, and the optimal solutions for reform presented remain viable and beneficial 
in terms of future development. The publications include: (i) ’Anglo-American Perspec-
tives on Partial Defences: Something Old, Something Borrowed, and Something 
amended diminished responsibility plea’ (2015) Cambridge Law Journal 74(2), 201-205 (note); and, 
Tony Storey, ‘Dimin ished responsibility: jury verdicts and ‘uncontradicted’ psychiatric evidence’ (2015) 
Journal of Criminal Law 79(1) 15-19 (note). 
72
 To this end, there are cross-references between the articles/chapters where appropriate. 
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New’;73  and, (ii) ’Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility? A 
Comparative Analysis’.74  
Part Two aims to examine the availability of insanity and automatism to the same cate-
gory of offender, with increased emphasis on the role of prior fault in precluding mental 
condition defences.75 The objective is to critically analyse the interaction between prior 
fault doctrine and the insanity and automatism defences, making reference to key juris-
dictions. Excluding the availability of defences based upon the offender’s prior fault in 
becoming intoxicated renders it difficult to respond to offenders with co-morbidity. A 
model predicated on potentiate liability and applying dépecage standardisations to indi-
viduated scenarios involving the intoxicated offender are advanced. A new offence of 
dangerous intoxication is proposed, in addition to recommendations, which would 
amend the current diminished responsibility defence. Revisions are suggested in relation 
to the Law Commission’s proposals as they apply to medication non-compliance, in the 
context of the advanced ‘recognised medical condition’ defence.76 The publications in-
clude: (iii) 'Of Blurred Boundaries and Prior Fault: Insanity, Automatism and Intoxica-
tion’;77 and, (iv) ‘Potentiate Liability and Prevening Fault Attribution; The Intoxicated 
"Offender" and Anglo-American Dépecage Standardisations’.78  
Parts Three-Four focus upon offenders vulnerable due to family violence and/or physi-
cal attack. Part Three aims to scrutinise the availability of loss of control79 to primary 
victims80 who kill. The objective is to provide a detailed assessment of the application 
of the loss of control, provocation, extreme provocation, and (the former) defensive 
homicide defences as they apply to primary victims across key jurisdictions. Two re-
form models operate across these jurisdictions; the exclusionary and positive-
restriction-based reform models. The current approach, which focuses upon re-
striction/exclusion at the expense of the vulnerable offender, is criticised and rejected. 
73
 Loss o f Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives 
(n 64) 183-207. 
74
 (2012) Journal of Criminal Law 76(1), 71-98. 
75
 See, generally, Thom Brooks (eds) Alcohol and Public Policy (Routledge, 2015). 
76
 Law Com DP, 2013 (n 7). 
77
 General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (n 1) 365-405. 
78
 (2014) The John Marshall Law Review 47(1) 57-113. 
79
 And equivalent provisions across selected jurisdictions. 
80
 The Family Violence Death Review Committee defines the primary victim as an individual experienc-
ing ‘ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour from their intimate partner’; (n 56). 
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An interim reform measure, which would introduce a ‘social framework’ evidence pro-
vision to each jurisdiction, pending wholesale reform is advanced. The provision is tai-
lored to meet the needs of the respective jurisdictions considered, and the amendments 
are designed to complement future reform to the partial defences. The publications in-
clude: (v) ‘Sexual Infidelity Killings: Contemporary Standardisations and Comparative 
Stereotypes’; 81 (vi) ’Political rhetoric or principled reform of loss of control? Anglo-
Australian perspectives on the exclusionary conduct model’; 82  and, (vii) ‘Anglo-
Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction Model and Abolition of the Provo-
cation Defence’.83 
Part Four broadens the analysis to assess the availability of self-defence to the primary 
victim, addressing difficulties in raising self-defence and loss of control simultaneously. 
The objective is to deliver a detailed exposition of the availability of self-defence, and 
the legitimacy of reverting to a partial defence where self-defence fails. Two bespoke 
partial defences, designed to accommodate the circumstances of the primary victim, are 
advanced. The first is a self-preservation defence, and the second is a fear of serious vi-
olence defence containing several threshold filter mechanisms designed to preclude the 
availability of the partial defences in unmeritorious cases. The recommendations are 
complemented by the use of social framework evidence (considered in Part Three), and 
the introduction of an interlocutory appeal procedure designed to prevent unnecessary 
litigation. The latter defence has been drafted and is being considered by the NZ Law 
Commission.84 The publications include: (viii) 'Battered women, startled householders 
and psychological self-defence: Anglo-Australian Perspectives';85 and, (ix) ‘“His home 
is his castle. And mine is a cage”: A New Partial Defence for Primary Victims Who 
Kill’.86  
81
 Loss o f Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives 
(n 64) 183-206. 
82
 Journal of Criminal Law (2013) 77 (6), 512- 542. 
83
 Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine (n 
1) 365-405.
84
NZ Law Com IP 39, 2015 (n 11).
85
(2013) Journal of Criminal Law 77(5), 433-457.
86
(2015) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2) 151-77.
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Part One: Intoxication, Alcohol Dependence Syndrome and
Partial Defences to Murder
(i) ‘Anglo-American Perspectives on Partial Defences: Something Old, Something Bor-
rowed, and Something New’87 
(ii) ‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility? A Comparative 
Analysis’88 
Introduction 
Part One of this collection focuses upon vulnerable offenders who raise the spectre of 
co-morbidity. Determining the legal culpability of this category of offender has always 
proved difficult for the legislature and the courts. From a public policy perspective, the 
law stipulates that the voluntarily intoxicated offender ought not to be able to escape 
criminal liability on grounds of intoxication. Voluntary induced intoxication is never a 
defence, save in the context of specific intent offences and as a denial of the requisite 
mens rea at the time of the criminal act.89 As Brooks identifies: ‘the criminal law is a 
crude instrument making few exceptions’90 in this context. The position becomes com-
plicated where the offender suffers from a mental condition in addition to being volun-
tarily intoxicated at the time of the fatal act. In cases where the mental disorder is linked 
to the alcohol consumption, this ostensible delineation between inculpatory and excul-
patory conduct becomes blurred.91  
Set at a time when the partial defences to murder had recently been altered by the Coro-
ners and Justice Act 2009 (‘CAJA 2009’), the publications in this part of the collection 
chart the approach that was adopted in relation to this discrete category of offender pre-
2010, before providing guidance to interpreting the (then) new provisions. In (i), the 
reader is introduced to the partial defences to murder operating in E&W; loss of control, 
87
 Loss o f Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives 
(n 64) 183-207. 
88
  (n 74) 71-98. 
89
 A point which is considered in detail in Part  Two. See, Majewski (n 70). See, generally, Andrew Sime-
ster, ‘Intoxication is never a defence’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 3. 
90
 Brooks, ‘Alcohol, Risks and Public Policy’ (n 75). 
91
 For d iscussion see Nicola Wake, ‘Alcohol dependence syndrome and dimin ished responsibility’ (2009) 
Journal of Criminal Law 73(1), 17-21 (note). Available at Appendix B. 
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and diminished responsibility. The key issues addressed relate to how the law does and 
should approach the intoxicated and mentally abnormal killer in the context of a murder 
charge. The publication explores the type of 'recognised medical condition' required to 
form a valid basis for a diminished responsibility plea, in addition to providing an as-
sessment of the extent to which voluntary intoxication and/or mental abnormality might  
be attributed to the characterisation of a societal expectation of reasonable conduct for 
the loss of control defence. Reforms that would preclude the use of voluntary intoxica-
tion under these defences are advanced. The potential problems predicted in these pub-
lications were borne out in case law, and the posited solutions remain viable and sup-
ported options for future reform.92 
Publication (ii) explores the implications of the use of the ICD-10 and DSM in inter-
preting the 'recognised medical condition' requirement of the diminished responsibility 
defence, focusing on the exclusion of 'acute intoxication'. Fortson accurately identified 
it 'cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion the court will not exclude conditions that 
are merely temporary or transient'.93 In terms of optimal reform, litigation94 could have 
been averted by the exclusion of acute intoxication through the legislation. This reform 
recommendation is modelled upon the law in Scotland and NSW where voluntary acute 
intoxication is explicitly and tacitly excluded from the legislation within these jurisdic-
tions, respectively.95 The focus should be on ensuring the partial defence remains avail-
able to the vulnerable offender, whilst precluding it to those seeking to use it as an ex-
cuse when they commit murder following voluntary intoxication. 
The analyses within both publications is set against an in-depth review of the US 
EMED defence, and the position in NZ where partial defences have been abolished. Ex-
perts recommended an EMED-based merged diminished responsibility and loss of con-
92
 Considered in detail in the conclusion to this part. This collection focuses on voluntary intoxication. 
For a innovative approach to reforming the law on involuntary intoxication see: Thom Brooks, 
‘Involuntary intoxication: a new six-step procedure’ (2015) Journal of Criminal Law 79(2), 138-146. 
93
 Rudi Fortson, ‘The Modern Partial Defence of Diminished Responsibility’ in Alan Reed and Michael 
Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility; Domestic, Comparative and Interna-
tional Perspectives’ (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) 29. 
94
 See Asmelash (70) and Dowds (70). 
95
 Section 51(3)B of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (as inserted by the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, section 168(3): ‘a person...under the influence of alcohol drugs or any 
other substance at the time of the [killing] does not in itself-(a) constitute an abnormality of mind for the 
purposes of [the defence], or (b) prevent such abnormality of mind being established'. 
15 
trol provision.96 The EMED defence was never intended to incorporate diminished re-
sponsibility, and this interpretation has resulted in rejection of the model in the majority 
of US jurisdictions, with negative ramifications for vulnerable offenders.97 In NZ, the 
abolition of all general partial defences means there is a risk this vulnerable category of 
offender will be charged with murder, and, if convicted, serve a longer sentence.98 The 
critique of the law in these jurisdictions demonstrates a careful balance must be 
achieved to ensure defences are broad enough to capture the circumstances of vulnera-
ble offenders, but narrow enough to exclude unmeritorious claims. 
96
 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1981) §210.3 (1) (b). 
97
 Chalmers (n 27) 167-182. For discussion on the Scottish approach to diminished responsibility see, 
Robert S Sh iels, ‘The uncertain medical origins of dimin ished responsibility’ (2014) Journal of Criminal 
Law 78(6), 467-476. 
98
 See, for example, Rihia (n 70); Wihongi (n 70). For discussion, see (ix). 
Publication (i) 
‘Anglo-American Perspectives on Partial Defences: Something Old, Something Bor-
rowed, and Something New’ in Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domes-





























(ii) ‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility? A Comparative 
Analysis’ (2012) Journal of Criminal Law 76(1), 71-98. 
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Abstract This article provides an analysis of the extent to which acute intoxication may or may not
satisfy the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement under s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, as
amended by s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. It is argued that jurisprudential authorities
clarifying the parameters of the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement are urgently needed. In
the interim period the importation of the novel terminology remains open to conjecture. The author
argues that ‘acute intoxication’ potentially satisfies the revised plea and utilises the position adopted
in Scotland, New South Wales and New Zealand to demonstrate this proposition. The latter
jurisdiction has never had a formal diminished responsibility plea, although it has been identified that
evidence of a defendant's mental abnormality was often used to reduce a murder conviction to one of
voluntary manslaughter via the legal conduit of provocation. Following the demise of the provocation
defence, however, issues pertaining to provocative conduct and/or a defendant's mental abnormality
fall to be considered by the sentencing judge, but only in restricted circumstances. The recent
implementation of a tripartite sentencing regime in New Zealand means that the alcohol-dependent
and/or provoked defendant who kills will not have such mitigation considered if they have previously
committed a qualifying offence under the scheme. The position in New Zealand is set against the
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 2010-11 which proposes a ‘two-strike’
system for a variety of offences including voluntary manslaughter. It is submitted that this type of
scheme has potentially significant consequences for the alcohol-dependent defendant who may not
have had appropriate treatment for his mental abnormality following a first conviction.
Keywords Acute intoxication; Alcohol; Diminished responsibility; Manslaughter; Murder
*J. Crim. L. 72 The partial defence of diminished responsibility2 was radically altered by s. 52 of the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009,3 and fundamental reformulations became effective on 4 October
2010.4 The new provision was designed to align the mitigating doctrine with ‘developments in
diagnostic practice’.5 To raise the revised plea successfully, the defendant must now prove, on the
balance of probabilities,6 that at the time of the killing he was suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental
functioning’ arising from a ‘recognised medical condition’.7 This definitional change ‘may have more
far-reaching consequences than initially anticipated’.8 The Royal College of Psychiatrists considered
that the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement would ‘encourage reference within expert
evidence to diagnosis in terms of one or two of the accepted internationally classificatory systems of
mental disorders (WHO ICD10 and AMA DSM)’.9 Both the WHO ICD10 and AMA DSM identify
several different mental and behavioural disorders arising from psychoactive substance *J. Crim. L.
73 use, including ‘acute intoxication’.10 If the court approaches the ‘recognised medical condition’
requirement in line with the Royal College of Psychiatrists' interpretation, it would seem that extreme
drunkenness could potentially satisfy the newly ordered partial defence.11 This is clearly outwith the
scope of traditional intoxication doctrine per se which establishes that voluntary intoxication does not
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negate the defendant's criminal liability, save in the limited context of specific intent offences and
operatively as a denial of the requisite mens rea at the time of the relevant act.12 It has been identified
that the ‘[l]aw and psychiatry are based on opposing paradigms, they cannot work together. Both
claim to have a monopoly on understanding human behaviour but, paradoxically, appear to approach
it from two different standpoints’.13 If acute intoxication satisfies the concessionary defence, this
potentially undermines established criminal law principles on voluntary intoxication. New
jurisprudential authorities embracing this reformatory defence are yet to reach English appellate
courts. In the interim period the importation of the novel terminology remains open to conjecture.
This article considers the extent to which transient states of acute intoxication may or may not satisfy
the requirements of the newly worded partial defence. It reviews the position adopted under the
original s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 in cases involving the voluntarily intoxicated and mentally
abnormal defendant and provides a fresh reappraisal in light of recent amendments introduced by s.
52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This analysis is supplemented by an in-depth consideration
of the applicability of the diminished responsibility defence in Scotland, New South Wales and New
Zealand. The approach adopted in these jurisdictions offers an invaluable insight into the potential
ambit of the revised plea and more specifically the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement.
This comparative analysis commences with a review of Scotland's recently codified diminished
responsibility defence. The Scottish Law Commission noted that the mitigating doctrine may be read
to include states of extreme drunkenness, since ‘an intoxicated person is at the *J. Crim. L. 74
material time suffering from an abnormal state of mind’.14 Taking this suggestion into account, the
Scottish executive deemed it appropriate to exclude intoxication per se from satisfying the partial
defence, in order to preserve traditional intoxication doctrine.15 The author considers the extent to
which ‘acute intoxication’ may satisfy the requirements of the revised s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957
(which remains silent on the issue of voluntary intoxication) in light of the Scottish Law Commission's
comments and Scotland's explicit exclusionary clause.
A consideration of the New South Wales position on ‘acute intoxication’ and its concessionary
defence is also provided. Unlike the revised s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, states of extreme
drunkenness are tacitly excluded from the New South Wales mitigation via the importation of an
‘underlying condition’ requirement, which mandates that at the time of the fatal act the defendant must
have been suffering from ‘a pre-existing mental or physiological condition other than of a transitory
kind’.16 The corollary is that in the absence of an explicit or implied exclusionary clause pertaining to
voluntary intoxication, states of acute intoxication could potentially satisfy the ‘recognised medical
condition’ requirement in England and Wales. In practical terms, whether acute intoxication satisfies
the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement is likely to be determined by which of two or more
medical experts are convincing before the jury. The testimony provided by medical experts for the
defence and the Crown in the English courts is likely to direct attention to the severity of the
defendant's condition17 and the stage of that disorder.18 The concessionary defence will remain ‘in the
hands of expert witnesses, whose sympathies understandably rest with defendants struggling with
various mental states and the spectre of the mandatory life sentence’.19 The ‘ultimate question’,
therefore, becomes a very onerous task for jurors who are required to ‘base their decision on opinion
which usually involves choosing between two differing views’.20 Judge LJ has suggested that ‘… if the
outcome of the trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement *J. Crim. L.
75 between distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe, to
proceed’.21
The author also explores New Zealand's formal rejection of the diminished responsibility defence.
Although an analysis of jurisprudential authorities reveal that the defence had been successfully
argued under the guise of loss of self-control, the recent demise of the provocation defence appears
to have closed the door to both the provoked and mentally abnormal defendant.22 The effect is to
remove issues of provocative conduct and/or mental abnormality from the trial to the sentencing
process. The trial judge is not in a position to substitute a murder conviction for one of manslaughter
and as such there is a distinct possibility that the provoked and/or mentally abnormal defendant will
be labelled a murderer. In addition, the recent enactment of the Sentencing and Parole Act 2010,
dubbed ‘one of the harshest criminal laws ever enacted’, means that evidence of provocation and/or
mental abnormality will only be relevant where it is the defendant's first serious offence.23 Under the
new regime, there is a real concern that the court will not be in a position to consider the defendant's
mental abnormality at all.
Finally, the author assesses the potential impact of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Bill 2010-11 on the alcohol-dependent defendant. The Bill proposes a ‘two-strike’ regime
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where a period of life imprisonment will be imposed where a defendant has committed two serious
offences. The scheme may apply to those suffering from mental disorders including alcohol and drug
dependence syndrome. It has been identified that more treatment needs to be provided to prisoners
suffering from substance-use disorders. The current provision of treatment is often ineffective, and
there is a high rate of reoffending amongst those suffering from addiction. The ‘two-strike’ regime
potentially leaves the alcohol and/or narcotic-dependent defendant in a more vulnerable position than
an offender who does not suffer any form of mental abnormality. Following an alcohol-dependent's
first serious offence under the regime, it is likely that he will be imprisoned with offenders who do not
suffer any form of abnormality. There is a real prospect that the alcoholic will not receive an
appropriate level of treatment and will be more likely to reoffend upon release. If the defendant's
second offence is regarded as serious, a sentence of life *J. Crim. L. 76 imprisonment may be
imposed. Much can be learned from the position in New Zealand which is demonstrative of the
problems associated with the imposition of arbitrary sentencing regimes.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009
The English Parliament made significant amendments to s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 by s. 52 of the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009.24 To raise the revised defence successfully, the defendant must now
be shown to have been suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’, a term preferred in
English law to ‘abnormality of mind’.25 As noted, this must have arisen from a ‘recognised medical
condition’.26 The ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement is designed to ‘encourage reference in
expert evidence’ to the World Health Organisation ICD-10.27 The classificatory system recognises
‘acute intoxication’ and ‘harmful use’ as disorders of clinical significance.28 The former is defined as ‘a
condition that follows administration of psychoactive substances resulting in disturbances in level of
consciousness, cognition, affect or behaviour, or other psycho-physiological functions and
responses’.29 The latter is defined as ‘a pattern of psychoactive substance use that is causing
damage to health, for example, episodes of depressive disorder secondary to heavy consumption of
alcohol’.30 The English diminished responsibility defence ‘remains silent as to levels of gradation of
voluntary intoxication that may or may not constitute a “mental abnormality”’ when a defendant kills
while under the influence of alcohol or narcotics'.31 It is therefore, likely that medical experts will be
required to provide evidence as to whether the defendant suffers from a disorder of clinical
significance which is capable of satisfying the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement.
The jury will be required to determine whether the ‘recognised medical condition’ substantially impairs
the defendant's ability to: understand the nature of the defendant's conduct; form a rational *J. Crim.
L. 77 judgement; or exercise self-control.32 The term ‘substantial impairment’ is one of few remnants
of the original diminished responsibility plea. In this regard, it would seem that the court will continue
to follow the ruling adumbrated in R v Ramchurn, 33 in which the Court of Appeal reflected that
‘substantially impaired’ within s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 meant something more than trivial, but
less than total.34 Presumably alcohol-related disorders will affect the defendant's level of self-control,
although there may be cases which affect the defendant's ability to form a rational judgement.35
Finally, fact-finders in the English court will be required to assess whether the mental abnormality
provides an explanation for the killing.36 The provision asserts that an explanation will be provided if ‘it
causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing the person to carry out that conduct’.37 This
requirement has been heavily criticised and Chalmers notes that ‘it is fortunate that it is not found in
the Scottish legislation’.38 It has been suggested that the causal element is likely ‘to direct attention to
the interaction of the medical condition with any other causal factor, such as alcohol consumption not
stemming from the condition itself’.39 For example, the causative effect of alcohol voluntarily
consumed will not prevent the defendant's alcohol dependence syndrome from substantially impairing
his mental capacity providing the disorder is a significant contributory factor in the killing. The
distinction between a defendant's voluntarily intoxicated state and medical condition, however, may
become irrelevant if acute intoxication is capable of satisfying the ‘recognised medical condition’
requirement under the reformed defence. Further interpretive guidance deciding the parameters of
the ‘recognised medical condition’ limb in the context of voluntary intoxication is urgently required.
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010
The problem explored above is unlikely to arise in Scotland, where the Scottish Parliament recently
codified the diminished responsibility defence under s. 168 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing
(Scotland) Act *J. Crim. L. 78 2010.40 The provision makes only minor modifications to the common
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law formulation as propounded in Galbraith v HM Advocate, 41 and specifically prevents acute
intoxication per se from satisfying the requirements of the partial defence.42 The Galbraith court had
concluded that the appropriate test for diminished responsibility was whether ‘at the relevant time, the
accused was suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired the ability of the
accused, as compared with a normal person, to determine or control his acts’.43 The similarity across
the Galbraith formulation and the original version of the English diminished responsibility plea is
striking.44 Under s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 the defendant was also required to prove an
‘abnormality of mind’.45 This requirement was slightly more restricted than its Scottish counterpart
since the ‘abnormality of mind’ must have arisen ‘from a condition of arrested or retarded
development of mind or any inherent causes’ or alternatively, it must have been ‘induced by disease
or injury’; the jury would be required to determine whether the abnormality of mind ‘substantially
impaired’ the defendant's ‘mental responsibility’ for the killing.46 The explicit invocation of the ‘normal
person’ as a comparator in Galbraith was something that had been held to be implicit in s. 2 of the
Homicide Act 1957 from its inception.47
The most significant difference between the formulations elucidated above was that under the
Scottish approach any abnormality arising from voluntary intoxication, or psychopathic personality
disorder was explicitly precluded from satisfying the diminished responsibility plea.48 The Court in
Brennan v HM Advocate 49 had ruled that:
*J. Crim. L. 79 a person who voluntarily and deliberately consumes known intoxicants, including
drink or drugs, of whatever quantity, for their intoxicating effects, whether these effects are fully
foreseen or not, cannot rely on the resulting intoxication as the foundation of a special defence of …
diminished responsibility.50
The Scottish Law Commission was concerned, however, that this exclusion might be misinterpreted
and felt that the principle required further clarification by statute.51 The Commission considered the
following four situations. The first is where the defendant kills while suffering from alcohol or drug
dependence.52 These types of dependence syndrome are capable of giving rise to conditions which
constitute diminished responsibility. The defendant would not necessarily be intoxicated at the time of
the killing and, as such, the dictum in Brennan would not apply.53
The second scenario arises ‘where at the time of the killing the accused suffered from a mental
abnormality within the scope of the plea and at the same time was drunk (in the sense of acute
intoxication)’.54 The Scottish Law Commission considered that the correct approach in such cases is
to direct the jury to consider ‘whether, despite the intoxication, the accused was suffering from an
abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his ability to determine or control his conduct’.55 It is
the abnormality of mind, rather than the intoxication per se, which satisfies the partial defence.
The third circumstance exists where the defendant suffers from alcohol or drug dependence and was
at the time of the killing intoxicated.56 The Scottish Law Commission was of the view that ‘the same
solution should apply in this case as in any other where there is a combination of a qualifying
condition and acute intoxication’.57 In effect, it is the dependence syndrome that is to be taken into
account for the purpose of the concessionary defence.
The final situation arises where the defendant is acutely intoxicated (voluntarily) but does not suffer
from another mental abnormality. It is in this instance that the dichotomy in Brennan is ‘directly
applicable’.58 The Scottish Law Commission considered that an explicit exclusionary clause was
crucial to cover this type of case. The Law Commission conceded that the exclusion might appear
unnecessary since:
… a transient state of intoxication would not fall within the test for diminished responsibility. However,
such an interpretation is not in every sense an obvious one. An intoxicated person is at the time of
intoxication *J. Crim. L. 80 suffering from an abnormal state of mind which does affect his ability to
determine or control his conduct. Accordingly the basis of the exclusion is not the definition of the plea
but the clear policy of the criminal law, as set out in the Brennan decision, that voluntary intoxication
does not elide criminal responsibility.59
In light of the Scottish Law Commission's recommendation the intoxication exclusion stipulated in
Brennan and reaffirmed in Galbraith is specifically maintained in s. 51B(3) of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by s. 168 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010,
which provides:
The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other substance at the time of
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the conduct in question does not of itself--
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of ss. (1), or.
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes.
This provision is designed to prevent the acutely intoxicated defendant from successfully claiming
diminished responsibility, unless that intoxication co-existed with an underlying medical condition.60
The result is that voluntary intoxication (acute intoxication) per se will be insufficient to satisfy the
diminished responsibility defence in Scotland. As such, the Scottish diminished responsibility plea
remains open in restricted circumstances to the voluntarily intoxicated, but alcohol-dependent or
mentally abnormal defendant.
Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997 (NSW)
The divergence in approach between England and Scotland is perhaps surprising given that both the
English Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission61 considered tacitly excluding states of
‘acute intoxication’ via the imposition of an ‘underlying medical condition’ requirement akin to that in
the Australian jurisdictions of New South Wales62 and the Northern Territory.63 In its 2004 Report, the
English Law Commission recommended that, in order to satisfy the concessionary defence, the
defendant must establish an ‘abnormality of mental *J. Crim. L. 81 functioning’ arising from an
‘underlying condition’.64 The impact would have been to exclude transient states of voluntary
intoxication from satisfying the requirements of the partial defence. Although this suggestion was
omitted from its 2006 Report, the English Law Commission remained heavily influenced by the New
South Wales formulation and, as such, the differences between s. 23A of the Crimes Amendment
(Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997 and s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 are minimal.65
The main deviation is that the New South Wales provision requires an ‘abnormality of mind’ arising
from ‘an underlying condition’.66 As such, the New South Wales formulation makes it clear that
although extreme drunkenness will never satisfy the requirements of the concessionary defence, it
will not preclude the availability of diminished responsibility where the defendant suffers from a more
permanent ‘underlying condition’. In stark contrast, the English Law Commission considered that
issues concerning the complex inter-relationship between the partial defence and acute intoxication
could be resolved by appropriate ‘judicial development’.67
Common law developments in England
In a trilogy of cases, prior to the enactment of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, both the House of
Lords and the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to review the concessionary defence in light of
traditional intoxication doctrine. Initial debate concentrated on whether voluntary intoxication should
preclude the partial defence to a mentally abnormal defendant,68 with intoxication per se
correspondingly stigmatised as *J. Crim. L. 82 potentially introducing an inculpatory fault element.69
More recently, deliberations have focused upon whether alcohol dependence syndrome could
independently constitute an abnormality of mind and exist as a bespoke qualifying condition.70 In the
first of the three cases, the House of Lords was required to reconcile and separate coterminous
issues of depression and intoxication. The House of Lords, in R v Dietschmann, considered that the
central focus in such cases should be on the underlying mental abnormality distilled from the
intoxication. Lord Hutton identified that the issue was not whether the defendant would have carried
out the killing in the absence of intoxication, but whether, if he did kill, he killed under diminished
responsibility. Lord Hutton considered the correct analysis to apply in such cases:
Assuming that the defence have established that [D] was suffering from mental abnormality as
described in s 2, the important question is: did the abnormality substantially impair his mental
responsibility for his acts in doing the killing? … Drink cannot be taken into account as something
which contributed to his mental abnormality and any impairment of mental responsibility arising from
that abnormality. But you may take the view that both [D's] mental responsibility and drink played a
part in impairing his mental responsibility for the killing and that he might not have killed had he not
taken drink. If you take that view, then the question for you to decide is this: has D satisfied you that,
despite the drink, his mental abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal
acts, or has he failed to satisfy you of that? If he has satisfied you of that, you will find him not guilty of
murder but you may find him guilty of manslaughter. If he has not satisfied you of that, the defence of
diminished responsibility is not available to him.71
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The ruling identified that a defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol would not preclude the
diminished responsibility defence. Instead, attention should be directed to the defendant's mental
abnormality and if the abnormality was a substantial cause (not the sole cause) of the killing the
concessionary defence would be satisfied. In effect, Lord Hutton directed the jury to ignore the effects
of the alcohol that the defendant had voluntarily consumed. As Simester and Sullivan identified:
[t]he drink does not supervene over the underlying subnormality. That underlying condition remains,
and so does the question whether the condition substantially impaired his responsibility for the killing.
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The ruling in Dietschmann clearly influenced the Scottish Law Commission's Report and it is
anticipated that s. 51(B) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by the Criminal
Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, will be interpreted in line with Lord *J. Crim. L. 83
Hutton's judgment. The combined effect of an underlying mental abnormality, which was not
inextricably linked to alcohol or drugs, and voluntarily induced intoxication had also been considered
in HM Advocate v Liam Thomas McLeod. 73 In McLeod, it was alleged that the defendant, who had
voluntarily inhaled butane gas prior to the killing, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Lord Drummond Young advocated that the diminished responsibility defence would be satisfied if it
was established that the defendant's abnormality of mind (i.e. PTSD) was ‘a substantial cause’ of his
actions. In considering the combined effect of the defendant's intoxication and PTSD, the jury were
directed as follows: if the inhalation of butane gas was the sole substantial cause of the defendant's
actions, the partial defence would fail; if the PTSD was the sole substantial cause, the partial defence
would be satisfied; if both the intoxication and the abnormality of mind contributed to the defendant's
actions, the test was whether the PTSD was a substantial cause of the fatal act. Lord Drummond
Young noted that the defendant's abnormality of mind ‘needn't be the only cause. It needn't even be
the main or predominant cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial cause’.74
Chalmers and Leverick have asserted that the McLeod approach is ‘unnecessarily complex’, noting
that it would be preferable to ask the ‘jury to consider whether--leaving the effects of intoxication out
of account--the underlying condition is, in itself, sufficient to meet the requirements of the plea’.75 The
problems associated with requiring a causative connection between a defendant's mental abnormality
and the killing are well documented. In 2004, the Law Commission recommended that for the purpose
of the diminished responsibility defence a defendant's abnormality must be a ‘significant cause’ of the
killing.76 The rationale for this explicit requirement appears to be that there ought to be ‘some
connection between the condition and the killing in order for the defence to be justified’.77 Criminal law
scholars, together with the Royal College of Psychiatrists, specifically advised against the creation of
‘a situation in which experts might be called on to “demonstrate” causation on a scientific basis’.78
Notwithstanding, the revised defence in England requires that the abnormality ‘causes, or is a
significant contributory factor in causing the’ defendant to kill.
The cases of Dietschmann and McLeod did not explicitly consider the approach the courts should
adopt where the defendant suffers from an alcohol or drug dependence and is intoxicated at the time
of the killing. Casey has suggested that Lord Drummond Young, in McLeod, ‘appeared *J. Crim. L.
84 to imply that a self-induced mental abnormality caused by the taking of drink or drugs would not’
satisfy the diminished responsibility test.79 In an obiter statement, Lord Drummond Young
commented:
… to the extent that PTSD may have caused the accused to get into the habit of butane gas
intoxication, that is not relevant to the defence of diminished responsibility …80
The reference to habitual drug use in the statement appears to relate to dependence syndromes. If
Lord Drummond Young intended to preclude the concessionary defence to the alcohol or
drug-dependent defendant his view represents a significant departure from earlier decisions made in
the Scottish courts.81 The ruling is also at odds with the decision in Dietschmann, which effectively
removed the juridical bar that had prevented some alcohol-dependent defendants from claiming the
partial defence in the English courts.82 Section 51B(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
appears to be more closely in line with the rulings in Dietschmann and Wood rather than the obiter
statement of Lord Drummond Young in McLeod.
The Court of Appeal, in Wood, was required to apply the ratio in Dietschmann to the
alcohol-dependent defendant who killed whilst voluntarily intoxicated. The defendant was a chronic
alcoholic and had killed the victim who allegedly made unwanted homosexual advances. The
defendant had been drinking heavily for 36 hours prior to the fatal act. Medical experts called for the
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defence and the Crown were in unanimity vis-à-vis the nature and level of the defendant's alcohol
dependence syndrome. Although the defendant had not suffered brain damage as a result, he
manifested at least six of the symptoms identified by the ICD-10 criteria for alcohol dependence
syndrome.83 The trial judge, in light of earlier authorities,84 struggled with the concept of an intoxicated
defendant being afforded the partial defence and advocated that the alcohol dependence syndrome
would only be relevant if the defendant suffered brain damage or, alternatively, if every drink
consumed on the day of the killing was truly involuntary.85 This direction *J. Crim. L. 85 was in line
with the earlier, and much-criticised, ruling in Tandy, 86 which had effectively accepted ‘the doctrine of
diminished responsibility as it applies to alcoholism only in terms of black and white rather than
shades of grey: either the defendant was wholly incapable of resisting the impulse to drink or she was
responsible for her actions and should be convicted of murder’.87 The trial judge's directions in both
Wood and Tandy required that the defendant ‘conform to a model of alcoholism that even the most
hardened, alcoholic would find difficult to meet’, and were clearly inconsistent with the House of Lords
ruling in Dietschmann. 88 Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal in Wood considered that the House of
Lords decision in Dietschmann required ‘a reassessment’ of the way in which Tandy had been
applied in the context of alcohol dependence syndrome where observable brain damage had not
occurred.89 No requirement existed for brain damage to have resulted from alcohol dependence
syndrome, but fact-finders could still evaluate whether the extent and nature of the syndrome met the
abnormality of mind threshold. In future cases the court would be required to, ‘focus exclusively on
the effect of alcohol consumed by the defendant as a direct result of his illness or disease and ignore
the effect of any alcohol consumed voluntarily’.90
The revised test received further clarification in Stewart. 91 The Court of Appeal noted that the
excessive consumption of alcohol could reduce murder to manslaughter:
[F]irst, where the effect of the intoxication was so extreme that the prosecution had failed to prove the
necessary intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; And, second, assuming that the necessary
intention was provided notwithstanding the consumption of alcohol, on the basis of diminished
responsibility.92
In determining whether the alcohol dependence syndrome had substantially impaired the defendant's
mental responsibility, the court in Stewart provided an additional list of factors which should be
considered by the jury. These include: (a) the extent and seriousness of the defendant's dependence,
if any, on alcohol; (b) the extent to which his ability to control his drinking or to choose whether to
drink or not, was reduced; (c) whether he was capable of abstinence from alcohol, and, if so; (d) for
how long; and (e) whether he was choosing for some particular reason to drink more than usual.93
The directions ask the jury to apply their common sense in determining whether the defendant's
responsibility for the killing was substantially impaired.94
This series of English cases demonstrates that prior to recent legislative enactments the partial
defence remained available in restricted *J. Crim. L. 86 circumstances to the defendant suffering
from a mental abnormality who was also acutely intoxicated at the time of the fatal act. It is expected
that the rulings in Dietschmann, Wood and Stewart will remain authoritative under the revised s. 2 of
the Homicide Act 1957.95 It is unclear, however, how the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement
will affect cases of this type. If acute intoxication falls within the parameters of this limb of the partial
defence, the jury will be required to consider whether that condition was a substantial cause of the
defendant's conduct. This would presumably erode the mental abnormality/voluntary intoxication
distinction made in such cases. Although Rudi Fortson QC has identified that it ‘cannot be taken as a
foregone conclusion that the courts will not exclude conditions that are merely temporary or transient’,
it is clear that the limits of this aspect of the provision will require clarification by the courts.96
In light of the problems associated with the mitigating doctrine it is perhaps unsurprising that ‘the
appropriateness of diminished responsibility as a partial defence has been questioned’.97 It has been
suggested that the rationale for retaining the defence is to circumvent the mandatory life sentence for
murder and to afford the sentencing judge the unfettered discretion that a manslaughter verdict
allows. The Law Commission stated that opinion was divided on the issue of retention if the
mandatory life sentence were abolished. It was noted that of the 68 respondents who ‘directly
expressed’ an opinion, ‘44 favoured retention of the defence regardless of whether or not the
mandatory sentence were to be abolished’.98 The Scottish Law Commission also favoured retention of
the partial defence in this context, and the concessionary defence survived beyond abolition of the
mandatory life sentence in New South Wales.99 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission
noted that the role of the jury in assessing culpability in diminished responsibility cases is invaluable.
100 In the absence of the diminished responsibility defence, relative culpability in murder cases would
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vest in the powers of the sentencing judge.101 The mitigating doctrine is also required to allow the law
to distinguish between those killings which should be labelled as voluntary manslaughter rather than
murder. In *J. Crim. L. 87 this regard, the sentencing process is not sufficiently adequate to
compensate for the absence of a diminished responsibility defence. Despite these concerns, the
problems associated with the concessionary defence have meant that certain jurisdictions have
rejected the diminished responsibility plea outright.
New Zealand's formal rejection of the diminished responsibility defence
New Zealand, unlike the aforementioned jurisdictions, has never had an official diminished
responsibility plea, despite strong arguments in favour of the partial defence.102 Significantly, the New
Zealand Parliament favoured abolishing the mandatory life sentence for murder in preference to
enacting a formal diminished responsibility plea.103 The Law Commission of New Zealand emphasised
the criticisms levelled at the English version of the partial defence, and concluded that a defendant's
diminished responsibility was better considered in sentencing.104 The result is that, in New Zealand, a
defendant's mental abnormality will exist as a question of sentencing for the trial judge, but only in
limited circumstances. Under the Sentencing and Parole Act 2010, the trial judge will only be able to
consider the defendant's ‘diminished intellectual capacity’ in sentencing if the homicide is the
defendant's first serious offence.105 The discretion afforded to the trial judge in these circumstances
remains subject to a very strong presumption of life imprisonment.106 The result is that a defendant's
mental abnormality will often be irrelevant at trial and inadmissible during sentencing.
It is true that a de facto form of diminished responsibility enjoyed a short period of gestation in the
New Zealand courts via the provocation defence; however, ‘the future relevance’ of that ‘body of case
law is doubtful’ post abolition of the latter.107 In 1976, the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform
Committee recommended abolition of the provocation defence and suggested that provocative
conduct should instead fall within the ambit of the sentencing process.108 The New Zealand Law
Commission also called for abolition of the partial defence in its 2001 and 2007 reports.109 The
Commission rebuffed Law Society claims that the provocation defence was necessary to allow the
jury to distinguish *J. Crim. L. 88 between degrees of murder, arguing that aggravating and
mitigating factors could be considered by the trial judge. However, it was the vituperative public
debate following the controversial case of R v Weatherston, 110 which marked the eventual demise of
the concessionary defence in November 2009.111
Clayton Weatherston, a 33-year-old lecturer from Otago University, claimed that he was ‘guilty of
manslaughter, but not guilty of murder’ when charged with the murder of his ex-girlfriend and former
student, Sophie Elliott. Weatherston had visited the victim's parental home armed with a large kitchen
knife. He proceeded to lock himself and the victim in her bedroom, before fatally stabbing and cutting
her 216 times. The victim's mother heard her daughter's frightened screams, but was unable to unlock
the bedroom door. When police arrived, Weatherston calmly admitted killing the victim but claimed it
was because of ‘the emotional pain that she [had] caused [him] over the past year’.112 At his trial,
Weatherston's plea of provocation was that the victim had become violent and angry when he
questioned her as to whether he should have an STD test as a result of her having had casual sex
with a man while on a recent trip to Australia.113 According to his evidence, the victim swore at him
and made insults about his family, before lunging at him with a pair of scissors causing his glasses to
fall off.114 Thereupon he lost his self-control and killed her. The defence argued that the defendant's
‘vulnerability without glasses because of poor eyesight’ should be considered when assessing his
power of self-control.115 Weatherston also claimed that his complex psychological constitution which
included elements of anxiety disorder, narcissism, obsessionality and histrionic and borderline
personality traits should also be considered.116 The concessionary defence was rejected by the jury
and he was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment of which he must serve a minimum of 18
years without parole.
The trial took place in a ‘blaze of publicity’.117 Weatherston's televised testimony which spanned seven
days was branded a ‘national disgrace’ by Women's Refuge.118 There was a prevailing view that
Weatherston's ‘use of the provocation defence to put Sophie Elliott on trial was not right’.119 The
defence led evidence that the victim had a ‘propensity to *J. Crim. L. 89 fling insults “if she felt like it”
and to “resort to violence if she felt pushed to frustration over relationship issues”’.120 The defence
poured over extracts from the victim's diary, where she had described attacking a previous boyfriend
following a series of insults.121 Weatherston also relied on evidence that the victim had smashed a
door at his (Weatherston's) flat in a demonstration of grievance and anger.122 The nature of the
evidence led at trial and Weatherston's apparent lack of remorse meant that the public ‘grew to
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“despise” Clayton Weatherston’.123 Heather Henare (Women's Refuge, Chief Executive) stated, ‘this
trial turned justice inside out--the killer became the victim and Sophie Elliott was portrayed to us all as
he chose to describe her’.124 Subsequently, Justice Minister, Simon Power, called for the defence's
abolition contending that the defence ‘… wrongly enables defendants to besmirch the character of
victims, and effectively rewards a lack of self-control’.125
On 24 November 2009, the House of Representatives voted 116:5 in favour of the Crimes
(Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009. The effect was to transfer issues pertaining to
provocative conduct to the sentencing judge. This reactionary response to the Weatherston trial has
been the subject of acerbic criticism. Barrister Ron Mansfield of the Auckland Bar remarked that
‘shifting the “provocation defence” to a “sentencing issue” would not work’.126 Tolmie identified that,
despite the problems associated with the concessionary defence, ‘there are cases where a person
has killed in response to … circumstances that are so horrible that most people would not want to
label the person a “murderer” and would not want them to serve life imprisonment’.127 Provocation has
been described as an “‘important and compassionate” part of the legal system in a “reactionary
period” during which society is lacking “soul, spirit and compassion”’.128 Tolmie recounts the case of a
doctor who successfully raised the provocation defence after he eventually ‘snapped in response to
his mother begging for relief from the pain of the final stages of her terminal bowel cancer and sped
up her eventual *J. Crim. L. 90 death’.129 Peter Williams QC described the case of an
alcohol-dependent defendant who he had previously defended. The man's wife had left him, taking
their six children. He began to drink and lost his job as a result of his alcoholism. He subsequently lost
his self-control and shot his wife as she was leaving a hotel bar. Williams observed that the defendant
had lost everything that he valued in life and he argues that it is cases of this nature which ‘cry out for
a reduced sentence’ and require a lesser verdict of voluntary manslaughter.130 The abolition of the
provocation defence means that it is likely that in future cases such defendants will be labelled
murderers and be subject to the applicable three-stage sentencing regime.131
The Supreme Court denied Weatherston leave to appeal earlier this year. Defence claimed that an
interview in the media had prejudiced Weatherston's right to a fair trial. It has been suggested that this
‘concludes the widely publicised saga that had prompted the abolition of the provocation defence in
New Zealand's criminal law’.132 The effect of the formal repeal of provocation, however, has also
effectively closed the door to the mentally abnormal defendant. A number of jurisprudential authorities
in New Zealand reveal that some defendants, by sleight of hand, framed their defence as tangentially
related to excusable loss of control dependent upon different factorisations.
Although New Zealand has never formally recognised the diminished responsibility defence, issues
pertaining to the defendant's state of mind were often a major factor in provocation trials. In R v
Ashton, 133 for example, the trial judge acknowledged that the defendant's mental abnormality
(paranoia) was a significant contributory factor in the commission of the offence. The court in R v
McCarthy 134 considered that an ‘inevitable and deliberate effect of the statutory changes embodied in
s 169 of the Crimes Act 1961’ was that diminished responsibility could fall within the purview of the
provocation defence.135 Accordingly, New Zealand's recent repudiation of the partial defence means
that both the provoked defendant and the mentally abnormal killer will have their ‘relative culpability’
assessed by a trial judge, who will not have the jurisdiction to substitute a murder verdict with one of
manslaughter.136 This is fundamentally at odds with principles of fair labelling. As Orchard *J. Crim. L.
91 contended, the stigma attached to the offence of murder should not be imposed on those who kill
because they are provoked.137 By failing to differentiate between those who kill because of some form
of mental abnormality or in response to a loss of self-control, and those who kill in cold blood, the law
is at risk of losing its moral credibility.138 The partial defences of provocation (loss of control) and
diminished responsibility play a vital role in this regard, since they have the ‘unique effect of altering a
charge of murder to one of manslaughter’.139
This issue is exacerbated by the restrictive sentencing policies that were introduced by the
Sentencing and Parole Act 2010. The provisions introduced a tripartite system under which stricter
penalties are imposed upon repeat offenders, and in some instances the trial judge is prohibited from
considering mitigation in sentencing.140 Where a defendant is convicted of an offence under s. 86A of
the Sentencing Act 2002, a first warning is issued.141 If the offender is subsequently convicted of a s.
86A offence, a final warning will be issued and parole will be prohibited if a custodial sentence is
imposed.142 A third offence under the provision will attract the maximum penalty for that crime and the
defendant will be ineligible for parole, unless the court is satisfied that such a sentence would be
‘manifestly unjust’.143 It is worthy of note that the ‘manifestly *J. Crim. L. 92 unjust’ rule applies only
to the defendant's ineligibility for parole, not the imposition of the maximum sentence for the offence
charged.144
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Following the abolition of the provocation defence, and in the absence of a formal diminished
responsibility plea, it is unlikely that the alcohol-dependent killer will be found guilty of manslaughter
unless the prosecution are unable to establish the requisite mens rea for murder. In this respect, the
treatment of the alcohol-dependent defendant under the new regime is particularly harsh. Under the
amendments introduced by the Sentencing and Parole Act 2010, the trial judge will only be able to
consider the defendant's ‘diminished intellectual capacity’ in sentencing if the homicide is the
defendant's first serious offence.145 Labour Representative, Grant Robertson, has contended that in
this respect, the provision is ‘unworkable, unjust and inequitable’.146 In cases involving the voluntarily
intoxicated defendant, s. 9 of the Sentencing Act 2002 specifically excludes the effects of voluntary
intoxication from consideration during sentencing.147 In light of this, acute intoxication will have no
bearing on the sentence imposed, whether or not it is the defendant's first serious offence. Acute
intoxication will only be relevant if the defendant's condition prevented him from manifesting the
requisite intention for murder.148 As Rumbles identifies, however, ‘it is incredibly rare for intoxication to
be successfully argued in this way’.149
If the alcoholic killer is convicted of murder, there is a presumption that a sentence of life
imprisonment will be imposed.150 If a life sentence is imposed, the defendant must serve a minimum
of 10 years (or 17 years, if the murder was aggravated151 ), unless that sentence would be *J. Crim.
L. 93 ‘manifestly unjust’.152 Under s. 24 of the Sentencing Act 2002, the defence and prosecution will
be able to consider and/or introduce mitigating and aggravating facts at ‘disputed fact’ hearings in a
bid to persuade the court that those facts justify the imposition of a greater or lesser sentence for the
offence charged. In light of the particularly harsh sentencing regime embraced in New Zealand, it is
likely that these hearings will be long and complex. The New Zealand Ministry of Justice has also
asserted that ‘a sentence of less than life imprisonment’ will only be substituted in ‘a limited number of
murder’ cases where ‘significant mitigating factors’ exist.153 If the sentencing judge decides to impose
a lesser sentence, he must provide ‘written reasons’ for doing so.154
Where murder is the defendant's second- or third-stage offence, the court must impose a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole.155 If the no-parole period is regarded as ‘manifestly unjust’, and it is
the defendant's second-stage offence, the court can impose a life sentence of which the defendant
must serve a minimum of 10 years (or 17 years, if the murder was aggravated).156 If the court regards
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the defendant's third-stage offence ‘manifestly
unjust’, the sentencing judge must impose life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 20
years. If the court considers that this non-parole period is ‘manifestly unjust’, the sentencing judge
may reduce the minimum period to 10 years (or 17 years, if the murder was aggravated).157
Brookbanks has asserted that the scheme becomes ‘especially disturbing … once a second- or
third-stage has been triggered’ because ‘[e]vidence of gross provocation, diminished responsibility or
serious impulse control disorder will have no bearing whatsoever on the penalty that must be imposed
by the court’.158
*J. Crim. L. 94 The approach adopted in New Zealand raises questions about appropriate
sentencing and labelling in homicide cases. In light of the Sentencing and Parole Act 2010, there is a
real prospect that the mentally abnormal killer will face life imprisonment. New Zealand's lack of a
partial defence also renders it more likely that the alcohol-dependent defendant will be labelled a
murderer. As Mansfield observed:
Murder should be broken down to various levels or degrees of the crime. The levels or degrees of the
crime should acknowledge an offender's actual culpability in the killing and the reality of the various
forms of diminished responsibility that may exist.159
The abolition of the provocation defence has effectively removed evidence of provocative conduct on
behalf of the victim and/or mental abnormality on the part of the defendant from the trial process and
transplanted it within the sentencing process. It is likely that ‘disputed fact’ hearings will render the
sentencing process as lengthy as the trial process. Unlike the position in England, New South Wales
and Scotland, however, the jury will not be charged to consider the defendant's mental abnormality
and the trial judge will not be in a position to substitute a murder conviction with one of manslaughter.
In practice, requiring a jury to determine guilt and expecting the judge to consider mitigating factors in
such cases may cause confusion because ‘the judge and the jury may have different views as to the
basis for the conviction’.160 The role of the jury is designed to represent societal views; provocation
trials often involve ‘issues that jurors can envisage--we can all be brought to breaking point’.161 It is
the jury who should decide the ‘appropriate level or degree of the crime and the judge then sentence
accordingly’.162 The tripartite regime also precludes consideration of provocation and/or diminished
responsibility where the murder charge is the defendant's second- or third-stage offence. The scheme
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effectively ‘authorizes the imposition of arbitrary and disproportionate sentences simply because the
offender has a previous (albeit not necessarily serious) qualifying conviction’.163
Legal Aid, Punishment and Sentencing of Offenders Bill 2010-11
At a more general level, the position in New Zealand emphasises the problems associated with the
imposition of a restrictive sentencing regime which severely limits the powers traditionally afforded to
the trial judge during the sentencing process. It is concerning that parallels may be drawn (albeit
limited) across the Sentencing and Parole Act 2010 and the Legal Aid, Punishment and Sentencing of
Offenders Bill 2010-11, which the UK government brought before the House of Lords on 4 November
2011. One of the key proposals under the new Bill is the *J. Crim. L. 95 imposition of a life sentence
for a second serious listed offence164 where the defendant is over 18, provided that certain key
conditions have been met.165 Schedule 16 to the Bill would introduce a new list of 44 serious offences,
including manslaughter, into the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In order to impose a life sentence the
court would need to consider that ‘the seriousness of the offence, or of the offence and one or more
offences associated with it, is such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for 10
years or more’.166 The defendant's previous offence would also need to fall within the list of offences
introduced by Sched. 16 and ‘a relevant life sentence or a relevant sentence of imprisonment or
detention for a determinate period’ would need to have been ‘imposed on the offender for the
previous offence’.167 If these conditions are met the court would have to impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life unless the circumstances ‘relate the offence to the previous offence’ or ‘would
make it unjust to do so’.
The Secretary of State for Justice, Kenneth Clarke, has stated that the regime would apply to
defendants who had committed two ‘probably near-murderous attacks’ and he anticipates that it will
affect approximately 20 cases per year.168 He contends that, ‘[t]he new regime will restore clarity,
coherence and common sense to sentencing and give victims a clearer understanding of how long
offenders will actually serve in prison’.169 Ashworth notes that these principles are essential to criminal
law ‘insofar as they conduce to predictability, consistency and accountability in decision-making’.170
Nevertheless, ‘consistency is only of benefit if it aligns with the inherent legal concept of fairness,
particularly in terms of procedure, labelling and disposal’,171 and ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional cases’ may
arise where the imposition of the mandatory sentence is inappropriate.172
There is a high rate of reoffending amongst those suffering from substance-use disorders, and
research suggests that there is a ‘yawning gap between the level of offender addiction, and treatment
availability in UK prisons’.173 The Chief Executive for the Rehabilitation of Addicted Prisoners Trust
(RAPt) acknowledged that ‘[a]lcohol addiction is a huge *J. Crim. L. 96 unmet need in prisons’.174
The ‘two-strike’ scheme will potentially have a significant impact on the alcohol-dependent defendant
who may not have had an appropriate level of treatment while incarcerated following a serious
offence under the scheme. Lord Ramsbotham, a former chief inspector of prisons, stated that this
type of prisoner ‘should be held in conditions similar to those in secure mental health hospitals’.175
Although treatment is in some instances made available to those with substance-related disorders,
there has been very little systematic analysis of the support offered and its effectiveness.176 In many
instances treatment has been regarded as ineffective and alcohol and drug-dependent defendants
will often reoffend within 12 months of their release.177 It is too early to assess the potential impact
that these divisive reform measures will have upon the alcohol-dependent defendant, but it would
seem that the arbitrary imposition of mandatory sentences is apt to cause injustice.178
Conclusion
The revised s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 and the provisions of the Legal Aid, Punishment and
Sentencing of Offenders Bill 2010-11 have potentially far-reaching consequences for defendants
suffering from substance use disorders. It is apparent that states of acute intoxication may satisfy the
‘recognised medical condition’ requirement which has become an integral part of the diminished
responsibility plea in England and Wales. This assumption is supported by the position adopted in
Scotland and New South Wales, where voluntary intoxication and transient states respectively are
statutorily excluded from satisfying the concessionary defence. The reformulated provision potentially
opens the door to defendants who would not previously have been able to rely on their voluntarily
induced state of intoxication to reduce a murder conviction to one of manslaughter, namely, those
defendants who commit the actus reus with the relevant mens rea.
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This is a significant departure from the traditional intoxication doctrine which establishes that
voluntary intoxication is only relevant where it prevents the defendant from formulating the mens rea
for a specific intent offence. It also demonstrates a marked shift from the position adopted in
Dietschmann, where the jury was required to focus *J. Crim. L. 97 primarily on the defendant's
depressive condition rather than his voluntarily induced state of intoxication. If acute intoxication per
se is capable of satisfying the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement, the court will no longer
need to distinguish between voluntary intoxication and other mental abnormalities for the purpose of
the concessionary defence. Of course, some medical experts might argue that although ‘acute
intoxication’ constitutes a disorder of clinical significance, it does not amount to a ‘recognised medical
condition’ in the same way that dependence syndromes do. If, however, the jury are satisfied that
‘acute intoxication’ meets the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement the defence must then prove
that the defendant's ability to form a rational judgement, etc. was substantially impaired.
It might be argued that prima facie expanding the palliative defence to include acute intoxication
should render it easier for the alcohol-dependent defendant to claim diminished responsibility
successfully. There is a real concern, however, that the importation of this lower threshold test for
substance use disorders may have the opposite effect. It has often been said that judges and lawyers
do not ‘understand the concept of alcoholism as a disease’.179 For many, substance use disorders
have a greater ‘kinship with self-indulgence than disease’ and it is not uncommon for the layperson to
query the appropriateness of the availability of the partial defence to the alcohol-dependent
defendant.180 In cases where the jury is unsure of whether the defendant is suffering from alcohol
dependence syndrome or was simply acutely intoxicated at the time of the killing, will they be more or
less likely to believe that the defendant's condition substantially impaired his ability to form a rational
judgement? The trial judge will need to provide very careful directions in relation to this aspect of the
provision in order to avoid misdirection as far as acute intoxication is concerned. We wait with bated
breath for new jurisprudential authorities clarifying the parameters of the ‘recognised medical
condition’ element of the new plea.
The recent repeal of the provocation defence in New Zealand effectively prevents the
alcohol-dependent defendant from raising issues of diminished responsibility at trial. The effect is to
transfer issues of provocative conduct and/or diminished intellectual capacity to the sentencing judge
who does not have the jurisdiction to reflect a defendant's reduced culpability with a verdict of
manslaughter rather than murder. Significantly, the new tripartite sentencing regime operating in New
Zealand means that a defendant's alcohol dependence syndrome will not be relevant if it is the
defendant's second or third offence under the scheme. Where the defendant's first qualifying offence
is murder, there is a presumption that a sentence of life imprisonment will be imposed and alcohol
dependence syndrome will only be relevant when considering parole eligibility. There is a real
possibility that the alcohol-dependent defendant will be convicted of murder and sentenced to life *J.
Crim. L. 98 imprisonment under the new scheme. In terms of the acute intoxication/dependence
syndrome delineation the sentencing judge will still be required to distinguish between those
conditions since evidence of voluntary intoxication is not relevant at the sentencing stage. By
transferring issues of provocative conduct and/or diminished responsibility from the trial to the
sentencing process the length of the trial has been shortened but only at the expense of extending
and complicating sentencing procedures.
The position in New Zealand is demonstrative of the difficulties associated with the imposition of
arbitrary sentencing regimes. It is well documented that ‘[t]he rigid mandatory term for murder [in
England and Wales] has long been a problem’.181 Despite this, the Legal Aid, Punishment and
Sentencing of Offenders Bill 2010-11 proposes the imposition of a mandatory life sentence for
defendants who commit two serious offences under the scheme. In a controversial statement,
Kenneth Clarke told BBC Radio 4's Today programme that the revised scheme is likely to apply to
those ‘people who, though they haven't committed murder, are pretty murderous … It is probably just
the skill of the medical profession stopping them from being in for murder’.182 This scepticism for
defences founded upon mental abnormality is problematic, especially when the Secretary of State
proposes a Bill which could have potentially significant consequences for mentally abnormal
defendants. As far as the alcoholic defendant is concerned, it has been identified that those suffering
from dependence syndromes do not receive an appropriate level of care in prison and are more likely
to reoffend upon release. In this regard, alcohol-dependent defendants are potentially more
vulnerable under the scheme than a defendant who does not suffer any form of mental abnormality.
The proposals extend the mandatory life sentence rather than focusing on cathartic reform; ‘a
dangerous precedent for more reactionary justice secretaries to exploit in future’.183
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These publications identify and critically address the issues faced by offenders who 
raise the spectre of co-morbidity, in the context of medical conditions complicated by 
the use of alcohol. It was suggested a failure to adequately legislate for this discrete cat-
egory of vulnerable offender could result in appellate court litigation, and this prediction 
was borne out in relation to both partial defences. The first appellate court case to ad-
dress the 'recognised medical condition' requirement concerned Dowds99, an offender 
who sought to claim diminished responsibility on grounds he was extremely intoxicated 
when he killed his partner.100 In Asmelash101, the Court of Appeal was required to assess 
whether voluntary intoxication could fall within the 'defendant's circumstances' for the 
purposes of the loss of control defence. 
 
It is 'unremarkable' the court adopted Majewski standardisations and rejected Dowds' 
plea.102 The Lord Chief Justice also ruled jurors should ignore Asmelash's intoxication 
for the purposes of the 'normal person' test.103 Accordingly, the question is whether a 
person of the defendant's 'sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the same circumstances, but unaffected by alcohol, would not have re-
acted in the same or similar way?’104 In both cases, their Lordships took care to assert 
that their rulings apply to acute intoxication only;105 alcohol dependence syndrome will 
continue to be relevant to diminished responsibility claims,106 and may be a relevant 
circumstance in loss of control cases where the offender is ruthlessly taunted about that 
condition (Alcohol abuse and dependence were also merged under the head of sub-
stance use disorder under the DSM-V).107 This was predicted in both publications. This 
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litigation could have been prevented by the exclusion clauses advanced. The Law 
Commission’s insanity and automatism discussion paper acknowledged Parliament’s 
failure to address the inter-relationship between intoxication and defences. 108  The 
Commission excluded voluntary acute intoxication from its newly proposed 'not crimi-
nally responsible by reason of a recognised medical condition' defence (‘RMC de-
fence’).109 Accordingly, the reform proposals recommended herein remain relevant and 
viable options for future reform. 
 
Although the issues raised in Dowds110 were predicted within publications (i) and (ii), 
the case law departed from the approach advocated by this author in respect of the 
meaning of the phrase 'substantial impairment’.111 Resigning from the 'more than trivial 
but less than total' approach identified, the Court of Appeal, in Golds112, considered the 
term 'substantial impairment' was capable of two possible meanings. The first being, the 
abnormality of mental functioning could be said to substantially impair the defendant's 
ability to understand the nature of his conduct, form a rational judgment and/or exercise 
self-control, if it does so to a 'more than merely trivial’ extent.113 A second possibility 
is, an abnormality of mental functioning substantially impairs a defendant’s ability to do 
one of the three things, identified above, if ‘it significantly or appreciably impairs that 
ability, beyond something that is merely more than trivial’. Their Lordships advocated 
the trial judge should, in future cases, refuse to elaborate on the meaning of the word 
'substantial' on the ‘optimistic' premise that this ought to be obvious. If assistance is re-
quired, jurors should be directed in relation to the second meaning.114 It is problematic 
that substantial is given a different meaning in the context of causation (more than min-
imal) to diminished responsibility, when principles of both areas may be considered in 
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the same trial.115 These issues are complicated by the fact that the abnormality of mental 
functioning must provide an explanation for the defendant's acts or omissions in the 
commission of the fatal offence.116 This will be the case if it causes, or is a significant 
contributory factor in causing the defendant's conduct. The term 'significant'  as opposed 
to 'substantial' means 'more than merely minimal'.117 This meaning of the term ‘substan-
tial impairment’ is set to be considered by the Supreme Court in July 2016.118 
In the same context, the Court of Appeal in Brennan119 clarified the ambit of the medi-
cal expert’s role in diminished responsibility cases.120 Medical evidence is a 'practical 
necessity';121 where there is no proper basis for departing from unchallenged medical 
evidence, then juries may not do so.122  As Fortson identifies this case gives helpful 
guidance to experts and practitioners concerning the issues in respect of which the ex-
pert is permitted to express an opinion (including the ultimate issue).123 The shift from a 
moral evaluative judgment regarding the offender's responsibility (a jury question) to a 
qualitative assessment of the offender's abilities renders the medical expert best placed 
to advise on the offender's impairment.124 This is significant for vulnerable offenders 
who exhibit signs of co-morbidity since the medical expert will be in a position to ex-
plain the impact of the diagnosis on the abilities identified. This in-depth analysis of the 
law relating to offenders with co-morbidity is explored further in Part Two, where de-
tailed consideration is given to the efficacy of the doctrine of prior fault in the context 
of medical condition defences. 
115
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Part Two: Prior Fault and Mental Condition Defences 
 
(iii) ‘Of Blurred Boundaries and Prior Fault: Insanity, Automatism and Intoxication’125 
(iv) ‘Potentiate Liability and Prevening Fault Attribution; The Intoxicated "Offender" 
and Anglo-American Dépecage Standardisations’126 
 
Introduction 
By broadening the analysis to explore the relationships between intoxication, and insan-
ity and automatism, the following publications build upon the research underpinning 
Part One. This analysis is timely given the Law Commission's insanity and automatism 
project was placed on hold following the release of its discussion paper in 2013.127 It is 
worth noting, there is no political will in E&W to amend the law on intoxicated offend-
ing and/or mental condition defences.128 The Law Commission is unlikely to return to 
their project in the near future given the limited number of responses it received during 
scoping paper consultation.129 It is important to be aware of the political landscape in 
terms of placing the literature and recommendations within their context; this should not 
detract from advancing optimal solutions to current problems within the law. The rec-
ommendations for future development contained herein would be relevant to any future 
continuation of the Commission’s work and/or review of the area. Unlike the partial de-
fences, automatism and insanity are general defences that may apply to any offence 
charged. As such, the analysis of the inter-relationship between intoxication and these 
defences extends beyond the specific intent offence considered, thereby incorporating 
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basic intent offences to which different intoxication principles apply.130 In the context of 
basic intent offences, the defendant's recklessness in becoming intoxicated is substituted 
for the mens rea of the offence charged, thereby having significant ramifications in 
terms of legal culpability.131 Accordingly, whether the offender's voluntary intoxication, 
medical condition or an alternative external factor caused the defendant's behaviour is 
relevant in determining whether the defendant is guilty, not guilty by reason of a recog-
nised medical condition (and subject to a disposal order), or not guilty (and entitled to 
an outright acquittal), respectively. Although the Law Commission recommendations 
are designed to make any new insanity defence more accessible to vulnerable offenders, 
the publications reveal that emphasis remains firmly upon ensuring the defence is not 
abused. A recalibration must occur to ensure that clear focus is placed upon vulnerable 
offenders when reforming mental condition defences. 
 
Publication, (iii) assesses the pressure placed on the legal approach to intoxicated of-
fending, from an Anglo-Australian perspective.132 The pressure identified arises from 
two main sources. The first is the increase in the number of vulnerable offenders intoxi-
cated by non-dangerous drugs, individuals who appear to not be at fault, although they 
became intoxicated consciously or willingly. The high profile of intoxication from so-
called non-dangerous drugs has challenged the notion that all (voluntarily) intoxicated 
offenders are culpable for their condition in some way, which in turn has made it diffi-
cult to utilise prior fault to bolster the ostensible coherence and certainty of this area of 
the criminal law. The second source of pressure on the current approach arises from 
cases involving those offenders, introduced in Part One, who raise the spectre of co-
morbidity; the latter category of offender is often viewed with less sympathy than the 
offender intoxicated by non-dangerous drugs; and it is questionable whether the current 
position remains apposite in terms of attributing criminal responsibility. 
 
These difficulties infect the new proposals posited by the Law Commission, which 
would introduce a heavily circumscribed automatism defence, and a broad RMC de-
fence, under which the notion of prior fault would have increased prevalence. The issue 
of non-dangerous drugs currently falls for consideration under the automatism de-
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fence.133 Under the new proposals, this issue would shift to the new RMC defence.134 In 
cases where the ingestion of non-dangerous drugs represents the predominant cause of 
the defendant's conduct, the defence will only be available where the ingestion of those 
substances was in accordance with the prescription and/or instructions provided (unless 
non-compliance was reasonable in the circumstances). The effect of this change is two-
fold. First, the outright acquittal following an automatism verdict would not necessarily 
follow a verdict of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of recognised medical condi-
tion’.135 
 
The second effect of the change would be to extend the notion of prior fault to a defend-
ant's unreasonable failure to comply with a prescribed medication regimen. In cases 
where the defendant was aware of the likely consequences of non-compliance, he or she 
will be convicted of any basic intent offence charged (assuming the remaining elements 
of the offence are satisfied) and sentenced accordingly. Currently, a blanket exclusion 
operating on the defendant's omission ensures the insanity defence remains available. 
The rationale for this position is that the defendant's condition, and not the omission to 
act, is regarded as having caused the defendant's conduct. The change emphasises the 
defendant's (ir)responsibility in failing to follow his/her prescription. The imposition of 
criminal liability is unlikely to encourage individuals to take medication; whether a 
sharp moral divide exists between an offender who overdoses and a defendant who fails 
to follow a prescribed medication regimen is unclear; the efficacy of imposing criminal 
liability is questionable. This proposal must be revisited to ensure vulnerable offenders 
are adequately accommodated under revised and/or new provisions. 
 
Publication (iv) focuses upon the problematic notion of prior fault, suggesting reform to 
the law on intoxicated offending is required; repudiation of the Majewski rules, consid-
ered in (iii) would be preferable. Given there is little political will for such 'radical' re-
form, a via media is proposed in (iv), which recognises the divergent categories of of-
fender, and would address the issue of intoxicated offending through the introduction of 
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an offence predicated upon criminal behaviour induced by voluntary intoxication. The 
problems with the current categorisations utilised in criminal law are considered in light  
of the US approach to intoxicated offending, identifying significant commonalities 
across the Anglo-American schematic template to intoxicated offending. Dépecage 
principles are used to 'pick and choose' different laws to govern specific issues of intox-
ication arising in four key contexts: Dutch courage and drinking to commit specific of-
fences; pathological intoxication and imbibing of 'therapeutic' substances; involuntary 
intoxication (outwith alcoholism); and basic intent offences simpliciter. This formula-
tion is predicated on the notion of potentiate liability, which provides a moral credibility 
and fairer approach to offence individuation than the current law. A modified partial 
diminished responsibility defence is advanced; this new provision would enhance the 
current law in E&W, and provide a needed partial defence to alcoholic offenders in the 
US, where the condition is presently viewed as 'part vice and part disease.'136 Reform of 
the problematic notion of prior fault is required to recalibrate the current approach, 
which focuses on preventing the availability of mental condition defences, and not 
enough on the vulnerable offenders to which these defences ought to be available. 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the will: Alcoholism and the dilemmas o f freedom (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998). See, Stephen Morse, A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency and Criminal Respon-
sibility (Taylor & Francis, 2013) 490-518.  
Publication (iii) 
‘Of Blurred Boundaries and Prior Fault: Insanity, Automatism and Intoxication’ in 
General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 
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POTENTIATE LIABILITY AND PREVENING 
FAULT ATTRIBUTION: THE INTOXICATED 
“OFFENDER” AND ANGLO-AMERICAN 
DÉPECAGE STANDARDISATIONS 
ALAN REED AND NICOLA WAKE 
I do not suppose that, when a drunkard reasons with himself 
upon his vice, he is once out of five hundred times affected by the 
dangers that he runs through his brutish, physical insensibility; 
neither had I, long as I had considered my position, made enough 
allowance for the complete moral insensibility and insensate 
readiness to evil, which were the leading characters of Edward 
Hyde.1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The intoxicated “offender” presents a dilemmatic Sophie’s 
Choice2 in terms of legitimate inculpatory principles of criminal 
law, but set against and conflicting with the availability of any 
exculpatory defences. The imbibing of drink or drugs may have 
released a character transformation and physiological reaction 
that creates a new individuated personification of wrong-doing, 
and an actor engaged in a penumbra of harmful risk-taking.3 It 
engrafts issues related to moral culpability and human frailty in 
viewing substance abuse disorders as potentially exculpatory, or 
alternatively constructing imputed liability centred on criminal 
responsibility in becoming intoxicated at first instance. The 
sympathy that may exist to the alcoholic, and the compassionate 
wish to extend the hands of support, is tempered by concern over 
the innocent victim(s) of their actions, and the need for societal 
 
      1. April 2014: ISSN: 0270-854X . Alan Reed (Professor of Criminal and 
Private International Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Innovation in 
the Faculty of Business and Law at Northumbria University) and Nicola Wake 
(Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University). 
Contact:[alan.reed@northumbria.ac.uk and 
nicola.wake@northumbria.ac.uk].1. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, STRANGE 
CASE OF DR JEKYLL AND MR HYDE AND OTHER TALES 60 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2006). 
  2.  WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Vintage Publ’g 2004). 
 3.  See generally Ronnie Mackay, The Taint of Intoxication, 13 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 37 (1990); Tim Quigley, Reform of the Intoxication Defence, 33 
MCGILL L.J. 1 (1987); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2005). 
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protection and deterrence of egregious behaviour.4 These tensions 
to which we refer are reflected in substantive policy choices, in 
particular the distinction made between liability for voluntary and 
involuntary intoxication. The offence-fault definitional nexus that 
pervades the compartmentalised perspectives attached to 
intoxication are more subtle than provided in current substantive 
law precepts.5 
It is our view that Anglo-American standardisations applied 
to the intoxicated offender are in urgent need of reform. The 
extant position is deconstructed in Part I of this article and it is 
propounded that it is inappropriate to focus on cognitive states of 
imputed “recklessness”, and thereby to amorphously construct a 
conviction predicated on a legalised fiction.6 The juxtaposition 
effected stands in contradistinction to primordial concerns 
attached to fair labelling and doctrinal coherence that ought to be 
determinative. A new optimal model is adduced herein on a 
principled basis that engages a re-examination of potentiate 
liability linked to actual criminal responsibility across the spectra 
of intoxication imputations. It is important to establish a moral 
legitimacy to inculpating any intoxicated offender who commits a 
crime without the prevalence of the designated offence-specific 
mens rea element at the time of commission of the unlawful act. It 
is provided by our new standardisation of “potentiate liability” for 
prevening fault, and inculcated policy rationalisations are derived 
from principled consideration of individual responsibility. Fault 
attached to lack of care as a moral agent should be determinative 
of inculpation, and not fictionalised cognitive states of imputed 
mens rea.7 
In Part II, we examine potentiate liability and prevening fault 
in Anglo-American standardisations of intoxicated offending. Our 
theoretical construct is contextualised within the parameters of 
four important situations attached to liability: Dutch Courage and 
drinking to commit specific offences; pathological intoxication and 
imbibing of “therapeutic” substances; involuntary intoxication 
(outwith alcoholism); and basic intent offences simpliciter. 
Dépecage principles are advocated in this context, utilising the 
ability to “pick and choose” different laws to appropriately govern 
specific issues of intoxication.8 It is the overarching concept of 
 
 4.  See generally David McCord, The English and American History of 
Voluntary Intoxication to Negate Mens Rea, 11 J. OF LEGAL HIST. 372 (1990) 
(Eng.). 
 5.  See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988). 
 6.  See generally Eric Colvin, A Theory of the Intoxication Defence, 59 
CANADIAN BAR REV. 750 (1981). 
 7.  See generally Andrew Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 
91 L.Q.R. 102 (1975) (Eng.). 
 8.  See ALAN REED, ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATE 
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potentiate liability that provides a moral credibility and legitimacy 
to our re-categorisations, and a fairer edifice of offence 
individuation. The demands of fair labelling require a more policy-
oriented and rule-selective methodology than is currently 
operative, and a greater appreciation of prevening fault attached 
to separately classified malfeasance. 
In Part III of this article, we consider the situation where the 
defendant suffers from alcohol dependence syndrome. A major 
aspect of the condition is an inability to control alcohol 
consumption, but numerous studies demonstrate that alcoholics 
often and volitionally refrain from alcohol intake over a 
continuum, and different gradations of intoxication apply than in 
stereotypical terminology.9 The ubiquitous nature of the syndrome 
represents “a challenge for a construction of the intoxicated 
offender as abnormal,”10 and as a result, it is not uncommon for 
the chronic alcoholic’s condition to be considered “part vice, part 
disease.”11 The idea that an alcoholic may retain the capacity to 
choose whether to consume intoxicants has resulted in a refusal to 
accept the syndrome as a bespoke medical condition for 
exculpatory purposes within U.S. jurisdictions. Alcoholism is 
unfortunately viewed in black and white terms, which are 
irreconcilable with the array of categorisations and gradations of 
substance use disorder recognised in medical and behavioural 
sciences.12 Alcohol consumption on the part of the chronic alcoholic 
is regarded as intentional,13 and accordingly the rules pertaining 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 n.2 (Edwin Mellin Press 2003) (explaining where the 
nature of dépecage principles are examined in the different context of Anglo-
American private international law standardisations).  
 9.  See generally HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF 
ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE (Univ. of California Press 1988); Herbert 
Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975); 
Herbert Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation 
for the “Disease Concept of Alcoholism”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1970). 
 10.  ARLIE LOUGHNAN, MANIFEST MADNESS: MENTAL INCAPACITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 199 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
 11.  MARIANA VALVERDE, DISEASES OF THE WILL: ALCOHOLISM AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM 51 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). See also Stephen 
Morse, A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency and Criminal 
Responsibility, 56(5) INQUIRY 490-518 (Taylor & Francis (2013)).  
 12.  See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., MANAGEMENT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
(Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/acute_intox/en/index.htm
l (providing that “[i]ntoxication is highly dependent on the type and dose of 
drug and is influenced by an individual’s level of tolerance and other factors,” 
and the “behavioural expression of a given level of intoxication is strongly 
influenced by cultural and personal expectations about the effects of the 
drug”).  
 13.  FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, supra note 9, at 34-39; Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal 
Responsibility, supra note 9, at 426-33; Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In 
Search of a Factual Foundation for the “Disease Concept of Alcoholism”, supra 
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to voluntary intoxication apply in terms of attributing fault in this 
context.14 In contrast, a more nuanced and empathetically valid 
approach is adopted in England, which recognises that the 
disorder may affect the defendant’s decision-making powers, but it 
does not completely abrogate or displace free will.15 The result has 
been to accept that chronic alcoholism may have an impact on the 
defendant’s culpability, but only to a limited extent, and this is 
reflected through the availability of the concessionary diminished 
responsibility defence.16 It is suggested herein that a revised 
approach to alcohol dependence syndrome ought to be adopted 
with a shift in emphasis from voluntary / involuntariness to a 
wider consideration of prevening culpability and responsibility. 
In Part IV, we contend that the bifurcatory categorisation of 
the alcohol dependent’s conduct as voluntary or involuntary has 
led the U.S. courts to standardise chronic alcoholics according to 
normative societal expectations of the reasonable sober person: an 
objectification that is inapt. A review of the Model Penal Code 
highlights that the chronic alcoholic’s condition is viewed con una 
prisma as part of involuntary act doctrine, rather than involuntary 
intoxication per se, and alcohol dependence is only regarded as 
potentially exempting where the defendant’s free will has been 
totally abrogated. This deontological reasoning has resulted in a 
refusal to accept alcohol dependence syndrome as a mental disease 
or defect for the purposes of exculpation;17 an overly restrictive 
approach which is erroneously supported by a number of 
academicians who claim that alcoholism is simply a way of life.18 
This view is counter-intuitive to psychiatric accounts of the 
condition,19 and it is our contention that distinguishing voluntary 
 
note 9, at 800-808; Morse, supra note 11. 
 14.  See infra Parts I and II; see also ELAINE CASSEL & DOUGLAS A 
BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 178 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2007). 
 15.  See Alan Reed & Nicola Wake, Anglo-American Perspectives on Partial 
Defences: Something Old, Something Borrowed, and Something New, in LOSS 
OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 183-206 (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds., 
Ashgate Publ’g 2011).  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See, e.g., Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(holding that “a mere showing of narcotics addiction, without more, does not 
constitute ‘some evidence’ of mental disease or ‘insanity’ so as to raise the 
issue of criminal responsibility”); see also Doughty v. Beto, 396 F.2d 128, 130 
(5th Cir. 1968) (holding that “chronic alcoholism, standing alone, raised no 
defense” to the charged crime). 
 18.  FINGARETTE HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, supra note 9, at 100; Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal 
Responsibility, supra note 9, at 443; Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search 
of a Factual Foundation for the “Disease Concept of Alcoholism”, supra note 9, 
at 801-02; Morse, supra note 11. 
 19.  LAW COMMISSION, INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIAL TO THE SCOPING PAPER (Law Com SM/SP, 2012). LAW COMMISSION, 
DISCUSSION PAPER, INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM (Law Com DP, 2013). 
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from involuntary intoxication on the part of the alcohol dependent 
defendant involves a blurring of individuated agency. In practical 
terms, whether the defendant could not or would not resist his 
impulse is “probably no sharper than between twilight and 
dusk,”20 and in this respect, a more delineated approach is 
required which recognises that alcohol dependence syndrome may 
affect the defendant’s level of criminal responsibility, and 
potentiate liability in terms of prevening fault attribution. 
In the final Part of our article, we suggest that the recently 
reformulated diminished responsibility plea in English law, within 
the ambit of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and as interpreted 
by the Court of Appeal, provides an appropriate template for 
beneficial harmonisation in terms of accounting for the chronic 
alcoholic’s condition in order to appropriately attribute fault in 
murder cases. The revised plea can be aligned with medical 
simulacrums of alcohol dependence syndrome, and is 
representative of a more realistic view of human behaviour: in 
essence, “the distinction between the impulse that was irresistible 
and the impulse not resisted” should no longer operate 
determinately.21 
II. INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR LABELLING AND 
DOCTRINAL COHERENCE 
The current metaphysics of Anglo-American criminal law 
reveals an uneasy equipoise in assessment of the effect of 
voluntary intoxication on criminal liability.22 The juxtaposition 
 
 20.  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
11 (1982).  
 21.  See Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. 
J. 194, 196 (1983) (arguing that the insanity defence should be narrowed to 
exclude questions of “whether the defendant had the capacity to ‘control’ 
himself or whether he could have resisted the criminal impulse”).  
 22.  See generally Douglas Husak, Intoxication and Culpability, 6 CRIM. L. 
& PHIL. 363 (2012) (rejecting the common conceptualisation of the effect of 
intoxication on criminal liability as Anglo-American jurisdictions analyse this 
effect in many different ways); Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness, and 
Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 545 (2012) (analysing the “Intoxication 
Recklessness Principle” and when most justified to employ its use); Rebecca 
Williams, Voluntary Intoxication – A Lost Cause?, 129 L.Q.R. 264 (2012) (Eng.) 
(examining the disadvantages of applying “the Majewski” common law 
approach as the compromising rule for dealing with voluntary intoxication and 
other possible alternatives); Susan Dimock, The Responsibility of Intoxicated 
Offenders, 43 J. VALUE INQUIRY 339 (2009) (providing an overview of the 
different categories of intoxication defences and then critiquing the 
intoxication rules); Susan Dimock, What are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible 
for? The “Intoxication Defense” Re-Examined, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2011) 
(presenting a brief history of the common law of criminal liability as it relates 
to intoxicated offenders in Canada and objecting to those rules as applied); 
Kimberly Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 
(2001) (exploring the placement of opaque recklessness, as it often falls outside 
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may be constitutively identified as “Janus-faced”23 in that 
bifurcatory conceptualisations of intoxication as an inculpatory or 
exculpatory element are prevalent.24  Intoxication is not an excuse 
per se, as in the case of cognate defences such as loss of control25 or 
duress; nor does it align with justificatory elements of self-defence 
or necessity.26 The attributional significance of intoxication relates 
to the individual actor’s mental state, and from a subjectivism 
perspective it ought to primordially attach to a potential denial of 
fault appurtenant to the time-specificity of commission of the 
relevant harm.27 In simple terms of coincidental liability where the 
requisite fault is lacking, and the intoxicated “offender” has not 
formed the offence-fault definitional nexus, exculpation 
presumptively is implicated.28 The “inexorable logic” is that where 
 
the scope of culpable recklessness, in criminal law); and Holly Smith, Non-
Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 97 (2011) (arguing 
that attributionist views on non-tracing cases of culpable ignorance should be 
seriously considered and culpability should be extended to non-voluntary 
responses). 
 23.  LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 63, 279, and 351. 
 24.  See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 196-
99 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); WILLIAM WILSON, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE 
AND THEORY 221-25 (Longman Law Series 2011).  
  25.  The English provocation defence was abolished by the Coroners and 
Justice Act, 2009, section 56. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, pt. 2, c. 1, 
§ 56 (U.K.). Section 54(1)(a) and (7) of the 2009 Act reduce a conviction of 
murder to one of voluntary manslaughter where the defendant kills subject to 
a loss of control; the loss of control must be attributable to at least one of two 
qualifying triggers. Id. § 54(1)(a) & 54(7). “The first qualifying trigger is 
satisfied by a thing said or things done or said (or both) which constituted 
circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused D to have a 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger). 
The second qualifying trigger requires D to fear serious violence from V 
against D or another identified person (the ‘fear’ trigger).” Nicola Wake, Loss 
of Control Beyond Sexual Infidelity, 76 J. CRIM. L. 193, 193 (2012). See also 
Coroners and Justice Act, § 55(3) (applying subsection of “qualifying trigger” 
when “D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence 
from V against D or another identified person”); id. § 55(4)(a)–(b) (defining loss 
of self-control when attributable to “a thing or things done or said (or both)”); 
id. § 55(6)(c) (requiring that the “thing done or said constituted sexual 
infidelity is to be disregarded”); R v. Clinton, Parker, & Evans, [2012] EWCA 
(Crim) 2 (Eng.) (holding by an appellate court most recently on the new 
defence); R v. Asmelash, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 157, [25] (Eng.) (finding “that 
the loss of control defence must be approached without reference to the 
defendant’s voluntary intoxication” in applying the statutory provisions about 
“loss of control”). 
 26.   See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
14–15, 68–71 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (asserting a five-part categorisation 
that encompasses justifications, excuses, absent element defences (e.g. alibi), 
non-exculpatory defences (e.g. diplomatic immunity), and offence modification 
defences (e.g. renunciation in attempts or conspiracy)). 
 27.   See ANDREW SIMESTER & BOB SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND 
DOCTRINE 628–30 (Hart Publishing 2007). 
 28.  John Child, Drink, Drugs And Law Reform: A Review Of The Law 
Commission Report No. 314, CRIM. L.R. 2009, 7, 488-501 (Eng.). See generally 
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the mens rea is lacking within offence-specificity inferentially 
affected through intoxication or any other destabilisation, then 
criminal liability is precluded on accepted doctrine.29 
The corollary to this “strictly logical”30 and mechanistic 
adoption of subjective mens rea for the crime charged posits an 
alternative policy-driven conceptualisation of intoxication as 
inculpatory ex ante, and morally, the harmful consumption itself is 
viewed as blameworthy.31 The imbibing of intoxicants, either 
alcohol or drug-taking, lowers the levels of cognitive perception 
Chester Mitchell, The Intoxicated Offender—Refuting the Legal and Medical 
Myths, 11 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 77 (1988) (comparing legal assumptions 
about intoxication with scientific findings to demonstrate the discrepancies 
between the law and empirical scientific evidence, and how medical testimony 
further complicates rectifying this issue); Andrew Paizes, Intoxication 
Through the Looking Glass, 105 S. AFRICAN L.J. 776 (1988) (analysing South 
Africa’s recognition of voluntary intoxication as a possible complete defence 
and the effect this holding had on the “specific-intent rule” at the time). 
29. See generally LAW COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY ¶¶ 1.49-1.55 (Law Com No 314, 2009). See generally Jeremy Horder, 
A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, CRIM. L.R., Oct. 
1995, at 759 (U.K.) (analysing the “correspondence principle” between the 
actus reus and mens rea relationship and its limited application); Stephen 
Gough, Intoxication and Criminal Liability: The Law Commission’s Proposed 
Reforms, 112 L.Q.R. 335 (1996) (Eng.) (offering one interpretation of current 
intoxication rules while bringing to light three particular weaknesses of the 
Law Commission’s reform of these rules); Ewan Paton, Reformulating the 
Intoxication Rules: The Law Commission’s Report, CRIM. L.R., May 1995, at 
382 (U.K.) (analysing the legislative and legal movement towards re-
implementing recklessness in voluntary intoxication considerations). There is 
a basic link between the situation where D knowingly takes a risk that 
intoxication may cause him to commit the actus reus of an offence and 
recklessness in criminal law. Child, supra note 28, at 490–91. This link is not 
present where the offence requires evidence of knowledge or intention. Id. at 
491. The courts admit to failing to have developed a universal “logical test” in 
this area. R v. Heard, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 125, [32], [2008] Q.B. 43, [55] 
(Eng.). See also New Jersey v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (N.J. 1979) 
(creating a distinction between specific and general intent crimes allows 
intoxication defences to inconsistently excuse crimes).  
“It has of course been long understood that the consumption of alcohol, 
or indeed the taking of drugs, may diminish the ability of an individual 
to control or restrain himself, so that, in drink, or affected by drugs, he 
may behave in a way in which he would not have behaved when sober or 
drug free.  Although it may sometimes impact on the question whether 
the constituent elements of a crime, in particular in relation to the 
required intent, have been proved, self-induced intoxication does not 
provide a defence to a criminal charge.”  
Asmelash, EWCA (Crim) at [22]. 
30. Child, supra note 28, at 488.
31. Important herein is societal expectations regarding legitimate notions
of justice. See, e.g., LORD C. RADCLIFFE, THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS 63–64 
(Faber and Faber 1960) (stating that “[e]very system of jurisprudence 
needs . . . a constant preoccupation with the task of relating its rules and 
principles to the fundamental moral assumptions of the society to which it 
belongs”). 
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and physical restraint, and our courts are overly burdened with 
intoxicated offenders, especially in the context of violence and 
sexual crimes.32 The implicated policy consideration, in 
“absolutist” terms,33 is that for reasons of deterrence and social 
protection it is essential to convict outwith definitional offence 
coincidence of liability: “It is common knowledge that those who 
take alcohol to excess or certain sorts of drugs may become 
aggressive or do unpredictable things.”34 
This construction of intoxication “imputes” liability for prior 
fault in becoming intoxicated in the first instance, and engrains an 
evaluative moral culpability within the parameters of the offence-
responsibility nexus.35 The policy tension created in Anglo-
American standardisation lies in a legal hinterland between the 
scylla and the charybdis, viewing intoxication as either 
“exculpatory abnormality”36 or “morally culpable conduct.”37 The 
conundrum that is presented is how to square the circle between 
legitimate subjectivism of individual offender treatment, 
coalescing and contradicting with societal protection and moral 
responsibility.38 Further grist to the mill is added by realisation 
that all intoxicated offenders are not the same, that different 
gradations and thresholds apply to voluntary and involuntary 
intoxication, and concatenations of responsibility are demarcated 
 
 32.  See LAW COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra 
note 29, at  ¶ 1.55 (stating that “Given the culpability associated with 
knowingly and voluntarily becoming intoxicated, and the associated increase 
in the known risk of aggressive behaviour, there is a compelling argument for 
imposing criminal liability to the extent reflected by that culpability. The 
imposition of such criminal liability is morally justifiable in principle, and 
warranted by the desirability of ensuring public safety and deterring harmful 
conduct.”).  
 33.  Id. at ¶ 1.57. 
 34.  R v. Bailey, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760 (A.C.) (Eng.).  
 35.  Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A 
Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1985) [hereinafter Causing the Conditions].  
“[T]he imputation of a culpable state of mind when none truly exists 
seems particularly strange for the Model Penal Code drafters. These 
drafters actively opposed placing the burden of persuasion on the 
defendant for most defences. Yet as to intoxication, the drafters permit 
what is in essence an irrebutable presumption as to the existence of an 
element of the offense.”  
Id. at 17. Equivalent culpability may presumptively apply in that a defendant 
who voluntarily becomes intoxicated is equated with the reckless actor. Paul 
H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 660-63 (1984). 
 36.  LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 174, 182, 185–86, 200. 
 37.  Id. at 174, 198-200. 
 38.  “By allowing himself to get drunk, and thereby putting himself in such 
a condition as to be no longer amenable to the law’s commands, a man shows 
such [disregard] as amounts to for the purpose of all ordinary crimes . . . .” 
Douglas A. Stroud, Constructive Murder and Drunkenness, 36 L.Q.R. 268, 273 
(1920) (Eng.). 
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in terms of moral agency or otherwise.39 
Our arguments suggest that a new via media is needed to 
properly reflect fair labelling in these terms, and the template 
presented looks to potentiate liability linked to actual criminal 
responsibility across the spectra of intoxication imputations.40 It is 
suggested that this modelling provides a cathartic panacea and 
much needed substantive transparency in an arena that has been 
correctly described by the English Law Commission as, 
“ambiguous, misleading and confusing.”41 The quintessential 
inquiry as to “blameworthiness” in relation to any intoxicated 
offender should focus upon lack of individuated responsibility in 
terms of prevening fault and attributional liability. It is inapt to 
focus instead on cognitive states of imputed recklessness and 
thereby to amorphously construct a conviction on a fundamental 
predicate that stands in contradistinction to correspondence 
principles and substantive coherence.42 
A review of extant law reveals significant Anglo-American 
commonalities in creating a bifurcatory schematic template to 
voluntary intoxication. It is viewed through a schizophrenic legal 
prism of inculpation and exculpation, akin in characterisation to 
the allegorical literary creations of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The 
topographical map has designated all types of crime within the 
penumbra of two discrete categorisations. In this iteration stands 
offences transmogrified as specific intent (intention, knowledge or 
purpose fault ingredients) to which subjective principles of mens 
rea pertain, aligned together with offence-specific definitional 
elements as a pathway to liability.43 Intoxication is presumptively 
39. See generally Arlie Loughnan, Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal
Law, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (Eng.) (discussing mental incapacity in its 
application in deciding exculpation for crimes within the English and Welsh 
legal system). 
40. See Robinson, Causing the Conditions, supra note 36, at 59 (contending
in a different context that, “the defendant would escape or reduce his liability 
by showing that he was not reckless or negligent as to the offense both at the 
time he became intoxicated and at the time of the alleged offense. The state 
could increase the defendant’s liability by showing that when he became 
intoxicated, he was knowing or purposeful as to the offense”). 
41. LAW COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note
29, at ¶ 1.28; LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 278 (stating that “The rules about 
how intoxication affects criminal liability are rather notorious for their 
complexity and technicality.”); Derrick Augustus Carter, Bifurcations of 
Consciousness: The Elimination of the Self-Induced Intoxication Excuse, 64 
MO. L. REV. 384, 411 (1999) (noting that jurists and legal commenters find the 
specific / basic intent delineation “illogical, inconsistent and inequitable”). 
42. See generally Andrew Simester, Intoxication Is Never A Defence, 2009
CRIM. L.R. 3 (2013) (U.K.) (addressing how intoxication should not be a 
criminal defence); see also LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 279 (noting that in 
this regard, intoxication is “conceptualized as a ‘doctrine of imputation’”) 
(quoting ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 67. 
43. Lawrence P. Tiffany, The Drunk, The Insane, And the Criminal Courts:
Deciding What To Make Of Self-Induced Insanity, 69 WASH. U. L. REV. 221, 
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relevant not as a defence per se, but simply as part of the overall 
evidence to rebut the inference of fault that would otherwise be 
adduced. This doctrine of specific intent is transformational in that 
it “collapses a question of fact (did the defendant form the 
requisite intent?) into the question of capacity (was the defendant 
capable of forming the requisite intent?).”44 A physiological linkage 
applies between the intoxication and the specific intent crime fault 
element. Intoxication may be adduced as affecting the individual’s 
powers of ratiocination and ability to form compartmentalised 
intentions, and the jurors assess this as part of their incanted Mr. 
Hyde character personification. This generalised evidential 
assessment applies to jury evaluation as part of normative “folk 
knowledge”45 on the transitional changes to personality affected by 
drugs or alcohol.46 It is predicated on personal experience and 
evaluative assessments on individual culpable intoxication. This 
model, utilising fact finders as a barometer of normative fault 
attached to any intoxicated offender, has been adopted in other 
jurisdictions.47 It has been broadly legitimised to all types of 
offences in Victoria in Australia and New Zealand, and not simply 
to those categorised as specific intent.48 Views, however, have been 
 
226-27 (1991); see generally Megan Paulk Ingle, Law On The Rocks: The 
Intoxication Defenses Are Being Eighty-Sixed, 55 VAND. L. REV. 607 (2002) 
(addressing mens rea and intoxication); Lawrence P. Tiffany, Pathological 
Intoxication And The Model Penal Code, 69 NEB. L. REV. 763 (1990) 
(addressing how intoxication relates to intent in the Model Penal Code).  
 44.  LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 121. 
 45.  Id. at 47. 
 46.  WILSON, supra note 24, at 231. Wilson cogently asserts:  
[s]ince it is common knowledge that intoxication disposes people to 
commit crime, voluntary intoxication supplies the fault element which 
intention and recklessness normally express. It is not necessarily 
contrary to principle, therefore, to hold a person responsible for an 
unforeseen harm if both the harm and the lack of foresight were 
occasioned by voluntary intoxication (a mind at fault).  A more elegant 
solution would be to remove entirely the need to reply on such 
constructive recklessness. 
Id. 
 47.  See R v Keogh (Vic) [1964] VR 400 (Austl.) (stating it is a jury’s job to 
determine if the defendant has the requisite mental state required for the 
crime, or if intoxication has precluded the forming of guilty intent); R v 
O’Connor [1980] 29 ALR 449 (Austl.)(Gibbs, J,, Mason, J., & Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (determining that evidence of self-induced intoxication is relevant 
if it raises a reasonable doubt as to whether an individual actor acted 
intentionally or voluntarily when committing the relevant act). This was a 
decision in Australia by a bare minority of the High Court. Id. In essence, the 
High Court minority refused any distinction between “specific” and “basic 
intent” offences holding the distinction to be unsupportable, and hence self-
induced intoxication could be relied upon to negative the fault element of any 
offence. Id. Barwick C.J., Stephen J., Murphy J. and Aicken J. were in the 
majority. Id. See also R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 (CA) (refuting any 
bifurcatory classification divide). This is the key authority in New Zealand. Id. 
 48.  See Gough, supra note 30, at 342-43 (observing that certain case law 
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intemperately and splenetically expressed, as to the success or 
otherwise of such a template: 
[T]he Australian approach . . . relies on juries to make covert moral 
assessments and not simply the factual assessment that the law 
requires.49 
In contradistinction, and for fundamental reconsideration 
herein, stands offences designated as basic intent (recklessness or 
negligence).50 In this pantheon, intoxication will not negative an 
inference of fault, but rather liability is constructed around the 
morally culpable conduct of the defendant in becoming intoxicated 
prior to the commission of the actus reus of the specified offence. 
The paradigm is that it is the state of intoxication that constitutes 
the culpability required for the offence.51 In this regard, however, 
it is important that we can justify the reasons for temporally 
defining the offence elements and harm-prevention nexus that 
pervades criminal law.52 For basic intent crimes a schism applies 
between T1 (the culpable intoxicating interlude) and T2 (external 
elements of offence commission). The actus reus elements for basic 
intent crimes at T2, without any subjective mens rea attachment, 
is conjoined together with the T1 state of intoxication to create 
 
makes no distinction between specific intent and general intent). R v. 
O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, 82 (Austl.) (Barwick C.J.: “[T]he distinction 
between basic and specific intent is unhelpful as a basis for distinction or 
crimes by reference to mens rea.”). 
 49.  ASHWORTH, supra note 24, at 201; see also Gerald Orchard, The Law 
Commission Paper on Intoxication and Criminal Liability: Part 2: Surviving 
Without Majewski – A View From Down Under, CRIM. L.R., Jun. 1993, at 426, 
429 (Eng.) (stating that the courts will take the decision out of the hands of 
the jury if there is not enough evidence to reasonably conclude that the there 
is an absence of intent). 
 50.  See SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 633-36; see generally 
Ingle, supra note 43 (discussing intoxication and the mens rea of 
recklessness).  
 51.  See LAW COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra 
note 29, at ¶ 2.19 (stating “D ought to be aware that by becoming voluntarily 
intoxicated, D increases the risk that he or she will cause harm to other 
persons or damage to property. That is enough to justify liability for the range 
of violent and sexual offences classified as offences of ‘basic intent’”); see 
generally James Chalmers, Surviving Without Majewski?, CRIM. L.R., Mar. 
2001, at 258 (Eng.) (addressing how voluntary intoxication can provide the 
necessary intent element to a crime); Alan Gold, An Untrimmed “Beard”: The 
Law of Intoxication As A Defence To A Criminal Charge, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 34 
(1976) (Eng.) (discussing how the intent requirement cannot be rebutted with 
evidence of voluntary intoxication). 
 52.  See generally Stephen Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of 
Emphasis On The Results of Conduct In The Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
1497 (1974) (addressing the results of criminal punishment); Paul R. Hoeber, 
The Abandonment Defense To Criminal Attempt And Other Problems Of 
Temporal Individuation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 377 (1986) (discussing temporal 
aspects to criminal offenses, such as attempt). 
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“inculpation”.53 The rationale for “offender” liability, despite the 
lack of coincidence in offence-definition nexus, was provided by a 
unanimous judgment of the House of Lords in Majewski.54 It is 
predicated upon a “fiction”55 that transmutes the common parlance 
of “recklessness” as an every-day term embracing an individual 
heedless of risk or demonstrating a lack of consideration to others, 
into a prescriptive and substantive definition of subjective 
recklessness as an essential fault element.56 This metamorphosis 
is replicated in the U.S. under the Model Penal Code definition, 
and in some common law jurisdictions.57 
In Majewski, following an incident in a public house, the 
defendant was convicted of three offences of assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm and three offences of assaulting a police officer 
in the execution of his duty.58 Prior to the alleged assaults 
Majewski had consumed large quantities of drugs and alcohol, as a 
result of which he said that he had been totally unaware of what 
he was doing, and thus was not subjectively reckless in accordance 
with the offence-definition element. Their Lordships, nonetheless, 
constructively imputed liability for policy reasons attached to basic 
intent offences of violence or disorder.59 If the accused is indeed so 
drunk that he does not form the mens rea of a basic intent crime, 
the prosecution will be unable to establish the fault element for 
culpability. In such circumstances the prosecution should, in 
accordance with Majewski, be entitled to prove that the accused 
did not form the mens rea for the offence, but that had he not been 
drunk he would have done so.60 The external elements of T2 are 
conjoined with T1 (voluntary consumption of drink or drugs), and 
liability can be established even though the individual actor did 
not appreciate the relevant risks, so long as it can be proved that 
the defendant (personified as Dr Jekyll) would have appreciated 
 
 53.  Simester, supra note 42, at 4-5. 
 54.  DPP v Majewski, [1977] A.C. 443 (H.L.) 474-75; see Alan Dashwood, 
Logic And The Lords in Majewski [1977] CRIM. L.R. 532 (1977) (U.K.).  
 55.  WILSON, supra note 24, at 231. 
 56.  ORMEROD ET AL, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW 314-16 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 13th ed., 2011). 
 57.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2). This code provides that self-induced 
intoxication is of no relevance to offences including recklessness as an 
element. Id. A number of states, including Montana, have a wider prohibition 
on the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication, excluding such 
evidence even in relation to fault requirements of intention or knowledge; and 
in Montana v Egelhoff, a plurality of the Supreme Court determined an 
evidentiary rule excluding such evidence was not unconstitutional. 518 U.S. 37 
(1996). 
 58.  Majewski, [1977] A.C. at 498. See generally Simon Gardner, The 
Importance Of Majewski, 14 O.J.L.S. 279 (1994) (discussing the Majewski 
case). 
 59.  Majewski, [1977] A.C. at 474-75.  
 60.  Id. 
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that risk if he or she had been sober.61 This construct of 
intoxication portrays it as an inculpatory mechanism to assist 
prosecutors, distilled from prior fault, and to safeguard societal 
interests so adduced by Lord Elwyn-Jones in Majewski: 
If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to 
cast off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done to 
him by holding him answerable criminally for any injury he may do 
while in that condition. His course of conduct in reducing himself by 
drugs and drink to that condition in my view supplies the evidence 
of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic 
intent?62 
The constructive nature of liability attached to prior fault in 
becoming intoxicated, in essence antecedent mens rea at T1, is also 
reflected in section 2.08(2) of the American Model Penal Code 
which provides that self-induced intoxication is of no relevance to 
offences involving recklessness as an element: “When recklessness 
establishes an element of the offence, if the actor, due to self-
induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have 
been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.”63 
A preponderance of states in the U.S. have accepted a distinction 
between specific / general intent (basic) classifications.64 If the only 
reason why an individual actor was reckless in their actions 
correlates to T1, and the defendant was too intoxicated to realise 
the risk they were taking, then imputed recklessness transpires. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code highlighted the risk-creation 
justification that governs intoxicated constructive liability, and is 
pervasive today at common law: 
[T]here is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential 
consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings 
 
 61.  Simester, supra note 42, at 4-5. The author asserts:  
The criminal law does contain an intoxication doctrine, but it is a 
doctrine of inculpation not exculpation. Whether the intoxication 
doctrine is evidential or substantive in character is uncertain, and I 
shall say something about that question below. Either way, however, it 
operates for the benefit of the prosecution, not the defence.  Wherever 
the doctrine applies, its function—its sole function—is to treat the 
defendant as if he acted with mens rea when, in fact, he did not. 
Id. at 4.  
 62.  Majewski, [1977] A.C. at 474-75. “[A] person who kills another should 
not be “privileged” if he [sic] was drunk when he acted, and actually deserves 
double punishment, because he has doubly offended.” Reniger v Feogossa 
(1551) 75 ER 1, 31 cited in DPP v Beard, [1920] 1 A.C. 479, 494. 
 63.  See generally Tiffany, The Drunk, The Insane, and the Criminal Courts: 
Deciding What to Make of Self-Induced Insanity, supra note 43, at 226-27. 
 64.  Id. Some States regard intoxication evidence as irrelevant in terms of 
assessing culpability and reports show that very few claims of involuntary 
intoxication are accepted. Ingle, supra note 43, at 608; see also JEROME HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 539 (Bobbs-Merrill 1960). See 
generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (Matthew 
Bender 1995). 
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to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in 
our culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence 
between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and 
the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk.65 
This fictionalised personification of criminal recklessness may 
be pervasive, but it is important to readdress the moral legitimacy 
of this ascription and the flawed assumptions that underpin the 
construct. 
III. POTENTIATE LIABILITY AND CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW STANDARISATIONS FOR 
INTOXICATION 
It is our contention that to continue to predicate the 
inculpatory effect of intoxication for basic intent crimes on a 
legalised fiction of subjective recklessness is fundamentally inapt, 
undermines fair labelling principles, and contradicts the 
requirement of specificity regarding individuation of offence 
definition.66 The continued pretence of deeming that such 
offenders are reckless in a criminal fault connotation, as if mens 
rea were present because foresight of the risk of harm described in 
the gravity of the offence should / ought to have been prevalent if 
the actor had been sober, is simply a prosecutorial inculpatory 
tool.67 The nature of prior fault, when properly deconstructed, is 
misunderstood in Anglo-American extant standardisations.68 It is 
not that the intoxicated offender is criminally reckless—in truth 
they lack subjective recklessness as a fault concept where any risk 
of harm never crossed their mind because they were inebriated. 
The stark reality, as a consequence, is not that they were 
criminally reckless, but that they were criminally responsible.  It 
is criminal responsibility in terms of awareness of the risk of 
criminality at the T1 stage of individuation that requires further 
exposition and appropriate modelling.69 The concepts of potentiate 
liability and prevening fault underpin consequentialist liability to 
this effect, and address fair labelling requirements. 
There must exist a moral legitimacy for inculpating the 
intoxicated “offender” who commits basic intent crimes without 
 
 65.  MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08, 3, and 9 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959). 
 66.  See WILSON, supra note 24, at 231-33. 
 67.  Simester, supra note 42, at 4. 
 68.  See generally Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing The 
Awkward, The Stupid, The Selfish And The Weak: Negligence As Criminal 
Culpability, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 147 (2011); Peter Western, An Attitudinal 
Theory Of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHIL. 289 (2006); LARRY ALEXANDER & 
KIMBERLEY KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J MORSE, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
 69.  See Rebecca Williams, Voluntary Intoxication – A Lost Cause?, supra 
note 22 (Eng.) (arguing for a new intoxication offence for the irresponsible 
acting.; see also Dimock, The Responsibility Of Intoxicated Offenders, supra 
note 22. 
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the prevalence of the designated offence-specific70 mens rea 
element at the time of the offence. It is provided by a 
standardisation of potentiate liability for prevening fault. 
Inculcated policy rationalisations are derived from abjuration of 
individual responsibility and attributional liability attached to 
lack of care as a moral agent determinative of inculpation, and not 
cognitive states of falsely imputed mens rea.71 Moral culpability 
should effectively apply in that an individual party must take 
responsibility for elective choices—drinking or taking drugs: “[I]t 
should be drunken unawareness, inattention or dangerousness 
which should be punished rather than allow the courts to continue 
to impose fictionalised responsibility for a crime where mens rea is 
lacking.”72 The epicentre of potentiate liability for intoxicated 
behaviour conflagrates around the standardisation of harm 
prevention as part of the legitimate factorisation of conduct 
criminalisation.73 Harm was perceived by Mill in the sphere of 
legitimate restriction of individual liberty and autonomy,74 and 
subsequently extrapolated by Feinberg as, “a thwarting; setting 
back or defeating of an interest.”75 
A corollary exists between our arguments of potentiate 
liability and prevening fault attribution to intoxicated “offenders”, 
and developments in substantive English law on supervening fault 
and creation of a dangerous situation.76 The latter doctrine is 
delineated by a reverse temporal individuation of harm–fault 
nexus in specificity.77At T1 the individual may create a dangerous 
situation without culpability, but this is aligned at T2 with 
supervening fault created by a failure of responsibility to an extent 
that is inculpatory.78Supervening fault is attributable where the 
criminal actor has set in motion a dangerous situation (in Miller79 
 
 70.  See generally Paul H Robinson, Causing The Conditions, supra note 35. 
 71.  GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 421 (Little Brown 
1978); see also Bob Sullivan, Making Excuses, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 
(Andrew Simester and ATH Smith eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (asserting: 
“Attributions of liability in Anglo-American criminal law rest on certain key 
assumptions. There is an assumption of free will or a version of compatibilism 
or at least that certain reactive attitudes to conduct and the punitive 
responses they engender remain acceptable practices even if hard 
determinism be true”). 
 72.  WILSON, supra note 24, at 231. 
 73.  See generally TADROS, supra note 3, at 207-11. 
 74.  See generally JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 22 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
 75.  JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 33 (Oxford Univ. Press 1984). 
 76.  See generally ALAN REED & BEN FITZPATRICK, CRIMINAL LAW 32-34 
(Sweet and Maxwell 2009). 
 77.  Paul R Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense To Criminal Attempt And 
Other Problems Of Temporal Individuation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 377 (1986). 
 78.  Alan Reed, Criminal Law, (2010) ALL ENGLAND ANNUAL REV. 131. 
 79.  R v. Miller [1982] UKHL 6, [1983] 2 A.C. 161 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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it was arson and in Evans80 the risk affected by drug 
administration related to gross negligence manslaughter) and then 
comes under an incumbent duty to prevent the harm occurring by 
taking effective and “reasonable” remedial steps to prevent 
inculpatory liabilities.81 Harm and deterrence theories coalesce 
together to identify liability of an intoxicated offender on similar 
grounds of reverse conduct prophylaxis, and reflective instead of 
potentiate liability for morally blameworthy engagement. 
The appellate court in Evans determined that the “duty” 
(criminal responsibility) arises when the individual actor realises 
or ought to have realised the danger; it is this foresight (or 
otherwise) of causing impairment or future harm that will apply in 
our new individuated proposals to intoxicated offenders.82 The 
harm-offence reasonableness nexus correlates with potentiate 
liability and the ambit of criminal responsibility attached to 
awareness of harm as a moral agent. A defendant who has created 
a dangerous situation is held to be under a criminal responsibility 
to mitigate the harm via proportionate reciprocal acts of 
disengagement: in Miller when the defendant accidentally set 
alight a mattress he became under a responsibility to counteract 
the damage to the property at risk by telephoning the fire brigade 
or householder; and in Evans the defendant’s supply of drugs 
supplied to her younger half-sister engendered prospective duties 
focused upon contacting hospital authorities or other effective care 
providers.83 The essence is that legitimate focus is accorded to the 
criminal responsibility of a morally blameworthy defendant who 
fails to regard the interests of others or risks attendant to culpable 
(in)activity.84 In a generalised context attribution of culpability, 
aligning together concepts of prevening and supervening fault, is 
posited by awareness of potential harmful effects attached to lack 
of moral responsibility. This model for the intoxicated offender 
may be contextualised in Anglo-American standardisations by 
evaluation of treatment in four identifiable situations and 
dépecage principles adopted: Dutch Courage and drinking to 
commit specific offences; pathological intoxication and imbibing of 
“therapeutic” intoxicants; involuntary intoxication (outwith 
alcoholism); and basic intent offences simpliciter. The subsequent 
Parts to this article then concentrate specifically on the alcoholic 
offender and inter-relationship of potentiate liability within 
partial defences. 
 
 80.  R v. Evans, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 650, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1999 (Eng.). See 
also Glenys Williams, Gross Negligence And Duty Of Care in “Drugs” Cases: R 
v Evans, CRIM. L.R. 2009, 9, 631. 
 81.  Reed, supra note 78. 
 82.  Id. at 136-37. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Sullivan, supra note 71.  
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A. Dutch Courage: Drinking to Commit Specific Crimes 
The potentiate liability principles apply with broad effect to 
intoxication induced with the purpose of committing crime. An 
individual actor who drinks to provide Dutch Courage to commit 
any designated offence, specific or basic, abjures responsibility to 
others and is morally culpable to an indefensible extent.85 In terms 
of temporal individuation of offence-definition nexus the prior fault 
awareness at T1 ought to be added to the unlawful commission of 
actus reus elements at T2 without delineation to inculpate the 
morally blameworthy agent. Potentiate liability ought to be 
holistically transmogrified to “Dutch Courage offenders” and to 
any offence without categorisation: “The actor’s liability for the 
offence may be based on his conduct at the time he becomes 
voluntary intoxicated and his accompanying state of mind as to 
the elements of the subsequent offence.”86 
By way of postulation, if a defendant forms an intent to kill 
his wife and then drinks heavily to give himself the courage to do 
the deed, he would undoubtedly be guilty of murder if, when he 
shot his wife, he intended to kill her; the fact that the alcohol had 
removed his fear of completing the deed would be totally 
irrelevant. If, however, the intoxication “removed” his mens rea at 
T2, yet he still managed to kill his wife, an argument may exist as 
to liability or otherwise for the specific intent offence of murder. A 
similar dilemmatic situation would be implicated if the accused, 
having formed an intent to kill his wife, drinks a large amount of 
alcohol which induces a latent disease of the mind so that he is 
unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts and in this 
state kills his wife. Both situations were addressed by Lord 
Denning in Attorney General for Northern Ireland,87 where he said: 
If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and 
makes preparation for it, knowing it is a wrong thing to do, and then 
gets himself drunk so as to give himself Dutch courage to do the 
killing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely on 
his self-induced drunkenness as a defence to a charge of killing, nor 
even as reducing it to manslaughter. He cannot say that he got 
himself into such a stupid state that he was incapable of an intent to 
kill. So also when he is a psychopath, he cannot by drinking rely on 
his self-induced defect of reason as a defence of insanity. The 
wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn 
 
 85.  Roger Shiner, Intoxication and Responsibility, 13 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 9, 9 (1990); Chester Mitchell, The Intoxicated Offender - Refuting 
the Legal and Medical Myths, 11 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 77, 77 (1988); Alan 
R. Ward, Making Some Sense of Self-Induced Intoxication, 45 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
247, 247 (1986). 
 86.  See Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions, supra note 35, at 35 
(finding the actor’s liability at the time he becomes intoxicated properly 
accounts for different levels of culpability as to causing the subsequent 
offense). 
 87.  Att’y Gen. for N. Ireland v. Gallagher, [1961] UKHL 2, [1963] A.C. 349.  
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him, coupled with the act which he intended to do and did do.88 
In both perspectives, envisaged by Lord Denning, there is a 
problem in that at the time the defendant perpetrated the actus 
reus (T2) he did not possess the mens rea and at the time he had 
the mens rea (T1) he did not bring about the actus reus. On the 
other hand, it seems entirely reasonable to say that if a man plans 
to kill his wife or indeed any lesser crime of violence, drinks to 
such an extent that he loses his ability to appreciate what he is 
doing and then while in this state for which he is criminally 
responsible, kills his wife, he should be convicted of murder.89 
Potentiate liability and prevening fault implicate liability for all 
types of offences in this regard, general or specific, predicated 
upon awareness of harmful effects directly linked to lack of moral 
responsibility. It is almost as if the individual actor is using 
himself as an innocent agent, but it is an agency disregarding the 
interests of others or risks attendant to culpable activity.90 A 
fortiori liability is implicated if the defendant is aware that 
excessive drinking triggers in him a dangerous and aggressive 
pattern of behaviour. 
B. Pathological Intoxication and Non-Dangerous Therapeutic 
Drugs 
Anglo-American constructs of intoxication draw parallels in 
terms of pathological intoxication where the physiological 
responses attendant to ingestion are unforeseeable, and 
demarcations apply between dangerous / non-dangerous drug-
taking.91 The normal rule for basic intent crimes, imputing 
88. Id. at 381. This view appears to be equally applicable to the new loss of
control defence, under sections 54-55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In 
the recent Court of Appeal case, R v. Asmelash, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 157, [17] 
(Eng.), it was suggested by counsel that the partial defence should not be 
available where the defendant had been drinking to give himself Dutch 
courage for some violent action. 
89. William Wilson, Involuntary Intoxication Excusing the Inexcusable, 1
RES PUBLICA 25 (1995). 
90. A corollary applies here to the decision in Ryan v. R (1967) 121 CLR
205, 205 (Austl.), vis-à-vis self-induced automatism. The defendant robbed a 
service station threatening the cashier with a sawn-off rifle; the rifle was 
loaded and the safety catch was off. He attempted to tie up the cashier with 
one hand while pointing the rifle at him with the other.  Unfortunately, the 
cashier made a sudden movement and Ryan shot him dead. The appellant 
contended that he had been startled by the sudden movement and had pressed 
the trigger “involuntarily”. The majority in the High Court of Australia took 
the view that he had voluntarily placed himself in a situation where he might 
need to make a split-second decision and the fact that he so responded by 
pulling the trigger did not make that act an involuntary act in the nature of an 
act done in a convulsion or epileptic seizure. It was conduct to which 
attributional liability applied in terms of criminal responsibility and similarly 
for the intoxicated offender in all types of Dutch courage situations.  Id. 
91. Lawrence P. Tiffany & Mary Tiffany, Nosologic Objections to the
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constructive liability by the Majewski application of “recklessness”, 
is overtaken by an alternative standardisation of recklessness 
where intoxication arises from drugs taken for therapeutic 
reasons: “If [D] does appreciate the risk that [failure to take food / 
taking the non-dangerous drug] may lead to aggressive, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable conduct and he nevertheless 
deliberately runs the risk or otherwise disregards it, this will 
amount to recklessness.”92 In essence, faultless self-induced 
intoxication by drugs is to be regarded as involuntary intoxication, 
and therefore outside the scope of the Majewski rule.93 These 
overarching principles were enunciated in Bailey,94 where the 
defendant was a diabetic requiring insulin to control sugar levels 
but failed to follow the medically prescribed treatment, and 
subsequently claimed that he had assaulted the victim during a 
period of unconsciousness caused by hypoglycaemia. There was no 
evidence to suggest that he was aware that failure to take 
sufficient food might lead to him becoming aggressive or 
dangerous, and so potentiate liability did not apply. In similar vein 
the agitated defendant in Hardie,95 who had taken valium tablets 
for the first time in order to calm nerves after a relationship 
ended, and then set fire to a bedroom, arguably had no 
appreciation of the risk created by the disorientation, and 
Majewski is inapplicable if the drug taken is “wholly different in 
kind from drugs which are liable to cause unpredictability or 
aggressiveness.”96 
Criminal Defense of Pathological Intoxication: What do the Doubters Doubt?, 
13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 49, 49 (1990). 
92. Bailey, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 765 (Eng.).
93. By way of comparison see R v. Quick, [1973] 1 Q.B. 910 at 922 (Eng.)
(“A self-induced incapacity will not excuse . . . , nor will one which could have 
been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do 
something, as, for example, . . . failing to have regular meals while taking 
insulin.”); LAW COMMISSION SCOPING PAPER, INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM 
(Law Com SP, 2012); Adam Jackson, Nicola Wake & Natalie Wortley, Insanity 
and Automatism: A Response to the Law Commission: Part 1, CRIM. L. & 
JUSTICE WEEKLY, 176, 50, 731-33 (2012); Adam Jackson, Nicola Wake & 
Natalie Wortley, Insanity and Automatism: A Response to the Law 
Commission: Part 2, CRIM. L. & JUSTICE WEEKLY, 176, 51-52, 752-54 (2012). 
But see LAW COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER, INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM 
(Law Com SP, 2013) (recommending that faultless self-induced intoxication in 
this context should fall within the parameters of a newly proposed “Recognised 
Medical Condition” defence). 
94. Bailey, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 760 (Eng.).
95. R v. Hardie, [1984] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 64 (Eng.); DAVID 
ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW 314 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
96. See Hardie, [1985] 1 W.L.R. at [70]. “Since drinking alcoholic liquor is
not usually followed by gross intoxication and does not usually lead to the 
commission of serious injuries, it follows that persons who commit them while 
grossly intoxicated should not be punished, unless at the time of the sobriety 
and voluntary drinking, they had such prior experience as to anticipate their 
intoxication and that they would become dangerous in that condition.” HALL, 
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It is within the boundaries of pathological intoxication and 
separate treatment for therapeutic drug-taking that our schematic 
template for potentiate liability and prior fault derivations of fair 
labelling receives the clearest endorsement from extant juridical 
precepts. Criminal responsibility attaches only to a defendant who 
is morally culpable and who with awareness disregards the 
interests of others or risks attendant to harmful conduct. The term 
“recklessness” is used in a particularised context of risk-taking 
awareness, and in a generalised sense, not requiring foresight of 
the actus reus of any particular crime as mandated in purposive 
criminal recklessness specificity. Instead, it is utilised to identify 
recklessness as moral culpability or otherwise and via 
transmogrification of awareness of a risk that the actor will 
become aggressive or dangerous (at T1 stage).97 Prior fault applies 
in a pithy sense that reflects the earthy realism behind 
appropriate criminalised behaviour in this sphere derived from 
harmful moral agency.98 
C. Involuntary Intoxication 
An individual may not be responsible for his intoxicated state, 
and consequently moral blamelessness may attach at the T1 stage 
of potentiate liability. A person may become involuntarily 
intoxicated in a variety of ways: his drinks may have been laced or 
he may have been tricked into taking drugs without his knowledge 
or the drugs may have been forcibly administered. The Model 
Penal Code response has been to establish a presumptive defence 
for involuntary intoxication99 to all types of criminal offence, but 
 
supra note 65, at 556. 
 97.  It is submitted that the word “recklessness” was utilised by the 
appellate courts in Bailey and Hardie to refer to the “fault” required by the 
individual actor in bringing about the condition of automatism. In order for 
the inculpation of an offence requiring subjective reckless it is apparent that a 
defendant would need to have been “subjectively reckless” in terms of a 
different connotation of lack of moral responsibility (prevening fault) in 
bringing about his or her condition. 
 98.  See SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 637 (asserting that the 
essence underlying juridical precepts in this substantive arena, “is a 
commendable reluctance to subject persons taking drugs for therapeutic 
benefit to the regime of social protection endorsed by the House of Lords in 
Majewski”). 
 99.  Intoxication which is “not self-induced”. The drafters of the Model 
Penal Code used the term “self-induced” in order to avoid confusion regarding 
the term “involuntary”, which could be seen to include duress or coercion. 
Although this article refers to involuntariness throughout in relation to the 
alcohol dependent defendant, it should be borne in mind that the term is not 
intended to encompass duress and coercion in this context. There is no 
statutory definition of “involuntary” intoxication in English law; however, the 
courts have similarly adopted a restrictive view of the concept. For example, a 
drink that is surreptitiously laced with alcohol will constitute involuntary 
intoxication. R v. Allen, CRIM. L.R. 1988, 698 (Eng.). Whereas underestimating 
the potentiate effects of substances will not. R v. Eatch, CRIM. L.R. 1980, 650 
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only where constitutively the actor is deprived of “substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the law.”100 The resonance 
herein is compotation with uncertain principles related to 
automatism where capacity for self-control is lost.101 The 
boundaries between automatism / involuntary intoxication are 
blurred in this respect, and the solipsistic line-drawing 
engagement precipitated has precluded common law adoption by 
many U.S. jurisdictions.102 The extant position in English law is 
laid out in the House of Lords judgment in Kingston,103 and the 
general principle unfortunately remains that unless relevant as a 
denial of mens rea defence, the moral blamelessness or qualitative 
culpability of an act does not affect inculpation.104 The 
involuntarily intoxicated “offender” remains liable if it is proved 
that the external elements of a crime were committed at T2 stage 
with the offence-definitional fault specificity.105 The gradation of 
moral culpability only impacts on gravamen of sentence. 
It is submitted that substantive doctrinal principles operate 
capriciously against destabilised “offenders” who have been 
involuntarily intoxicated. Potentiate liability is not invoked at the 
T1 stage of temporal individuation, and the morally blameless 
offender ought to be able to raise an inference for fact-finder 
determination that but for the disinhibition created involuntarily 
and without responsibility at T1, no harmful effects at T2 would 
have been engendered: “The non-conviction of the blameless 
should be a pervasive principle of substantive criminal law limited 
only by the need to theorise and practice criminal law as a system 
of rules and by the exigencies of forensic practicability.”106 The 
defendant should have the opportunity to argue that the 
 
(Eng.). 
 100.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (4) (a) and (b); Fingarette, Addiction and 
Criminal Responsibility, supra note 9, at 424 n.56; see also Ingle, supra note 
43, at 644 (suggesting that, “the involuntary intoxication defense is illusory. 
Like the Loch Ness monster, it is often discussed, sometimes searched for, but 
ultimately never convincingly documented”). 
 101.  ASHWORTH, supra note 24, at 203-04. See generally R v. Coley, McGhee 
and Harris [2013] EWCA (Crim) 223; R v. Oye [2013] EWCA (Crim) 1725. 
 102.  Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal 
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (1992). See also Ronnie Mackay, 
Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism, CRIM. L.R. 1982, 146 (“Problems stem 
from the fact that intoxication is regarded as a plea which is separate and 
distinct from automatism when this is plainly not so.”). 
 103.  R v. Kingston, [1994] UKHL 9, [1995] 2 A.C. 355 (Eng.); Bob Sullivan, 
Involuntary Intoxication and Beyond, CRIM. L.R. 1994, 272; Stephen Gardner, 
Criminal Defences by Judicial Discretion, 111 L.Q.R. 177, 177 (1995); John 
Spencer, Involuntary Intoxication as a Defence, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 12, 12 
(1995). 
 104.  See SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 638–39. 
 105.  As Loughnan notes, “[w]here the moral culpability underpinning the 
legal approach to voluntary intoxication is absent, the effects of that approach 
are unpalatable.” Loughnan, supra note 10, at 304. 
 106.  Sullivan, supra note 71.  
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allegorical Mr. Hyde personification at stage T2 would not have 
occurred to Dr. Jekyll without involuntary intoxication at T1 
creating disequilibrium and destabilisation. The persuasive 
burden should rest on a defendant to address lack of prevening 
fault in this contextualisation.107 
The adoption of a reverse burden affirmative defence, 
focusing on lack of prevening fault, may be supported by three 
separate arguments highlighted in disparate sections of the 
commentary to the Model Penal Code: (i) most importantly the 
constitutive facts and attitudinal behaviour (character 
personification) are within the ambit of the individual actor to 
fruitfully produce for the court, including motivational pathways; 
(ii) instances of this type of defence predicated on lack of prevening 
fault or culpable awareness at T1 will occur very infrequently, and 
when they do arise the defence is often unlikely, subject to 
correction by the defendant; and (iii) the focus on lack of potentiate 
liability and no disregard for the interests of others at T1 creates 
an affirmative defence of exceptional pathology attached to moral 
legitimacy exculpating the radically destabilised “offender”.108 
D. Basic Intent Offences Simpliciter 
It is time to acknowledge that Anglo-American intoxication 
doctrine has created a legal fiction in terms of imputed liability for 
basic intent offences.109 This constructive liability is predicated not 
on criminal recklessness but criminal responsibility of a volitional 
agent, and the prior fault lies in voluntary intoxication. It is 
attributional culpability derived from potentiate liability at T1 
temporal individuation, and applies irrespective of conscious 
advertence to the risk of ultimate harm. Fair labelling and 
doctrinal coherence requires a specific offence110 detailing the 
inculpatory nature of prevening fault, and potentiate liability, 
mirroring the German Code standardisation: 
Whosoever intentionally or negligently puts himself into a drunken 
state by consuming alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants shall be 
 
 107.  See generally FLETCHER, supra note 71. 
 108.  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, §5.01, 361 (Official Draft 
1962 and Revised Comments 1985). 
 109.  See WILSON, supra note 24, at 231. 
 110.  See Rebecca Williams, supra note 22 (suggesting, in a different context 
to potentiate liability, a bespoke offence of “committing (the actus reus of 
offence X) while intoxicated” and suggesting that this “could [in principle] 
apply across the board”); LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL 
CODE: INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 60–61; ¶ 263(2), (Law Com No 
229, 1992) (introducing plans for criminal intoxication—”guilty of doing the 
act while in a state of voluntary intoxication”). See generally Dimock, The 
Responsibility of Intoxicated Offenders, supra note 22 (arguing that the 
“[Canadian courts’] treatment of intoxicated offenders is inconsistent across 
[the intoxication rule] categories and offends important principle[s] of criminal 
justice and legality”). 
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liable to imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine if he 
commits an unlawful act while in this state . . . . The penalty must 
not be more severe than the penalty provided for the offence which 
was committed while he was in the drunken state.111 
It is the commission of an unlawful act whilst in a state of 
voluntary intoxication to which potentiate liability ought to apply 
in our recalibration of Anglo-American standardisations. The 
position may be different, however, in the context of a large cadre 
of offenders who assert that their intoxication is involuntary 
because of addiction to alcohol or other intoxicants. The 
boundaries of the Majewski bifurcation appear inapposite to the 
intoxicated alcoholic “offender” who kills as a result of this 
condition. The delimitation in the U.S., viewing alcoholism as only 
relevant to denial of “substantial capacity” within self-induced 
automatism, remains unduly constraining and inapt. It is our 
perspective, addressed in the subsequent parts of this article, that 
the condition of alcoholism for the purposes of diminished 
responsibility, and as a partial defence to murder, must be treated 
more expansively in our dépecage identifications. The reforms to 
English law contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, as 
interpreted by recent juridical authorities, and operating in 
tandem with novel proposals on classificatory systems, constitute 
a template for beneficial harmonisation. The first drink need not 
be taken involuntarily at the T1 stage of individuation, but rather 
potentiate liability principles mandate a wider consideration of 
prevening culpability and responsibility. 
 
 111.  Die Übersetzung [German Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL I 
[FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE] § 323a, amended by Article 3 of the Law of Oct. 2, 
2009, translated by PROF. DR. MICHAEL BOHLANDER. See LOUGHNAN, supra 
note 10, at 315. (arguing that this approach would “make overt the connection 
between intoxication and criminal liability, sabotaging the myth that 
intoxication is some kind of ‘defence’ to a criminal charge”); GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 564 (Stevens and Sons 1961) 
(As Williams poignantly enquired, “[i]f a man is punished for doing something 
when getting drunk that he would not have done when sober, is he in plain 
truth punished for getting drunk?”); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DORLEY, 
JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME 105-15 (Westview Press 1995) (discussing the 
varying determinations of liability with respect to a person’s pre-intoxication 
culpability when committing the offense); See generally THOMAS VORMBAUM, 
A MODERN HISTORY OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW (Michael Bohlander ed., 
Springer 2013). However, the low level maximum penalty in Germany has 
sparked controversy. German case law illustrates that in some cases where 
the maximum penalty has been considered insufficient, the courts have 
reverted to the action libera in causa doctrine which arguably undermines the 
purpose of section§ 323a. Kai Ambos and Stefanie Bock, Germany, in 
GENERAL DEFENCES: DOMESTIC, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Michael 
Bohlander & Alan Reed eds., Ashgate Publ’g 2014) (forthcoming). See also, 
Gerhard Kemp, South Africa, in GENERAL DEFENCES: DOMESTIC, AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Michael Bohlander & Alan Reed eds., Ashgate 
Publ’g 2014) (forthcoming). 
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IV. THE MODEL OF ALCOHOLISM 
Anglo-American jurisprudence has struggled to appropriately 
attribute fault where the chronic alcoholic defendant is concerned, 
and deontological reasoning has produced bright-line principles, 
which frequently results in the alcoholic’s condition being 
considered irrelevant to the question of criminal responsibility. 
The law proceeds on the basis that an individual’s conduct is 
within his / her control and as a result it would not be unjust to 
attribute fault.112 In contrast, behavioural and medical sciences 
consider that symptoms of substance-use disorders are invariably 
external manifestations of a pre-existing cause.113 The notion that 
an individual’s actions are pre-determined is at odds with legal 
conceptions of culpability and fault attribution, and it is, therefore, 
unsurprising that gradations of addiction, which straddle the 
analytical divide between voluntariness and involuntariness, 
remain in a befuddled law-psychiatry hinterland.114 This Part of 
our article outlines the standardisational and definitional 
perspectives that underpin conflict between the law and 
psychiatry, and categorisation of the chronic alcoholic’s conduct as 
voluntary or involuntary, in terms of attributional criminal 
liability. It is suggested herein that this categorisation is 
fundamentally important in terms of appropriate fault attribution. 
As noted in Part I, where a defendant’s intoxication is deemed to 
be voluntary at the T1 stage, this intoxication is conjoined with the 
external elements of the offence at the T2 stage in order to 
construct liability. In murder cases, D’s voluntary intoxication at 
T1 will only have a bearing on D’s culpability at the T2 stage if the 
prosecution fails to establish the requisite mens rea, and this has 
significant consequences for the alcohol dependent defendant. 
Two polarised schools of thought exist vis-à-vis alcohol 
dependence syndrome.115 The first considers alcoholism a 
recognised condition over which the sufferer exercises no 
intelligible control, and accordingly as a potentiate form of 
diminished responsibility in terms of reconstitutive criminal 
 
 112.  See generally ASHWORTH, supra note 24. 
 113.  Boldt, supra note 102, at 2304. 
 114.  See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86–113 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (discussing the differences between intentionalism 
and determinism and how liberal discourse privileges the former over the 
latter). For the purposes of this article we refer to alcohol dependence, 
addiction, chronic alcoholism, and alcoholism interchangeably. It should be 
noted, however, that dependence may be “a normal body response to a 
substance” and is not always symptomatic of addiction. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, 
SUBSTANCE-RELATED ADDICTIVE DISORDERS (2013). 
 115.  See LAW COMMISSION, INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM: SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIAL TO THE SCOPING PAPER, supra note 19, at 21, ¶¶ 2.58-2.59 
(identifying that the first school views alcoholism as a disease, whereas the 
second school views it as a habit). 
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liability.116 The second regards addiction as a pattern of learned 
behaviour resulting from psychological and societal influences.117 
Medical and behavioural sciences may be clearly aligned with the 
former view, which proposes a “less autonomous view of 
drunkards”118 and suggests that events are the product of an 
amalgamation of pre-existing factors rendering them inevitable.119 
The latter approach is compatible with “intentionalist” criminal 
justice theory which imposes liability on the assumption that 
individuals are rational, “phenomenological” and “free will 
oriented” and accordingly accountable for their conduct.120 
Imposing liability on the alcohol dependent defendant is counter-
intuitive to proponents of the strict determinist approach, which 
regards individual behaviour as “structuralist” and “amoral”, 
thereby deserving neither approbation nor reproach.121 This 
conflict between “intentionalist” and “determinist” accounts of 
human conduct has engendered a blurred philosophical 
compromise, viewing behaviour through a legal prism where 
individuals are regarded as criminally liable for their conduct in 
the absence of an applicable defence.122 The effect is that complete 
 
 116.  Julia Tolmie, Alcoholism and Criminal Liability, 64 MOD. L. REV. 688, 
688–92 (2001); see also MARTIN WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL: 
CULTURE, LAW AND POLICY IN ENGLAND 1830–1914 295 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1990) (identifying that, as early as 1879, it was argued that 
“drunkenness was an affliction in which self-control is suspended or 
annihilated”).   
 117.  FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, supra note 9, at 102 (“Heavy drinkers are people who have over time 
made a long and complex series of decisions, judgements, and choices of 
commission and omission that have coalesced into a central activity [i.e. heavy 
drinking].”); Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 9, 
at 431 (“A very large proportion of new addicts in the United States today are 
young, psychologically immature, occupationally unskilled, socially uprooted, 
poor and disadvantaged.”); Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a 
Factual Foundation for the “Disease Concept of Alcoholism”, supra note 9, at 
806 (arguing that alcoholics are not without control over their actions, indeed 
“on the whole, the alcoholic has chosen this way to handle his problems in 
life”). See generally VALVERDE, supra note 11. See generally MORSE, supra 
note 11.  
 118.  WIENER, supra note 116, at 294; see also id. at 295–96 (noting that, in 
1879, the British Medical Association helped in the cause of “full 
medicalization of dipsomania” and passing the Habitual Drunkards Act). 
 119.  Boldt, supra note 102, at 2304. 
 120.  KELMAN, supra note 114, at 86 (emphasizing “the indeterminacy of 
action and, correlatively, the ethical responsibilities of actors”); HALL, supra 
note 64, at 166–67 (discussing that because defendants are “reasonable” men, 
“the objective method of fact-finding and the objective standard of liability 
function accurately and justly in most cases”); Tolmie, supra note 116, at 689–
92 (discussing the differences between the disease model and the habit model, 
wherein the latter model reflects the intentionalist theory). It was noted in 
Bailey v. United States that a person “is not to be excused for offending simply 
because he wanted to very, very badly.” 386 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 121.  KELMAN, supra note 114, at 86. 
 122.  See generally ASHWORTH supra note 24. 
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exculpation will only be permitted where actions may be identified 
as so pre-determined that the normative presumption of free will 
is rendered nugatory or, alternatively, where the alcoholic’s 
criminal responsibility for those actions is so impaired that the 
partial defence of diminished responsibility applies, and this 
rationale is considered below. This approach to criminal liability is 
set against the backdrop of an underlying conflict between the 
“strictly logical” approach, as outlined in Part I, which dictates 
that intoxication evidence should always be relevant to questions 
of culpability, and the “absolutist” position, which contends that it 
would be dangerous to permit a voluntarily intoxicated defendant 
to escape criminal liability on account of that intoxication.123 
Anglo-American attempts to satiate both camps have resulted, as 
stated in Part I of this article, in voluntary intoxication evidence 
being relevant only where it negates the mens rea for a specific 
intent offence in English law, and for offences requiring knowledge 
or purpose in the U.S.124 For lesser intent crimes, intoxication 
evidence is used as a basis to constructively impute liability.125 It 
is only where the defendant’s intoxication is involuntary, not self-
induced or pathological in nature, that it may have a significant 
bearing upon the attribution of fault liability,126 and we have 
suggested alternative remodeling centred around potentiate 
liability and reverse burden in this sphere. 
The difficulty in cases involving the chronic alcoholic, 
however, is that the defendant invariably exhibits determinist and 
intentionalist features in tandem. A predominant aspect of the 
syndrome is an inability to control alcohol consumption, but 
numerous studies demonstrate that those suffering from 
withdrawal symptoms frequently and volitionally refrain from 
alcohol intake and many consume intoxicants without becoming 
addicted.127 The notion that the alcohol dependent defendant may 
 
 123.  Child, supra note 28. 
 124.  See Majewski, [1977] A.C. at 474-75; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08(1) 
(“Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section [pathological or not self-
induced], intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an 
element of the offense.”); LAW COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY, supra note 29, at ¶ 1.58 (concluding that neither the strictly logical 
approach nor the absolutist alternative are ideal); Simester, supra note 42, at 
3–14. 
 125.  See Majewski, [1977] A.C. 443, and the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 
(explaining intoxication relevance and available defences); see also LAW 
COMMISSION, INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 29; 
Simester, supra note 42, at 14 (discussing the evidentiary nature of the 
intoxication doctrine). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, supra note 9, at 34-38; Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal 
Responsibility, supra note 9, at 432 n.93; Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In 
Search of a Factual Foundation for the “Disease Concept of Alcoholism”, supra 
note 9, at 804-05. 
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retain some capacity to choose whether to consume alcohol 
suggests that the normative presumption of free will has not been 
completely displaced.128 These concerns have resulted in a judicial 
reluctance to accept the disorder as a valid form of concessionary 
mitigation. The focus in extant English and U.S. law has been to 
distinguish voluntary from involuntary intoxication when 
determining whether the defendant’s condition should exist as a 
valid form of exculpation, rather than accept, as we propound, that 
the true state of affairs is more complex and individuated between 
these fictionalised boundaries. The U.S. courts have been inclined 
to regard intoxication arising from the condition as voluntary. The 
disorder is regarded as a latent characteristic in the offender, 
which results in a propensity to consume alcohol.129 This 
suggestion has been heavily criticised as speculative and 
unsupported.130 Nevertheless, this characterisation is 
fundamentally at odds with notions of exculpation, and, therefore, 
the defendant’s condition is often irrelevant to questions of 
culpability. In England, more recent jurisprudential authority 
suggests that the disorder might impair the defendant’s 
responsibility, but it does not totally abrogate or displace free will. 
The result has been to recognise that alcohol dependence 
syndrome may have a bearing upon the defendant’s culpability, 
but only in the most exceptional cases,131 and only to a partial 
extent. 
V. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE SYNDROME  
The bifurcatory categorisation of the chronic alcoholic’s 
conduct as voluntary or involuntary, and no distinctive hues in-
between, is demonstrative of a reluctance to deviate from an 
antediluvian template pertaining to intoxicated offending as 
outlined in Parts I and II of our article. This obsession with 
traditional intoxication doctrine, and inculcated policy 
considerations,132 has led U.S. courts to standardise alcohol 
dependent defendants according to normative societal expectations 
of the reasonable sober person. It is our contention that it is 
inappropriate and inapt to hold the mentally disordered offender 
 
 128.  See generally Mitchell Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of 
the Intoxication Defense, 87.2 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 482 (1997) (noting 
how courts expand exculpatory effects of intoxication). 
 129.  V. Dole & Marie Nystander, Methadone Maintenance and Its 
Implications For Theories Of Drug Addiction, in THE ADDICTIVE STATES 359 
(A. Wickler ed., 1968). 
 130.  AVRAM GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., THE PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION 474 
(1969); see also DELONG, The Drugs and Their Effects, in DEALING WITH DRUG 
ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1972).   
 131.  JONATHAN HERRING, ET AL., INTOXICATION AND SOCIETY: 
PROBLEMATIC PLEASURES OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
 132.  See generally LOUGHNAN, supra note 10. 
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to this standard, and that the alcoholic defendant’s condition 
ought to be considered more broadly in terms of criminal 
responsibility and attributional fault liability. The revised 
diminished responsibility plea in English law, within the purview 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and as recently interpreted 
by the Court of Appeal, provides an appropriate via media in 
terms of accounting for the chronic alcoholic’s condition in order to 
appropriately attribute fault in murder cases, and recognises the 
responsibility-culpability nexus that should be determinative to 
this category of “offender”. Potentiate liability principles should be 
deployed more widely in terms of recognition of mental disorder 
conditions that affect culpability thresholds, and a more balanced 
appreciation of voluntary / involuntary intoxication is urgently 
needed. 
A review of the contradictory Model Penal Code approach is 
central to our analysis, and provides that “intoxication of the actor 
is not a defense unless it negatives an element of an offence 
requiring knowledge or purpose.”133 As highlighted in Part I, this 
constitutes a failure to establish an element of the offence, which 
may have the effect of reducing a murder conviction to one of 
manslaughter,134 and, as such, it is not a “true” defence, in 
contrast to other cognate defences.135 If, however, the defendant’s 
intoxication is not self-induced or is pathological in nature, and, as 
such, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate its criminality or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,136 he will be 
entitled to an outright acquittal.137 The focus of the U.S. courts 
has, therefore, been to distinguish “between incapacity and 
indisposition, between those who can’t and those who won’t, 
between impulse irresistible and impulse not resisted.”138 This 
approach is akin to trying to pinpoint the exact moment at which 
Dr. Jekyll lost control and was taken over by Mr. Hyde. It ignores 
the interim period where Dr. Jekyll was “losing hold of his original 
and better self . . . .”139 The imputation is that the chronic alcoholic 
is viewed in the U.S. through the legal prism of automatism rather 
 
 133.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1); see also id. § 2.08(2) (showing where 
recklessness establishes an element of the offence, an actor’s unawareness of 
self-induced intoxication is immaterial).  
 134.  See id. § 44.02 (rejecting the murder-by-degrees approach); see also 
LAW COMMISSION, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE (Law Com No 
304, 2006) (recommending the rejection of a hierarchical restructuring of 
homicide offenses). 
 135.  Andrew Simester, Intoxication is Never a Defense, 1 CRIM. L.R. 3, 14 
(2009). 
 136.  MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §§ 2.08, 3, 363. 
 137.  Id. § 2.08(4) 
 138.  United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also 
Bonnie, supra note 21 (asserting lack of objective basis for determining 
undeterrable from the merely undeterred). 
 139.  STEVENSON, supra note 1, at 59. 
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than involuntary intoxication. It is only where there has been a 
total lack of volitional conduct (the language of non-insane 
automatism) that alcohol dependence is supererogatory. If this 
threshold is not reached then the intoxicated “offender” is treated 
within the purview of voluntary intoxication and potentiate 
liability applies in this circumscribed sphere. In this regard, the 
alcohol dependent defendant’s conduct is assessed according to the 
normative expectations society has of the sober person, and the 
risks that would have been aware to non-alcoholics in terms of 
prevening fault and criminal liability. The external elements of the 
offence at T2 are aligned with the defendant’s “voluntary” 
consumption of alcohol at the T1 stage, and liability is accordingly 
established, even though the actor was operating under the 
baneful influence of the syndrome. The defendant’s intoxication is 
only relevant at the T2 stage where the offence is regarded as 
requiring specific intent, and the substance use prevented the 
formulation of the culpable state of mind. This principle applies 
whether or not the defendant suffers from alcohol dependence 
syndrome.140 Potentiate liability in a consequentialist sense is 
obscured in terms of legitimate import and moral 
blameworthiness. 
The narrow view that there exists an element of reasoned 
choice when an addict knowingly uses the substance to which he is 
addicted, rather than participating in a treatment or 
rehabilitation programme,141 has also resulted in the rejection of 
alcohol dependence syndrome as a bespoke mental disease or 
defect, within U.S. jurisdictions.142 The outcome is that the chronic 
alcoholic is unable to rely upon the syndrome in order to raise the 
insanity defence,143 which provides that a person is not to be held 
criminally responsible for his acts if, at the time of that conduct 
and as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.144 
 
 140.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1); see also LOUGHNAN, supra note 10. 
 141.  Moore, 486 F.2d at 1183. 
 142.  Heard, 348 F.2d at 44. 
 143.  Bailey, 386 F.2d at 3-4; see also United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 
960, 963 (10th Cir. 1977); Yassen v. United States, 1129 U.S. 94 (1974) (being 
involuntarily under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime is not a 
legal equivalent of insanity); Moore, 486 F.2d at 1181; United States v. 
Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stevens, 461 
F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1972); Berry v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 816, 820 
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (rev. on other grounds), 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969); Green v. 
United States, 383 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (cert. denied), 390 U.S. 961 
(1968); Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Fingarette, 
Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 9, at 424-25 (asserting that 
the medical profession lacks a consensus over whether addiction is a disease).  
 144.  Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 916 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). 
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Intoxication145 is not sufficient to establish a mental disease146 and 
the “terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include abnormality 
manifested by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social 
conduct.”147 Alcohol addiction per se is erroneously regarded as the 
external manifestation of a latent character defect, which results 
in a propensity to consume intoxicants, and is, therefore, 
incompatible with exculpatory doctrines in the U.S.:148 
A mere showing of . . . addiction, without more, does not constitute 
“some evidence” of mental disease or insanity so as to raise the issue 
of criminal responsibility.149 
Societal acknowledgement that certain mental diseases 
should be relevant to questions of criminal responsibility does not 
extend to alcohol dependence syndrome,150 and in this regard, the 
definition of “mental disease or defect” is considered to be a matter 
of legal and not medical judgment.151 Individuation characteristics 
are engrafted whereby the defendant’s “anti-social” conduct, in 
terms of repetitively drinking to excess, at T1, is adjoined with the 
external elements of the offence at T2 and the defendant’s alcohol 
dependence syndrome will only be considered relevant in limited 
circumstances. 
The courts have reluctantly allowed substance dependence 
evidence to be presented in court where it is used to establish that 
at the time of the offence, the defendant was suffering from a 
psychological condition, which pre-dated the physiological 
dependence,152 or that the alcohol was used in a bid to alleviate or 
assuage the symptoms of an underlying condition, for example, 
depression or anxiety disorder.153 In these cases, substance 
dependence evidence is utilised to prove that the defendant 
suffered from the underlying condition at the time of the offence 
 
 145.  Intoxication means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities 
resulting from the introduction of substances to the body. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.08 (5)(a). 
 146.  MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08(3) (1962). 
 147.  Id. § 4.01(2) (1962). 
 148.  Dole & Nystander, supra note 129; AVRAM ET AL., supra note 130; see 
also DELONG, supra note 130, at 212.  
 149.  Heard, 348 F.2d at 44. See also Doughty, 396 F.2d at 130 (stating that 
imprisoning a chronic alcoholic does not constitute “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under the 8th Amendment). 
 150.  Freeman, 357 F.2d at 625. 
 151.  State v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1984). The criminal law 
cannot “vary legal norms with the individual’s capacity to meet the standards 
they prescribe, absent a disability that is both gross and verifiable, such as the 
mental disease or defect which may establish irresponsibility.” MODEL PENAL 
CODE AND COMMENTARY §§ 2.09, 6 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960). 
 152.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 672 (1962); Watson v. United 
States, 439 F.2d 442, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Gaskins, 410 F.2d at 989; Heard, 
348 F.2d at 499; Green, 383 F.2d at 201.  
 153.  United States v. Cooper, 465 F.2d 451, 452 (9th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 201–02 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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and not to prove alcohol dependence per se.154 Similarly, where the 
defendant suffers from permanent or transient psychosis as a 
result of the repeated insult from the intoxicants, evidence of the 
defendant’s addictive behaviour is admissible in order to prove 
that psychosis.155 Where the ingestion of alcohol causes a mental 
disease or defect outwith substance dependence per se, the 
defendant will normally be able to rely upon that mental disease 
or defect to support his contention that he lacked criminal 
responsibility, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant’s 
alcohol intake was voluntary.156 Evidence of alcohol dependence 
syndrome will be relevant at the T2 stage where it is used to 
establish that at the time of the offence the defendant suffered 
from damage to the brain or nervous system;157 brain pathology or 
induced psychosis; or an alternative disorder as a result of the 
physiological dependence.158 It is only where the dependence 
syndrome is so severe that it results in brain damage or an equally 
damaging condition that it will be relevant to the defendant’s 
culpability, and, even then, its practical utility is doubted: 
To us it seems to rest on the proposition that, 
assuming . . . addiction itself is neither a mental disease nor a 
defect, yet the two are often to be found in association, so that an 
addicted person is more likely to suffer from some mental disorder 
than is one who is not addicted. By a parity of reasoning, since 
combat veterans as a group are self-evidently more likely to have 
suffered the loss of a physical member than is the populace at large, 
evidence of whether a party is a combat veteran should be received 
on the issue whether he has lost a leg. Or, to take a less extreme 
example, since because of light skin pigmentation persons of 
Scandinavian ancestry are more subject to skin cancer than are 
others, the family tree of a suitor should be received in evidence 
when his skin cancer is at legal issue. The flaw in both illustrations 
 
 154.  Lyons, 731 F.2d at 2463. 
 155.  Fitts v. United States, 484 F.2d 108, 113 (10th Cir. 1960); People v. 
Kelly, 516 P.2d 875, 882-83 (Cal. 1973). 
 156.  Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (Mass. 1978).  
 157.  JOHN BURKOFF & RUSSELL WEAVER, INSIDE CRIMINAL LAW 233 (Aspen 
Publishers 2008). “[T]he great weight of legal authority clearly supports the 
view that evidence of . . . addiction, standing alone and without any other 
physiological and psychological symptoms involvement, raises no issue of a 
mental disease or defect.” Lyons, 731 F.2d at 245. In Lyons, the defendant 
(Lyons) was charged with twelve counts of knowingly and intentionally 
securing controlled narcotics by misrepresentation, fraud, deception and 
subterfuge in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843 (a)(3) (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 
(1976). Id. at 244. At trial, Lyons attempted to rely on the insanity defence, 
asserting that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law as a result of the physiological and psychological 
effects of his drug dependence. Id. Cf. R v. Tandy, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 350 (CA) 
(insanity defence only available if addiction rendered consumption of alcohol 
involuntary and intoxication impaired defendant). 
 158.  Robinson, 370 U.S. at 672; Watson, 439 F.2d at 460; Gaskins, 410 F.2d 
at 989; Heard, 348 F.2d at 989; Green, 383 F.2d at 201.  
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seems evident: where evidence bearing directly on a legal question is 
available, that involving tangential matters, even though perhaps 
logically relevant in theory, is of small practical value.159 
A further anomaly applies in that the American Law Institute 
was prepared to accept pathological intoxication, the status of 
which is still being examined,160 as providing an affirmative 
defence, while rejecting alcohol dependence syndrome unless 
equated with brain damage or an alternative mental disorder as a 
valid form of mitigation. Pathological intoxication is defined as the 
rapid onset of acute intoxication following consumption of alcohol, 
which is insufficient to cause intoxication in most people.161 In this 
regard, the condition could be categorised as involuntary on the 
basis that the defendant is unaware that the substance would 
intoxicate him “to the extent it did.”162 The Model Penal Code 
distinguishes “intoxication which is not self-induced”, defined as 
“merely accidental”, from “pathological intoxication” which is 
intoxication which takes the individual by surprise.163 The drafters 
of the Model Penal Code noted a particularised rationale for this 
bespoke category: 
[A] provision was required because of a concern that bizarre 
behavior caused in part by an abnormal bodily condition (in some 
cases, in others the atypical intoxication can be related to mental 
disturbance), would not seem to result from “mental disease” and 
thus would not fall under section 4.01 [the insanity defence].164 
The effect is to allow an affirmative defence where the 
defendant suffers from a mental condition short of insanity, 
notwithstanding the voluntary consumption of alcohol.165 A more 
nuanced view has been applied to the pathologically intoxicated 
offender that ought to apply similarly to the alcoholic. In both 
situations it is potentiate liability and prevening fault at the T1 
stage of inculpation that is fundamental in terms of culpability 
and criminal responsibility. Unfortunately, this contemporary 
 
 159.  Lyons, 731 F.2d at 246-47. 
 160.  See Tiffany, Pathological Intoxication and the Model Penal Code, supra 
note 43, at 768 (providing an in-depth analysis of the flaws inherent within 
arguments that pathological intoxication is not a valid condition); Tiffany & 
Tiffany, supra note 91, at 49-75. See generally Note, Pathological Intoxication 
and the Voluntarily Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 419 
(1969). 
 161.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5). 
 162.  Tiffany, Pathological Intoxication and the Model Penal Code, supra 
note 43, at 768. See also Paul H. Robinson, Causing The Conditions, supra 
note 35. 
 163.  Tiffany, Pathological Intoxication and the Model Penal Code, supra 
note 43, at 768. 
 164.  MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08, 7, 12 (Tentative Draft 
No. 9, 1959). 
 165.  Tiffany, Pathological Intoxication and the Model Penal Code, supra 
note 43, at 768. 
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approach to pathological intoxication has met resistance amongst 
the States, on grounds that the availability of an affirmative 
defence is too broad and also over confusion regarding the true 
nature and extent of the condition. 
The exclusionary approach to alcohol dependent defendants is 
mistakenly supported by a number of academicians who 
universally claim that concepts of addiction cannot be “usefully 
adapted to the context of legal argument.”166 The suggestion is 
that studies which show that drinkers volitionally abstain from 
alcohol “belie the myth” of loss of control, and, as such, alcoholism 
is simply a “way of life”, rather than a disease;167 moreover, there 
“is no reason to assume whatever is a medically recognised 
symptom must be legally involuntary. A symptom is simply an 
indicator or manifestation of disease.”168 This reductionist 
perspective ignores the fact that alcoholism is a recognised 
condition over which the sufferer may exercise no intelligible 
control.169 It does not follow that alcohol dependency syndrome 
should not be considered a relevant factor in terms of assessing 
culpability, simply because the defendant’s free will has not been 
completely displaced. It is not self-induced automatism and total 
destruction of volitional control that is at issue, but rather partial 
lack of responsibility at T2 affected by blameworthiness at T1. The 
alcoholic’s “decision” to consume alcohol at the T1 stage is 
fundamentally different from the decision made by the sober 
person. The present situation, which categorises conduct as sane 
or insane, and the chronic alcoholic’s intoxication as voluntary or 
involuntary, is unjust since it fails to consider the “wide range of 
rational and control capacities” exhibited by defendants.170 Where 
the defendant’s intoxicated state is the by-product of a disease his 
“moral culpability is attenuated” such that it is appropriate that 
the condition is considered when attributing fault:171 
If criminal punishment should be proportionate to desert, as 
virtually all criminal law theoreticians believe, blanket exclusion of 
doctrinal mitigating claims and treatment of mitigation solely as a 
matter of sentencing discretion is not fair.172 
 
 166.  Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 9, at 
413-34.fn42.  
 167.  FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, supra note 9, at 99. MORSE, supra note 11. 
 168.  Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 9, at 
424. 
 169.  Tolmie, supra note 116, at 688. 
 170.  Stephen Morse, Diminished Rationality: Diminished Responsibility, 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003). See generally Stephen Morse, 
Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 24 (1984). 
 171.  ARLIE LOUGHNAN, supra note 10, at 307. 
 172.  Morse, Diminished Rationality: Diminished Responsibility, supra note 
170, at 297. Attempts to afford consideration to a defendant’s mental 
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In cases where a defendant’s alcohol dependence syndrome 
potentially has a bearing upon his responsibility for the offence, it 
is appropriate that the condition is considered in terms of 
prevening liability and criminal responsibility: “[t]he proper way 
to protect ourselves from the dangerously mentally ill is not 
through distortion of the criminal justice system,” but by ensuring 
that blame is appropriately assigned.173 An alternative approach 
predicated on the defendant’s impaired capacity would be 
preferable, and the mechanistic bright-line standardisations in the 
U.S. to mental disorder, including alcoholism, have been 
unfortunate, and mistakenly predicated on improper judicial 
constructs of either insanity or automatism. 
Attempts to introduce a partial diminished responsibility plea 
to the U.S. occurred by sleight of hand “through the judicial back 
door.”174 Disinclination to permit a concessionary defence, or “an 
all-embracing unified field theory” which could exculpate “anyone 
whose capacity for control is insubstantial”175 resulted in the 
diminished capacity defence176 being met with almost “universal 
hostility”.177 Of the five successful attempts to introduce the 
mitigation for murder, four were removed upon adoption of the 
Model Penal Code178 and the fifth was abolished following public 
 
abnormality through the doctrines of diminished responsibility and extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance have proved largely unsuccessful. LAW 
COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER App. F, ¶¶ 5-6 (Law Com No 
290, 2004). See generally Douglas Brown, Disentangling Concessions to 
Human Frailty: Making Sense of Anglo-American Provocation Doctrine 
through Comparative Study 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 675 (2007). 
 173.  Robinson, Causing The Conditions, supra note 35, at 1. 
 174.  Morse, supra note 170, at 24.  
 175.  Moore, 486 F.2d at 1182. 
 176.  The term “diminished capacity” is used interchangeably to refer to the 
partial defence of diminished responsibility and also a denial of mens rea for 
offences requiring purpose or knowledge as per section 2.08 of the Model Penal 
Code. The latter categorisation is misleading on the basis that section 2.08 is 
not used to consider whether the defendant exhibits a lower level of 
culpability, rather it has the effect of reducing a murder conviction to one of 
manslaughter where the defendant lacks the requisite mens rea for the offence 
charged. References made to diminished capacity and / or diminished 
responsibility throughout this article apply to the partial defence rather than 
murder reductions predicated on a lack of mens rea. See generally Paul H. 
Robinson, Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder: The U.S. Perspective, 
in LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Bohlander & Alan 
Reed eds., Ashgate Publ’g 2011). See also Morse, supra note 170, at 24. 
 177.  Phillip E. Has, Drug Addiction of Related Mental State as Defense to 
Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 16, 16 (1991). 
 178.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 (1). See also, Brown, supra note 172, at 675. 
The diminished responsibility defence exists in limited form where it is 
explicitly included in codified homicide schemes. HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-102 
(West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.03 (LexisNexis 2005); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 161.035 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-105 (West 2008). 
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rioting in response to the decision in People v White.179 White had 
assassinated Mayor Moscone and Harvey Milk in 1978. At his trial 
for first-degree murder, White successfully pleaded diminished 
capacity on grounds of a depressive condition. During the course of 
the trial it was suggested that a symptom of the depression was 
White’s compulsion for junk food. Diminished responsibility 
subsequently became derisively dubbed the “twinkie defense”,180 
before being dismissed as little more than “tea leaves and crystal 
balls.”181 Commenting on the risks associated with the diminished 
responsibility defence, the drafters of the Model Penal Code stated: 
By evaluating the abnormal individual on his own terms, 
[diminished responsibility] decreases incentives for him to behave as 
if he were normal. It blurs the law’s message that there are certain 
minimal standards of conduct to which every member of society 
should conform. By restricting the extreme condemnation of liability 
for murder to cases where it is warranted in a relativistic sense, 
diminished responsibility undercuts the social condemnation. In 
short, diminished responsibility brings formal guilt more closely in 
line with moral blameworthiness, but only at the cost of driving a 
wedge between dangerousness and social control. The MPC does not 
recognise diminished capacity as a distinct category of mitigation.182 
The effect is to adjudge the chronic alcoholic according to 
normative standards of societal behaviour,183 and to an 
individuated allegorical Dr. Jekyll personification that is heavily 
prescribed, in an aim to deter him from criminal conduct. This 
personified approach to culpability is fundamentally flawed on the 
basis that deterrence cannot be achieved by punishing an 
individual for acts beyond their control.184 It ignores the fact that 
the defendant may not have had the capacity and opportunity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as a result of 
the baneful effects of the syndrome,185 and thereby inappropriately 
 
 179.  172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 612 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); CAL. PEN. CODE 
§ 188 (West 2003); People v Bobo, 271 Cal. Rptr. 277, 290 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990). See also the film, THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK. 
 180.  Kelly Snider, The Infamous Twinkie Defense-Fact or Fiction?, 9 
ANNALS AM. PSYCHOTHERAPY ASSOC. 42, 43 (2006). 
 181.  Jay Ziskin, Ph.D LL.B, Professor, Psychology, Cal State, Un Los 
Angeles, at the hearings held Tuesday, December 4, 1979, in Doris Hardyman, 
Comment, The Diminished Capacity Defense in California; An Idea Whose 
Time Has Gone? 3 Glendale L. Rev. 311, 319 (1978-79). 
 182.  MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3(1)(b).  
 183.  ASHWORTH, supra note 24. 
 184.  Boldt, supra note 102, at 2289. “Men are not to be hanged for stealing 
horses, but that horses may not be stolen.” GEORGE SAVILE (MARQUIS OF 
HALIFAX) CHARACTER OF KING CHARLES THE SECOND: POLITICAL, MORAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 114 (J & R Tonson 1750). See 
also Ingle, supra note 43 (stating that punishment will not deter antisocial 
behaviour when the conduct is not a product of the defendant’s own volition). 
 185.  HERBERT HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford Univ. Press 
2008). 
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treats the chronic alcoholic as a “mere vehicle through which to 
deter others.”186 Punishment is inequitably attached to the conduct 
of a defendant whose mental abnormality may have substantially 
impaired his or her decision-making capacity at the time of the 
offence.187 The inappropriate attribution of fault liability in cases 
of this context cannot be justified on public policy grounds, and a 
more enlightened template is needed to reflect potentiate liability 
and “actual” responsibility at the T1 stage of intoxication.188 
A contradictory approach applies to partial defences in 
general in that the American Law Institute was prepared to accept 
a “substantial enlargement” of the traditional plea of provocation 
in order to embrace psychological failings on the part of the 
defendant.189 The formulation was never meant to create a 
conjoined standardisation, embracing diminished responsibility 
within the boundaries of mental disturbance: the doctrine reduces 
a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in 
response to an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, for which 
a reasonable explanation or excuse is provided.190 The provision 
met with considerable resistance amongst the states, with not a 
single state being prepared to adopt the “Extreme Mental or 
Emotional Disturbance” defence in its entirety.191 Of the few states 
to adopt the provision, most repudiated the term “mental”.192 This 
is reflective of a generalised reluctance to accept murder 
reductions to manslaughter predicated on mental abnormality 
within the U.S.,193 and effectual rejection of alcohol dependence 
 
 186.  Moore, 486 F.2d at 1240-41 (Wright J., dissenting) 
 187.  Boldt, supra note 102, at 2247,  
 188.  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darles, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 453, 454-55 (1997) (stating that liability should be proportionate to 
the person’s level of culpability towards the conduct constituting the offense). 
 189.  James Chalmers, Merging Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: 
Some Reasons for Scepticism, CRIM. L.R. 2004, 198, 211. 
 190.  MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3(1)(b). 
 191.  LAW COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER, supra note 172, at 
App. F, ¶ 5. See also Susan Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the 
Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 202 (2005) (stating that Arkansas 
is one of the few jurisdictions that followed the Model Penal Code’s extreme 
and mental or emotional disturbance rule). The problems associated with 
delimiting the scope of the EMED defence have resulted in controversial case 
law and confusion at appellate court level. See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 132 
S. Ct. 2148, 2151-53 (2012) (deciding whether the Sixth Circuit erred in 
rejecting the Kentucky Supreme Court’s interpretation of extreme emotional 
disturbance in Kentucky’s murder statute). See also Stephen Garvey, Passion’s 
Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1690 (2005) (explaining that few jurisdictions 
have adopted the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance in place 
of traditional provocation).  
 192.  LAW COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER, supra note 172, at 
App. F, ¶¶ 5-6.  
 193.  Morse, supra note 170, at 24. See also Brown, supra note 172 
(discussing the unwillingness of American jurisdictions to reduce murder to 
manslaughter on the basis of mental abnormalities). 
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syndrome as a relevant ground for abjuration of criminal 
responsibility outwith automatism or insanity. 
The inherent injustice in failing to consider alcohol 
dependency syndrome as a potentiate partial defence to murder 
when assessing a defendant’s culpability was recently highlighted 
by the Privy Council following the Trinidad and Tobago case of 
Daniel,194 engaging a 25 year-old defendant, with no previous 
convictions. On the day of the killing, the defendant had smoked 
“blacks”195 and consumed vast quantities of rum. According to his 
evidence, the defendant had driven his friend and the victim to a 
secluded area where they listened to rock music. When the victim 
rejected the defendant’s sexual advances, “a demon” rose up inside 
him and he choked her for over a minute,196 before slitting her 
throat and stabbing her in the chest and stomach. At trial, it was 
argued that the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea for 
murder due to intoxication. The partial defence of diminished 
responsibility was not raised.197 The jury found that the defendant 
had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge subsequently issued 
the death penalty.198 
The defendant appealed to the Privy Council,199 following the 
Court of Appeal’s refusal to consider fresh evidence which 
intimated that the defendant was suffering from a personality 
 
 194.  Daniel v. The Queen, [2012] UKPC 15 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
Trinidad and Tobago). 
 195.  “‘Blacks’ are marijuana cigarettes rolled with crack cocaine.” Daniel, 
[2012] UKPC at [7]. 
 196.  The defendant told police, “[i]t was a demon inside my head . . . . I did 
not know what I was doing. I was seeing a dark object in front of me and I did 
not know what it was. I was not seeing or hearing Suzette in front of me.” 
Daniel, [2012] UKPC at [7] 
 197.  OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT, 1861, 24 and 25 Vict., c. 11, § 4A 
(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall 
not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of 
mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or 
injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts 
and omissions in doing or being a party to the murder. (2) On a charge of 
murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged is by 
virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder. 
 
Id. The provision is identical to the original English diminished responsibility 
plea, under s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957, considered below. 
 198.  For an assessment of the use of the death penalty in retentionist 
States, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, THE 
DEATH PENALTY AND THE ‘MOST SERIOUS CRIMES (DPIC Jan. 2013), available 
at http://www.icomdp.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Most-serious-
crimes_final_6Feb2013.pdf  (outlining a country by country overview of 
criminal offences punishable by death). 
 199.  It was also suggested that the evidence casts doubt upon the 
voluntariness and therefore the admissibility of the statement that he made to 
the police under caution, however, the main submission relates to the partial 
defence. Daniel, [2012] UKPC at [1] 
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disorder,200 alcohol dependence and drug induced psychosis, which 
may have had a “direct impact on [his] level of cognitive and social 
functioning”201 at the time of the offence.202 The prosecution 
alleged that Daniel should not be entitled to rely on the partial 
defence on grounds that the initial decision not to raise diminished 
responsibility at the trial was a tactical one. It was asserted that 
the psychiatric reports available at the time had the potential to 
undermine the defence argument that the defendant lacked the 
requisite mens rea.203 The Privy Council accepted that it is well-
established that one of the factors likely to weigh heavily against 
the reception of fresh evidence in an appeal is “a deliberate 
decision by a defendant whose decision-making facilities are 
unimpaired not to advance before the trial jury a defence known to 
be available.”204 The Privy Council concluded, however, that the 
diminished responsibility defence was not raised because the 
initial psychiatric reports did not suggest that the plea was 
 
 200.  It was noted that this Daniel’s personality disorder did not include 
“anti-social” or “sadistic sexual aspects.” Daniel, [2012] UKPC at [19]. 
Emotionally Unstable (Borderline) Personality Disorder is defined by the 
World Health Organisation as:  
A personality disorder in which there is a marked tendency to act 
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explosions’; these are easily precipitated when impulsive acts are 
criticised or thwarted by others. Two variants of this personality 
disorder are specified, and both share this general theme of 
impulsiveness and lack of self-control.  
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 201.  Daniel, [2012] UKPC at [19]. 
 202.  Id. at [18]. 
 203.  Id. at [20]. The initial psychiatric reports suggested that the defendant 
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features” and that “it is not possible to make a case for insanity or diminished 
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disorders do not constitute an abnormality of mind that could support such a 
position.” Id. at [10] and [12]. It is not uncommon for the diminished 
responsibility plea to be precluded to those defendants suffering from 
psychopathic personality disorder. See also, e.g., Galbraith v H.M. Advocate, 
(2002) J.C. 1 (Scot.). See also James Chalmers, Partial Defences to Murder in 
Scotland: An Unlikely Tranquility, in LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED 
RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 167-83 (Michael Bohlander & Alan Reed eds., Ashgate Publ’g 
2011); SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON INSANITY AND DIMINISHED 
RESPONSIBILITY ¶ 3.40 (Scottish Law Com No 195, 2004). The Scottish 
diminished responsibility plea was recently codified under section 168 of the 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND LICENSING (SCOTLAND) ACT 2010. 
 204.  R v Erskine and Williams, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 183 [90] (quoting R v 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, Ex p Pearson, [1993] 3 ALL ER 498, 517. 
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available, and further noted that a tactical decision should not 
result in conclusive objections in every case since “the overriding 
discretion conferred on the court enables it to ensure that, in the 
last resort, defendants are sentenced for the crimes they have 
committed, and not for psychological failings to which they may be 
subject.”205 The decision in Daniel has a particular resonance for 
Anglo-American categorisations of intoxicated offenders. It is 
vitally important that “psychological failings” of a defendant, 
including alcoholism, are brought to the attention of fact-finders as 
part of their normative assessments in a murder case. In this 
context, the “salutary words” of the Privy Council in Daniel 
provide a reminder that it is essential to properly reflect on 
gradations of culpability and responsibility of the destabilised 
offender.206 
The position in England is that alcohol dependence syndrome 
may be relied upon for the purposes of the diminished 
responsibility defence within constrained boundaries.207 The 
partial defence represents a bespoke form of mitigation, which has 
the effect of reducing a murder conviction to one of voluntary 
manslaughter where the defendant’s abilities are substantially 
impaired208 as a result of the defendant suffering from a mental 
abnormality short of insanity.209 Previously there had been a “rigid 
dichotomy between sane or insane, responsible or not responsible, 
bad or mad.”210 Diminished responsibility in this respect supplied 
the law with “a new moral and social barometer” upon which a 
mentally abnormal defendant’s lower level of responsibility could 
be measured.211 
Under the original wording of section 2 of the Homicide Act 
1957 the defendant was required to prove212 an “abnormality of 
mind.” Fact-finders were mandated to consider whether the 
abnormality of mind arose from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes, or alternatively, 
whether the abnormality was “induced by disease or injury.” The 
jury was charged to determine whether the abnormality of mind 
“substantially impaired” the defendant’s “mental responsibility” 
for the killing. 
The English courts initially struggled with the notion of an 
 
 205.  Daniel, [2012] UKPC at [23]. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Homicide Act 1957, s.2 (1) as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, s. 52. 
 208.  R v Ramchurn, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 194. See also Nicola Wake, 
Substantial Confusion Within Diminished Responsibility, 75 J. CRIM. L. 12 
(2011); R v Lloyd (Derek William), [1967] 1 Q.B. 175 (Eng.). 
 209.  LAW COMMISSION, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER, supra note 172, at 
¶¶ 7.6-7.7. 
 210.  Id. at ¶ 6.52. 
 211.  REED & WAKE, supra note 15, at 184.  
 212.  On the balance of probabilities. 
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intoxicated defendant being afforded the concessionary defence, 
and provided a straitened test that alcohol dependence syndrome 
would only be relevant if the defendant suffered brain damage as a 
result, as in the U.S., or alternatively, if the first drink consumed 
on the day of the killing was truly involuntary.213 It was treated as 
axiomatic in Tandy that intoxication simpliciter was incapable of 
founding a plea of diminished responsibility.214 In essence, the 
defendant’s voluntary consumption of alcohol at T1 was coalesced 
with the external element of the offence at the T2 stage, and any 
evidence of involuntariness in the supervening period was 
considered irrelevant in terms of attributional fault liability, 
unless the defence could establish that the defendant had suffered 
brain damage as a result of the condition. 
The question of whether the defendant “did not or could not 
resist his impulse” was considered irrelevant where the first drink 
of the day had been voluntary.215 The chemically dependent 
offender attributionally either lacked the capacity to resist the 
urge to drink or was responsible for his conduct and should be held 
accountable.216 The judiciary’s treatment of chemically dependent 
offenders could be likened to distinguishing between an alcoholic 
who does not have the money to purchase alcohol and the alcoholic 
who has a bottle of whiskey in the kitchen.217 By the time the first 
has acquired the means to purchase alcohol he may be suffering 
from withdrawal, in which case, his behaviour is ostensibly 
involuntary and the diminished responsibility defence would be 
available. In the second instance, the defendant may have 
voluntarily consumed the alcohol in a bid to delay or prevent the 
onset of withdrawal symptoms and use of the partial defence 
would be prohibited.218 A bizarre process of temporal individuation 
resulted, whereby the mitigating doctrine would be unavailable to 
the defendant who consumed intoxicants in the supervening 
period between the initial decision to ingest alcohol and 
withdrawal occurrence. The idea that every drink consumed by the 
 
 213.  R v Tandy, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 350 (CA). 
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Damage as a Result, CRIM. L.R. 2008, 976, 978. 
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1994, 156. 
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chronic alcoholic had to be involuntary was antithetical to 
psychiatric understanding of the disease:219 
Very few, if any alcoholics will be permanently in a condition where 
the immediate consumption of alcohol is required to prevent or 
assuage the symptoms of withdrawal from alcohol. Routinely 
alcoholics will consume alcohol before withdrawal symptoms arise or 
become distressing.220 
The court’s pre-eminent focus on the behavioural aspects of 
alcohol dependence syndrome,221 in the absence of a contextual 
evaluation of the other symptoms and mental processes of the 
disease,222 fundamentally undermined the rationale underpinning 
the partial defence by failing to recognise that a complete 
destruction of the defendant’s free will was not required for his 
liability to have been substantially impaired.223 
Judicial recognition of this failure has resulted in a more 
contextualised dépecage approach in this arena, which requires 
jurors to focus on the defendant’s mental abnormality and ignore 
the effects of any alcohol voluntary consumed. The House of 
Lords224 in Dietschmann225 advocated that jurors should be 
directed to focus on the underlying abnormality rather than the 
intoxication per se. Lord Hutton identified that the issue is not 
whether the defendant would have carried out the killing in the 
absence of the intoxication, but whether, if he did kill, he killed 
under diminished responsibility. As a result, the defendant’s 
voluntary consumption of alcohol at the T1 stage will not preclude 
the availability of diminished responsibility, where the defence is 
able to establish that the alcohol dependence syndrome 
substantially impaired the defendant’s responsibility for murder at 
the T2 stage. Potentiate liability principles have constrained 
impact in abjuring “partial” but not full responsibility on the 
commission of the actus reus at the T2 stage of individuation. 
Reviewing Dietschmann, the appellate court in Wood226 
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subsequently considered that in future cases fact-finders would be 
required to “focus exclusively on the effect of alcohol consumed by 
the defendant as a direct result of his illness or disease and ignore 
the effect of any alcohol consumed voluntarily.”227 It was no longer 
the case that the repeated insult from the intoxicants had to result 
in brain damage, as in the U.S., or alternatively, that every drink 
consumed on the fatal day was involuntary before the syndrome 
would be regarded a relevant factor in terms of potentiate liability 
and attributional criminal responsibility. The decision in Wood 
represented a significant relaxation of the Court of Appeal’s 
ostensibly “phemenological, forward looking [and] free will 
oriented”228 view of chemically dependent offenders. Nevertheless, 
the test articulated in Wood which required “the jury to ‘separate 
out’ . . . each and every drink”229 in order to determine “the degree 
of voluntariness and involuntariness” in the defendant’s 
drinking230 represented a judicial reluctance to deviate from 
traditional “intentionalist” theory.231 In practice, it will be almost 
impossible for jurors to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary intoxication at the T1 stage where the chronic 
alcoholic is concerned. A rigid analytical divide between 
voluntariness and involuntariness in this arena is arguably a 
misnomer and ought not to be the principal focus in cases of this 
context. The dépecage approach to fault attribution in cases 
involving the chronic alcoholic reflects the view that the 
defendant’s responsibility is lower than that of the reasonable and 
sober person, regardless of whether the first drink of the day was 
consumed voluntarily. 
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties associated with 
requiring jurors to separate out each drink of the day, the effect of 
the ruling in Wood is that alcohol dependency syndrome has the 
potential to reduce murder to manslaughter in two situations. The 
first essentially mirrors section 2.08(1) of the Model Penal Code 
and operates where the “effect of the intoxication is so extreme” 
that the prosecution is unable to prove the requisite intention for 
murder—a decision for fact-finders as part of “folk wisdom” on the 
effects of voluntary intoxication.232  The second arises where, again 
the necessary intention for murder is proven, notwithstanding the 
consumption of alcohol, but partial exculpation applies on the 
basis of diminished responsibility.233 In this regard, the 
 
 227.  Id. at [41].  
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 229.  Stewart, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 593 at [28]. 
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diminished responsibility defence represents an appropriate via 
media through which the alcohol dependent defendant’s lower 
level of culpability can be assessed. It identifies that in order to 
appropriately attribute fault the various gradations of mental 
disorder identified in medical and behavioural sciences must be 
recognised, and recent reform to the diminished responsibility plea 
under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides an appropriate 
template for beneficial harmonisation within the U.S. 
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATORY SYSTEM  
The recently revised diminished responsibility plea provides 
an appropriate aperture through which to consider the chronic 
alcoholic’s criminal responsibility in murder cases, and it is 
suggested herein that an equivalent form of mitigation is 
considered in the U.S. To raise the revised plea successfully the 
defendant must now prove, on the balance of probabilities,234 that 
at the time of the killing he was suffering from an “abnormality of 
mental functioning” arising from a “recognised medical 
condition.”235 Jurors will be required to consider two issues in 
order for the partial defence to be satisfied. First, fact-finders will 
have to assess whether the recognised medical condition 
substantially impairs the defendant’s ability to (a) understand the 
nature of the defendant’s conduct; (b) form a rational judgement; 
or (c) exercise self-control.236 Secondly, jurors will be required to 
determine whether the mental abnormality provides an 
explanation for the killing.237 An explanation will be provided “if it 
causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing” the 
person to carry out that conduct.238 
The revised plea is demonstrative of a discernible move 
 
 234.  Placing the burden of proof on the defendant is compatible with the 
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towards medicalisation of the concessionary defence239 and the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists rightly suggested that the 
“recognised medical condition” requirement would encourage 
experts to confine their diagnosis to those accepted in the 
international classificatory systems of mental disorders (WHO 
ICD-10 and AMA DSM).240 The first241 appellate court case to 
apply the “recognised medical condition” requirement has very 
recently highlighted that this definitional change may have more 
significant consequences than initially thought.242 In Dowds,243 the 
appellant was a 49 year-old college lecturer, with no previous 
convictions, who stabbed his partner to death after having 
consumed vast quantities of alcohol. According to his evidence, 
both were habitual binge drinkers and there had been a long 
history of violence between them, mostly initiated by her, and 
usually when one or both had been drinking. The defendant 
claimed to have no recollection of the events, which led to the 
victim’s death, but accepted that he must have been responsible 
for her wounds. Dowds was convicted of murder after the jury 
rejected the loss of control defence244 and concluded that Dowds 
had intended to cause serious bodily harm. At the outset of the 
trial, Wait J. ruled that the Majewski principle was determinative, 
and voluntary intoxication was only relevant to specific intent 
offences, and operated as a denial of the requisite mens rea, and 
accordingly transient acute intoxication was insufficient to raise 
the partial defence of diminished responsibility.245 
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The defendant appealed, arguing that the amendments made 
to section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957,246 within the purview of 
section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, meant that acute 
voluntary intoxication247 may give rise to the concessionary 
defence and thus reduce a murder conviction to one of voluntary 
manslaughter. The defence’s argument was that section 2(1) of the 
1957 Act, as amended,248 requires that at the time of the killing 
the defendant must have been suffering from an “abnormality of 
mental functioning” arising from a “recognised medical condition”. 
The ICD-10 contains at F10.0, the condition of “Acute 
Intoxication”.249 Acute intoxication is, therefore, a “recognised 
medical condition” and thus presumptively his intoxication 
involved an impairment of mental functioning, which may have 
affected his ability to form a rational judgement and / or exercise 
self-control.250 Accordingly, Dowds asserted that the newly 
formulated defence should have been left to the jury. 
In policy terms, it is “unremarkable”251 that the English Court 
of Appeal emphatically rejected the appeal on the basis that 
voluntary acute intoxication, whether from alcohol or an 
alternative substance, is not capable of founding diminished 
responsibility,252 since the defendant’s argument runs counter to 
the established Majewski253 principle, as outlined in Part I, that 
voluntary intoxication is not a defence, save upon the limited 
question of whether a “specific intent” has been formed.254 Lord 
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Justice Hughes, delivering the unanimous judgment of the 
appellate court, was of the view that if Parliament intended to 
alter the law on voluntary intoxication it would undoubtedly have 
made this intention explicit,255 and it was not possible to infer such 
an intention from the adoption in the new formulation of the 
expression “recognised medical condition,”256 Their Lordships were 
careful to outline that the ruling applies only in the context of 
voluntary intoxication simpliciter which is uncomplicated by 
alcoholism or dependence.257 In this regard, the earlier Court of 
Appeal decisions in Wood and Stewart have been impliedly 
reaffirmed, and alcohol dependence syndrome will continue to be 
relevant in assessing a defendant’s culpability for murder in 
English Law under the reformulated plea. As noted, the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol at T1 will not preclude the availability of 
the partial defence where the defendant suffers from alcohol 
dependence syndrome. In cases of this context, the focus should be 
on whether the defendant’s abnormality “substantially 
impaired”258 the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of his 
conduct; form a rational judgment; or to exercise self-control.259 
This dépecage approach to criminal liability provides an 
individuated response through which the alcoholic defendant’s 
culpability can be assessed in light of the syndrome. It is not the 
identification that alcohol dependence is a medically recognised 
condition per se, but it is the fact that the severity of the syndrome 
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may, in limited circumstances, have a bearing on the defendant’s 
criminal responsibility that justifies the reduction from murder to 
manslaughter, and potentiate liability applies at T1 individuation 
as an abjuration of responsibility, albeit partial. This template 
ought to also apply in the U.S. in terms of a more empathetic 
approach to the intoxicated offender and mental condition defence 
treatment. 
The approach their Lordships adopted in relation to acute 
intoxication in Dowds has been extended to cover the 
concessionary loss of control defence in English law. The partial 
defence applies where the defendant kills subject to a loss of 
control; the loss of control must be attributable to at least one of 
two qualifying triggers. The first qualifying trigger is satisfied by a 
thing said or things done or said (or both), which constituted 
circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused the 
defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.260 
The second qualifying trigger requires the defendant to fear 
serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another 
identified person.261 The defendant’s charge will be reduced from 
murder to voluntary manslaughter where the jury concludes that 
a person of the defendant’s sex and age, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the same circumstances, might 
have acted in the same or a similar way to the defendant.262 In this 
context, all of the defendant’s circumstances will be considered 
except those whose only relevance is that they bear on the 
defendant’s general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.263 
In the recent case of Asmelash,264 the Court of Appeal 
assessed whether the voluntary consumption of alcohol could fall 
within the “defendant’s circumstances” for the purposes of the 
partial defence of loss of self-control.265 The Lord Chief Justice for 
 
 260.  The “seriously wronged” trigger. The Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, 
§§ 54(1)(b) and 55(3), (4)(b).  
 261.  The “fear” trigger. The Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, §§ 54(1)(b) and 
55(3),(4)(a)-(b), (6)(c)). 
 262.  Id. § 54(1)(c). 
 263.  Id. § 54(3). 
 264.  [2013] EWCA Crim 157. 
 265.  Id. at [21]. The Crown Court Bench Book stated:  
D’s circumstances would include the consumption of alcohol. The jury 
will no longer be directed that a reasonable man is a sober man. The 
jury will need to decide whether a man in these circumstances 
(including the consumption of drink) but nevertheless possessing a 
normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might act as D did. It is 
suggested that the jury may still be directed that D’s conduct is to be 
judged by the standard of the person who retained a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint even if that person had consumed alcohol as 
D did. 
 
[2013] EWCA Crim at [17]. This suggestion was criticised as ignoring the 
wording of the loss of control defence. Id. at [20]. See also David Ormerod’s 
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England and Wales cited with approval the initial trial judge’s 
direction which required jurors to ignore the defendant’s 
intoxication and apply Majewski standardisations: 
Are you sure that a person of [defendant’s] sex and age with a 
normal degree of tolerance and self restraint and in the same 
circumstances, but unaffected by alcohol, would not have reacted in 
the same or similar way?266 
The impact is that voluntary intoxication at the T1 stage will 
not preclude the availability of the loss of control defence at T2; 
the defendant’s conduct is assessed according to the standards of 
the ordinary sober person. This approach is clearly aligned with 
the Law Commission’s recommendation that atypical mental 
states, such as intoxication and irritability, should be omitted from 
consideration on the basis that they constitute factors which bear 
on the defendant’s general capacity to exercise adequate self-
control.267 The court was persuaded by the “compelling 
reasoning”268 in Dowds and accepted that the term “unaffected by 
alcohol” should be implied into the loss of control defence, 
otherwise “the floodgates would be open for every violent drunk 
would say ‘I must be judged against the standards of other 
violently disposed drunken people even though I may be like a 
lamb when I am sober.’”269 In practical terms, it was considered 
illogical to apply a discrete rule to the loss of control defence, given 
that in many cases the partial defences are raised 
simultaneously.270 Importantly, their Lordships noted that a 
gravitational approach would apply where the defendant suffers 
from alcohol dependence syndrome and is ruthlessly taunted 
regarding that condition (to the extent that it amounts to a 
qualifying trigger) in which case the syndrome would constitute 
part of the circumstances for consideration.271 In this regard, the 
 
comments:  
Section 54(3) only appears to exclude a circumstance on which D seeks 
to rely if its sole relevance is to diminish D’s self-restraint. This could 
open the opportunity for D to adduce all sorts of evidence. In particular, 
D might claim that his intake of alcohol or other intoxicants was a 
relevant circumstance and that the intoxication did not simply diminish 
his self-restraint, but also had some other relevance—e.g. that it caused 
a relevant mistake. This may amount to no more than a plea of lack of 
intent on grounds of intoxication, but it will make directing the jury 
more complex. 
 
DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW 526 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2011). 
 266.  Asmelash, [2013] EWCA Crim at [15] (emphasis added). 
 267.  LAW COMMISSION, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE, supra 
note 134. See also R v. Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 322. 
 268.  Asmelash, [2013] EWCA Crim at [24]. 
 269.  Id. at [15]. 
 270.  Id. at [24]. 
 271.  Id. at [25]. 
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ruling suggests that alcohol dependence syndrome would be 
relevant at the T2 stage of individuation, notwithstanding the 
voluntary consumption of alcohol at T1, in that jurors would be 
required to consider whether an ordinary person “of the 
defendant’s sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and suffering from alcohol dependence syndrome 
would have acted in the same or a similar way.” Despite the 
obvious problems associated with requiring jurors to answer 
hypothetical questions of this nature, this nuanced approach 
reflects the general consensus in English law that alcohol 
dependence syndrome potentially impacts upon the defendant’s 
level of criminal responsibility. In this regard, cases such as 
Asmelash and Dowds reaffirm that a dépecage approach ought to 
be adopted to the chronic alcoholic in order to engage in a fair and 
valid assessment of the defendant’s culpability. 
Further grist to the mill pervades the outcome in Dowds by 
their Lordships’ recognition that Parliament did not formally 
make reference to the ICD-10 and DSM in the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009.272 This is attributed to the the disparity between 
the requirements for an impairment to be recognised by the 
international classificatory systems and the level mandated in 
law.273 Accordingly, the presence of a “recognised medical 
condition” is a necessary, but not always a sufficient condition to 
raise the issue of diminished responsibility.274 The effect is to 
imply that in certain cases the defendant will be required to prove 
something beyond a “recognised medical condition” before he may 
satisfy that aspect of the partial defence.275 Although the 
international classificatory systems were not explicitly written 
into the statutory formula, the rationale for including the 
“recognised medical condition” requirement was to ensure a 
greater balance between the law and psychiatry.276 The idea that 
the courts will be required to determine which recognised medical 
conditions are valid for the purposes of the partial defence is 
inimical to this aim.277 
Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that this juridical bar has 
been attached to the defence, in light of the array of “disorders” 
potentially applicable (for example, “unhappiness”,278 “irritability 
 
 272.  [2012] UKPC 15 [35]. 
 273.  Id. at [30]. 
 274.  Id. at [40].  
 275.  However, the Court of Appeal provided no further guidance in relation 
to this tacit requirement. See generally Nicola Wake, Diminished 
Responsibility: Raising the Bar?, (2012) JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 76 (3) 193-
97. 
 276.  R v Brown (Robert), [2011] EWCA Crim 2796 [23]; LAW COMMISSION, 
MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 134, at ¶ 5.114. 
 277.  Wake, supra note 275, at 193-97.  
 278.  Dowds, [2012] UKPC at [31]. See also World Health Organisation, ICD-
10 (R45.2), available at: 
106 The John Marshall Law Review [47:57 
and anger”,279 “suspiciousness and marked evasiveness”,280 
“pyromania”,281 “paedophilia”,282 “sado-masochism”,283 
“kleptomania”,284 “exhibitionism”,285 “sexual sadism”286 and 
“intermittent explosive disorder”287) which, although recognised by 
the international classificatory systems, appear to be incompatible 
with criminal law principles of exculpation. The ruling implies 
that the aforementioned conditions will be insufficient to satisfy 
the “abnormality of mental functioning” requisite, despite existing 
as “recognised medical conditions”. The Court of Appeal’s 
reservations regarding conditions like “intermittent explosive 
disorder”, or instinctual monomanias, which manifests itself in 
impulsive acts of aggression, reflects the general public policy 
conceptualisation of aggressive and combative behaviour as 
inculpatory conduct, despite the condition originally being denoted 
as a form of partial insanity. In this regard, dépecage selectivity is 
adopted to individuated concerns in order to maintain a balance 
between acknowledging that a defendant’s mental disorder may 
have an impact on his legal responsibility, whilst protecting the 
public. 
Alcohol dependence syndrome, pre-and-post the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, has been jurisprudentially determined to 
constitute a valid basis upon which to claim the partial exemption 
of diminished responsibility in English law. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that the divergent approaches adopted in terms of 
categorising mental and behavioural disorders under each of the 
international classificatory systems will present problems in 
future cases involving substance related disorders. The ICD is 
designed to be a comprehensive guide to all diseases and related 
health issues and is used by a vast array of health professionals in 
a variety of countries of different sizes, cultures and resources. In 
contrast, the remit of the DSM is much narrower, focusing upon 
psychiatry and clinical psychology in the U.S.288 The result is that 
 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en (last accessed on 
Jan. 27, 2014). 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  Id.  
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id.  
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 569 (4th ed. 1994). 
 286.  Id. at 573. 
 287.  Id. at 663-67.  
 288.  Pathological intoxication manifests itself through outbursts of 
“irrational, combative, destructive behaviour.” R Kendell, The relationship 
between DSM–IV and ICD–10, (1991) J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY, 100, 297– 
301, 299–300. “It is important to note that the definition of mental disorder 
included in the DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public 
health officials, and research investigators rather than all of the technical 
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variations between the criteria-set wording in the DSM and the 
WHO have the potential to lead to equivalent conditions “being 
defined differently” and this “undermines the credibility of the 
entire diagnostic process.”289 This difficulty is illustrated by 
conceptual differences in the diagnostic criteria for patients whose 
substance use does not meet the criteria for substance dependence 
ICD-10.290 The ICD-10 criteria-set for “harmful use”291 focuses on 
the detrimental effect substance use has on the patient’s health, 
for example, episodes of depressive disorder secondary to alcohol 
consumption. In contrast, the criteria for “Substance-Induced 
Disorders”292 under the DSM-5 emphasises the “problematic 
behavioral and psychological changes associated with 
intoxication.”293 The focus of the ICD is on the biological deficit294 
whereas the DSM considers the abnormal behaviour of the 
individual.295 In a practical context, such disparities may result in 
disputes between the prosecution and the defence in terms of 
which criteria-set to adopt. In light of Dowds, the judiciary might 
advocate that harmful use per se is incapable of satisfying the 
diminished responsibility plea. Nevertheless, distinguishing 
between harmful use/ substance abuse for the purposes of the 
diminished responsibility plea may be rendered difficult in light of 
the DSM-5’s re-categorisation of abuse and dependence into a 
single disorder of graded clinical severity.296 
Amendments to the international classificatory systems in the 
DSM-V and forthcoming ICD-11 manuals are designed to align 
core versions of the ICD and DSM manuals by ensuring that 
 
needs of the courts and legal professionals.” AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013). 
 289.  Michael B. First, Harmonisation of ICD–11 and DSM–V: Opportunities 
and Challenges, 195 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 382 (2009). 
 290.  Id. at 382-90. 
 291.  WHO, ICD-10, 69, available at 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf (defining “harmful 
use” as “[a] pattern of psychoactive substance use that is causing damage to 
health . . . e.g. episodes of depressive disorder secondary to heavy consumption 
of alcohol”). 
 292.  (The American Psychiatric Association category of “Substance Induced 
Disorders” includes intoxication, withdrawal and other substance induced 
mental disorders (e.g. substance induced psychotic disorder and substance 
induced depressive disorder). AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013). 
 293.  First, supra note 289, at 382-90. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).  
 294.  Seymour L. Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and the 
Law: A Utilitarian Perspective, L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 133 (1986). 
 295.  Id. at 133, 136. 
 296.  See Reed & Wake, supra note 15, at 183, 191 (discussing the 
combination of both disorders as well as a graded system of determining 
clinical severity). AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 485-87 (5th ed. 2013). 
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category names, glossary descriptions and criteria are identical.297 
At present “trivial” differences in the wording of criteria-sets and 
the threshold number of symptoms for the diagnosis of substance 
dependence often result in substantial differences in diagnoses.298 
Medical experts have the option of which diagnostic criteria to 
adopt when assessing a defendant’s condition in cases like Wood, 
and this renders it more likely that dissonance will operate on the 
extent to which that “recognised medical condition” is capable of 
constituting an “abnormality of mental functioning” for the 
purposes of the revised plea.299 For example, the ICD-10 and the 
criteria requires a minimum of three symptoms from a list of six 
for diagnosis whereas the DSM-V may be satisfied by evidence of 
two symptoms from eleven indicators.300 It is clear that disparate 
diagnostic methods contribute to the “uneasy fit between 
theoretical views that urge the predominant moral significance of 
activities on the one hand, and the [criminal law’s] everyday 
practices of assigning blame and granting excuses on the other.”301 
The mental gymnastics that jurors engage in when determining 
whether the defendant’s responsibility is “substantially impaired” 
will invariably be exacerbated by the conflicting testimony 
provided by medical experts.302 The U.S. courts have heavily 
criticised doctrines which appear to divide “decision-making 
authority” between fact-finders and expert witnesses.303 However, 
suggestions that the use of medical testimony should be prohibited 
 
 297.  INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE REVISION OF ICD–10 
MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 3RD 
MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE REVISION OF 
ICD–10 MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS (World Health Organization 
2008), available at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/icd_summary_report_march_2008.
pdf (last accessed on Jan. 27, 2014). See generally, THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANISATION, ICD-11 BETA DRAFT available at: < 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd11/browse/l-m/en> (last accessed, Feb 
20th, 2014).  
 298.  First, supra note 293, at 384 (discussing how modern systems which 
are “intended to create a shared language” have the potential to create 
“epistemic blinders that impede progress toward valid diagnoses”); SUMMARY 
REPORT OF THE 3RD MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP FOR 
THE REVISION OF ICD–10 MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS, supra note 
297, at 155. 
 299.  For discussion on the problems associated with conflicting psychiatric 
testimony in diminished responsibility cases, see Nicola Wake, supra note 241, 
at 122-29. See also R v Brown (Robert), [2011] EWCA Crim 2796 [23]. 
 300.  First, supra note 293, at 382-90. See also Reed & Wake, supra note 15, 
at 183-206. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 490-91 (5th ed. 2013). 
 301.  Boldt, supra note 102, at 2252. 
 302.  Matt Gibson, Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility: The Impact of 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, CRIM. L.R. 2011, 909-924, 920. R v. Bunch, 
[2013] EWCA (Crim) 2498. 
 303.  Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
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in order to protect the public profoundly undercuts the “moral 
credibility”304 of the criminal law: “[p]roportionality between 
blameworthiness and liability is sacrificed [where] potentially 
erroneous convictions [are permitted] in exchange for an increased 
ease of prosecution.”305 As identified in the DSM manual, many of 
these difficulties stem from the importation of the DSM and ICD-
10 into settings for which they were not designed: 
The use of the DSM-5 should be informed by an awareness of the 
risks and limitations of its use in forensic settings. When DSM-5 
categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for 
forensic purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be 
misused or misunderstood. These dangers arise because of the 
imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law 
and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.306 
In recognising that “one size does not fit all”307 the WHO 
published three specialised versions of the ICD-10 for use in 
primary care,308 clinical practice,309 epidemiological and clinical 
studies,310 and intends to introduce similar documents to run 
alongside the ICD-11. A specialised approach needs to be adopted 
vis-à-vis the diminished responsibility plea, and a tabulated 
 
 304.  Paul H Robinson, supra note 176, at 299. See also Paul H Robinson, 
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Criminal 
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (discussing why the justice system’s shift in 
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13 (2001). 
 306.  AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 25 (5th ed. 2013). See generally Dowds, [2012] 1 W.L.R. at [30]. 
 307.  Geoffrey M Reed, Toward ICD-11: Improving the Clinical Utility of 
WHO’s International Classification of Mental Disorders, 41 PROF. PSYCHOL. 
RES. AND PRAC. 457, 461 (2010). 
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accessed Jan. 27, 2014). 
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regulatory approach is needed to beneficially promulgate the 
questioning of “recognised medical condition[s]” for the purposes of 
a re-standardised partial defence on both sides of the Atlantic.311 
There is a “world of difference” between cases of homicide 
where the defendant killed whilst voluntarily intoxicated and 
killings committed under the influence of alcohol dependency 
syndrome,312 and, as such, the focus in cases involving substance 
use disorders should be upon the defendant’s mental abnormality, 
rather than on conceptualisations of voluntariness. Despite the 
difficulties associated with delimiting the diminished 
responsibility plea, it provides a viable route of partial exculpation 
where the defendant’s responsibility is reduced, notwithstanding 
the fact that he may have been acting voluntarily. The fact that 
the defendant’s first drink may have been voluntary at T1 does not 
preclude the availability of the partial defence at T2, providing all 
elements of the concessionary defence are satisfied. This dépecage 
approach to alcoholic defendants who kill avoids the rigid 
voluntary / involuntary categorisation and permits the jury to 
assess whether the defendant’s culpability was affected by mental 
disorder in terms of potentiate liability: “if an offender’s liberty is 
to be infringed . . . it must be as a consequence of . . . wrongful 
conduct that is properly attributable to the will of the actor and 




 311.  This could be achieved by the commission of a Working Group 
comprised of members of the judiciary, legal practitioners, psychiatrists, 
clinical psychiatrists and members of the World Health Organisation and 
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 313.  Richard C Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
It is our contention that a new via media is urgently needed 
in Anglo-American standardisations applicable to the intoxicated 
offender, utilising dépecage selectivity to individuated concerns. A 
new schematic template, on a principled edifice, is required to 
properly reflect fair labelling and achieve doctrinal coherence. As 
such, it is necessary to re-examine potentiate liability linked to 
actual criminal responsibility across the spectra of intoxication 
imputations. The demands of substantive transparency and moral 
credibility determine that the quintessential inquiry as to 
“blameworthiness” in relation to any intoxicated offender should 
focus upon lack of individuated responsibility in terms of 
prevening fault and attributional liability. It is inapt to focus 
instead on cognitive states of imputed recklessness and thereby to 
amorphously construct a conviction on an imputed legalised 
fiction. 
There must exist a moral legitimacy for inculpating the 
intoxicated “offender” who commits basic intent crimes without 
the prevalence of the designated offence-specific mens rea element 
at the time of the offence. It is provided by standardisation of 
potentiate liability for prevening fault. The principles herein stand 
as a corollary to acknowledged principles of supervening fault and 
“responsibility” attached to creation of a dangerous situation. 
Inculcated policy rationalisations are derived from abjuration of 
individual responsibility and consequentialist effect attached to 
lack of care as a moral agent determinative of inculpation, and not 
cognitive states of falsely imputed mens rea. Moral culpability 
should effectively apply in that an individual party must take 
responsibility for elective choices—drinking or taking drugs. The 
éminence grise of potentiate liability for intoxicated behaviour 
involves a standardisation of harm prevention as part of the 
legitimate factorisation of conduct criminalisation, and this 
coalesces with awareness creating inculpatory responsibilities. 
Potentiate liability and prevening fault may be beneficially 
adapted to a number of different postulations engaging the 
intoxicated “offender” in dépecage normalisations. An individual 
actor who drinks to provide Dutch Courage to commit any 
designated offence, specific or basic, abjures responsibility to 
others and is morally culpable to an indefensible extent. In terms 
of temporal individuation of offence-definition nexus the prior fault 
awareness at T1 ought to be added to the unlawful commission of 
actus reus elements at T2 without delineation to inculpate the 
morally blameworthy agent of all crimes. The concatenation is 
that it is almost as if the individual actor is using himself as an 
innocent agent, but it is an agency disregarding the interests of 
others or risks attendant to culpable activity. The imputation is 
that attributional liability is morally legitimate if the defendant is 
aware that excessive drinking triggers in him a dangerous and 
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aggressive pattern of behaviour. 
Potentiate liability and prevening fault principles are of 
supererogatory effect within the boundaries of pathological 
intoxication and separate treatment for therapeutic drug-taking. 
Criminal responsibility attaches only to a defendant who is 
morally culpable and who with awareness disregards the interests 
of others or risks attendant to harmful conduct. The term 
“recklessness” is used in a particularised context of risk-taking 
awareness and in a generalised sense, not requiring foresight of 
the actus reus of any particular crime as required in purposive 
criminal recklessness specificity. Instead, it is utilised to identify 
recklessness as moral culpability or otherwise, and via 
transmogrification of awareness of a risk that the actor will 
become aggressive or dangerous (at T1 stage). 
It is our view that substantive doctrinal principles operate 
capriciously against destabilised “offenders” who have been 
involuntarily intoxicated.  Potentiate liability is not invoked at the 
T1 stage of temporal individuation, and the morally blameless 
offender ought to be able to raise an inference for fact-finder 
determination that “but for” the disinhibition created involuntarily 
or without responsibility at T1 then no harmful effects at T2 would 
have been engendered. The burden should rest on a defendant to 
address lack of prevening fault in this regard. The focus on lack of 
potentiate liability and disregard for the interests of others at T1 
creates an affirmative reverse burden defence of exceptional 
pathology attached to moral legitimacy in exculpating the 
radically destabilised “offender”. 
A legalised fiction has been created in Anglo-American 
intoxication doctrine in terms of imputed liability for basic intent 
offences. This constructive liability is predicated not on criminal 
recklessness but criminal responsibility of a volitional agent, and 
the prior fault lies in voluntary intoxication. It is attributional 
culpability derived from potentiate liability at T1 temporal 
individuation, and applies irrespective of conscious advertence to 
the risk of ultimate harm.  Fair labelling and doctrinal coherence 
require a specific offence detailing the inculpatory nature of 
prevening fault and potentiate liability, and a template prevails in 
German law standardisations. 
The rejection of alcohol dependence syndrome as a bespoke 
“mental disease or defect” for the purposes of the insanity defence 
by the U.S. courts, has resulted in the condition being regarded as 
voluntary for the purposes of attributing criminal liability. In the 
absence of a full diminution in “substantial capacity” (equated 
with automatism), the alcoholic defendant is standardised 
according to the normative expectations that society has of the 
reasonable sober person, and the flawed rules pertaining to 
traditional intoxication doctrine apply. The law is viewed in black 
and white terms, whereas distinctive hues ought to apply to 
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different categorisations and gradations of substance abuse 
disorder. Fair labelling requires that an appropriate partial 
defence is available in murder cases where the defendant suffers 
from alcohol dependency syndrome or an alternative mental 
disorder; and reduced culpability levels apply in terms of 
prevening fault in that a “world of difference” exists between cases 
of homicide where the defendant killed whilst voluntarily 
intoxicated, and killings under the influence of alcohol dependency 
syndrome. It is our recommendation that the reformulated 
diminished responsibility plea in English law, within the purview 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, may operate as a cathartic 
panacea to the rigid and mechanistic system imposed by the Model 
Penal Code, and reflects a new standardisation to intoxicated 
“offenders” encompassing legal and psychiatric conceptualisations 
of alcohol dependence syndrome, aligned with proposed 
amendments to the international classificatory systems. 
Potentiate liability principles determine that it is not a bifurcatory 
divide between voluntary and involuntary intoxication that should 
apply to the alcoholic offender, but rather a dissonance attached to 
partial and full responsibility at the T1 stage of individuation that 
is determinative, tied to an acknowledgement of the prevailing 
medical condition. 
The reductionist approach to intoxicated offending, which 
imposes criminal liability by attempting to categorise the 
defendant’s conduct as voluntary or involuntary, is outmoded and 
the basis upon which criminal liability is constructed is inherently 
unfair. It is imperative that a more nuanced approach, utilising 
dépecage principles to individuated scenarios is adopted on both 
sides of the Atlantic. A more transparent approach is required in 
order that defendants are appropriately punished for the crimes 
they commit, rather than on the basis that they voluntarily 
consumed alcohol at an earlier point in time, or on grounds of 
some psychological failing. When philanthropic Dr. Jekyll first 
took the potion that would transform him into the allegorical Mr. 
Hyde, he was unaware of the risk that Hyde would unlawfully kill 
Sir Danvers Carew.314 The time is ripe for Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
to be treated in accordance with their potentiate liabilities and 
criminal responsibilities properly addressed in a new reflective 
template. 
 314.  STEVENSON, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
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Conclusion 
Part One and Part Two of this collection critically elucidate the apparent difficulties as-
sociated with offenders with co-morbidity raising defences, and the challenges of ac-
commodating a differentiated group of offenders beneath the Majewski137 approach to 
intoxication. An alternative, and preferable, approach138 was adopted by the High Court 
of Australia in O'Connor;139 advocating that evidence of intoxication may be adduced in 
relation to all criminal offences. A comparative analysis reveals that repudiation of the 
Majewski rules does not represent a panacea for all the ills associated with determining 
the liability of those intoxicated by non-dangerous drugs and offenders with co-
morbidity, but it provides a logical and fair starting point for evaluating legal responsi-
bility. Concerns regarding the floodgates being open for drunken offenders to claim 
they should not be found liable due to their self- induced intoxication have not been 
borne out in jurisdictions that have departed from the Majewski approach.140  
The proposals advanced reject the construction of criminal liability based upon cogni-
tive states of imputed recklessness. The rejection of constructive liability in relation to 
intoxicated offending is required before any meaningful review of mental condition de-
fences can take place. This review ought to be holistic in considering all mental condi-
tion defences to ensure consistency in approach and application of the law in the context 
of  vulnerable offenders. In terms of appropriate standardisation and fair labelling, this 
framework would introduce a new offence of dangerous intoxication. The imposition of 
liability would be attached to the offender's responsibility for creating a dangerous sit-
uation, rather than cognitive states of imputed mens rea. In terms of the variety of sce-
narios that arise in the context of intoxicated offending, dépecage standardisations, as 
outlined in (iv), ought to apply. This reassessment provides a more balanced approach to 
reform in the context of vulnerable offenders. In terms of medication non-compliance, 
the Law Commission recommendations must be amended. The recommen-dations 
represent a dangerous extension of the problematic notion of prior fault. Engag-ing in 
an assessment of an offender's reason for non-compliance is likely to be notori-
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 Majewski (n 70). 
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 Albeit one which is unlikely to garner political support in E&W, through fear of appearing 'soft on 
crime’. 
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 O’Connor (n 70). 
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ously difficult, and is unlikely to encourage medication compliance. In cases involving 
offenders with co-morbidity, failure to recognise the impact of their condition on crimi-
nal responsibility is unjust. Voluntary acute intoxication should be excluded from the 
defences, but this should not preclude consideration of underlying medical conditions. 
The law in this area remains in need of reform; the proposals advanced provide an op-
































Part Three: Comparative Perspectives on Exclusionary 
and Positive Restriction Reform Models 
 
(v) ‘Sexual Infidelity Killings: Contemporary Standardisations and Comparative Stereo-
types’141 
(vi) ‘Political rhetoric or principled reform of loss of control? Anglo-Australian per-
spectives on the exclusionary conduct model’142  
(vii) ‘Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction Model and Abolition 
of the Provocation Defence’143 
 
Introduction 
Part Three departs from concerns relating to co-morbidity, and focuses on offenders 
who are vulnerable as a result of being subjected to family violence. These articles chart 
a pathway of the availability of the partial loss of control defence to the primary vic-
tim.144 In rare cases, the primary victim may respond to this family violence with the 
use of lethal force. The loss of self-control requirement operating in E&W makes it dif-
ficult for primary victims to establish the defence, because it is unlikely an offender will 
lose self-control in response to a fear of serious violence.145 The analysis addresses po-
tential opportunities for optimal reform designed to afford the partial defence in merito-
rious cases, whilst ensuring the defence is not inappropriately utilised by the predomi-
nant aggressor.146 These articles explore the exclusionary,147 and positive restriction148 
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 Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspec-
tives (n 64) 115-134. 
142
 (n 82). 
143
 Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine (n 
1) 365-405. 
144
 Introduced in Part One. 
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 Susan Edwards, Loss of Self-Control: When His Anger is Worth More than Her Fear’ in  Loss of Con-
trol and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011) 79-96. 
146
 The predominant aggressor is the principal aggressor in the relationship who ‘has  a pattern of using 
violence to exercise coercive control’; FVDRC (n 46).  
147
 The exclusionary conduct model refers to law reform that excludes the availability of a particular de-
fence through the use of exclusionary clauses. 
148
 The positive-restriction-based model operating in  NSW positively restricts the availability of the ex-
treme provocation defence by requiring that the victim’s  conduct amounts to ‘a serious indictable of-
fence’ for the defence to be engaged. 
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reform models operating within E&W, and NSW, respectively, focusing upon the ac-
cessibility of the partial defences to primary victims and predominant aggressors. 
Publication (v) focuses upon the availability of the partial defence in cases involving 
sexual infidelity and family violence. The loss of control defence in E&W is predicated 
on an exclusionary conduct model, prohibiting the application of sexual infidelity as a 
qualifying trigger for the partial defence.149 Published prior to the Clinton150 litigation, it 
is argued that it is unrealistic to isolate specific conduct from the multiplicity of factors 
that combine to induce a loss of self-control; complex cases involving a variety of fac-
tors ought to be dealt with by the trial judge utilising his exclusionary discretion, rather 
than through the use of arbitrary blanket exclusions.151 This view was confirmed by 
their Lordships in Clinton, when the court concluded that sexual infidelity may be con-
sidered where it ‘is integral to and forms an essential part of the context in which to 
make a just evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of’ 
the partial defence.152  
The NSW Committee advanced an exclusionary conduct model based upon sections 54-
55 CAJA 2009, which would exclude the partial defence where the killing was in re-
sponse to the victim's attempt to exercise personal autonomy, (for example, by leaving 
the relationship) except in cases of a most extreme and exceptional character.153 Publi-
cation (vi) suggests exclusionary-based reform models must adopt an 'all or nothing' 
approach to be effective, otherwise offenders are likely to include something alongside 
the excluded conduct to bring the  claim within the partial defence. Of course, ‘all or 
nothing’ exclusionary conduct models predicated on the conduct of the victim (rather 
than the offender), which may manifest in a variety of different ways and/or contexts, 
have the potential to cause injustice. The NSW parliament declined to enact the exclu-
sionary conduct model, in favour of a positive-restriction-based reform model mandat-
ing the offender's loss of self-control was in response to a serious indictable offence. 
149
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 55(6)(c). 
150
 Clinton (n 29). For discussion see Nicola Wake, ‘Loss of control beyond sexual infidelity’ (2012) 
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held: Mohammad Mazher Idriss ‘Sentencing guidelines for HBV and honour killings’ (2015) Journal of 
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Publication (vii), assesses the efficacy of positive-restriction-based reform models. An 
in-depth comparison between the exclusionary conduct approach adopted in E&W, and 
the positive-restriction-based approach operating in relation to the extreme provocation 
defence in NSW is provided. This analysis demonstrates that these approaches have the 
potential to unfairly preclude the availability of the defence to the primary victim. The 
extreme provocation defence is yet to be tested by the courts, but there is concern that 
the serious indictable offence154 requirement will render the defence unworkable. 
 
This assessment is set against the position in NZ where the provocation defence has 
been abolished, on the basis that family violence towards a primary victim could be tak-
en into account during the sentencing stage.155 A review of NZ case law reveals, prima-
ry victims are being convicted of murder and the sentences imposed are almost double 
that issued pre-abolition.156 A common failure to understand the circumstances of those 
who kill their abusers is partly to blame for the way the law deals with this type of case 
in these jurisdictions. In E&W, and NSW this can result in the primary victim agreeing 
to a plea bargain pre-trial rather than risk being convicted of murder.157  
 
A proposal, predicated on the law in Victoria, is advanced which would render social 
framework evidence158admissible during the trial and/or sentencing stage within these 
jurisdictions. Clear guidance on the types of evidence that should be made available in 
these cases would ensure consistency in application, in addition to assisting the criminal 
justice systems of the jurisdictions outlined to understand the circumstances of the pri-
mary victim. It is imperative that individuals within the criminal justice system have a 
                                                 
154
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better understanding of the nature and impact of family violence if justice is to be 
done.159 
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Political rhetoric or principled reform of loss of control? Anglo-Australian
perspectives on the exclusionary conduct model
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Keywords: Adultery; Conduct; Loss of control; Murder; New South Wales; Provocation; Qualifying
trigger
Legislation: Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c.25) s.54, s.55, s.56
Case: R. v Clinton (Jon-Jacques) [2012] EWCA Crim 2; [2013] Q.B. 1 (CA (Crim Div))
*J. Crim. L. 512 [The exclusionary conduct model] seems to imply the extraordinary proposition that
no one--including husbands and wives--has any right to expect fidelity or lifelong commitment in a
relationship; and that marital betrayal or desertion, even without notice and announced in a way that
is viciously cruel or taunting, should never give rise to any reaction other than a cool response of ‘I
wish you the best in your freely chosen autonomous decision about your personal and sexual life.’ It
seems perverse to continue to allow the defence for all sudden provocations other than those that
touch on intimate relationships including marriage. This is unrealistic and reflects an extreme
ideological, individualistic view of marriage and of personal sexual relationships.1
Abstract The New South Wales Legislative Council Select Committee published its report on the
partial defence of provocation in April 2013. The Committee's recommendations are closely modelled
on the framework and rationale of the loss of control defence under ss 54-56 of the Coroners and
Justice Act 2009, with significant exceptions designed to circumvent the difficulties associated with
the novel terminology. Interestingly, the Committee advocates the adoption of an exclusionary
conduct model, despite the problems associated with s. 55(6)(c), which specifies that sexual infidelity
is to be disregarded for the purposes of the concessionary mitigation. The Committee asserts that a
carefully worded exclusionary conduct model would serve to restrict the partial defence whilst
avoiding the issues which have manifested themselves at appellate court level in England and Wales.
Irrespective of the wording, specific prohibitions which focus on the conduct of the victim are
unrealistic in *J. Crim. L. 513 that they fail to account for the multitudinous and interconnected nature
of loss of control/provocation claims. Nevertheless, exclusionary conduct models which concentrate
on the conduct of the victim ought to be distinguished from clauses which focus on the defendant's
actions. If the defendant undertakes to cause the victim to respond in a manner for the purpose of
providing an excuse to use violence it is clear that the defence ought not to apply. Similarly, where a
defendant becomes voluntarily intoxicated, it may be appropriate to exclude that intoxication from
consideration when making the objective assessment as to whether an ordinary/reasonable person
would have reacted as the defendant did in the circumstances. In this context, explicit legislative
exclusions do have the potential to prevent unnecessary appellate litigation, but only in limited
circumstances.
Keywords Australia; Coroners and Justice Act 2009; Exclusionary conduct models; New South
Wales; Loss of control; Sexual infidelity
The New South Wales Legislative Council Select Committee2 published its report on the partial
defence of provocation in April 2013. The Report's recommendations are modelled closely on ss
54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 as implemented in England and Wales,3 albeit with
significant exceptions designed to circumvent the intractable flaws associated with the novel
terminology.4 The NSWLCSC placed particular emphasis on avoiding the problems arising from the
divisive sexual infidelity prohibition contained within s. 55(6)(c) of the 2009 Act.5 Notwithstanding
these concerns, the NSWLCSC's recommendations are predicated on an exclusionary conduct model
which would preclude the mitigation to defendants who ‘respond to a non-violent sexual advance by
the victim’6 and the defence would remain unavailable, ‘other than in cases of a most extreme and
exceptional character’ in several specified domestic situations including, inter alia, where the
provocation is ‘based on anything done by the deceased or anything the defendant believes the
deceased has done’ to end or change the nature of the relationship.7
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This comparative extirpation provides a timely and critical reappraisal of the efficacy of excluding
specific types of behaviour for the purposes of loss of control/provocation claims. Less than two years
after the implementation of the loss of control defence under ss 54-56 of the 2009 *J. Crim. L. 514
Act, the Court of Appeal in R v Clinton 8 effectively rendered the controversial sexual infidelity
prohibition nugatory where the defendant alleges that the victim's infidelity combined with other
factors caused him to lose his self-control and kill. The ruling mandates, in effect, that sexual infidelity
may be considered relevant to a loss of control claim where it is not the only factor to be relied upon
for the purposes of establishing an ostensible qualifying trigger. In practice, it is likely that evidence
will be adduced to prove that a number of factors contributed to the defendant's loss of self-control
and as a result the exclusionary clause has effectively become a ‘dead letter’.9 Judicial law-making
appears to have triumphed over the provisions of the statute in this regard.
These problems were highlighted in the NSWLCSC's report on the partial defence of provocation.
Fitz-Gibbon asserted that ‘ Clinton … provides … a clear example of the ineffectiveness of
exclusionary based reform models’ and accordingly, ‘a warning to the Committee to steer clear of
implementing this model of reform in NSW’.10 It was similarly acknowledged that the exclusionary
model is unlikely to succeed because the victim's conduct ‘will always be redefined in a way that
allows it to fall within the scope of the defence’.11 Notwithstanding these reservations, the Committee
considered that a carefully drafted exclusionary clause would suitably restrict the availability of the
partial defence whilst avoiding the problems experienced in England and Wales.12
The lessons learned in England and Wales, however, strongly suggest that specific prohibitions
needlessly complicate the partial defence and it is contended that s. 55(6)(c) of the Coroners and
Justice 2009 is irretrievably defective. Exclusionary clauses which arbitrarily restrict loss of
control/provocation claims based on isolated aspects of the victim's behaviour fail to acknowledge the
interconnectivity between events and their context. The victim's conduct is beyond the control of the
defendant and will often involve a multiplicity of factors. An all-legislative amendment delimiting the
defence based upon the victim's conduct, such as that recommended in NSW,13 carries with it the
potential to cause injustice. That is not to say that any aspect of the victim's conduct ought to satisfy
the concessionary mitigation, rather the trial judge should be afforded discretion in determining
whether the victim's conduct justifies leaving the partial defence for fact-finder evaluation.14
*J. Crim. L. 515 Exclusionary conduct models which concentrate on the conduct of the victim ought
to be differentiated from provisions which focus on the defendant's actions. If the defendant
undertakes to cause the victim to respond in a manner for the purpose of providing an excuse to use
violence, it is clear that the defence ought not to apply on grounds of the defendant's prior fault in
instigating the provocative conduct. Similarly, where a defendant acts out of a considered desire for
revenge he or she should be regarded morally responsible for his or her conduct. In cases where a
defendant becomes voluntarily intoxicated, it may be appropriate to exclude that intoxication from
consideration when making the objective assessment as to whether an ordinary/reasonable person
would have reacted as the defendant did in the circumstances.15 In this context, explicit legislative
exclusions do have the potential to prevent unnecessary appellate litigation, but only in limited
circumstances and within the boundaries of prevening individual culpability.
The loss of control defence
There are three essential components to ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The first
requires the killing to have resulted from the defendant's loss of self-control.16 The loss of control need
not be sudden,17 but the defence will not operate where the defendant has acted in a considered
desire for revenge.18 The second component necessitates that the loss of control is attributable to at
least one of two qualifying triggers, or a combination of both. The first qualifying trigger is satisfied by
a thing said or things done or said (or both) which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave
character, and caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.19 The
second qualifying trigger requires the defendant to fear serious violence from the victim against the
defendant or another identified person.20 The mitigation is unavailable to the defendant who, looking
for trouble to the extent of inciting or exciting violence, loses his control21 and the fact that a thing
done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.22 The final component requires the jury
to assess whether a person of the defendant's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and
self-restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant, might have reacted in the same or a similar
way.23 The defendant's circumstances *J. Crim. L. 516 extends to ‘all’ of the circumstances except
those bearing on his general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.24
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Attribution of prevening fault
The exclusionary clauses operate to preclude the partial defence in cases of self-induced provocation
25 and where the killing was borne out of ‘a considered desire for revenge’.26 As far as the victim's
conduct is concerned, the legislation stipulates that sexual infidelity is to be disregarded for the
purposes of the qualifying triggers. There is a significant difference between prohibiting the availability
of the partial defence on the basis of the defendant's actions as opposed to the conduct of the victim.
In the former case, the defendant has acted in a way which renders it appropriate to preclude the
concessionary mitigation. For example, D formed an intention to kill V. D approached V in a nightclub.
Knowing that V's wife had recently left him, D mercilessly taunted V. V responded saying, ‘I'll kill you!’
and advanced towards D, whereupon D hit V over the head with a bottle, from which V subsequently
died. In this case, D is unable to rely on the loss of control defence, based on a fear of serious
violence or otherwise, because D instigated V's conduct for the purpose of using it as an excuse to
use violence. D's prior fault in causing V to respond in a provocative manner effectively precludes the
availability of the partial defence.27
Similarities may be drawn between the defendant who incites conduct for the purpose of using it as
an excuse to use violence and the intoxicated defendant. An individual offender who drinks copious
amounts of alcohol in order to provide Dutch courage to commit any designated offence, specific or
basic, is regarded as morally culpable for his actions.28 Lord Denning in Attorney-General for Northern
Ireland 29 stated:
If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for it knowing that it
is a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to give himself Dutch courage to do the
killing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely on his self-induced drunkenness as a
defence to a charge of murder, nor even as reducing it to manslaughter. He cannot say that he got
himself into such a stupid state *J. Crim. L. 517 that he was incapable of an intent to kill. So also,
when he is a psychopath he cannot by drinking rely on his self-induced defect of reason as a defence
of insanity. The wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him, coupled with
the act which he intended to do and did do.30
Liability is constructed on the basis of the defendant's prior fault in becoming voluntarily intoxicated for
the purpose of committing the elected offence.31 In the same regard, evidence of voluntary acute
intoxication on behalf of the defendant is irrelevant when making the objective assessment as to
whether an ordinary/reasonable person would have reacted as the defendant did in the
circumstances.32 In R v Asmelash, 33 the Court of Appeal assessed whether the voluntary
consumption of alcohol could fall within the ‘defendant's circumstances’ for the purposes of the partial
defence of loss of self-control.34 The Lord Chief Justice cited with approval the initial trial judge's
direction which required jurors to ignore the defendant's intoxication and apply Majewski 35
standardisations:
Are you sure that a person of [defendant's] sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and
self-restraint and in the same circumstances, but unaffected by alcohol, would not have reacted in the
same or similar way?36
*J. Crim. L. 518 The effect is that voluntary intoxication does not preclude the availability of the loss
of control defence, rather the defendant's conduct is assessed according to the standards of the
ordinary sober person.37 This approach is clearly aligned with the English Law Commission's
recommendation that atypical mental states, such as intoxication and irritability, should be omitted
from consideration on the basis that they constitute factors which bear on the defendant's general
capacity to exercise adequate self-control.38 The Court of Appeal asserted that the term ‘unaffected
by alcohol’ should be implied into the loss of control defence, otherwise the floodgates would allow
every intoxicated defendant to claim:
I must be judged against the standards of other violently disposed drunken people even though I may
be like a lamb when I am sober.39
Voluntary acute intoxication on the part of the defendant is, in this respect, impliedly excluded from
consideration when assessing whether the ordinary person would have behaved as the defendant did
in the prevailing circumstances. The Asmelash litigation might have been avoided had Parliament
enacted a specific exclusionary clause akin to that recommended by the NSWLCSC, which provides
that ‘where a defendant is intoxicated at the time of the act or omission causing death, and the
intoxication is self-induced, a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged caused by that intoxication
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or resulting from a mistaken belief occasioned by that intoxication is to be disregarded’.40 This clause
would align provocation with the partial substantial impairment of the mind defence and is likely to be
subject to s. 428A of the Crimes Act 1900:41
[The NSWLCSC's] reason for expressly excluding self-induced intoxication from consideration in
relation to the partial defence, is essentially, to be consistent with existing legislative policy on the
admissibility of evidence of intoxication in relation to criminal offences … That policy is said to be
based on the view that it is unacceptable to excuse otherwise criminal conduct because the accused
is suffering from self-induced intoxication, *J. Crim. L. 519 and that people who become voluntarily
intoxicated should be held responsible for their actions.42
The recommendation could be enhanced by specifically outlining whether it should apply to acute
intoxication only and/or by specifying any exceptions to the exclusion, for example, alcohol
dependence syndrome or gradations of harmful drug/alcohol use.43 In Asmelash, their Lordships
noted that a nuanced approach should apply where the defendant suffers from alcohol dependence
syndrome and is ruthlessly taunted regarding that condition (to the extent that it amounts to a
qualifying trigger) in which case the syndrome might constitute part of the circumstances for
consideration.44 This ruling appears to imply that alcohol dependence syndrome may remain relevant,
notwithstanding the voluntary consumption of alcohol, in that jurors would be required to consider
whether an ordinary person ‘of the defendant's sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and
self-restraint and suffering from alcohol dependence syndrome would have acted in the same or a
similar way’. Despite the obvious problems associated with requiring jurors to answer hypothetical
questions of this nature, this nuanced approach reflects the general consensus in English law that
alcohol dependence syndrome potentially impacts upon the defendant's level of criminal
responsibility.45
It is not atypical for evidence of a defendant's intoxication to be omitted from consideration when
assessing whether a particular defence ought to apply.46 Nor is it uncommon for a defence to be
precluded to the defendant who voluntarily places himself into a situation which he knows, or ought to
know, may result in him becoming involved in criminal activity.47 In this respect, explicit and implied
exclusionary models which focus on the conduct of the defendant may be cogently aligned with other
areas of substantive criminal law. It is inapposite to afford a defence (and/or to take account of a
defendant's voluntary intoxication) when the defendant has culpably fostered a situation in order to
use violence.
*J. Crim. L. 520 Sexual infidelity plus
The sexual infidelity prohibition is logically distinct from the foregoing exclusionary provisions in that it
focuses on the conduct of the victim. Specific prohibitions of this nature are more problematic since
the defendant is not responsible for the conduct of the victim and a variety of factors may combine to
cause the defendant to lose self-control. An absolute statutory exclusion aimed towards particular
forms of conduct has the potential to produce harsh and unjust results. The Law Commission advised
against the implementation of s. 55(6)(c) on grounds that the policy objective underpinning the
exclusionary conduct model was unclear and that it would unnecessarily complicate the partial
defence.48 The rationale for the delimitation is that ‘it is unacceptable for a defendant who has killed
an unfaithful partner to rely on that unfaithfulness to try to escape a murder conviction’.49 The
government's approach in this context erroneously assumes that judges and juries would accept a
loss of control claim predicated on the victim's alleged sexual perfidy alone.50 Case law demonstrates
that the concession to human frailty underpinning the partial defence only extends so far, and that in
contemporary society judges and jurors deem it inappropriate to afford a partial defence on grounds
of a partner's actual or suspected infidelity.51 In light of these observations, the sexual infidelity
prohibition is unnecessary since unmeritorious cases are invariably filtered out by judges and jurors.
The 1975 case of R v Davies (Peter) 52 highlights that jurors are disinclined to allow provocation even
in cases where the trial judge has been *J. Crim. L. 521 generous to the defendant. The defendant
killed his wife after she commenced a relationship with another man, by shooting her as she left her
place of work to meet her lover who was waiting outside. The defendant was charged with murder
after the jury rejected provocation based upon the wife's conduct, i.e. leaving the defendant and
commencing a relationship with another man. The defendant appealed on the basis that the judge
had misdirected the jury in failing to direct that the actions of the wife's lover could be taken into
account for the purposes of the provocation defence. The Court of Appeal asserted that since the
judge had directed the members of the jury that they could consider the wife's conduct over the
Page4
previous year as acts of provocation, which was generous to the defence, the jury, in the
circumstances of the case, could not have separated the wife's actions from those of her lover and
the failure to direct the jury that the lover's presence at the victim's workplace amounted to
provocation would not have altered their view that it was a premeditated killing. This is one example in
a plethora of cases where jurors have refused to allow provocation claims predicated on the victim's
actual or alleged sexual infidelity. In this respect, the government's vociferous campaign against
sexual infidelity has been heavily criticised as taking advantage of the emotions evoked as a result of
sexual infidelity killings. It has been suggested that the exclusionary clause is nothing more than
‘nonsensical rhetoric in an area of law of great sensitivity’53 since provocation cases based on sexual
infidelity per se have been rejected by jurors for many years.
The government also failed to consider the impact of the higher threshold test introduced via the new
qualifying triggers under ss 54-55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 when it enacted the sexual
infidelity prohibition. In practice s. 55(6)(c) adds very little to the partial defence in cases where the
only provocative conduct to be relied upon is the victim's infidelity since the anger/fear trigger(s)
operate to exclude such claims. The concessionary mitigation requires that the defendant lost
self-control in response to the fear and/or anger trigger(s). During parliamentary debate Mr Llwyd
provided the following scenario in which the provocative conduct pertains to sexual infidelity alone: ‘V
was bragging about having sexual relations with D's wife. D went out, bought a knife and stabbed V to
death’ (‘Sexual infidelity per se’ ).54 It is clear that the defendant in this example did not fear serious
violence and he could not have experienced a justified sense of being seriously wronged. The
defendant's claim is filtered out by the higher threshold required by the new qualifying triggers.
The foregoing principle was applied in the case of R v Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer. 55 H fatally stabbed
his estranged partner, B, at her home in *J. Crim. L. 522 Sheffield. H and B had been in a
relationship for about a year, when B indicated that she intended to return to her home in Maidstone
where she had commenced a sexual relationship with a man called Dave. On the evening of the fatal
attack, H was seen entering B's home via an upstairs window. An argument shortly followed, which
was loud enough for the neighbours to hear. One neighbour gave evidence that he had heard H say,
‘You are not going. I'm not letting you go’. A second witness testified that she heard H ask, ‘Have you
shagged Dave?’ to which B replied ‘No, I've only kissed him’. Shortly thereafter, H stabbed V in the
chest and wrist, killing her. H was subsequently charged with murder. The prosecution contended that
B was the victim of a premeditated killing. The defence asserted that the victim's death was a dreadful
accident.
Judge Goldsack refused to leave the partial defence to the jury on grounds that the things said or
done ‘did not come anywhere near’ founding ‘circumstances of an extremely grave character’ nor
could they have caused the defendant to have ‘a justified sense of being seriously wrong’.56 The
requirements of the qualifying trigger operated to preclude the partial defence in this case (as the Law
Commission had intended)57 without the need for recourse to the sexual infidelity prohibition. The
‘presence or otherwise of a qualifying trigger’ requires objective evaluation and ‘is not defined or
decided by the defendant and any assertions he may make in evidence, or any account given in the
investigative process’.58 The requirements of the new qualifying triggers effectively raise the bar for
defendants who kill in anger and accordingly it is unlikely that sexual infidelity per se would ever
satisfy the anger trigger:59
To suggest that the fact of a break-up of a relationship could amount to circumstances of an
extremely grave character or that it would entitle the aggrieved party to feel a justifiable sense of
being seriously wronged would be to ignore the normal meaning of these words. It would also result in
the defence of loss of control being left to the jury in almost every case where one partner to a
relationship kills the other, which was clearly not Parliament's intention.60
In order for the concessionary mitigation to apply, it is insufficient for the defendant to have a sense of
being seriously wronged. The partial *J. Crim. L. 523 defence requires that the circumstances were
of an extremely grave character and that the defendant's sense of being wronged by them is
justifiable. Similarly, it is difficult to envisage a situation where the defendant fears serious violence as
a result of sexual infidelity. There was no need to introduce an explicit legislative provision in order to
filter out cases like that of Hatter. Notwithstanding these observations, the government felt that it was
‘important to set out the position precisely and uncompromisingly namely that sexual infidelity is not
the kind of thing done that is ever sufficient on its own to found a successful plea of loss of control’.61
The sexual infidelity prohibition may have more to do with political rhetoric than principled reform in
this regard. In reality, it will only be in rare cases that sexual infidelity per se will be relied upon in
support of a qualifying trigger since ‘daily experience in both criminal and family courts demonstrates
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that breakdown of relationships, whenever they occur, and for whatever reason, is always fraught with
tension and difficulty’.62
In a small minority of cases, it may not be too onerous to disentangle sexual infidelity from a
particularly severe form of provocative conduct.63 The scenario of a defendant who returns home to
find her husband raping her child, whereupon she loses control and kills him64 (‘Rape of a child’)
provides a fundamental example of this type of case. The sexual infidelity per se is arguably irrelevant
when situated in the context of the rape. There is no question that the revelation that your child has
been raped, whether from hearing what is happening or by catching the perpetrator in the act, is one
of the most serious forms of provocative conduct, regardless of whether it was the act of a spouse or
a stranger. If fact-finders were asked to disregard sexual infidelity for the purposes of the partial
defence, this is unlikely to affect the outcome of the case. The jury will simply be required to
determine whether finding your/a child being raped is sufficiently provocative to satisfy the ‘seriously
wronged’ trigger.65 The exclusion of sexual infidelity as a qualifying trigger is an unnecessary
requirement in cases of this context.
In the vast majority of cases, however, a combination of factors including the victim's unfaithfulness
will contribute to the defendant's loss of self-control. At the very least, the sexual infidelity will provide
a context to the provocative conduct of the victim. It is highly artificial, if not impossible, to expect
fact-finders to evaluate whether an ostensible qualifying trigger is satisfied based upon the victim's
conduct whilst at the same time requiring them to disregard the victim's sexual infidelity. *J. Crim. L.
524 The following scenario is demonstrative of the problems associated with asking jurors to engage
in this form of mental gymnastics:
D is abused by her husband (V) over a long period, at the end of which they are reconciled. V says
that he will moderate his behaviour and promises to be faithful to D in the future. D comes home the
following weekend to find V in flagrante with his lover. V tells D that the marriage is now at an end,
and D kills him. (‘the abused wife’)66
This postulation draws on both the ‘fear’ trigger (in the context of domestic abuse) and the ‘seriously
wronged’ trigger (the abuse coupled with the revelation that the marriage was at an end). It is not
simply V's threat to leave, but the ‘cumulative impact’67 of the domestic abuse, the promises, and V's
sexual infidelity which contribute to D's loss of self-control. These contributory qualifying and
non-qualifying triggers combine to cause D to lose her self-control. The omission of sexual infidelity
from the remaining factors results in D claiming that the final straw, the revelation that her husband
was going to leave, caused her to lose self-control.68 A number of commentators have asserted that
this is the correct approach and that the domestic violence per se would have to satisfy the qualifying
trigger.69 For some the ‘repeated beatings and immense fear’ suffered by the battered woman will be
sufficient to raise the fear trigger and the main obstacle for battered women is the ‘loss of control’
requirement.70 This observation fails to address the link between the loss of control requirement and
the qualifying trigger. The sexual infidelity is ‘an important and relevant component of the cocktail of
events’ that combined to make the defendant lose control71 and to exclude it from fact-finder
evaluation is to omit an important narrative which may impact upon whether the defence succeeds or
fails.72 Fact- *J. Crim. L. 525 finders are charged to evaluate whether D had truly lost control or was
acting in a considered desire for revenge;73 in this particular scenario the sexual infidelity represents
an important factor in D's loss of self-control: ‘how can we exclude the deepest feelings and passions,
the breach of trust and the breach of faithfulness from our considerations?’.74 Although some have
criticised the use of extreme examples as ‘watering down the law’, it is submitted that this
unnecessary exclusion has the potential to cause grave injustice in a small number of cases75 and
this is precisely why such examples ought to be considered.76
R v Clinton
This was recognised by the Court of Appeal in the case of R v Clinton 77 which adopted a remarkably
inclusionary approach to the application of the sexual infidelity prohibition. The defendant, C, was
devastated when his wife, V, left him and their two children to begin a ‘trial separation’. Both parties
had a history of clinical depression and their marriage was fraught with financial difficulties. Two
weeks after leaving, V informed C that she had been having an affair with a man (X) whom she had
met via Facebook. The following day, C accessed several suicide websites and V's Facebook
account where he ‘tortured’ himself over photographs of V and X. V's relationship status indicated that
she was ‘separated’ and ‘open to offers’ and C found sexually explicit photographs which confirmed
the affair. When confronted, V informed C that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with five
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different men, going into graphic detail. V subsequently noticed that C had accessed suicide websites
and told him that ‘it would have been easier if you had, for all of us’, whereupon C picked up a
wooden baton and struck V repeatedly before strangling her with a ligature.78
The facts gave rise to three contributory triggers: the sexual infidelity; the taunts regarding C's suicide
plan; and the fear that C would be required to care for the children on his own. At first instance, the
trial judge advocated that the comments pertaining to V's sexual infidelity were to be disregarded and
that the remaining evidence was insufficient to satisfy the ‘seriously wronged’ and/or ‘fear’ triggers.
On appeal, the *J. Crim. L. 526 Court of Appeal asserted that sexual infidelity can be considered as
one of the circumstances which might have caused a person with a normal degree of tolerance and
self-restraint to lose control. Fact-finders were required to assess whether the taunts were sufficient to
cause the defendant to lose self-control in circumstances where the defendant was angered by his
wife's sexual infidelity. Lord Judge CJ stated:
Our approach has, as the judgment shows, been influenced by the simple reality that in relation to the
day to day working of the criminal justice system events cannot be isolated from their context … [T]o
seek to compartmentalise sexual infidelity and exclude it when it is integral to the facts as a whole is
… unrealistic and carries with it the potential for injustice … we do not see how any sensible
evaluation of the gravity of the circumstances or their impact on the defendant could be made if the
jury, having, in accordance with the legislation, heard the evidence, were then to be directed to excise
from their evaluation of the qualifying trigger the matters said to constitute sexual infidelity, and to put
them into distinct compartments to be disregarded. In our judgment, where sexual infidelity is integral
to and forms an essential part of the context in which to make a just evaluation whether a qualifying
trigger properly falls within the ambit of subsections 55(3) and (4), the prohibition in section 55(6)(c)
does not operate to exclude it.79
The ruling mandates, in effect, that if an admissible trigger may be present, the evidence relating to
sexual infidelity arises for consideration as part of the context in which to evaluate that trigger and
whether the statutory ingredients for that particular trigger have been satisfied.80 In this case, the
sexual infidelity provided more than a contextual narrative. Indeed, the taunts plus V's sexual infidelity
could be sufficient to satisfy the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger, despite the fact that the taunts per se
were deemed inadequate to fulfil that aspect of the partial defence; the combination of ‘matters relied
on as a qualifying trigger, evaluated in the context of the evidence relating to V's sexual infidelity, and
examined as a cohesive whole, were of sufficient weight to leave the partial defence to the jury’.81 The
effect is that the victim's actions beyond his or her sexual infidelity (for example, the victim's taunts
about C's failed suicide attempt) may satisfy the qualifying trigger(s) when considered in the context
of that infidelity.82
Baker and Zhao contend that this is the wrong approach and if the taunts per se were incapable of
satisfying the partial defence, then there was no need to assess whether ‘a person of D's sex and age
with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D *J. Crim. L. 527
might have acted in the same or a similar way to D’.83 In contrast, the Court of Appeal asserted that
although its ruling was consistent with the views of those who opposed the sexual infidelity prohibition
in its entirety, it did not depart from the views of the ministers responsible for the legislation during its
passage through Parliament:84 ‘we do not accept that [sexual infidelity] of itself ought to lead to
reducing a murder finding’;85 ‘if other factors come into play, the court will of course have an
opportunity to consider them, but it will not be able to make the decision exclusively on the ground of
sexual infidelity’86 ; ‘We are simply saying that sexual infidelity in itself cannot and should not be … a
defence for murder’.87 If this was Parliament's intention, then the statutory exclusion is unnecessary
on grounds that sexual infidelity per se could not possibly result in a fear of serious violence or cause
D to have a justified sense of being seriously wronged.
The NSWLCSC has similarly criticised the sexual infidelity prohibition in its report on the partial
defence of provocation.88 The Committee was established following the high-profile case of R v Singh,
89 in which the defendant cut his wife's throat in a ‘ferocious attack’ after she allegedly denied ever
having loved him, told him she was going to leave and threatened to have him deported. The case
attracted significant media attention90 and resulted in public outrage when the defendant had his
conviction reduced from murder to manslaughter91 and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment,
with a six-year non-parole period.92
In terms of substantive reform to the partial defence, a number of high-profile stakeholders93 provided
some support for an ‘exclusionary conduct’ model, but queried its workability citing Clinton, 94 whilst
others went further, naming Clinton as the reason why such a model should be avoided.95
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Nevertheless, many Inquiry participants were supportive of specific exclusionary clauses relating to
non-violent sexual advances, anything said or done by the victim in the exercise of personal
autonomy about their lives and relationships, and words alone. As previously noted, commentators
have suggested that the defence should be unavailable where the defendant killed while acting under
the influence of self-induced intoxication.96 The NSWLCSC concluded that there was merit in specific
exclusions pertaining to non-violent sexual advances, *J. Crim. L. 528 sexual jealousy and sexual
infidelity, but asserted that ‘the exclusionary approach to reform is particularly vulnerable to
manipulation’97 and in light of the Clinton ruling it is ‘critically important’ that any delimiting clauses are
drafted to reflect the policy intention underpinning them; further, that intention should be clearly
articulated by legislators during the parliamentary process.98 The NSWLCSC noted that the
‘ineffectiveness’ of s. 55(6)(c) of the 2009 Act could have been prevented by careful and precise
legislative drafting, specifying that the prohibited conduct cannot, ‘in and of itself’, 99 be relied upon as
provocative behaviour.100 Arguably, this would add little to the partial defence since it has long been
established that sexual infidelity does not ‘in and of itself ’ 101 constitute a valid ground for the
concessionary defence.
Constituit iudicem legi
The ruling in Clinton has polarised opinion. For many it represents a common-sense approach to a
tautological and imprecise provision.102 It is highly artificial to require that specific events are isolated
from their context.103 Other commentators have voiced their disapproval:
The Court of Appeal has likely ensured that the sexual infidelity provocation [sic ] within the new
partial defence of loss of control will be largely ineffective in minimising the use of the defence by men
who kill a female intimate partner in the context of sexual infidelity. As described by one media
commentator at the time, the decision ‘restores the defence in so-called crime of passion cases’ …
and as such raises the fear that in practice this new partial defence will do little to overcome the
problems associated with the now abolished provocation defence.104
Regardless of whether the ruling is welcomed or criticised, through novel construction of the statutory
provision and by judicial sleight of hand, fact-finders are not only entitled to consider sexual infidelity
but to fuse it with other factors in order to satisfy the seriously wronged trigger, and it cannot be
denied that this form of constituit iudicem legi *J. Crim. L. 529 causes substantial uncertainty in
terms of the applicability of the concessionary defence. The judicial remedy provided in Clinton
effectively ignores the sexual infidelity prohibition in a manner which extends the availability of the
partial defence without achieving finality or certainty. Judicial law-making may have prevailed over the
wording of the statute in this context. This battleground between judicial and statutory impact has
many different layers in substantive criminal law. In the controversial case of DPP v C (A Minor), 105
Lord Lowry expertly articulated the undesirability of the judicial remedy approach to doli incapax
principles:
(1) If the solution is doubtful, the judges should beware of imposing their own remedy.
(2) Caution should prevail if Parliament has rejected opportunities of clearing up a known difficulty or
has legislated, while leaving the difficulty untouched.
(3) Disputed matters of social policy are less suitable areas for judicial intervention than purely legal
problems.
(4) Fundamental legal doctrines should not be lightly set aside.
(5) Judges should not make a change unless they can achieve finality and certainty.106
Accordingly, it was left to Parliament to abolish the rebuttable presumption of criminal law that ‘a child
aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence’.107 Similarly, in the controversial case of R v
Clegg, 108 the Court of Appeal declined to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter on grounds
that the defendant had used excessive force in self-defence. The case involved a British soldier on
patrol in Northern Ireland, who opened fire on the occupants of a stolen car which had failed to stop at
a checkpoint. According to his evidence, the defendant believed that the life of his colleague on the
opposite side of the road was in danger. He fired three shots at the windscreen of the car and a fourth
shot at the side of the car as it was passing. The trial judge ruled that the final shot, which killed the
rear-seat passenger, was not fired in self-defence. The certified question of law in Clegg was whether
a soldier on duty, who kills a person with the requisite intention for murder, but who would be entitled
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to rely on self-defence, but for the excessive use of force, is guilty of murder or manslaughter.109 The
court considered that had Parliament intended to create a qualified defence in cases where the
defendant uses excessive and unreasonable force in preventing crime it *J. Crim. L. 530 would have
done so under s. 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.110 The court acknowledged the severity of its ruling
111 and the boundaries of jurisprudential precedent:
I can find no escape from the conclusion that if a crime was committed, it was murder if the shot was
fired with intent to kill or seriously wound. To hold that it could be manslaughter would be to make
entirely new law. If a plea of self-defence is put forward in answer to a charge of murder and fails
because excessive force was used though some force was justifiable, as the law now stands the
accused cannot be convicted of manslaughter. It may be that a strong case can be made for an
alteration of the law to enable a verdict of manslaughter to be returned where the use of some force
was justifiable but that is a matter for legislation and not for judicial decision.112
In other areas, the courts have been more inclined towards judicial activism. For example, the House
of Lords, in R v R, 113 abolished the marital rape exemption without waiting for Parliament. The
indemnity was predicated on the words of Sir Matthew Hale in 1736, when he stated in the History of
Pleas of the Crown :
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband
which she cannot retract.114
The courts had assumed that Parliament intended to retain the immunity of the husband when
enacting s. 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, which provides: ‘a man commits rape
if--(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not
consent to it …’. The word ‘unlawful’ was interpreted as referring to non-consensual sexual
intercourse outside of the matrimonial relationship.115 Although the court acknowledged the view that
this was an area where it should step aside to leave the matter to the parliamentary process, the
House of Lords felt compelled to abolish the *J. Crim. L. 531 appalling rule which stipulated that a
man was incapable of raping his wife:
This is not the creation of a new offence, it is the removal of a common law fiction which has become
anachronistic and offensive and we consider that it is our duty having reached that conclusion to act
upon it.116
In Clegg, the House of Lords commended the ruling in R, but urged caution advising that it is
inapposite to make such amendments where the course for development is unclear and Parliament,
knowing of the difficulty, has chosen not to address the issue.117 Lord Lloyd of Berwick asserted that
‘the reduction of what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in a particular class of case seems
to me essentially a decision for the legislature, and not [the House of Lords/Supreme Court] in its
judicial capacity’.118 There is an obvious difference between the rulings in Clegg and R. In Clegg, the
court was effectively being asked to allow a defence where one did not exist, whereas in R the House
of Lords abolished an outdated and invidious legal principle.
The case of Clinton 119 arguably has more in common with the case of Clegg than that of R. The Court
of Appeal was asked to allow evidence of sexual infidelity to be considered as part of the defendant's
loss of control claim, despite the existence of a specific statutory provision mandating that sexual
infidelity is to be disregarded. In effect, the court was being asked to permit the reduction of what
would otherwise be murder to manslaughter on the grounds of the victim's infidelity plus the taunts
regarding the defendant's failed suicide attempt. The fact that the court was willing to allow evidence
of the victim's sexual infidelity to be considered as part of the objective assessment as to whether the
defendant lost his self-control is arguably akin to allowing a new partial defence.
Lord Lowry, in DPP v C (A Minor), 120 similarly urged caution where ‘Parliament has rejected
opportunities of clearing up a known difficulty or has legislated, while leaving the difficulty untouched’.
121 The ‘rape of a child’ and ‘the abused wife’ scenarios (considered above) which were presented
during parliamentary debate on the Coroners and Justice Bill to illustrate the difficulties associated
with the introduction of an explicit exclusionary clause effectively gave Parliament notice of the
problems presented by the introduction of a specific prohibition pertaining to sexual infidelity. Despite
being put on notice of these complications, Parliament saw fit to legislate in this area. Akin to Clegg, it
was therefore inappropriate for the Court of Appeal to introduce a partial defence of *J. Crim. L. 532
sexual infidelity plus,122 no matter how logical that ruling might appear to be.
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New South Wales
Despite the problems encountered in England and Wales, the exclusionary conduct model garnered
support from a significant proportion of Inquiry participants in New South Wales.123 Contributors
identified several types of conduct which they believed should be excluded from consideration as part
of provocation claims. As noted, this included, inter alia, sexual infidelity and non-violent sexual
advances.124 In a bid to circumvent the difficulties associated with s. 55(6)(c) of the 2009 Act, the New
South Wales Select Committee recommended the introduction of a very specific exclusionary clause
125 which would preclude the availability of the NSW provocation defence, ‘other than in
circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character’, if:
A domestic relationship exists between the defendant and another person; and,
(a) The defendant unlawfully kills that person and/or another person (the deceased); and,
(b) The provocation is based on anything done by the deceased or anything the person believes the
deceased to have done--
a. To end the relationship; or
*J. Crim. L. 533 b. To change the nature of the relationship; or
c. To indicate that the relationship may, should or will end,126 or that there may, should or will be a
change to the nature of the relationship, and that for the purposes of determining the above, the court
should have regard to the following circumstances where a defendant (except in some ‘extreme and
exceptional circumstances’) should not be able to avail themselves of the partial defence of gross
provocation:
These scenarios are designed to cover instances in which the victim attempts to exercise personal
autonomy.127 Inquiry participants asserted that ‘[t]he continued use of the partial defence of
provocation where killings have occurred in the context of sexual infidelity or a change in relationship
condones and sanctions violence against women. In effect women are being killed for exercising their
right to end a relationship’.128 The focus on the ‘changing nature of the relationship’ is more
appropriate than concentrating on sexual infidelity. The experience in England has been preoccupied
with sexual infidelity rather than the rationale underpinning the exclusionary clause.129 Speaking in his
role as a Law Commissioner, Professor Jeremy Horder asserted that the preeminence attached to
sexual infidelity as a primordial exclusionary *J. Crim. L. 534 basis is simply ‘bizarre’ 130 and
questioned whether the government had confused sexual infidelity with excessive jealousy, envy and
male proprietorialness.131
The aim of the NSWLCSC recommendation is to restrict the availability of the partial defence to
defendants who kill their partners after subjecting them to systematic and prolonged abuse, while
ensuring that it remains available to abused defendants who ‘lash out’ killing their tormentor.132
Interestingly, the exclusionary provision does not appear to cover the ‘obsessed stalker scenario’
since many stalking situations do not necessarily arise from the breakdown or changing nature of a
relationship. An increase in the use of social media, in particular, often means that the defendant may
never have met the victim when he or she begins to develop the obsession. This lack of coherence is
equally applicable to the 2009 Act where the exclusionary clause is unlikely to apply to stalking cases:
D became obsessed with C (an ex-girlfriend) who had ended their relationship and began stalking
her. One evening, D found C having sex in a car with V, whereupon D fetched a knife and stabbed V
to death. (‘The obsessed stalker’)133
It is somewhat paradoxical to exclude sexual infidelity from juror evaluation in the ‘rape of a child’ and
‘abused wife’ scenarios, identified above, whilst leaving stalking cases to be considered by the trial
judge, particularly in light of the increase in reports of stalking within England and Wales.134 The
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 made stalking a criminal offence for the first time by inserting three
new offences of stalking into the Protection from Harassment Act 1997135 and the Director of Public
Prosecutions has issued interim guidelines on prosecuting in cases involving social media.136 The
new provisions are designed to *J. Crim. L. 535 address specific stalking behaviour as opposed to
harassment more generally137 and would extend to the ‘obsessed stalker’ scenario. In light of the
problems associated with stalking it is surprising that the exclusionary clause does not extend to
envy, proprietorialness and stalking.138 Nevertheless, this would represent an unwarranted extension
of a hopelessly defective clause, since the ‘obsessed stalker’ will remain ineligible to claim the loss of
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control defence because the trial judge has the authority to remove pleas predicated on
possessiveness and jealousy from juror consideration.139 In this regard, the sexual infidelity prohibition
is superfluous since the loss of control defence will only be left to the jury if sufficient evidence is
adduced which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude
that the defence might apply.140
In a bid to assuage concerns that the exclusionary conduct model places primordial emphasis on
specific scenarios at the expense of equally deserving cases, the NSWLCSC asserts that the list is
not designed to be exhaustive but, rather, provides examples of the forms of conduct which should be
excluded from forming a valid basis for the partial defence. The problem with providing such a list,
however, is that it begs the question as to why other forms of conduct were excluded from that list.
Commenting on the English sexual infidelity exclusion, Widdecombe asked, ‘What is unique about
sexual infidelity that it must be removed from the almost endless list of circumstances in which
somebody might be provoked?’141 Difficulties also arise when interpreting the type of behaviour that
the list is designed to exclude. The English ‘sexual infidelity’ prohibition has been described as a
‘formidably difficult provision’ and the most ‘critical problem’ as regards the loss of control defence.142
There are obvious difficulties associated with defining the term ‘sexual infidelity’ and/or assessing the
scope of the ‘words and acts constituting’ it143 and in many cases it will be impossible to disentangle
sexual infidelity from other factors. This problem is likely *J. Crim. L. 536 to arise in New South
Wales if para. (ii) is enacted. Tolmie urges caution in this respect:
I think one case that the Committee would be well served to read as a cautionary tale is R v Clinton,
Parker, Evans : a recent House of Lords [sic ] decision this year. England tried to modify its
provocation defence … and the House of Lords [sic ] unpicked it in that particular case … Sexual
infidelity was removed as a qualifying trigger … The House of Lords [sic ] said it was ridiculous and it
could not apply it. It effectively read it in such a way that it is a dead letter. I think it is a cautionary
case to read and to think about what judges can do with these provisions if they are not very carefully
crafted.144
Similar interpretative difficulties are likely to arise in relation to the NSWLCSC's recommendation that
non-violent sexual advances be omitted from the concessionary mitigation. It was suggested that the
exclusionary clause should be gender neutral, but, in practice, it is recognised that ‘the defence has
only ever applied in the case of a nonviolent sexual advance from a male to another male …’.145 The
specific prohibition is designed to prevent the availability of what has colloquially become known as
the ‘gay panic defence’ which has the potential to legitimise murder ‘that is informed by bigotry’.146
Inquiry participants assert that the provision would assist in preventing ‘the differential treatment to
gay males in the legal system which has otherwise delivered inequality’.147 In line with the sexual
infidelity exclusion, the term ‘non-violent sexual advance’ is inherently vague:
The delineation between what constitutes ‘a non-violent sexual advance’ and what does not is not
necessarily clear … a grab on the arm, or on the buttock, may constitute a common assault. It could,
therefore, be argued that such an advance is no longer non-violent.148
This undermines the basis of the entire provision. Although the recommendation is designed to reflect
current norms and societal expectations, it fails to accommodate the complexities of real life. In
practice, it is likely that the defendant will allege that the sexual advance could be categorised as
violent. Further, it has been suggested that the exclusionary conduct model ought only to apply where
the conduct excluded is the only provocative behaviour to be relied upon. This is in line with
provisions in the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.149 The ACT provision, which is
almost identical to the Northern Territory provision, provides:
However, conduct of the deceased consisting of a non-violent sexual advance (or advances) towards
the accused--
*J. Crim. L. 537 (a) is taken not to be sufficient, by itself, to be conduct to which subsection (2)(b)
[the provocative conduct] applies; but
(b) may be taken into account together with other conduct of the deceased in deciding whether there
has been an act or omission to which subsection (2) applies.150
The effect is that such conduct is not excluded where it is relevant to other factors i.e. it is not the only
provocative conduct to be relied upon. This is reflective of the manifold factors which usually comprise
provocation claims since everyday life tells us that individual conduct cannot be compartmentalised
and isolated from its context. The flexibility built into the provision, however, means that it is likely that
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provocation claims involving non-violent sexual advances will be individually tailored in order to
circumvent the exclusion.
Phased abolition?
Inquiry participants in New South Wales assert that limiting the partial defence so that it applies in
‘circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character’ will go a significant way toward
preventing the availability of the defence in cases where the defendant kills in response to the victim
exercising personal autonomy.151 It is submitted, however, that the phrase is vague and has the
potential to create a ‘loophole’ in the law.152 This is because provocation is designed to apply in
‘circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character’153 and as such it is difficult to see what
an exclusionary conduct model would offer where it would only apply if the case was not one of
extreme and exceptional character. In this respect, the novel terminology is likely to give rise to the
same problems encountered in England and Wales. As previously noted, the Court of Appeal in
Clinton asserted that its ruling accorded with the views of the parliamentarians enacting the sexual
infidelity exclusion. The Court of Appeal claimed that Parliament only ever intended to exclude sexual
infidelity per se. If that is truly the case then the sexual infidelity prohibition constitutes a superfluous
aspect of the concessionary mitigation. It might be suggested that s. 55(6)(c) appears to have more to
do with political rhetoric than principled reform in this respect.
Concerns regarding whether an ‘all-legislative amendment’, such as that suggested by the
NSWLCSC, is capable of achieving the desired outcome154 are well founded. Although a number of
Inquiry participants appeared to prefer an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the exclusionary conduct model,
this would lack the flexibility required to deal with exceptional cases such as that of the ‘abused wife’
scenario identified above. The extensive list suggested by the NSWLCSC questions the very *J.
Crim. L. 538 basis of the partial defence ‘as a concession to human frailty’155 and, perhaps, indicates
the beginning of ‘a phased approach to abolition’.156 Many of the Inquiry participants who favoured the
exclusionary conduct model did so as their second choice with most preferring abolition of the partial
defence.157 Academicians have suggested that the exclusionary conduct model could provide an
interim measure pending a comprehensive review of homicide law.158 The effect of abolition is that
consideration of provocative words and/or conduct is removed from the trial setting and transplanted
within the sentencing process, if they are considered at all.159
The provocation defence was abolished in 2003 in Tasmania.160 As a result, provocation may only be
considered in mitigation during sentencing. In 1655, Judge Aske, questioned whether the provocation
defence was appropriate when he said, ‘I find no difference between murther and manslaughter, for it
makes no difference between hot blood and cold blood, as we do now distinguish.’161 In the present
day, the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions espoused:
One of the hallmarks of [provocation] is a sudden loss of self-control. This is not entirely consistent
with the expectations of a civilised society. With the abolition of mandatory life imprisonment for
murder, and the ability to impose a sentence reflective of the circumstances, it seems to me
questionable that provocation as a defence needs to be retained.162
Despite the problems with the concessionary defence, ‘there are cases where a person has killed in
response to … circumstances that are so horrible that most people would not want to label the person
a “murderer” and would not want them to serve life imprisonment’.163 It will be recalled that in R v
Cocker, 164 the defendant suffocated his wife when her pleas that he put an end to her suffering
became too much for him. The defendant pleaded guilty to murder following the trial judge's ruling
that there was no evidence of provocation and his subsequent appeal was *J. Crim. L. 539
dismissed on grounds that there was no evidence that he had lost his self-control.165 Tolmie recounts
the case of a doctor who successfully raised the provocation defence after he eventually ‘snapped in
response to his mother begging for relief from the pain of the final stages of her terminal bowel cancer
and sped up her eventual death’;166 it is cases of this nature which ‘cry out for a reduced sentence’
and require a lesser verdict of voluntary manslaughter.167 The stigma attached to the offence of
murder should not be imposed on those who kill because they are provoked.168 By failing to
differentiate between those who kill because of some form of mental abnormality or in response to a
loss of self-control, and those who kill in cold blood, the law is at risk of losing its moral credibility.169
The partial defence of provocation (loss of control) plays a vital role in this regard, since it has the
‘unique effect of altering a charge of murder to one of manslaughter’.170
The NSWLCSC recommendation leaves the notion of ‘circumstances of a most extreme and
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exceptional character’ open to interpretation. It has been suggested that ‘[exclusionary models] would
protect against potential prejudices by judges and jurors and would also send a message that the
accused's response was contrary to the rights of the deceased and explicitly unacceptable and
inexcusable’,171 but only at the expense of complicating the law and potentially causing grave injustice
in certain cases. The English government ‘decided that thousands of years of *J. Crim. L. 540
human history and experience should be jettisoned for a piece of political correctness and
proclamation: a declaratory statement that sexual infidelity can never justify violent behaviour’172 and
the New South Wales Parliament risks doing the same, albeit using more sophisticated wording. A
more appropriate method of ensuring that undeserving cases are not left to jurors is to rely on the trial
judge to filter out unmeritorious cases173 as recommended by the NSWLCSC174 and the English Law
Commission.175
Conclusion
Exclusionary conduct models are designed to reflect contemporary normative societal expectations,
but often fail to accommodate the complexities of real life. In order for an exclusionary clause to be
effective, the provision must adopt an ‘all or nothing’ approach which renders particular forms of
conduct admissible or inadmissible when assessing culpability, in order to avoid further instances of
constituit iudicem legi in this area. Any attempt to build discretion into an exclusionary conduct model
potentially creates a loophole in the law. The NSWLCSC recommendation that the exclusionary
conduct model applies ‘other than in cases of a most extreme and exceptional character’ is a
fundamental example of this problem. In the majority of cases, the provocative behaviour will be
recast in such a way that it can be construed as coming within the ambit of the loss of
control/provocation defence.
The lessons learned in England and Wales regarding the reach of the controversial s. 55(6)(c)
delimitation should provide a salutary warning against the use of exclusionary conduct models in
other jurisdictions. Exclusionary clauses give rise to interpretational difficulties and it is inappropriate
to expect jurors to disregard specific aspects of the victim's conduct when determining whether the
loss of control/provocation defence is satisfied. In cases where it is unclear whether the defence
ought to apply ‘it is very dangerous … to deprive juries of the opportunity to use their good sense to
evaluate that evidence’ 176 and wholesale bans on specific forms of provocative conduct serve to
prevent such appraisals. If the aim is to ensure that normative expectations are met, it is imperative
that the role of the jury is not circumscribed to the extent that specific forms of provocative conduct
are automatically excluded from objective evaluation.177
*J. Crim. L. 541 In England and Wales, the trial judge has the authority to filter out unmeritorious
cases by removing the concessionary mitigation178 on grounds that no jury properly directed could
reasonable conclude that the defence might apply and an equivalent provision is recommended in
New South Wales.179 This is not about legitimising violent and fatal reactions to the autonomous
actions of a spouse or partner, but it is about identifying that in reality events cannot be isolated from
their context. In some cases there may be a legitimate provocation claim and it is for this reason that
the judge and jury are a vital tool in ensuring that provocation is available only in deserving cases.
The optimal solution for New South Wales in cases of this context would be to adopt a more
satisfactory equipoise by avoiding the imposition of exclusionary clauses which apply to the victim's
conduct and to trust the trial judge to filter out unmeritorious cases. Social norms can be mediated
through the trial judge and jury.
In contrast, plainly worded exclusionary clauses which focus on the defendant's conduct may be
appropriate where the aim is to delimit the concessionary defence based upon the defendant's
actions in causing or contributing to a qualifying trigger/provocation claim. In terms of appropriate
exculpation, it is clear that when a defendant has incited the provocation, the defence will be
precluded based upon the prevening fault of the defendant in instigating the victim's behaviour.
Similarly, where the defendant kills out of revenge, he or she ought to be regarded fully responsible
for his or her actions. It might also be apposite to exclude statutorily evidence of voluntarily induced
intoxication from the objective assessment as to whether the ordinary person would have lost his or
her self-control in like circumstances. The defendant's prior fault in becoming intoxicated prevents him
or her from raising such evidence as part of a loss of control/provocation claim.
These types of exclusion are less problematic than prohibitions which focus on the conduct of the
victim because fault rests with the defendant in these cases. It is the defendant's responsibility for
inciting the provocation, acting out of a considered desire for revenge and/or becoming intoxicated
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which justifies barring the concessionary mitigation or adopting a nuanced approach to the
applicability of the partial defence. Notwithstanding these observations, any exclusionary clause must
be carefully drafted to ensure that it is appropriately applied. For instance, a statutory prohibition on
intoxication evidence would need to address explicitly the situation where the defendant's condition
has reached the level of dependency. Initially the Ministry of Justice indicated that:
*J. Crim. L. 542 factors, such as alcoholism or a mental condition, which affect the defendant's
general capacity for self-control, would not be relevant to this partial defence (though they might be to
diminished responsibility). Characteristics (e.g. intoxication, irritability, excessive jealousy) which do
not arise from a medical condition and do not satisfy the test for diminished responsibility should be
disregarded altogether.180
The Court of Appeal in Asmelash, 181 however, suggested that a nuanced approach ought to apply
where the defendant suffers from alcohol dependence syndrome and is mercilessly taunted about
that condition.
In this respect, explicit legislative exclusions do have the potential to prevent unnecessary appellate
litigation, but only in limited circumstances and within the bounds of individual prevening culpability.
Specific exclusionary clauses should only be enacted where Parliament is certain that the prohibition
will not arbitrarily preclude the partial defence based upon conduct over which the defendant has no
control. In all cases Parliament ought to ensure that the exclusionary clause is truly necessary
otherwise it could be suggested that the enactment has more to do with political rhetoric than
principled criminal law reform.
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The Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW) received 
assent from the New South Wales Governor on the 20th May 2014.2 The 
Act represents a marked departure from the New South Wales Legislative 
Council Select Committee’s Report. Less than one year earlier the 
Legislat ive Council proposed a new partial defence modelled closely on 
recommendations of the Law Commission of England and Wales in its 
reports on homicide and the partial defences to murder, and sections 54-56 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 as subsequently implemented.3 The 
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer, Northumbria University ISSN: XXXXXXX. I am grateful to 
Professor Alan Reed (Associate Dean for Research and Innovation, Northumbria 
University), Dr Arlie Loughnan (Associate Professor, University of Sydney), 
Professor Thom Brooks (University of Durham), Ben Livings (Senior Lecturer, 
University of New England) and Emma Smith (Lecturer, University of 
Northumbria) for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Any errors or 
omissions remain my own.  
2  Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW), schedule 1. The Act  
substitutes section 23 of the Crimes Act 1900, with an entirely new provision, 
considered further below. Hereinafter, the ‘2014 Act’. 
3  See, respectively, NSW Legislative Council Select Committee, The Partial 
Defence of Provocation (NSW LCSC, 2013)  
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/Parlment/committee.nsf/0/61173c42185
3420aca257b5500838b2e/$FILE/Partial%20defence%20of%20provocation_Final
%20report.pdf>  accessed 19 April 2014; Law Commission for England and 
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provisions of the 2014 Act are designed to provide a more restricted partial 
defence, whilst ensuring that the mit igation remains availab le to vict ims of 
long-term abuse.4 Despite the aims of the Committee and the New South 
Wales government, the wording of the 2014 Act potentially risks 
rendering the defence unworkable.5  
The New South Wales Legislative Council Select Committee (the 
‘Committee’) was established by the Legislative Council to inquire into, 
and report on, the part ial defence o f provocation and the adequacy of self-
defence for victims  of p rolonged domestic and sexual vio lence. 6  A 
significant number o f inquiry part icipants favoured abolit ion on grounds, 
inter alia, that the defence is antediluvian, inherently gender b iased, and it  
suggests that the victim was in some way responsible for their death.7 The 
recent New South Wales Supreme Court decision in Hassan 8 is the latest 
in a number of controversial cases, which contextualises the view that the 
current formulation of the defence privileges male angered states.9  54-
year-old Hassan stabbed his 24-year-o ld wife to death because, according 
to his evidence, she had declared  that he was not a man, the ch ild ren were 
not his, but another man’s, and these words were accompanied by 
swearing on her part. Hassan was convicted of manslaughter, and 
sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years, with a 
minimum non-parole period of nine years. Th is case adds to the expanding 
number of injustices meted out via the partial defence, and further fuels 
                                                                                                     
Wales, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006); Law 
Commission for England and Wales, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 
290, 2004); Sections 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 were brought into 
force on 4 October 2010 (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 4, 
Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2010 (SI 2010 No. 816)) (Hereinafter, 
the ‘2009 Act’). 
4 NSW Legislative Council, 5 March 2014, page 27033. 
5 Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Kate Fitz-Gibbon responds to NSW provocation law reform’ 
(Deakin Blogs, 15 Nov 2014) <https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/criminology/kate-fitz-
gibbon-responds-to-nsw-provocation-law-reform/> accessed 19 April 2014. 
6 The Committee (n 3) paras 1.1 and 1.5-1.8. 
7 Ibid para 1.19. See, generally, Jenny Morgan, ‘Provocation law and facts: dead 
women tell no tales, tales are told about them’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University 
Law Review 237. 
8 [2014] NSWSC 280. 





calls for its abolit ion.10 There is merit, however, in retain ing the partial 
defence, pending a comprehensive review of homicide law, part icularly in  
cases involving abused defendants. Retention of the defence should be 
complemented by reform to the law on self-defence, in order to more 
appropriately accommodate the circumstances of the abused victim who 
kills her abuser in o rder to  thwart an  anticipated attack which was not 
immediately imminent. 11  The argument that such issues could be 
adequately dealt with at the sentencing stage, as it is with all other criminal 
offences, fails to address the significant stigma attached to the murder 
label, and the importance of juror input in  determining whether a 
manslaughter label should be attached in light of the circumstances of the 
case.12  
This chapter consists of four parts. Part I provides a background to the 
2014 Act reforms. It explo res the potential overlap between the partial 
defences of provocation/loss of control and substantial impairment by 
abnormality of mind/dimin ished responsibility in cases involving the 
abused defendant who kills. The recognition o f battered woman syndrome 
(considered further below) resulted in a divergence in approach relating to  
the way these defences could apply to the abused defendant. In England 
and Wales, the judiciary focused on the clinical aspect of the syndrome, 
whereas in New South Wales the syndrome was utilised to illustrate how 
abused defendants might have felt the need to act out of self-preservation. 
The former approach operated to psychologise the abused defendant, 
whilst the latter offered a more empathically valid assessment of the 
circumstances of the abused defendant. Despite the ostensible shift away  
from the psychologisation of women in  relation to the partial defences, I 
argue that current and former iterat ions of the provocation defence are 
demonstrably unsuited to this type of case, and that a common failure to  
understand the circumstances of those who kill their abusers is partially to 
blame for the problems associated with the way the law deals with this 
type of case within these jurisdictions. 
Part II advances a critical review of the 2014 Act, comparing it to the 
2009 loss of control defence in  England and Wales. The retention of the 
                                                 
10 Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘The injustice of the provocation defence in NSW continues’ 
(Deakin Blogs, 24 March 2014)  <https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/criminology/the-
injustice-of-the-provocation-defence-in-nsw-continues/> accessed 19 April 2014. 
11 The Committee (n 3) paras 1.19-1.20.  
12 Ibid para 1.19. See, generally, Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Provocation in New South 
Wales: The need for abolition’ (2012) 45 Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 194, 207.  
Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction Model  
 
367 
loss of self-control requirement within  both jurisdictions fails to 
adequately accommodate the circumstances of the abused defendant, who 
will o ften be acting in a state of fear. The imperfect coalition between  
these ostensibly polarised psychological states is counterintuitive and apt 
to cause juror confusion. The difficu lties associated with raising the partial 
defence in New South Wales are further exacerbated under the 2014 Act 
by virtue of the requirement that the provocative conduct amount to a 
serious indictable offence. Several hypothetical scenarios are posited in  
order to highlight the controversial and arbitrary nature of the new 
provision. I argue that these reforms will potentially leave the abused killer 
bereft of a defence in cases where there ought to be a defence available. 
Part III compares the 2014 Act with the position in New Zealand 
where the part ial defence has been abolished, and suggests that abused 
defendants in New South Wales may find themselves in a similar position 
to those in New Zealand given the restrictive ambit of the new plea. The 
controversial case of Wihongi (considered below) illustrates the injustice 
that is borne out of dealing with an abuser’s provocation at the sentencing 
stage. I contend that New Zealand’s abolit ion of the provocation defence 
has simply shifted the problems associated with provoked killings to the 
sentencing stage of trial, and the case of Wihongi shows a worrying lack of 
awareness of the circumstances of domestic abuse within  the criminal 
justice system. 
Part IV provides an overview of the law in Victoria where a bespoke 
family vio lence provision has been operating since 2005, and has recently 
been extended to cover other offences. 13  This part demonstrates the 
benefits of the Victorian approach and highlights how it could be tailored  
to benefit the criminal justice systems of England and Wales, New South 
Wales, and New Zealand, despite their very disparate approaches to 
provocative conduct. Although not a panacea for the ills associated with 
the law in this area, the provision of social framework evidence and an 
education package are vital in order to begin to adequately address the 
circumstances of those who kill their abusers. 
                                                 
13 This comparative analysis with the common law state of Victoria is apt because, 
like New Zealand, Victoria has also abolished the provocation defence. In the 
years 2000-2010, Victoria has also had more battered women cases than the code 
states of Western Australia and Tasmania, the other two Australian States to 
abolish the defence; Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered 
Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New Zealand: How Do 





I. Background: Problems with the Provocation Defence 
There have always been fundamental issues with the operation of the 
provocation defence in both England and Wales and NSW, particularly in  
relation to those who kill their abusers. Traditionally, the position in 
England and Wales operated to psychologise the conduct of the abused 
woman, whilst the approach in NSW was to assist jurors in understanding 
the circumstances of the abused defendant. Although the latter approach is 
to be preferred, the loss of control requirement which was, and remains 
integral, to former and current iterations of the partial defence in both 
jurisdictions render the extreme provocation and loss of control defences 
demonstrably unsuited to the circumstances of those who kill their 
abusers. 
Given their similarities it is not uncommon for the partial defences 
(extreme provocation and substantial impairment by abnormality of mind  
in NSW, and loss of control and diminished responsibility in England and 
Wales) to be raised simultaneously.14  This is particularly true in cases 
involving abused defendants where the cumulat ive impact of that abuse 
has resulted in a recognised medical condition. 15 In England and Wales, 
recognition of battered woman syndrome permitted the introduction of 
medical expert evidence to help juries to understand the psychological 
effects of domestic abuse, whilst contemporaneously depicting the abused 
defendant as extraord inary or irrational. The availability of the diminished 
responsibility plea resulted in the abused defendant having her case 
portrayed in a way which suggested that she was pathological, rather than 
acting reasonably in the circumstances.16 Although a cycle o f abuse may 
result in a psychological condition, this is not always the case and the 
categorisation of the abused woman who kills as ‘less rational rather than 
less culpable’ is inherently unfair.17 
                                                 
14  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), sections 23 and 23A as amended by the Crimes  
Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW); and, Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
sections 54-55; and, Homicide Act 1957 section 2(1) as amended by section 52 the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, respectively.  
15 The Committee (n 3) para 2.48 citing The Hon James Wood AO QC. 
16 The Court of Appeal, in Ahluwalia, suggested that the effect was to describe the 
abused defendant as ‘a different person from the ordinary run of [women]’; 
Ahluwalia (1992) 4 AER 899 citing McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 . See, 
generally, Anne Worral, Offending Women (Routledge, 1990) 31. 
17 The Committee (n 3) para 2.49 citing Professor Julie Stubbs. See, generally, 
Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (Harper and Row, 1979); Celia 
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In contrast, the New South Wales Supreme Court in Hickey18 adopted 
a more empathetically valid approach, which v iewed the syndrome as a 
means of explaining why the defendant might have reacted in the way that 
she did. The defendant had been in a relat ionship with the victim fo r a 
number of years, during which she had frequently been beaten. It was 
during the course of a physical fight, in which she had been thrown onto 
the bed and head-butted, that she finally killed her abuser. Although more 
frequently utilised to exp lain the temporal divide between the provocative 
conduct and the killing, battered woman syndrome was instead used to 
explain why the defendant had been unable to leave the relationship.19  
Later cases in England and Wales recognised that the provocation 
defence ought to be made available to the abused defendant, and the 
House of Lords advocated that battered woman syndrome could be 
considered a relevant characteristic when determining how the 
hypothetical reasonable person might have reacted in response to a 
particular type of provocative conduct. 20  More recently, the House of 
Lords, the Privy Council, and the Law Commission for England and 
Wales (the ‘Commission’) observed that the overlap between provocation 
and dimin ished responsibility, coupled with a lack of statutory recognition 
that the former defence ought to be available to certain defendants who kill 
in fear, was becoming increasingly problematic.21 
The introduction of a novel loss of control defence, which  is t riggered, 
in part, by a fear of serious violence, was designed to assist in divorcing 
provocation/loss of control from dimin ished responsibility claims in  
                                                                                                     
Wells, ‘Battered Woman Syndrome and Defences to Homicide: Where Now?’ 
(1994) Legal Studies 266; and Stanley Yeo, ‘Battered Woman Syndrome in 
Australia’ (1993) 143 New Law Journal 13. 
18 (1992) 16 Crime LJ 271. 
19 For further discussion see, Patricia Easteal, ‘Translating Women’s Experiences: 
The Need for Expert Witnesses in the Court’ (Australian Institute of Criminology)  
<http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/medicine/peasteal.pdf> 
accessed 19 April 2014. As Crofts and Loughnan identify, ‘a successful 
provocation plea effectively sends a different message about the accused, when 
compared with a successful substantial impairment plea-despite the formal legal 
outcome being common in both (manslaughter). In provocation the message 
encoded in the defence is that an ordinary person could have reacted in the same 
way the accused did’; Thomas Crofts and Arlie Loughnan, ‘Provocation: the Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly’ Criminal Law Journal (2011) 37(1) 23. 
20 See, for example, Thornton (no 2) [1996] 1WLR 1174. 
21 See, Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 Cr App R 5; Attorney General v Holley [2005] 2 




England and Wales. Further amendments made to the diminished 
responsibility defence mean  that the partial mit igation will only apply  
where the defendant suffers from a recognised medical condition, thereby 
restricting the availability of the defence for the abused defendant.22  
Although this appears to signify a more formal departure from the 
psychologisation of abused women, the loss of control conceptualisation, 
which is central to the partial defence, is antithetical to the pattern of 
psychological and behavioural responses exh ibited in relation to long-term 
physical and emot ional abuse. Paradoxically, the partial defence requires 
the abused defendant to claim that she feared serious violence and lost 
self-control in response to the cumulative impact of the domestic abuse.23 
Similar problems have arisen in relat ion to New South Wales’ former 
provocation defence. The partial defence operated where the defendant 
suffered a loss of self-control that was induced by any conduct of the 
victim (including g rossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affect ing 
the defendant; and that conduct was such as could have induced an 
ordinary person in the position of the defendant to have so far lost self-
control as to have formed an intention to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily 
harm upon the victim. The ord inary person test was two-limbed. The first 
required fact-finders to consider the gravity of the provocation. In this 
context, the ordinary person was imbued with any relevant characteristics 
of the defendant, including battered woman syndrome. The second 
charged jurors to assess the ordinary person’s powers of self-control in  
response to that provocation. Age was a relevant consideration but sexual 
preference, racial background, physical disability, etc., was not.24 
                                                 
22 See generally, Dowds [2012] EWCA 281 (in relation to the recognised medical 
condition requirement). See also, Nicola Wake, ‘Diminished Responsibility; 
Raising the Bar’ (2012) Journal of Criminal Law 76(3); Bunch [2013] EWCA 
Crim 2498 (in relation to the need for medical evidence in diminished 
responsibility cases); and Gold [2014] EWCA Crim 748 (in relation to the meaning 
of ‘substantial’ in the diminished responsibility defence). 
23  See, generally, Nicola Wake, ‘Battered Women, Startled Householders and 
Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian Perspectives’ (2013) Journal of 
Criminal Law 433, 439; Susan Edwards, ‘Loss of Self-Control: When His Anger is  
Worth More than Her Fear’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of 
Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International 
Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) 79; Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer [2013] 
EWCA Crim 322 (in relation to the need to consider the cumulative impact of the 
victim’s conduct in order for the abused defendant to be brought within the ambit 
of the defence).   
24The Committee (n 3) para 2.36. 
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Akin to provocation/loss of control in  England and Wales, the partial 
defence has been heavily criticised for priv ileg ing stereotypically male 
responses to provocative conduct and thereby tacitly legit imising anger as 
an excuse to use violence.25 Female defendants who are more prone to 
slow burn react ions rather than angry outbursts are required  to distort their 
experience in order for it to fit within the partial defence, o r risk it being 
rejected outright.26 The loss of self-control requirement is indicative o f a 
lack of understanding regarding the circumstances and experiences of the 
abused defendant.  
Notwithstanding such criticis ms, the government for Eng land and 
Wales contend that the loss of self-control requirement is essential in order 
to prevent the defence from being misused in cases of cold-blooded, gang-
related or honour killings, and similar concerns impelled the New South 
Wales government to retain the loss of self-control requisite when enacting 
the 2014 Act. 27  The loss of control conceptualisation is inherently 
ambiguous, and this is complicated by the fact that it must be considered 
in light of the cumulative impact of the provocative conduct. 28  The 
imprecise drafting of the leg islation means that perplexed jurors will be 
required to engage in  mental gymnastics in order to determine whether the 
partial defence applies to the abused killer. As Edwards suggests, retention 
of the loss of control requirement symbolises that ‘his anger is worth more 
than her fear’, and it undoubtedly renders it more difficult for the abused 
defendant to claim the partial defence.29 
II. The Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 
The 2014 Act rep laces the provocation defence with a new partial 
defence of extreme provocation. The New South Wales government 
rejected the Committee’s recommendation that the defence be renamed 
                                                 
25 Ibid para 4.6. 
26  Ibid para 4.8 citing the NSW Domestic Violence Committee Coalition, 
submission 37, 2-3. 
27 see,  Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for  
Reform of the Law (MoJ CP19/08, 2008) para 36; NSW Department of Attorney 
General and Justice, Reform of the Partial Defence of Provocation (2013) 
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_index.html> accessed 24 
April 2014, respectively. 
28 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) paras 3.28-3.30. See also, Dawes, Hatter and 
Bowyer (n 23). 




gross provocation based upon an earlier p roposal by the Commission.30 It 
has been suggested that the term gross might have subjective connotations 
of something ‘crude’ or ‘unpleasant’.31  Although the revision does not 
represent an outright departure from the provocation label, as has occurred 
under sections 54-56 of the 2009 Act, it  suggests that only particularly  
serious cases ought to be considered for the purposes of the partial 
defence.32 
The Committee also adopted the Commission’s recommendation that 
the partial defence should be predicated on a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged.33 The Committee defined gross provocation as ‘words 
or conduct, or a combination of words or conduct which caused the 
defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.’34 The 
New South Wales government, however, rejected this approach in favour 
of a positive restriction model, which ensures that the partial defence is 
available only where the provocative conduct amounts to a serious 
indictable offence (that is, an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment 
for life or for a term of five years or more).35 
The extreme provocation defence has the effect of reducing a murder 
conviction to one of manslaughter, where the killing was committed in  
response to the commission of a serious indictable offence against or 
affecting the defendant. The victim’s conduct must have caused the 
defendant to lose self-control and it ought to be such that it could have 
caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to the extent of intending to 
kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. Where there is evidence of ext reme 
provocation, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the act was not done in response to such conduct.36 
 
                                                 
30  The Committee (n 3) para 9.30; Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 1.13, 
respectively. 
31 ibid Law Com No 290, 2004, fn 52; NSW Department of Attorney General and 
Justice (n 27). 
32 Thomas Crofts and Arlie Loughnan, ‘Provocation, NSW style: Reform to the 
defence of provocation in NSW’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 109, 113. 
33 The Committee (n 3). See also, Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 3.70. 
34 Ibid The Committee,  recommendation 5. 
35  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), section 23 (2) (b) as amended by the Crimes  
Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW), schedule 1, and Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW), section 4, respectively. 
36 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), sections 23(1)(2)(a)-(d) and (7) as amended by the 
Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW), schedule one. 
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(a) Loss of self-control 
As noted, the loss of self-control requirement, which formed the basis 
of the former provocation defence in New South Wales, and is central to  
sections 54-55 of the 2009 Act, is retained under the 2014 Act. The term 
has been criticised as ambiguous, lacking a clear basis in science or 
medicine, and failing to appreciate the true reality of domestic vio lence.37 
Nevertheless, the New South Wales government justify its retention on 
grounds that the partial defence would be available in undeserving cases if 
the loss of control requirement were repudiated, particularly  given the 
potentially vast array of circumstances that might induce a justifiab le sense 
of being seriously wronged.38 The loss of control requirement has always 
been a particularly difficult aspect of the defence for abused killers, since a 
defendant is much less likely to lose control when they know that is is 
likely that they will ‘come off worse’ as a result.39 
The predicament of abused women is partly addressed in section 23 (4) 
of 2014 Act, which provides that ‘the conduct of the deceased may 
constitute extreme provocation even if it  did not occur immediately  before 
the act causing death’. The omission of the words ‘or at any previous time’ 
which appear in the orig inal wording of the defence implies that 
                                                 
37  Commenting on the loss of control requirement, Reilly observed: ‘[L]oss of 
control in anger is  traditionally characterized by external signs of rage and, in 
particular, the extremity of the violent response. Fear might be associated with 
external signs which are not easily detectable; perhaps being characterised more 
typically by paralysis and submission, while retaining the ability to response [sic] 
with a single act of homicidal violence’; Alan Reilly, ‘Loss of Self-Control in 
Provocation’ [1997] 21 Criminal Law Journal 320, 330. See also, Law Com 290 (n 
3) para 3.28; The Committee (n 3) paras 4.97-4.118; and, Edwards (n 23) 88. 
38 New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice (n 27). Livings  
noted the potential breadth of the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger under sections 54-55 
of the 2009 Act, when he contended that a sense of being wronged may arise from 
a particular set of circumstances or decisions taken by individuals or bodies; Ben 
Livings, ‘A New Partial Defence for the Mercy Killer-Revisiting Loss of Control’ 
(2014) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(2), 187-204, 199. According to 
Livings,  ‘a lack of conceptual certainty in the demand for a loss of self-control’ 
coupled with the potentially ‘empathic response...of jurors, who are entitled to take 
a more holistic view of the circumstances of the case’ may render the partial 
defence ‘more amenable’ in cases which were not traditionally viewed as falling 
within the ambit of the provocation defence; Ibid 196. 




cumulat ive provocation will be less relevant to the new plea. 40  An 
alternative approach, found within section 54 (2) o f the 2009 Act, would  
be to provide that ‘the loss of control need not be sudden’. The Court of 
Appeal for England and Wales recently interpreted this to mean that the 
loss of self-control may fo llow from the cumulat ive impact of earlier 
events.41 Of course, the lack of a suddenness requirement does make it 
difficult for jurors to distinguish genuine from disingenuous claims, 
particularly where there is evidence of deliberation.42 
The New South Wales government justify the section 23(4) limitat ion 
on the basis that the partial defence should remain unavailable, even where 
there is a history of abuse, in cases of pre-meditated killing that do not 
involve a loss of control. The government asserts that this type of case 
should be dealt with via self-defence or mitigation in sentencing. 43  In 
practical terms, the requirement that the defendant believed that such 
conduct was necessary will usually bar self-defence and excessive self-
defence claims in cases of this context. Th is is because the threat will 
usually be anticipated, but not sufficiently imminent in order to justify 
raising either defence. 44  Unfortunately, the archetypal paradigm of an 
abused woman killing her abuser may often suggest pre-meditation: 
 
A man told his wife, ‘I stay with you out of pity. Who else would want a 
barren woman?’ She waited until he fell asleep, before taking a knife and 
stabbing him to death. She subsequently told police, ‘I am glad I did it, he 
deserved it!’ He had carried out a long-term campaign of abuse, both 
                                                 
40  Gibbon et al made this point in relation to the draft Crimes Amendment 
(Provocation) Bill 2013; Helen Gibbon, Alex Steel, Julie Stubbs and Courtney 
Young, ‘Submission to the NSW Government on the Exposure Draft Crimes  
Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ (2013) para 3.1  
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/lpclrd/documents/doc/submis
sion_on_edb_julie_stubbs_nov_2013.doc> (accessed 23 April 2014). See also, 
WEL, ‘The Exposure Draft Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ (2013) 
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_bills.html
> (accessed 24 April 2014). 
41 Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer (n 23). 
42 For problems associated with the repudiation of the suddenness requirement see, 
Jeremy Horder, ‘Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence’ 
(2005) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25, 123; and, Andrew Simester and Bob 
Sullivan, Criminal Law, Theory and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd 
edition, 2003) 343 
43 New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice (n 27).  
44 See, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), sections 418 and 421. 
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physical and emotional, against her in response to the miscarriage of their 
child, which had occurred four years earlier. 
 
The temporal d ivide between the p rovocative conduct and the fatal act, 
the weapon, and the ostensible lack of remorse demonstrated in the 
foregoing example may suggest revenge. In reality, the fatal conduct is in 
response to prolonged and systematic abuse, the taunt representing the 
final straw. The killing  is the by-product of a complex combination of 
emotions including, inter alia, fear, desperation, anxiety, anger and low 
self-esteem. 45 Th is contextual appreciat ion of the plight of the battered 
woman is essential in  distinguishing between intentional killings involving 
a complex array  of inculpatory motives and pre-meditated, non-domestic 
cases.46 
In order to avoid unnecessary overlap between extreme provocation 
and the partial defence of excessive self-defence, the fear of serious 
violence requirement, within  section 55(3) of the 2009 Act, is not included 
in the 2014 Act. 47  Ironically, the fact that extreme provocation is 
predicated on a serious indictable o ffence in the 2014 Act has the effect of 
producing a substantial overlap between ext reme provocation and 
affirmat ive self-defence, depending upon the circumstances of the alleged 
offence.48 In some cases, a defendant will be able to argue that force was 
necessary in response to the serious indictable offence. The v ictim of 
abuse is unlikely to be ab le to make such a claim since she is less likely to  
lose self-control and attack a physically stronger abuser. Successful 
attempts are, therefore, more likely to occur when the physically stronger 
abuser is unaware or o ff-guard. 49 The corollary is that it becomes very 
difficult to establish that she believed that force was necessary. Although 
self-defence and excessive self-defence may be more appropriate defences 
than provocation in cases involving victims of domestic vio lence, it is 
                                                 
45 See, generally, The New South Wales Domestic Violence Death Review Team 
Annual Report (2011-2012)  
<http://www.coroners.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/_assets/coroners/m401601
l5/dvdrt_annual_report_final_october_2012x.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2014). 
46 Edwards made this point in relation to the loss of self-control element which is  
integral to the loss of control defence in England and Wales (n 23) 89. 
47 The Committee suggested that the new plea should not include a fear of serious 
violence prong (n 3) paras 7.94-7.95. 
48 The New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice identified 
that there is inevitably an overlap between the defences (n 27). 




clear that the legislation needs to be developed in order to properly  
accommodate the circumstances of the abused defendant (discussed 
further in Part IV).50 
(b) The ‘Ordinary Person’ Test 
The 2014 Act is predicated on an objective test, which removes the 
current requirement for the jury to  first consider the degree of provocation 
from the defendant’s perspective. As previously mentioned, the old  
provocation defence applied where the conduct of the victim towards the 
defendant caused the defendant to lose self-control; and that conduct was 
such as could have induced an ordinary person in the defendant’s position 
to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intention to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm. The test required fact finders to assess the 
gravity of the provocation by reference to the ordinary person who has all 
of the characteristics of the defendant, before considering the objective 
prong of the defence.51  
Precedent demonstrates the difficult ies associated with personalising 
the ordinary person test. For a period of t ime in  England and Wales, 
discreditable /creditable characteristics were to be treated alike p rovided 
that there was a tautological link between the provocative conduct and the 
defendant’s characteristics. Repugnant characteristics could be attached to 
the reasonable person test, provided the condition was permanent (not 
transitory), and the subject matter of the provocation.52 Similar issues have 
arisen in Model Penal Code States in the US where the courts have been 
required to consider the defendant’s situation, and in some instances, his 
                                                 
50 The Committee (n 3) para 5.60, citing Fox, Zheng, Mata and Bulut. 
51 Original Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), sections 23(2)(a)-(b). In Stingel, the court  
advocated that ‘the preferable approach is to attribute the age of the accused to the 
ordinary person of the objective test, at least in any case where it may be open to 
the jury to take the view that the accused is immature by reason of youthfulness’; 
Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312, 331. 
52  For further discussion, see, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, ‘Anglo-American 
Perspectives on Partial Defences’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss 
of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and 
International Perspectives  (Ashgate Publishing, 2010) 199. See also, Andrew 
Simester and Bob Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (Hart Publishing, 
2010) 381. 
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subjective perspective of the fairness of that situation.53  In Guevara54  
jurors were required to consider the alleged provocation of a wife who had 
filed for divorce, from the perspective of an unfaithful husband. 
The 2009 and 2014 Acts in contrast, engage an objective inquiry 
whereby fact finders are charged to  assess whether a qualify ing trigger (or 
combination thereof) or the ext reme provocation (respectively) could  have 
caused an ordinary person to lose self-control. The ordinary person test has 
been vehemently crit icised on grounds that only extraordinary people kill 
in response to provocation.55 In reality, the law does not excuse because 
the ordinary person kills, but rather because the law recognises reason in 
the defendant’s emotion.56 A purely objective inquiry fails to appreciate 
that most people will be unacquainted with the fear experienced by an  
abused woman. A contextual narrat ive combined with elements of 
individual subjectivity is therefore essential in cases of this nature. 
The 2014 Act test will continue to require jurors to engage in  mental 
gymnastics in determining whether some hypothetical ordinary person 
would have lost self-control. 57 Given the complexity of the objective test, 
more specific  guidance would  have been beneficial, as has occurred in  
England and Wales. 58 The purely  objective test, which was implemented 
under the 2009 Act, stipulates that the ordinary person is a person of the 
defendant’s sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint. Further, this objective assessment must be undertaken in light of 
the defendant’s circumstances.59 
                                                 
53 See, generally, Victoria Nourse, ‘Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and 
the Provocation Defense’ The Yale Law Journal 106, 1331, 1354. For further 
discussion of the position in Model Penal Code States see Reed herein at chapter 
seven.  
54 521 NYS2d 292 (App Div 1987). 
55 The Committee (n 3) para 4.132 citing Graeme Coss. 
56 See, generally, Nourse (n 53) 1338. See also, Reed herein at chapter seven. 
57  Commenting on the ordinary person test generally; Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Defences to Homicide (VLRC Final Report, 2004) page 35. 
58 Crofts and Loughnan (n 32) 117. 
59Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c). For further discussion of the 
‘ordinary person’ test see, Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157. Crofts and 
Loughnan highlight the potential incompatibility between excluding specific forms  
of conduct from the partial defence, and then requiring jurors to evaluate the 




(c) A Positive Restriction Model: The ‘Serious Indictable 
Offence’ Requirement 
The 2014 Act fu rther mandates that the partial defence will only be 
available where the conduct of the vict im amounted to a serious indictable 
offence. The New South Wales government suggests that this positive 
restriction provides a workable model for excluding certain forms of 
conduct from the concept of ext reme provocation. 60  The Committee’s 
preferred approach was predicated on an exclusionary conduct model 
which would render the defence unavailable, ‘other than in cases of a most 
extreme and exceptional character’ in several specified domestic situations 
including, inter alia, where the provocation is ‘based on anything done by 
the deceased or anything the defendant believes the deceased has done’ to 
end or change the nature of the relationship.61  The New South Wales 
government, however, were unconvinced that the exclusionary conduct 
model would be effect ive in achieving the Committee’s policy objectives, 
citing the problems associated with the notorious sexual infidelity  
prohibition under section 55(6) of the 2009 Act in this regard.62 Further 
the lack o f definit ional clarity pertaining to circumstances of ‘an ext reme 
and exceptional’ character is ostensibly absent from the notion of a serious 
indictable offence, which is clearly defined in statute. 
From a US perspective, Nourse has previously argued that the partial 
defence should only be available in cases where the provocative conduct 
amounts to a criminal offence. For Nourse, this would align the 
defendant’s emotional misconduct with legal notions of retribution, 
thereby avoiding the inherent contradiction in punishing the emotions 
implied through legal judgments (that criminal offences are wrong and 
worthy of retribution). 63 The same arguments cannot be made for the 
defendant who kills in response to separation or arguments regarding 
childcare: 
 
When a defendant responds with outrage to wrongs society punishes, he 
asks us to believe that he has legis lated nothing. However, when a 
defendant responds with outrage to conduct society protects [departure, for 
instance], he seeks to supplant the State’s normative judgment, to impose 
                                                 
60 New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice (n 27). 
61 The Committee (n 3) para 9.75. 
62 New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice (n 27). 
63 Nourse (n 53) 1392-3 
Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction Model  
 
379 
his individual vision of blame and wrongdoing not only on the victim, but 
also on the rest of us.64 
 
In this respect, the partial defence would be unavailab le where the 
defendant’s emotional response does not coincide with the law in terms  of 
those acts that ought to be punished. This approach queries whether the 
victim’s behaviour was contrary to law, rather than the defendant’s 
individual sense of wrongfulness per se. The defendant’s outrage may be 
warranted, depending upon several factors including, inter alia, whether 
the defendant had induced the victim’s conduct and also whether the 
outrage was genuine and proportionate to the actions of the victim. 65  
Nourse is of the view that part ial condemnation illustrates that the law 
remains unprepared to condone the conduct of those who take the law into 
their own hands. The defence would be completely excluded where the 
victim would not have expected legal punishment for the provocative 
conduct, for example, leaving an abuser.66 
Nourse’s attempt to introduce a more coherent structure to the defence 
is to be commended, but it  lacks cred ibility. 67 The emphasis on criminal 
conduct is arbitrary, and it fails to recognise the many different fo rms of 
(not necessarily criminal) conduct that may provoke an individual to lose 
self-control. 68  Horder illustrates the haphazard nature of a provocation 
defence based upon the victim’s alleged criminal conduct, by reference to 
the law in Michigan, where it is a criminal offence for any man to seduce 
and debauch an unmarried woman, and Arizona, where adultery is 
criminalised. 69If Nourse’s proposals were to become law, a paramour’s 
alleged in fidelity could amount to provocation in law where the infidelity  
constituted the seduction and debauchment of an unmarried woman or 
where such infidelity was adulterous, depending upon the state.70 Limit ing 
the scope of the provocation defence to a particular category of offence 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid 1397. Nourse refers to this as ‘warranted excuse’. 
66 According to Nourse, ‘[j]udges must not only evaluate, they must be convinced 
that a law that, in effect, embraces divorce and moving out as ‘emotional wrongs’ 
cannot coexist in a world which the law permits women to divorce and separate.’ 
Ibid 1394, and 1401. 
67 Horder (n 42) 123. 
68 Ibid Horder. 
69 Ibid Horder. See also, Michigan Comp Laws Ann s750.532. (punishable by up 
to five years imprisonment); Ariz Rev State 13-1408 (2001). 




would not serve to eradicate the arbitrariness found within this approach, 
nor is the problem resolved by Nourse’s suggestion that the criminal 
offence criterion for provocation to go to the jury should be viewed as ‘a 
guide…not a doctrinal standard’.71  
These criticis ms are levelled at the potential cross-state application of 
Nourse’s proposal, but similar criticis ms may be made of the 2014 Act. 
The 2014 Act embraces Nourse’s conceptual framework, but raises the bar 
higher by virtue of the serious indictable offence requirement. Whilst 
Nourse would leave it to courts and juries to determine whether the 
victim’s illicit conduct is capable of satisfying the partial defence, the 
2014 Act mandates that the victim’s actions constitute a serious indictable 
offence before the part ial defence is engaged. It does not automatically  
follow that an act, which is punishable for life  or a term of five years or 
more, would be one that ought to trigger the partial defence. Similarly, the 
fact that the victim’s alleged conduct is not deemed to be criminal does not 
mean  that it is any less provocative. Indeed, there may be many cases in 
which society would deem that the partial defence should be available to  
the defendant, irrespective of whether the victim’s conduct amounts to a 
serious indictable offence. In equal measure, there will undoubtedly be 
cases where society deems it inappropriate to allow the partial defence, 
despite the alleged criminal conduct of the victim.  
The following scenarios have been drafted in order to demonstrate the 
latent problems associated with a part ial defence predicated on the 
victim’s alleged criminal conduct; the difficult ies associated with the 
serious indictable offence requirement; and, ultimately, to illustrate the 
conceivable injustices that may arise from the tightly constrained ambit of 
the partial defence: 
 
(i) V tells his wife (D) that he has had/intends to have sexual intercourse 
with her 18-year-old daughter (his step-daughter). D knows that her 
daughter did not/would not consent. Whereupon D loses self-control and 
beats V to death (‘The representation’). 
 
(ii)  D was married to V as part of an arrangement between their parents. 
V did not want to marry D and blamed her for the arrangement. One week 
prior to the wedding, V brutally assaulted D both physically and sexually. 
D confided in her sister, but afraid of angering their father neither one told 
their parents of the abuse. During the course of the marriage, V was  
repeatedly unfaithful, and verbally and physically abusive to D. One day, 
                                                 
71 Ibid Horder; Nourse (n 53) 1396, Fn 381. 
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V asked if D had ever considered taking her own life. He asserted that she 
was a drain on both him and her family and that it would be better for 
everyone if she killed herself. That evening, D waited until V was asleep 
before stabbing him to death (‘Excessive taunting’). 
 
(iii)  D returns home to find his wife (V) in flagrante delicto with his  
brother. D’s brother pushes past D and runs from the house. In a fit of fury, 
D proceeds to pack V’s clothes into a suitcase. When D ignores V’s pleas 
for him to stop she becomes frustrated and responds by slapping D in the 
face, bursting his lip. D loses self-control and strangles V to death (‘Sexual 
infidelity plus’). 
 
(iv) D invited her cousin (V) to live with her when he lost his job as a 
result of the recession and his house was subsequently repossessed. D 
became suspicious that V had been abusing her two young children. D 
discovered V masturbating in front of her 11-year-old daughter. She lost 
self-control, removed a knife from the kitchen drawer and stabbed V to 
death72 (‘Act of indecency’). 
 
The term serious indictable offence fails to include representations 
(extremely insulting words or gestures) by the victim that he had or 
intended to commit a serious indictable offence. 73  On this basis, it is 
likely that the representation made in scenario (i) would be insufficient to 
amount to extreme provocation, irrespective of whether V had actually 
committed an offence. The wording of the statutory provision is unclear as 
to whether D has to witness the alleged offence (as in scenario (iv )), in  
order for the partial defence to apply. The cases of Thorpe74 and Davis75, 
which predate the 2014 Act required that the conduct occurred in the 
defendant’s sight or hearing, but, in relat ion to the latter requirement, 
extremely insulting words or gestures formed part of the provocation 
                                                 
72  This example is derived from the case of R v KMB [2003] NSWSC 862 as 
highlighted by Gibbon et al in their review of the exposure Draft Crimes  
Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013; Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young (n 40) para 
3.4.3. 
73 The New South Wales Bar Association commenting on ‘The Exposure Draft 
Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ (2013) (Phillip Boulten) 
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_bills.html
> (accessed 21 April 2014). 
74 (No 2) [1999] VR 719 
75 (1998) 100 A Crim A R 573. See also, Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332, 338 and 





defence provided those words were o f an exceptional or ‘v iolently  
provocative’ nature. Repudiation of ext remely insulting words or gestures 
from the provocation defence fails to recognise the impact of ext reme 
taunting on domestic violence vict ims.76 Family v iolence often manifests 
itself through a variety of non-physical behaviours. This abuse may 
involve controlling behaviour and emotional abuse, such as, criticising and 
taunting the victim. 77 It would be very d ifficu lt to establish that this type 
of conduct had reached the level of a serious indictable offence. In this 
regard, the notion that ordinary people are only provoked when confronted 
with a serious indictable offence does not reflect real life. Crofts and 
Loughnan have suggested that a better approach would be to follow 
Queensland in excluding words except in the most extreme and 
exceptional circumstances.78 
It is also unclear whether it is necessary to establish that V committed 
the offence alleged. A lthough unlikely as an intuitive response it remains 
feasible until settled jud icially. If it  were necessary to prove the actus reus 
and mens rea of the serious indictable offence this would be very difficult  
to establish given the absence of the alleged perpetrator.79  The serious 
indictable offence requirement is illogical in that it potentially requires the 
court to consider whether the deceased (V) has committed an offence in 
circumstances where no offence has been charged. The serious indictable 
offence mandate shifts the emphasis from the defendant to the victim, by 
labelling the victim a criminal in circumstances where he is unable to 
defend himself.80 
                                                 
76 Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young (n 40) para 3.2. As Tolmie notes, ‘it is not 
uncommon for victims of domestic violence, including victims of severe physical 
abuse, to observe that the physical abuse is easier to withstand than emotional 
abuse in such a relationship’; Julie Tolmie, ‘Is the Partial Defence an Endangered 
Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish Provocation’ [2005] New Zealand Law 
Review 25, 42.  
77  Kingsford Legal Centre commenting on the ‘Exposure Draft Crimes  
Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’ page  
1<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/lpclrd/documents/pdf/submi
ssion_on_edb_kclc_nov_2013.pdf> accessed 23 April 2014. Ibid page 2. 
78 Crofts and Loughnan, ‘Provocation: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (n 19). See 
also, Criminal Code (Qld) section 304(3). 
79 Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young, (n 40) para 3.4.3.  
80  Ibid,. See also, Legal Aid NSW, ‘The Exposure Draft Crimes Amendment  
(Provocation) Bill 2013’  
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_bills.html> 
(accessed 21 April 2014) 
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Under the previous law, the excessive taunts in scenario (ii) could, 
when considered in the historical context of the relationship between D 
and V, amount to provocation.81  The law reflected the view that it is 
simply unrealistic to isolate indiv idual incidents of domestic abuse from 
the oppressive circumstances within which  that abuse is situated.82 The 
Court of Appeal, in England and Wales, recognised that it is of practical 
necessity that in such cases the cumulative impact of the abuse is 
considered in order to engage in a realistic assessment of whether the 
partial defence ought to apply.83  
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the defendant in scenario (ii) would be 
entitled to the rev ised defence, because of the need to satisfy the serious 
indictable offence requirement. For instance, it would be difficult to  
establish that the taunts were said with the intent to cause the victim (D, in  
the scenario) to fear physical or mental harm for the purposes of section 13 
of the Crimes (Personal and Domestic Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). It is 
well recognised that section 13 (3) is difficu lt to use in domestic violence 
cases because of the problems associated with proving that the defendant 
(V, in the scenario) did, in fact, intend to cause the victim to fear harm. 
The fact that the alleged perpetrator (V) is dead would make this offence 
more d ifficu lt to establish. As a result, the serious indictable offence 
requirement, combined with the tacit exclusion of extremely insulting 
words or gestures, potentially  excludes non-violent abuse.84  The final 
trigger may  be considered triv ial and insufficient to amount to ext reme 
provocation, despite the defendant having suffered years of abuse.85 
Sections 7 and 8 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Vio lence) Act 
2007 (NSW) do provide that evidence of past violent conduct is 
                                                 
81 R v R (1981) 28 SASR 32 1 (the provocative trigger of a husband saying they 
would be ‘one happy family’ could only be appreciated in the context of the 
defendant finding out that the victim had been sexually abusing their daughters). 
82 Rebecca Bradfield, citing Dutton, in ‘Understanding the Battered Woman Who 
Kills her Violent Partner-The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Domestic 
Violence in Australia’ Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (2002) 9(2), 178. 
83 Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer (n 23). 
84 Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young, (n 40) para 3 
85  Legal Aid NSW commenting on the Exposure Draft Crimes Amendment  
(Provocation) Bill 2013 (n 80). ‘The final wrongful act or insult might, of itself, be 
comparatively trifling, but when taken with what had gone before, might be the 
last straw in a cumulative series of incidents which finally broke down the 
accused’s self-control and caused him to act in heat of passion’; Mehmet Ali (1957) 




admissible in relation  to the section 13 o ffence noted above. However, 
revisiting the history of abuse to identify an earlier serious indictable 
offence in relat ion to the partial defence, as envisaged by the New South 
Wales Parliament, would be problematic. 86  From an evidential 
perspective, the defendant in scenario (ii) has confided in her sister rather 
than am official authority, and according to the New South Wales 
Domestic Violence Death Review Team it is quite common for abused 
women to confide in  a friend or family member rather than to report  the 
abuse. The result is that there are low levels of indictable offence charges 
in domestic vio lence situations.87 This would render it difficu lt for D to 
provide evidence which may demonstrate that V had previously 
committed a serious indictable offence against her. 
If an allegation of a serious indictable offence constituted sufficient 
grounds for raising the defence, this might assist victims of unreported 
long-term domestic abuse. 88  Of course, if an allegation provided a 
sufficient base for the partial defence, this potentially provides an avenue 
for unmeritorious provocation claims, whereby the defendant has 
manufactured a defence.89  For instance, a claim that V had committed 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm against D (as in scenario (iii)) 
would be d ifficu lt to negate since the only other witness, V, is unable to  
provide evidence.90 The lack of a specific exclusion pertaining to sexual 
infidelity means that the defence would not be automatically excluded, 
although it ought to be noted that the existence of such an exclusionary 
clause would not necessarily  bar the availability of the partial defence (see 
further below). 
It could be argued that fact-finders are unlikely to conclude that a slap 
per se could have caused an ordinary person to lose self-control to the 
extent of intending to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. In reality it is the 
                                                 
86  Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Second Reading (8 May 2014) 58; Gibbon, 
Steel, Stubbs and Young, (n 40) para 3.4.2. 
87 The New South Wales Domestic Violence Death Review Team Annual Report 
2011-2012 (n 45). 
88 Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young, (n 76) para 3. 
89  The Committee (n 3) para 6.34. Graeme Coss, ‘The Exposure Draft Crime 
Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013’  
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_bills.html> 
(accessed 21 April 2014).  
90 Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that ‘[w]hosoever assaults 
any person, and thereby occasions actual bodily harm, shall be liable to 
imprisonment for five years; Ibid Coss. 
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sexual infidelity coalesced with the assault that caused the defendant to 
lose self-control. The trial judge could potentially  exclude the infidelity or 
the defence under his/her general discretion, on grounds that the assault (‘a 
slap’) is insufficient to raise the partial defence. It is worthy of note, 
however, that in some jurisdictions a slap could provide sufficient grounds 
for such a defence. 91  The New South Wales government rejected the 
Committee’s recommendation to codify  the common law princip le that a  
judge should not be required to leave the defence to the jury unless there is 
evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly  directed, could  conclude 
that it might apply. 92  This mirrored  the earlier approach of the 
Commission, subsequently enacted under section 54(6) of the 2009 Act.93 
The New South Wales government was of the view that such an 
amendment would cause unnecessary confusion on grounds that the trial 
judge’s exclusionary discretion is a princip le of general application, which  
has not been codified in relation to other defences.94  
The idea that the courts would be required to determine which serious 
indictable offences are valid for the purposes of the partial defence would  
arguably be inimical to the government’s aim that ext reme provocation be 
determined by reference to a list of defined offences. Parallels may be 
drawn with the recognised medical condition requirement found within  the 
dimin ished responsibility defence in England and Wales. The Court of 
Appeal, in Dowds95, when considering whether voluntary acute intoxication 
could form the basis of a  diminished responsibility plea, ruled  that the 
presence of a recognised medical condition is a necessary, but not always 
a sufficient condition to raise the partial defence. 96 The material effect of 
the ruling is that jurisprudential authority will be required in order to  
determine whether a number of recognised medical conditions are capable 
of satisfying the partial defence. Ult imately, prohib iting the availability of 
the partial defence in cases where a serious indictable offence is alleged 
would undoubtedly result in appellate litigation, as has occurred in relat ion 
to the diminished responsibility plea in England and Wales. 
                                                 
91  See, for example, s210(3) MPC, and State v D’Antuono 441 A.2d 846, 850 
(Conn 1982).  
92 The Committee (n 3) recommendation 9. 
93 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 3.150. See also, Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 
414 and Workman [2014] EWCA Crim 575, which highlight the need for sufficient 
evidence to leave the partial defence to the jury. 
94 New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice (n 27). 





In any event, it is highly art ificial to isolate provocative conduct from 
its context. As previously noted, a mandate restricting juror evaluation to 
an isolated serious indictable offence could have significant implications 
for the abused defendant. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm could  
constitute the final straw that causes the abused defendant to lose control. 
Again, it is the composite of the assault and the abuse that induce the 
defendant’s response, not the assault per se. The abrogation of this 
important contextual narrative may result in rejection of the partial defence 
in cases where a defence ought to be available. These illustrations 
demonstrate that in most cases involving sexual infidelity and/or domestic 
abuse (whether or not such amounts to a serious indictable offence), the 
infidelity/abuse will be integral to the facts and to ‘compartmentalise 
sexual infidelity [/certain fo rms of violence] and exclude it when it is 
integral to the facts as a whole...is unrealistic and carries the potential for 
injustice.’97 It was on this basis that the Court of Appeal, in Clinton98, 
adopted a remarkably inclusionary approach to the application of the 
explicit sexual in fidelity prohibition under section 55(6)(c) of the 2009 
Act. 99  The ruling mandates, in effect, that sexual infidelity may be 
considered relevant as part of the circumstances in a loss of control claim 
where it is not the only factor to be relied upon for the purposes of 
establishing a qualifying trigger. The Committee was not persuaded that a 
New South Wales court would necessarily adopt the view of their 
Lordships in Clinton, who ruled that sexual infidelity could not be 
removed from its context, and therefore it  is, perhaps, unlikely that the 
New South Wales court would admit contextual ev idence when assessing 
the availability of the partial defence.100 In  this regard, juridical p recepts 
clarify ing the parameters of th is new nomenclature is urgently required. In  
the interim period the importation of the 2014 Act remains open to 
conjecture.  
The act of masturbation in scenario (iv) would constitute an act of 
indecency, carrying a maximum term of two years imprisonment.101 As a 
result, the victim’s conduct does not amount to a serious indictable offence 
and would not, therefore, provide a basis for the extreme provocation 
defence. This example illustrates the extent to which the serious indictable 
                                                 
97 Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2; [2013] QB 1 (CA (Crim Div)) 39. See also, 
Nicola Wake, ‘Loss of Control Beyond Sexual Infidelity’ (2012) 76(3) 193. 
98 Ibid Clinton. 
99 Wake (n 97). 
100 The Committee (n 3) para 9.62. 
101 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s.61N(1). 
Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction Model  
 
387 
offence mandate has the potential to preclude the availab ility of the 
defence in extremely  provocative circumstances. Replacing the child in  
scenario (iv) with a ten-year-old serves to expose the absurdity of this 
arbitrary delineation. Section 61O(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 renders it an 
indictable offence, of up to seven-years imprisonment, to commit an  act of 
indecency towards a person under the age of ten-years. The effect is that 
the defence would be available the day before the child’s eleventh 
birthday, but not on the day of his birthday, despite the conduct of V being 
no less provocative. 102  Similar issues arise in relation to the age of 
criminal responsibility.103 If the admissibility of provocative behaviour on 
the part of a ch ild  depends upon the lawfulness of that behaviour, then a 
child under the age of fourteen is presumed incapable of provocative 
conduct for the purposes of the defence, whilst a child under the age of ten 
is deemed  incapable of such conduct. Postulation (iv) serves to 
demonstrate that there will undoubtedly be a series of circumstances where 
many would agree that the defence ought to be available but no serious 
indictable offence has occurred. 
(d) The Exclusionary Conduct Model 
Despite the government’s reservations regarding the exclusionary 
conduct model, the Act specifically excludes the defence where the 
provocation is self-induced or based upon a non-violent sexual advance. In 
addition, self-induced intoxicat ion is excluded when assessing whether an 
ordinary person would have lost self-control. 104 
The New South Wales government asserts that it is a  matter of 
common sense for juro rs to determine whether particular conduct 
constitutes a non-violent sexual advance, but the concept remains poorly  
defined.105 If this exclusion is to operate at all, it will do so only in limited 
                                                 
102Gibbon, Steel, Stubbs and Young, (n 40). 
103  The age of criminal responsibility in New South Wales is ten; Children 
(Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 No 55 (NSW), section 5. The common law 
presumption of doli incapax continues to apply in New South Wales. On the age of 
criminal responsibility, see generally, Arthur in the following chapter. 
104 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) section 23(3)(b) (a) and (5), respectively, as amended 
by the Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW), schedule one. 
105  Hansard, Legislative Council, Second Reading (5th March 2014). The 
Committee (n 3) para 3.32. Although see Crofts and Loughna, ‘Provocation: the 





circumstances as a non-violent sexual advance will rarely amount to a 
serious indictable offence. 106 In cases where the sexual advance amounts 
to a serious indictable offence it is questionable why this specific form of 
conduct has been excluded from forming the basis of the partial defence, 
when all other serious indictable offences are prima facie capable of 
giving rise to the partial defence. The statutory wording excludes ‘non-
violent sexual advances taken alone’, which appears to imply that the 
partial defence may  be invoked in a more nuanced and attenuated way 
where the non-violent sexual advance is combined with other conduct.107 
This is important since a non-violent sexual advance may constitute the 
last straw for an abused defendant. However, this potentially invites 
defence counsel to ensure that the provocative conduct falls within the 
scope of the Act in other (potentially unmeritorious) cases.108 It may be 
that a non-violent sexual advance would only be relevant if it were 
combined with a serious indictable offence. Th is would align the exclusion 
with legislation in the ACT and the Northern Territory which state that a 
non-violent sexual advance cannot, of itself, found a defence of 
provocation, but may be considered in the context of other conduct by the 
victim. 109 If this is the case, the ostensible exclusion potentially operates to 
include non-violent sexual advances depending upon the circumstances of 
the individual case. Th is is surely in imical to the policy object ives of the 
New South Wales government and the Committee, and is likely to have 
unintended consequences in practice.110  
Reflecting the common law position, which precludes the availability 
of the mitigation on the basis of the defendant’s prior fault  in  instigating 
                                                 
106 Crofts and Loughnan (n 32).  For example, Ierace identifies section 66C(3) and 
73(1) and (4)of the Crimes Act 1900 where violence is not an element of the 
offence; Public Defenders, ‘Crimes (Provocation) Amendment Bill 2013’  
http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/lpclrd/documents/pdf/submissi
on_on_edb_pds_nov_2013.pdf (accessed 8 August 2014).  
107 See the comments of the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby, ‘Ending an excuse for 
murder: Revisiting the partial defence of provocation in New South Wales’ (2013) 
<http://www.lpclrd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_bills.html
> (accessed 21 April 2014). 
108 Coss (n 89). 
109  Criminal Code Act NT (No 2) (2006), section 158 (5)(as inserted by the 
Criminal Reform Amendment Act (no 2) (2006) (NT S17)); and, Crimes Act 5 
1900 (ACT) 13 (3) ( as inserted by the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation 
Amendment Act 2004 (ACT) section 3 Schedule 2 part 2.1).  
110  See, for example, the comments in Hansard, Legislative Council, Second 
Reading (n 105). 
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the victim’s behaviour, the exclusion of self-induced provocation is 
relatively unremarkable. 111  The provision may be aligned with sections 
55(6)(a)-(b) o f the 2009 Act, which p rohibits the availability of the loss of 
control defence where the provocative conduct was induced by the 
defendant for the purpose of using it as an excuse to use violence. 112 
Parallels may be d rawn between  the defendant who incites provocative 
conduct and an individual who drinks alcohol to excess. The exclusionary 
clause is in  line with section 428F of the Crimes Act 1900 which provides 
that where, fo r the purposes of determin ing whether a person is guilty of 
an offence, it  is necessary to compare the state of mind of the accused with 
that of a reasonable person, the comparison is to be made between  the 
conduct or state of mind of the accused and that of a reasonable person 
who is not intoxicated: 
 
Provocation...is as available to an intoxicated accused as to a sober 
accused. If an intoxicated accused has in fact lost his or her self-control, it 
becomes a question of fact for the jury whether that loss of self-control was 
caused by the deceased’s words or conduct, or solely by the inflammatory 
drink or drugs.113 
 
In practice, section 23(5) of the 2014 Act ensures that the jury may no 
longer take into account self-induced intoxication. 114 A similar approach 
was adopted at common law in relation to the loss of control defence in 
England and Wales. In Asmelash 115, the Court of Appeal assessed whether 
the voluntary consumption of alcohol could fall within the defendant’s 
circumstances for the purposes of the partial defence. Prior to Asmelash, it  
was thought that the defendant’s circumstances might include the 
consumption of alcohol. The Supplement to the Crown Court Bench Book 
(2011) stated that: 
 
                                                 
111As Robinson notes, ‘every jurisdiction...acknowledges that causing-one’s own 
defense can be relevant to an actor’s liability’; Paul H Robinson, ‘Causing the 
Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal 
Law Doctrine 71 Virginia Law Review 1, 24 (1985). 
112 See generally, Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer (n 23) where the court established 
that just because the defendant is behaving badly and acting in a provocative 
manner does not necessarily mean that the defence will be precluded.  
113 Cooke (1985) 16 A Crim R 304. 
114 Hansard, Legislative Council, Second Reading (n 105). 




[T]he jury will no longer be directed that a reasonable man is a sober man. 
The jury will need to decide whether a man in these circumstances  
(including the consumption of drink) but nevertheless possessing a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint might act as D did.116  
 
The Lord  Chief Justice cited with approval the init ial trial judge’s 
direction to ignore the defendant’s intoxicat ion and apply Majewski117  
standardisations; namely that intoxication is never a defence, save in the 
context of specific intent offences and operatively as a denial of the 
requisite mens rea. The effect is that evidence of voluntary intoxicat ion 
does not preclude the availability of the partial defence, rather the 
defendant’s conduct is considered according to the standards of the 
ordinary sober person. The Asmelash litigation might have been avoided 
had Parliament enacted a specific exclusionary clause akin to that in the 
2014 Act. The Commission recently acknowledged that the lack of an 
explicit exclusionary clause pertaining to acute intoxication had presented 
problems in relation to the partial defences.118 
The new extreme provocation defence is heavily circumscribed. The 
loss of control limb of the defence has always made it difficult for the 
abused defendant to claim the partial defence, and it is clear that 
combin ing this requirement with the need to establish a serious indictable 
offence on the part of the victim will only serve to make it more difficult  
for the abused killer to satisfy the new plea. The scenarios outlined in this 
part of the chapter demonstrate the potentially  arbit rary nature of the 
                                                 
116 Cited in Ibid., [20]. Ormerod similarly identified that the partial defence ‘only 
appears to exclude a circumstance on which D seeks to rely if its sole relevance is  
to diminish D’s self-restraint. This could open the opportunity for D to adduce all 
sorts of evidence. In particular, D might claim that his intake of alcohol or other 
intoxicants was a relevant circumstance.’ David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law (Oxford University press: Oxford 2011) 526. 
117 [1976] UKHL 2, [1977] AC 443.Andrew Simester, ‘Intoxication is Never a 
Defence’ [2009] Crim LR 3, 5. See, generally, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, 
‘Potentiate Liability and Prevening Fault Attribution: The "Intoxicated Offender" 
and Anglo-American Depecage Standardisations’ (2014) John Marshall Law 
Review, Chicago 47, 57  
<http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1702&context=lawreview> 
(accessed 10 June 2014) 
118  Consequently, the Commission’s newly proposed affirmative ‘recognised 
medical condition’ defence contains a specific exclusion preventing voluntary 
acute intoxication from satisfying the defence; Law Commission of England and 
Wales, Insanity, Automatism and Intoxication (Law Com DP, 2013). 
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defence, and suggest that the defence may be precluded in cases where it  
really ought to be availab le. Abused killers in NSW may now find 
themselves in the same position as if the defence had been abolished, since 
the practical effect of the rev ised plea is that it  is now more likely that she 
will be convicted of murder and sentenced accordingly.  
III. Provocation in Sentencing: 
The New Zealand Experience 
This part of the chapter considers the impact that the absence of an 
adequate partial defence has on the abused killer, via a review of the 
position in New Zealand where the defence has been abolished. For a 
significant number o f commentators the arguments in favour o f abolishing 
the partial defence are undeniable. Indeed the partial defence has been 
abolished in Tasmania, Victoria (considered below) and Western 
Australia. 119  The defence has been heavily crit icised for being gender 
biased, out-of-date, and fundamentally flawed. 120 As previously noted, 
several inquiry participants suggested that provocation could be 
adequately dealt with at the sentencing stage. At this point, it is worth  
reiterating that, in New South Wales, both self-defence and excessive self-
defence in their current formulations are simply unable to adequately 
respond to defendants who kill after prolonged abuse and whom currently  
rely on provocation. 
The argument that provocation should be dealt with as a sentencing 
matter in  New South Wales carries more force than it does in England and 
Wales where the mandatory life  sentence is still in operation. 121  The 
importance of fair labelling, and the affect that a jury verd ict has on 
sentencing, remain equally important considerations across both 
jurisdictions. For some, a provoked killing remains an intentional killing, 
and therefore worthy of the murder label.122 Provoked killings can often be 
                                                 
119 See, The Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 
2003 (Tas); Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic);  Western Australia provision 
120 See, for example, the comments by Coss (n 89); Jeremy Horder, Provocation 
and Responsibility (1992) 186-187; and Nourse (n 53) 1341. 
121 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 5) paras 5.10-5.11. See, in the context of diminished 
responsibility, Howard herein at chapter 12. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), section 19A 
provides that the maximum sentence for murder is life imprisonment. It should be 
noted, however, that in limited cases the mandatory life sentence continues to 
apply; section 19B.  




equally as brutal some of the worst murders, but some may be far less 
culpable, and it is these cases that ought to be recognised as manslaughter:  
 
If we abolish the defense, what becomes of the woman who, distraught and 
enraged, kills her stalker, her rapist, or her batterer? I suspect that many 
would say that these women deserve our compassion.123 
 
It is appropriate that jurors to determine whether the killing is more-or-
less blameworthy depending upon the circumstances of the case. This 
ensures transparency in approach, engages society in the decision-making 
process and thereby increases societal confidence in the criminal justice 
system.124 
The cases of Ambach125 and Weatherston 126  provided an excuse to 
repeal the partial defence in New Zealand. Ambach ruthlessly beat 69 
year-old Ronald Brown around the head with a banjo before ramming the 
broken neck of the instrument down the victim’s throat. Ambach 
ransacked the victim’s home, overturning furn iture, s mashing windows 
and ripping fittings from the walls. Ambach had thrown so many items on 
to the stairs where Mr Brown lay that the stairs were almost impassible. 
The stair area was heavily  spattered with b lood and smears of the v ictim’s 
faeces were found downstairs.127 Despite the horrific nature of the attack, 
                                                 
123 Nourse (n 53) 1390 [footnote omitted from original quote]. The Committee (n 
3) para 5.4. See, generally, Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 65. See generally, Martin Wasik, ‘Partial Excuses in Criminal 
Law’ (1982) 45(5) Modern Law Review 516. As Crofts and Loughnan note, ‘part 
of the role of provocation is to reduce (but not erase) the stigma and condemnation 
attached to offender’s behaviour by convicting of the offence of manslaughter 
rather than murder’; Crofts and Loughnan, ‘Provocation: the Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly’ (n 19). See generally, Thomas Crofts, ‘Two Degrees of Murder: 
Homicide Law Reform in England and Western Australia’ (2008) 8 Oxford 
University Commonwealth Law Journal 187-210. 
124 Ibid Crofts and Loughnan, ‘Provocation: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’  
125  Ambach HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-027374, 18 September 2009. See, 
generally, Andrew Koubaridis, ‘Jury find banjo killer guilty of manslaughter’ 
(2009) The New Zealand Herald  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10582997> 
(accessed 21 April 2014) and Andrew Koubaridis, ‘Accused blames spiked drink 
for rage’ (2009) The New Zealand Herald  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10581699> 
(accessed 21 April 2014).   
126 Clayton Robert Weatherston [2011] NZCA 276, 
127 Ambach (n 232) [3]-[4]. 
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Ambach successfully pleaded provocation on grounds that the victim had 
made minor sexual advances towards him. The trial judge imposed a 12-
year-sentence with a minimum non-parole period of only 8 years, despite 
describing the killing as being ‘as close to murder as you could possibly 
get while still obtaining the benefit of manslaughter’, and asserting that 
‘the degree of provocation was extremely low and was aggravated by the 
use of weapons’.128 
It was the latter case of Weatherston,129 which generated most media 
attention. Clayton Weatherston, a 33-year-old lecturer from Otago University, 
savagely stabbed his ex-g irlfriend and former student in a locked bedroom 
at her parents’ home, while her mother desperately tried to get into the 
room. Weatherston was unsuccessful in h is provocation claim, but his 
protracted television testimony in which he asserted that he had killed the 
victim because of ‘the emotional t rauma she [had] caused [him]’ resulted 
in public outrage and was branded a ‘national disgrace.’130  
On 24 November 2009, the House of Representatives voted 116:5 in  
favour of the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Bill 2009, with the 
effect of transferring issues pertaining to provocative conduct to the 
sentencing judge. The lack of a formal diminished responsibility defence, 
and New Zealand’s rejection of excessive self-defence claims, coalesced 
with  the abolit ion of provocation, effectively  means that New Zealand has 
no partial defences capable of reducing murder to manslaughter. Culpable 
homicides are treated as murder and defendants are sentenced accordingly.131 
The experience in New Zealand, post abolition of the partial defence, is 
that transplanting provocation issues from the trial to the sentencing stage 
in murder cases is both punitive and ineffective. The Crimes (Provocation 
Amendment) Repeal Act 2009 (NZ) has resulted in some defendants 
                                                 
128 NZ Herald Staff, NZPA, NEWSTALK ZB ‘Banjo killer sentenced to 12 years 
in jail’ (2009) The New Zealand Herald  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10598104> 
(accessed 21 April 2014).  
129Weatherston (n 233). 
130  Ibid 2; Jarrod Booker ‘Jury finds Weatherston guilty of murder’ The New 
Zealand Herald (2009) available at:  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10585763> 
(accessed 21 April 2014).   
131Warren Brookbanks, ‘Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand’ in Alan Reed 
and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: 
Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) 




(including battered women defendants) receiving harsher penalties 
including murder convictions and longer prison terms. 132  Many of the 
issues raised in provocation trials have simply  been shifted to the 
sentencing stage. In an unnerving precedent, the sentences being issued in 
cases involving domestic abuse victims who kill their abusers are more 
than double the thresholds that were issued pre-abolition of the 
provocation defence.133 As a result, a number of ‘women are languishing 
in New Zealand jails…for unjustifiab ly killing  their partners’ despite the 
fact that ‘the broader community would  understand that they did so as a 
result of appalling violence and intolerable conditions.’134 
The Supreme Court recently refused Jacqueline Wihongi’s application 
for leave to appeal the Court o f Appeal’s ruling that her eight-year term of 
imprisonment be increased to 12-years.135 The init ial trial judge’s decision 
to issue an eight-year sentence marks one of very  few rulings in which  the 
presumption of life fo r murder has been displaced since the Sentencing 
Act 2002 (NZ) came into force. 136 There is a presumption under section 
102 that a sentence of life imprisonment will be imposed where the 
defendant is convicted of murder. 137  If a life sentence is imposed, the 
defendant must serve a min imum of 10 years (or 17 years, if the murder 
was aggravated)138, unless that sentence would be ‘manifestly unjust’.139 
                                                 
132 See, for example, Wihongi [2012] NZSC 12. 
133 Equal Justice Project, ‘Battering the Law’ (2013)  
<http://equaljusticeproject.co.nz/2013/09/12/battering-the-law/> (accessed 21 
April 2014). 
134 This point was raised by Mr David Shoebridge during discussion on the new 
extreme provocation defence in NSW; Legislative Council,  Second Reading (n 
198) page 27417 Mr David Shoebridge. 
135 Wihongi (n 132) 
136 In Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500, the mercy killing of an elderly woman suffering 
from Alzheimer’s Disease by her husband, attracted an 18 month term of 
imprisonment.  See also, Reid HC Auckland CRI-2008-090-2203, 4 February 
2011. It is worth noting that the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court ruling that 
a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust; Wihongi (n 132) [2].     
137 Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ), section 102. 
138 Ibid section 104. In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court 
must take into account the following aggravating factors to the extent that they are 
applicable in the case: (a) that the offence involved actual or threatened violence or 
the actual or threatened use of a weapon; (b) that the offence involved unlawful 
entry into, or unlawful presence in, a dwelling place; (c) that the offence was  
committed while the offender was still on bail or still subject to a sentence; (d) the 
extent of any loss, damage, or harm resulting from the offence; (e) particular 
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In the majority of cases, it is highly unlikely that a finding of manifest 
injustice will be made. In  appropriate cases, however, provocation may be 
considered in determining whether it would be manifestly unjust to impose 
a sentence of at least 17 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal advised 
that this type of case will be ‘exceptional but need not be rare.’140 
Despite the restrictive leg islative reg ime operating in New Zealand, the 
legislature failed to issue any specific guidance as to how provocative 
conduct might be considered during the sentencing stage of trial. 141 The 
New Zealand Law Commission considered that any modification to the 
‘manifestly unjust’ test ‘may undermine the message that life imprisonment 
remains the norm in cases of intentional killing’. 142  The trial judge is 
charged to determine whether the degree of provocation is so ‘extreme’ 
that it would be justifiable for a sentence of less than life imprisonment to 
be imposed.143 The court is required to assess whether the provocative 
words or conduct should be treated in all the circumstances as reducing the 
culpability of the defendant. In this regard, any provocative words or 
conduct by the victim may be treated as a mitigating factor.144  
                                                                                                     
cruelty in the commission of the offence; (f) that the offender was abusing a 
position of trust or authority in relation to the victim; (g) that the victim was 
particularly vulnerable because of his or her age or health or because of any other 
factor known to the offender; (f) that the offender committed the offence partly or 
wholly because of hostility towards a group of persons who have an enduring 
common characteristic such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, 
sexual orientation, age or disability; and (i) the hostility is because of the common 
characteristic; and (ii) the offender believed that the victim has that characteristics; 
(ha) that the offence was committed as part or, or involves a terrorist act (as 
defined in s. 5(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002); (i) premeditation on the 
part of the offender and, if so, the level of premeditation involved; (j) the number, 
seriousness, date, relevance, and nature of any previous convictions for which the 
offender is being sentenced or otherwise dealt with at the same time; Sentencing 
Act 2002m (NZ) s.9(1)). 
139 Ibid section 102. See generally, O’Brien (2003) 20 CRNZ 572 [36]; and, Mayes  
CA26/03 16 October 2003 [32]. 
140 For example, ‘cases such as mercy killings, failed suicide pacts and situations in 
which the accused is termed a “battered defendant”‘; Hamidzadeh (n 131) [57] See 
also, Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 [120]-[121]; and Williams [2005] 2 NZLR 506 
(CA). 
141  Ibid Hamidzadeh [1]. 
142 New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC 
R98, 2007) 200. 
143 Hamidzadeh (n 131) [48]. 




The Court o f Appeal, in  Hamidzadeh145, expressed that it would be 
inappropriate to return to ‘the legal gymnastics’ required in assessing the 
provocation defence, but did provide further guidance for judges, vis-à-vis 
the articulation of provocation as a mitigating factor in  terms of 
appropriate specimen guidance for future sentencing. In determin ing 
whether the defendant’s culpability is reduced, Justice Randerson 
pronounced a non-exhaustive list of five factors which the sentencing 
judge should take into account, including: 
 
(a) the nature, duration and gravity of the alleged provocation;  
(b) the timing of any response by the defendant;  
(c) whether the response was proportionate to the nature, duration and 
gravity of the provocation;  
(d) whether the provocation was (or remained) an operative cause of the 
defendant’s response; and,  
(e) whether the provocation was such as to reduce the defendant’s 
culpability in all the circumstances.146     
 
It is no longer necessary to determine whether the provocation would 
have deprived the ordinary person, with the characteristics of the 
defendant, of the power of self-control. A killing in response to a sudden 
and justified loss of self-control, however, may ind icate a lower degree of 
culpability than one involving a controlled  and calculated response.147 In 
terms of sexual infidelity, the court acknowledged Lord Judge’s ruling in  
Clinton148 that such situations can give rise to highly  emotional responses, 
but concluded that the ‘ordinary expectation of the community is that this 
ought not to justify the use of violence, especially where there are fatal 
consequences’.149 
The High Court  considered that Wihongi’s case was ‘exceptional’ with 
significant mitigating factors. Wihongi stabbed her estranged partner, Mr 
Hirin i, following an argument over him taking several thousand dollars in  
compensation she had received, during the course of which he demanded 
                                                 
145 Ibid [60]-[64]. 
146 Ibid [71]. 
147 Ibid [60]. See also, Brookbanks (n 131) 271; Tyne v Tasmania [2005] TASSC 
119, (2005) 15 Tas R 221. 
148 Clinton (n 97) [16]. 
149 Hamidzadeh (n 131) [64] and [68]. See also, Felicite [2011] VSCA 274. 
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sexual intercourse.150 Before issuing the eight-year sentence, Justice Wild 
of the High Court described Wihongi’s ‘history of vict imhood’.151 At the 
age of 13, W ihongi suffered an anoxic brain in jury fo llowing a drugs 
overdose in response to an argument with her mother. Upon leav ing 
hospital, she was unable to walk or speak properly and when she 
eventually returned to school she lasted less than one month before leav ing 
and never going back. From that point, Wihongi had consistently abused 
alcohol and, at the age of 14, was sexually abused by her drug and alcohol 
counsellor. Shortly thereafter, W ihongi began a relationship with Mr 
Hirin i’s o lder brother who prostituted her for money and drugs over a six-
month period. At the age of 16, she commenced a ‘tempestuous and 
chaotic’ relationship with Mr Hirini, a  ‘Black Power’ gang member. The 
relationship was marked by alcohol abuse and domestic violence and 
Wihongi was gang-raped many times by members of the ‘Black Power’ 
gang. At the age of 19, a  member of the gang threatened to harm 
Wihongi’s baby daughter before raping her in her own home. When she 
was 26, an intruder broke into her home and hit her over the head with a 
full bottle of beer in front of her children. Justice Wild was of the opinion 
that Hirin i’s demand fo r sexual intercourse triggered Wihongi’s loss of 
self-control. He considered that Wihongi’s violent response may  have 
been the product of ‘an overwhelming sense of anger, threat and fear 
driven by a combination of cognitive impairment, the effects of repeated 
trauma, personality dysfunction and the chaotic and conflicted relationship 
she had with the vict im.’152 A sentence of eight-years imprisonment was 
imposed on grounds that life imprisonment would be ‘manifestly 
unjust’.153 
Women’s Refuge extolled the sentence of the High Court as ‘brave and 
right’, but the Court of Appeal subsequently substituted the eight-year 
prison term with a sentence of 12-years on grounds that Wihongi 
represented a ‘high risk of reoffending’ due to her association with the 
gang.154 In a ruling that showed an appalling lack of understanding of the 
                                                 
150 Wihongi HC Napier CRI 2009-041-2096 [2010] NZHC 2034 (30 August 2010) 
[6]-[8]. 
151 Ibid [25]. 
152 Ibid [38]. 
153 Ibid [46]. 
154  See, Dan Satherley, ‘Woman receives only eight years for murder’ 3 News 
<http://www.3news.co.nz/Woman-receives-only-eight-years-for-
murder/tabid/423/articleID/173403/Default.aspx> (accessed 22 April 2014); 




sexual abuse, substance abuse and other mental impairments from which  
Wihongi suffered, the Court of Appeal claimed that they would only 
reduce her sentence if she discontinued ‘any association with gangs’ 
asserting that ‘given their treatment of her, there is every incentive for her 
to do so’.155 Dissociation from a gang is often very difficult. The gang 
members may demand money or force the leaving member to commit a 
crime. In other cases the member will be required ‘to undergo some formal 
punishment’ before being allowed to leave the gang. Th is may involve a 
beating from other gang members, serious assault and in some cases 
stabbing. 156  The Supreme Court denied  Wihongi’s appeal against 
sentence.157  
The Wihongi lit igation illustrates a worrying lack of understanding of 
the circumstances of domestic and familial abuse. In New Zealand, the 
abrogation of the provocation defence has the effect of circumventing the 
moral evaluation as to whether the defendant ought to be convicted of 
murder or manslaughter. The moral evaluation undertaken by jurors in 
such cases provides an important backdrop against which the sentencing 
judge can determine the appropriate sentence, in light of applicable 
sentencing guidelines.158 Irrespective of whether a mandatory life  sentence 
exists, as in England and Wales (with or without the potential for 
reduction in ‘exceptional circumstances’, as in New Zealand) or not, as in 
New South Wales, there will undoubtedly be cases in which the murder 
label is inappropriate. It is inherently unjust to label the abused defendant 
who kills in  despair and out of self-preservation a murderer. Th is in justice 
is further exacerbated by the fact that individuals who are convicted of 
murder are more likely to receive a longer term of imprisonment than 
those convicted of manslaughter. Unfortunately, the restrictive ambit  of 
the 2014 Act is likely to place abused defendants in this position, despite 
the ostensible availability of a partial defence. 
                                                 
155 Ibid., Equal Justice Project. 
156  Rebecca Kesby, ‘New Zealand gangs: The Mongrel Mob and other urban 
outlaws’ (2012) BBC News available at: <http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
19153425> (accessed on 22 April 2014). 
157 Wihongi (n 132). 
158 On the importance of fair labelling see, George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal 
Law (1978), 4.2.1, 243. See also, Paul H Robinson, The Fundamentals of Criminal 
Law (1988) 619. See also, James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in 
Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 217. 
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IV. Context is Essential: Learning from the Experience  
in Victoria 
One thing that is certain from the fo regoing analysis is that context is 
essential in cases involving domestic abuse. This was made clear by the 
Committee, it  is ev ident from the cases of Thornton, Hickey, and Hirini in  
England and Wales, New South Wales and New Zealand respectively, and 
the recent reforms to law relat ing to self-defence and the admissibility of 
evidence on family v iolence in Victoria makes this explicit.159 Th is part of 
the chapter suggests that the NSW government erred in  refusing to enact a  
specific social framework provision when reformulating the provocation 
defence, and argues that experience in Victoria indicates that the criminal 
justice systems of England and Wales, New South Wales and New 
Zealand could each benefit from the introduction of a specific social 
framework provision and education package, which is individually tailored  
to suit the disparate approaches to provocative conduct within each of 
these jurisdictions. 
The provocation defence was abolished in Victoria and replaced by a 
new offence of defensive homicide in 2005, which was complemented by 
a provision which outlined the circumstances in which family violence 
might be admissible in homicide cases. 160  The offence of defensive 
homicide was designed to operate in cases where the defendant kills in  
circumstances in which self-defence applies, but the defendant did not 
have reasonable grounds for the belief that force was necessary.161 This 
engaged a two-part test where jurors were required to consider whether the 
defendant believed their conduct was necessary in order to  defend 
him/herself or another person from death or really serious injury. If ju rors 
were satisfied that the defendant held that belief, or alternatively, the 
prosecution failed to disprove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
held that belief, then the defendant had to be acquitted of murder and 
jurors were d irected to consider whether he/she was liable for defensive 
homicide. The defendant would be guilty of defensive homicide if the 
                                                 
159 See generally, Victoria Department of Justice, ‘Defensive Homicide Proposals 
for Legislative Reform’ (DoJ CP, 2013). 
160 Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) sections 9AD and 
9AH, respectively. 
161 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), sections 9AC-9AD. See generally, Julia Tolmie, ‘Is the 
Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish 




prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did 
not have reasonable grounds for the belief.162  
In such cases, evidence of family  violence could be admitted under 
s9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in order to help jurors to understand 
the circumstances of the defendant. Evidence of family vio lence includes, 
inter alia, the history of the relationship between the defendant and the 
family member, including v iolence towards the defendant or another 
family member; the cumulative effect of that violence on the defendant 
and/or another family  member;  and, the social, cultural and economic 
factors that impact a person or family member who has been affected by 
family v iolence. How these factors affect people and relationships 
generally might also be relevant.  
The offence of defensive homicide was heavily criticised for its 
complexity by practitioners and academics alike.163 The VLRC noted that 
there was a lack of evidence in respect of whether the offence was 
adequate in cases where women kill in response to family v iolence, 
particularly given that 25 out of the 28 defensive homicide convictions 
were of men. 164 The defence was also used to advance provocation-type 
arguments, although it has been recognised that comparatively defensive 
homicide has been utilised in fewer cases to partially excuse male on 
female intimate partner violence than the provocation defence.165 It was 
also suggested that by removing the focal enquiry from self-defence to  
defensive homicide, the offence tacitly implied that the abused woman’s 
response was irrational, rather than reasonable in the circumstances.166 It is 
therefore unsurprising that defensive homicide was abolished following 
comprehensive review. 167 Abolition  of the offence emphasised the need to 
                                                 
162 Babic (2010) 28 VR 297 [95]. 
163  See, for example, Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law-A "Mildly 
Vituperative" Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1177, 1182; 
Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Victoria, 
Australia: From Provocation to Defensive Homicide and Beyond’ (2012) 52 
British Journal of Criminology 158, 167-168. 
164 The Victoria DoJ CP, 2013 (n 159) notes that since 2010, there have been three 
defensive homicide convictions in cases where women have killed their intimate 
partner. These cases are: Black [2011] VSC 152; Creamer [2011] VSC 196; and 
Edwards [2012] VSC 138. 
165 Ibid Victoria DoJ CP, 2013, 27-28. See also Middendorp (2010) VSC 202. 
166 Ibid Victoria DoJ CP, 2013, viii. 
167 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (no 63 of 
2014) (Vic), section 3. 
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improve the law on self-defence and evidence admissibility, part icularly  
where alleged family violence is at issue.168 
The Crimes Amendment (Abolit ion of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 
(Vic) subsequently abolished the common law on self-defence and 
replaced it with a new statutory framework, which outlines the potential 
impact that evidence of family  violence might have in  relation to such 
claims. New section 322K of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) requires that the 
defendant believed that conduct was necessary in self-defence, and the 
conduct must be reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant 
perceived them to be. In cases involving murder, it is essential that the 
defendant believed that the conduct was necessary in order to defend 
him/herself or another person from the inflict ion of death or really serious 
injury. Section 322M specifies that in cases where family violence is an 
issue, the requirements of self-defence may  still be satisfied, even where 
the threat is not imminent, or the use of force is excessive. The defendant’s 
response may appear excessive in the face of the vict im’s conduct (see, for 
example, the ‘excessive taunting’ scenario outlined above), but it  ‘is that 
these acts take place within a context which gives them a certain meaning-
that the context plus its meaning generate claims of plausible emotion’.169 
Ev idence of family  violence will undoubtedly be relevant in determin ing 
whether self-defence ought to apply in such circumstances. In all cases, 
the defence does not apply where the defendant is responding to lawful 
conduct, and the defendant knows that the conduct is lawful at the t ime.170 
Like the serious indictable offence requirement under the 2014 Act, this 
element of the defence may render it difficult for the abused defendant to 
claim the defence where the conduct of the vict im may be regarded as 
trivial, for example, a  taunt. How delimit ing this will be is likely to depend 
upon how broadly the court is prepared to interpret section 322M, and the 
extent to which earlier events may be taken into account. 
Prior to  the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) 
Act 2014 (Vic) the use of family vio lence evidence under s9AH was 
limited to homicide cases. New section 322J extended the use of family  
violence evidence to all claims of self-defence. It is anticipated that these 
reforms will help the legal p rofession and the courts to become more 
familiar with the law relat ing to the admissibility of family violence 
                                                 
168 Victoria DoJ CP, 2013 (n 159), 35. 
169 Nourse (n 53) 1378. 




evidence, in addit ion to increasing understanding of the type of evidence 
that may be relevant in family violence cases 
The offence of defensive homicide may not have had the intended 
results in Victoria but recognition that the contextual narrat ive is 
fundamental in cases involving family violence renders Victoria a step 
ahead of England and Wales, New South Wales, and New Zealand in this 
type of case. The use of ‘Social Framework’ evidence is not without its 
difficult ies. Unfortunately, a potential effect of the provision of expert  
testimony is that it may operate to recast the defendant as weak or 
psychologically unstable. As a result, her conduct might be framed as 
irrational as opposed to being comprehensible given the situation. It has 
been suggested that the admission of psychiatric evidence may result in a 
more sympathetic approach to the defendant, despite the nature of the 
defendant’s claims. 171 . For this reason it is essential that any family 
violence or social framework provision is appropriately supported by a 
comprehensive education and training package, designed to assist judges, 
the legal pro fession and experts in understanding and dealing with  
domestic violence cases. There is still some way to go in appropriately  
accommodating the circumstances of the abused defendant within the 
criminal justice system (and it is simply not possible to provide a detailed 
analysis of the implications of Victoria’s new self-defence framework in  
this chapter) but it is apparent that the introduction of a new indiv idually  
tailored social framework evidence provision and eduction package, as 
recommended by the NSW  Committee would  go some way  in  recognising 
the circumstances of the abused killer in England and Wales, New South 
Wales, and New Zealand.172 As Reed identifies in chapter seven, ‘the focal 
inquiry has concentrated too much on the control element for exculpating, 
and not enough on the narrative.’173 
Conclusion 
There is an ostensible lack of understanding of the circumstances of 
abused women who kill their abusers in the law of England and Wales, 
New South Wales and New Zealand. This lack of understanding manifests 
itself in various ways in the law pertain ing to provocative conduct on the 
part of the victim within these jurisdictions. The experience in New 
                                                 
171 Nourse (n 53) 1358. 
172 The Committee (n 3) paras 8.102-8.138 
173 For further discussion see Reed herein at chapter seven.  
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Zealand demonstrates that in the absence of an  applicable defence, abused 
women are being convicted of murder and sentenced accordingly, despite 
such killings taking place in circumstances in which many would agree 
that a manslaughter conviction would be more appropriate. The 
availability of the partial defence in England and Wales and New South 
Wales does not automatically mean that such defendants will be spared a 
murder conviction and receive a reduced sentence. Rather, it suggests that 
the abused killer may  have her case considered before a jury, depending 
upon the circumstances. Unfortunately the emphasis on the loss of control 
and serious indictable offence requirements under the 2009 and 2014 Acts, 
respectively, potentially render it difficult for the abused defendant to 
successfully claim the partial defence. 
The problems with the law in this area are not easy to resolve, but all 
three jurisdictions would undoubtedly benefit from bespoke family  
violence provisions tailo red to meet  the very  different needs of these 
criminal justice systems. Victoria has already trialled s9AH of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) in homicide cases, and despite the failure of Victoria’s 
defensive homicide offence the benefits of the family violence provision 
have been recognised. Victoria’s new approach to self-defence places the 
circumstances of the abused defendant at the centre of analysis where 
domestic violence is alleged, and as a result of section 322j such evidence 
is no longer limited to homicide offences only.  
The New South Wales Committee similarly recognised the benefits 
associated with s9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), but unfortunately the 
government was not convinced, and opted not to enact a social framework 
provision modelled on Victoria’s statute. The fact that Victoria’s 
confirmat ion of the benefits of such evidence occurred in the wake of the 
introduction of extreme provocation in New South Wales does not detract 
from the government’s disappointing dismissal of this particular Committee 
recommendation. It is clear that there is a lack of understanding in relat ion 
to those who kill their abusers, and appropriate education and training is 
essential in order to better equip the criminal justice system in dealing with  
cases of this nature. More importantly, evidence of family v iolence should 
be admitted in appropriate trials and/or at the sentencing stage so that 
those making the decisions in this type of case have at least heard the 
impact that domestic abuse may have had in relat ion to the defendant’s 
conduct. As the Victorian Law Reform Commission stated: 
 
Defences and/or partial defences to homicide should not be based on 
abstract philosophical principles, but should reflect the context in which 
homicides typically occur. In particular, the law should deal fairly with 
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These publications demonstrate the inadequacy of exclusionary and positive-restriction-
based reform models. Reform’s aim is focused upon preventing the availability of the 
partial defence in unmeritorious cases, at the expense of considering the impact those 
exclusions/restrictions have upon vulnerable offenders. The sexual infidelity exclusion, 
which forms part of the loss of control defence in E&W, provides such an example. As 
noted in (v), the sexual infidelity exclusion may represent the 'final straw' for the prima-
ry victim. The sexual infidelity may form an integral aspect of the narrative, which in-
duced the primary victim's loss of self-control. To exclude this important factor from 
juror evaluation when determining whether the primary victim lost self-control, runs the 
risk that the partial defence could be rejected, thereby resulting in a murder conviction.  
In rare cases, sexual infidelity may even form part of the family abuse.160 In these cases, 
it is inapposite and unjust to prevent jurors from assessing the impact of sexual infideli-
ty in determining whether the partial defence ought to apply. 
 
The publications reject exclusionary-based clauses focused upon the victim’s behaviour. 
Put simply, the victim’s behaviour is beyond the control of the offender, and particular 
categories of conduct may manifest in a variety of forms. Blanket exclusions on the 
availability of the partial defence (based upon the conduct of the victim) are apt to cause 
injustice and have no place in the partial defence. In cases where the victim’s conduct is 
trivial or slight, the higher threshold of the qualifying triggers will preclude the de-
fence.161 In all cases, the trial judge may use his/her exclusionary discretion to filter out 
unmeritorious cases. 
 
The positive restriction model similarly has the potential to exclude meritorious cases 
from the parameters of the partial defence. The serious indictable offence requirement 
demonstrates a total lack of understanding of the nature of family abuse. Brooks ex-
plains, it ‘is repeated violence of a relational nature’; it is prolonged, continued and sys-
tematic abuse, which induces a perpetual state of fear in the primary victim, and not a 
one-off serious indictable offence.162 The extreme provocation defence is yet to be test-
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 For an excellent exposition of the relational nature of family violence, see Brooks (n 14). 
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ed at appellate court level, but it is apparent the new plea will render it difficult for the 
primary victim to claim the partial defence. The risk is that this vulnerable category of 
offender would be left bereft of an appropriate (partial) defence. This is the position in 
NZ, where the Law Commission are reviewing whether a new partial defence ought to 
be introduced post abolition of the provocation defence in 2009.163 
 
These publications identify a common theme across the jurisdictions considered; name-
ly, a lack of understanding regarding the nature of family abuse and its impact on the 
primary victim. To address this endemic problem, the introduction of social framework 
clauses modelled on the law in Victoria, and tailored to the law within these jurisdic-
tions is recommended. The proposals advanced are designed as an interim measure that 
may be enacted to assist in improving current understanding of the impact of family 
abuse on primary victims. It is envisaged that this optimal reform would complement 
the partial defence models outlined in Part Four. 
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Part Four : Self-Defence and Partial Defences in Cases 
Involving Family Violence and/or Physical Attack 
 
(viii) 'Battered women, startled householders and psychological self-defence: Anglo-
Australian Perspectives'164  
(ix) ‘“His home is his castle. And mine is a cage”: A New Partial Defence for Primary 
Victims Who Kill’165  
 
Introduction 
Part Four builds upon the analysis of the exclusionary and positive-restriction-based 
reform models considered in Part Three, in addition to exploring the inconsistencies be-
tween affirmative self-defence and partial defence formulations. The expansion of the 
analysis in Part Four to encompass self-defence draws upon another category of vulner-
able offender (those subject to attack), and highlights the inconsistencies between the 
defences available for primary victims. As noted in Part Two, it is important to adopt a 
holistic approach in relation to defences of this nature to ensure a coherent and worka-
ble reform model is advanced.166 Potential reform options should consider the different 
models available, and how these models align with other available defences. In this re-
gard, the partial defence reform options advanced in Part Four provide an optimal solu-
tion to reform based upon the research underpinning Part Three and the publications 
which follow. 
 
Publication (viii) compares the fear trigger under the loss of control defence and self-
defence formulations in E&W. Section 76 (5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008167 provides, ‘in a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be 
regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it 
was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances’. In contrast, section 76(6) provides 
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 See, generally, Claire Hogg, ‘The insanity defence: an argument for abolition’ (2015) Journal of 
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that in a case other than a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be 
regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it 
was disproportionate in those circumstances.’ Accordingly, grossly disproportionate 
force will always be unreasonable, but disproportionate force may be reasonable in the 
overarching context in householder cases only.168 This potentially renders it easier for 
householders to claim self-defence against a trespasser than it is for primary victims to 
claim self-defence against a predominant aggressor.169 The purpose is to provide a ‘dis-
cretionary area for judgment in householder cases, with a different emphasis to that 
which applies in other cases.’170 For example, a failure to retreat in a householder case 
may be reasonable albeit disproportionate, but in a non-householder case that would be 
unreasonable.171 It is unclear why this provision should apply solely to the householder, 
and not the primary victim who is also likely to be attacked in his/her own home. Sec-
tion 76(5A), if it is to apply at all, should apply equally to offenders, and for cases 
where the force is unreasonable a new partial defence predicated on excessive self-
defence operating in NSW172, supplemented with a 'social framework' provision is ad-
vanced.173  
 
Publication (ix) advances a partial defence predicated on a fear of serious violence and 
several filter mechanisms designed to accommodate the circumstances of the primary 
victim. The proposed framework builds upon the research underpinning Parts Three-
Four. It draws upon the earlier recommendations of the Law Commission for E&W,174 
and a comprehensive review of the operation of sections 54-55 of CAJA 2009, but the 
proposals reject the paradoxical loss of self-control requirement and sexed normative 
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 Collins (n 55) [19]-[20]. 
 Recently, a  Joint Statement
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 regarding the use of force against intruders, stated the force used must 
continue to be reasonable in the circumstances, even where it is, upon reflection, d isproportionate. Crown  
Prosecution Service, Householders and the use of force against intruders (Jo int Public  Statement from 
the Crown Prosecution Service  and the Association of Chief Police  Officers) available at : 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/householders.html> accessed 24 October 2015.   
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 Section 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides as follows: if (a) the person uses force that in-
volves the infliction o f death, and (b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he 
or she perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary: (c) to defend himself o r herself or 
another person, or (d) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty  
of another person. (2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, the 
person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise criminally  responsible for man-
slaughter. 
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 As discussed in Part Three. 
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 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 31). 
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standard. This new framework is complemented by social framework evidence175 and 
mandatory jury instructions, drawing from the law in Victoria.176 An interlocutory ap-
peal procedure designed to prevent appellate court litigation is outlined. This model 
provides an appropriate via media and optimal solution to the problems faced by prima-
ry victims in Victoria and NZ, where all general partial defences have been abolished.177 
The partial defence has been drafted and is currently under consideration by the New 
Zealand Law Commission as part of its project on victims of family violence who 
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 Jury Directions Act 2013, sections 31 and 32, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Abolit ion of 
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014, part 4. 
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 This framework is fully drafted in Appendix F. 
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*J. Crim. L. 433 Abstract This article provides a timely and critical reappraisal of the interconnected,
but discrete, doctrines of loss of self-control, under ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
and self-defence within s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The loss of control
conceptualisation renders it difficult for defendants to claim the partial defence where exculpatory
self-defence has been rejected, and fear of serious violence is adduced. This doctrinal incoherence
has been exacerbated by the fact that s. 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 effectively legitimises
the use of disproportionate force in self-defence, but only in ‘startled householder’ cases. A more
appropriate avenue of reform is provided by developments in Australian jurisdictions. This
comparative extirpation engages the introduction of a new partial defence of
self-preservation/psychological self-defence predicated on the notion of excessive utilisation of force
in self-defence as in New South Wales, supplemented with a ‘social framework’ provision, akin to that
in Victoria. The new defence would avoid the problems associated with requiring the abused woman
to establish a loss of self-control and/or affording an affirmative defence in ‘startled householder’
cases.
Keywords Australia; Excessive use of force in self-defence; New South Wales; Loss of control; Social
framework evidence
The loss of control defence exists as a paradigm illustration of the difficulties associated with
over-emphasising political policy at the expense of optimal and coherent criminal justice reform. The
partial defence as enacted in ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 20091 deviated significantly
from the Law Commission's recommendations. The government abolished provocation,2 rejected the
Law Commission's *J. Crim. L. 434 schematic hierarchical template for homicide offences3 and
arbitrarily selected aspects of the Law Commission's coherent reform package4 for the purpose of
introducing the new defence.5 This piecemeal approach has resulted in tautological and imprecise
terminology with resultant implications at both a practical and doctrinal level.
This article focuses specifically on the government's controversial decision to predicate the partial
defence on a ‘loss of self-control’ threshold filter mechanism contrary to the Law Commission
recommendations. It reviews the problems associated with the ‘loss of control’ conceptualisation and
considers the extent to which this requirement impacts upon defendants who seek to use this partial
concessionary mitigation as a fall-back option in cases where self-defence is rejected. Recent
amendments under the Crime and Courts Act 20136 have exacerbated the difficulties in this area by
placing the ‘startled householder’ in a better position than every other defendant in cases involving
self-defence. This analysis is supplemented by an in-depth consideration of the applicability of
excessive self-defence in Australia, specifically New South Wales, and recent reform
recommendations on provocation in that jurisdiction.7
The partial loss of control defence is designed to be available where a defendant kills in response to a
fear of serious violence. Under s. 54 (7) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 a successful plea
operates to reduce a murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter. At an operational level a fear of
serious violence may be fundamentally incompatible with the notion of a loss of self-control. A
defendant claiming exculpatory self-defence on the basis of a fear of serious violence should be able
to revert to the loss of control defence where the initial plea fails. In practice, however, a defendant
alleging self-defence is claiming that his or her conduct was reasonable in the circumstances and in
many cases this is at odds with any claim that the defendant's actions were borne out of a loss of
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self-control. The only exception arises in relation to s. 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which
effectively legitimises the use of disproportionate force in ‘startled householder’ cases. In such cases,
the defendant's argument that he used disproportionate force to repel an intruder *J. Crim. L. 435
might be viewed as support for any subsequent claim that he lost his self-control, should self-defence
be rejected.
In terms of doctrinal coherence and appropriate standardisation, a more appropriate avenue of reform
would have been to introduce a new partial defence of self-preservation/psychological self-defence
predicated on the notion of excessive self-defence as in New South Wales, supplemented with a
‘social framework’ provision, akin to that in Victoria, as discussed below. The new defence would
circumvent the difficulties associated with requiring the abused woman to establish a loss of
self-control and provides a more appropriate reflection of the defendant's culpability where the
homeowner utilises disproportionate force in order to repel an intruder.
Loss of self-control
There are three essential components to the English loss of control defence that are established in
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The first requires the killing to have resulted from the defendant's
loss of self-control.8 The loss of control need not be sudden,9 but the defence will not operate where
the defendant has acted in a considered desire for revenge.10 The second component provides that
the loss of control must be attributable to at least one of two qualifying triggers, or a combination of
both. The first qualifying trigger is satisfied by a thing said or things done or said (or both) which
constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused the defendant to have a
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (the ‘seriously wronged trigger’). The second qualifying
trigger requires the defendant to fear serious violence from the victim against the defendant or
another identified person (the ‘fear trigger’).11 The mitigation is unavailable to the defendant who,
looking for trouble to the extent of inciting or exciting violence, loses his control12 and the fact that a
thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.13 The final component requires the
jury to assess whether a person of the defendant's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance
and self-restraint and in the circumstances of defendant, might have reacted in the same or a similar
way (the ‘ordinary person’ test).14 The defendant's circumstances extends to ‘all’ of the circumstances
except those bearing on his general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.15
A significant divergence between the partial defence as enacted and the Law Commission's
recommendations is the implementation of the loss of self-control requirement. The Law Commission
advised against *J. Crim. L. 436 the use of the confusing terminology and indicated that the term
might make it difficult for abused defendants to claim the concessionary mitigation. A commendable
outcome of the Law Commission's recommendations was that, in the absence of the loss of control
requirement, the partial defence could be cogently aligned with the law on self-defence; where
self-defence fails, the new partial defence, which encompasses killing out of a fear of serious
violence, might apply.16 In this regard, the use of excessive force in self-defence is incorporated into
the new plea.17 The ‘fear trigger’ is designed to apply where the defendant is unable to satisfy the
requirements of self-defence because the force used was more than is objectively reasonable in the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be,18 or the threat was not sufficiently imminent.19
When an abused woman kills her partner, she will rarely be able to claim self-defence, either because
the force used was disproportionate20 or she is unable to prove that the threat was imminent.21
Unfortunately, the government's decision to qualify the ‘fear trigger’ with the controversial ‘loss of
self-control’ conceptualisation has undermined the doctrinal coherence in the Law Commission's
recommendations, rendering the partial defence ‘unnecessarily complex’.22
In its interpretation of ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, in R v Dawes, Hatter and
Bowyer, 23 the Court of Appeal suggested that the loss of control threshold may make it more difficult
for defendants to *J. Crim. L. 437 rely on the partial defence where a claim of exculpatory
self-defence has been unsuccessful. The Lord Chief Justice noted that although there ‘will often be a
factual overlap’ between the loss of self-control defence and self-defence, ‘there are obvious
differences between the two defences and they should not be elided’.24 Referring specifically to
circumstances in which the defendant attempts to raise loss of control and self-defence, the court
identified that ‘[t]he circumstances in which the defendant, who has lost control of himself, will
nevertheless be able to argue that he used reasonable force in response to the violence he feared, or
to which he was subjected, are likely to be limited’.25 Evidence of a loss of self-control will not
necessarily prevent a successful self-defence claim, provided the violent response was not
unreasonable in the circumstances.26 In cases where the defendant genuinely fears serious violence,
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then his response may legitimately be more extreme.27 In such cases ‘it is likely that in the forensic
process those acting for the defendant will advance self-defence as a complete answer to the murder
charge, and on occasions, make little or nothing of the defendant's response in the context of the loss
of control defence’.28
Difficulties are more likely to arise in cases where self-defence is rejected. As a procedural factor, a
self-defence claim does not bar the loss of control defence and provided the statutory conditions
pertain the partial defence should be left for fact-finder evaluation.29 It should be remembered that
unlike self-defence, the loss of control defence requires D to fear serious violence from the victim or
another identified person. There is also no requirement that D's response was reasonable. Where the
partial defence might apply, the ‘practical course’ is to leave the concessionary mitigation to the jury
after it has rejected exculpatory self-defence.30 Issues may arise where the defendant, who has
alleged that he or she was acting reasonably in the prevailing circumstances, attempts to claim that
his or her response was borne out of a loss of control. Terms such as ‘lost the plot’, ‘snapped’, and
‘went berserk’ *J. Crim. L. 438 which are commonly used to establish a loss of self-control31 might be
viewed as implying that the defendant's conduct was not reasonable in the prevailing circumstances.32
In the majority of cases where the defendant alleges a loss of self-control, the fact that the defendant
acted disproportionately is likely to support the assertion that the defendant lost his or her self-control.
In cases involving a change in plea from self-defence to loss of self-control jurors may become
confused and the defendant could appear to be disingenuous.
The problems associated with the inter-relationship between the partial defence and self-defence are
not limited to the abused defendant and may extend to other cases in which the defendant attempts
to utilise loss of control as a fall-back option, by adducing a fear of serious violence. Although
Parliament has attempted to delimit the difficulties associated with the threshold test by stipulating
that the loss of control need not be sudden, the partial defence continues to place a premium on
anger over fear.33 This doctrinal incoherence is exacerbated by s. 43 of the Crime and Courts Act
2013 which effectively legitimises the use of disproportionate force in self-defence, but only in ‘startled
householder’ cases. The result is that, in cases of this context, the threshold for establishing
self-defence is lowered and the claim that disproportionate force was used may also imply a loss of
self-control rendering it easier for the ‘startled householder’ to claim either defence. The following four
postulations (the ‘football supporter’, the ‘abused woman’, the ‘British soldier’, and the ‘startled
householder’) are utilised to demonstrate the extent to which the ‘loss of control’ requirement has
undermined the Law Commission's proposals, and has the potential to result in arbitrary outcomes:
1. D was walking home from a football match with several friends (A, B and C) when they met with
some supporters of the away team. Both groups chanted about the opposing team. One of the away
fans (V) punched B and then advanced towards D, brandishing *J. Crim. L. 439 what D believed was
a knife. D pulled a knife from his jacket pocket and stabbed V, killing him. V had been carrying a silver
tobacco tin (the ‘football supporter’).34
2. D and V live together, but their relationship is a violent one. V frequently hits D when he (V) comes
home drunk. One night, when V comes home drunk and threatens to beat D yet again, she goes to
the kitchen, fetches a knife, and stabs V in the chest while he is off guard. V dies (the ‘abused
woman’).35
3. A British soldier (D), on patrol in Northern Ireland, opened fire on the occupants of a stolen car
which had failed to stop at a checkpoint. D believed that the life of his colleague on the opposite side
of the road was in danger. He fired three shots at the windscreen of the car and a fourth shot at the
side of the car as it was passing. The final shot killed one of the passengers (the ‘British soldier’).36
4. D was awoken by the sound of smashed glass. D picked up his golf club and went downstairs to
investigate. D was confronted by an intruder (V) and he responded by hitting V repeatedly over the
head with the golf club, killing him (the ‘startled householder’).
The first illustration above highlights the situation where D uses excessive force in response to a
perceived threat.37 D may rely on self-defence provided that the use of force is reasonable in the
circumstances as he honestly and instinctively believed them to be.38 It is irrelevant that D's belief
may be regarded unreasonable providing it was genuinely held.39 D ought not to be deprived of the
exculpatory doctrine simply *J. Crim. L. 440 because his actions might have given rise to the need to
act in self-defence:40
We need to say as clearly as we may that it is not the law that if a defendant sets out to provoke
another to punch him and succeeds, the defendant is then entitled to punch the other person … The
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reason why this is not the law is that underlying the law of self-defence is the common-sense morality
that what is not unlawful is force which is reasonably necessary … Of course it might be different if
the defendant set out to provoke a punch and the victim unexpectedly and disproportionately attacked
him with a knife.41
The jury may still reject self-defence where the force used was excessive in the circumstances as D
mistakenly believed them to be.42 In this instance, D may choose to rely on the loss of control
defence. Even if D's mistaken belief was unreasonable, he will be able to rely on the partial defence
provided the remaining elements are satisfied.43 The fact that D may have been looking for and
provoking trouble does not preclude the availability of the concessionary defence, unless his actions
were intended to provide him with an opportunity to use violence.44 The qualifying trigger based on a
fear of serious violence will almost inevitably include a consideration of things said and done (i.e. the
football chants and previous violence against B),45 and D may claim that when faced with what he
believed to be a ‘fight-or-flight’46 situation, he lost his self-control.
A more nuanced approach needs to be deconstructed and adopted in relation to postulation 2, which
is taken verbatim from the Law Commission's 2006 report.47 The ‘loss of self-control’
conceptualisation is antithetical to the pattern of psychological and behavioural responses exhibited in
response to long-term physical and emotional abuse48 --‘her state of mind and manifestation of
behaviour at the time of the *J. Crim. L. 441 killing are not a loss of self-control in the traditionally
masculinist sense at all. Nor is she in the period before the killing in a state of anger. She is in a state
of fearful contemplation’.49 Yet paradoxically, the abused defendant will have to claim that she feared
serious violence and lost self-control in response to the ‘cumulative impact’ of the domestic abuse:50
[T]he battered abused woman in fear has to conform, it would appear, to an outward expression of
loss of self-control predicated on the vehement passion of anger when her emotional state and state
of mind are intractably one of fear as is her response to the violence which presents itself.51
The fact that D's loss of control was not sudden does not negate the partial defence;52 however, the
lack of immediacy renders it difficult to assess whether D truly lost self-control. The removal of the
suddenness requirement will make it challenging to evaluate whether the killing was borne out of a
considered desire for revenge53 or alternative motivations.54 The Law Commission's
recommendations, which abrogated the loss of control mandate, were specifically targeted towards
ensuring that the defence would be accessible to abused women. Unfortunately, the government's
emphasis on delimiting the defence in cases involving gang-related violence55 and honour killings56
means that the abused defendant will continue to find it difficult to satisfy the revised plea.57
*J. Crim. L. 442 The availability of a partial defence predicated on a loss of self-control is contrary to
normative societal expectations that people ‘maintain control’.58 It is inappropriate to ground the
defence in terminology for which there is no existing medical or scientific criterion against which to
assess whether the defendant truly lost self-control.59 The requirement ‘may not be apt to describe the
ultimate issue that the jury has to decide, namely whether the defendant's tolerance and his/her
self-restraint were overborne by his/her circumstances’.60 At an operational level, the loss of
self-control requirement might be viewed as an inability to comport oneself with normative societal
expectations61 in order for the abused defendant to be able to plead the partial defence successfully.
This novel interpretation of the term would effectively render the ‘loss of control’ requirement nugatory
in this type of case. It might have been preferable for the ‘loss of control’ requirement to have been
limited to the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger,62 albeit that this may not prevent the availability of the partial
defence in gang-related violence cases.63 Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that under s. 54(6)
the trial judge has the authority to filter out unmeritorious cases.
The loss of control conceptualisation does not only render the partial defence internally incoherent,
but it has significant consequences at a doctrinal level. It would be difficult for the British soldier in
scenario 3 to claim that he lost self-control in the exercise of his duty. The facts provided are derived
from the case of R v Clegg, 64 in which the House of Lords declined to reduce culpable homicide from
murder to manslaughter where a plea of self-defence had failed because the force used was
excessive and unreasonable.65 Lord Lloyd of Berwick asserted that *J. Crim. L. 443 ‘the reduction of
what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in a particular class of case seems to me
essentially a decision for the legislature, and not [the House of Lords/Supreme Court] in its judicial
capacity’.66 For the purposes of the use of self-defence outside of the home, an individual is permitted
to use force that is reasonable in the circumstances as they believe them to be, in self-defence and/or
defence of another.67 The logical approach in cases of this context is to leave loss of control to the
jury after it has rejected self-defence.68 Clegg's claim was not that he lost self-control, but rather that
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he acted in defence of another. In practice it will be incredibly difficult for D to establish a loss of
self-control successfully after he has asserted that his response was reasonable in the
circumstances. This could potentially lead to erroneous murder convictions and/or defendants
claiming loss of control when self-defence might in fact apply.
Controversial amendments to s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 have the
potential to exacerbate the aforementioned doctrinal incoherence between the loss of control
requirement and self-defence. The Crime and Courts Act 201369 expands the ambit of defence of
property beyond that of other self-defence pleas.70 Prior to the enactment of the Crime and Courts Act
2013, a householder could use such force as was reasonable in the circumstances, as he believed
them to be, in order to protect his property, but the use of disproportionate force would negate the
defence. Section 43(2) of the 2013 Act amends s. 76 of the 2008 Act so that the use of
disproportionate force is regarded as reasonable in ‘startled householder’ cases. The revised defence
will be satisfied where it is established that the defendant believed that the use of force was
necessary in the circumstances as he honestly believed them to be and that the force used was not
grossly disproportionate.71 If successful, the defendant will be entitled to an outright acquittal.
Section 43(2) applies only where the victim was a trespasser in the defendant's dwelling.72 The
contentious clause is intended to reduce the stress associated with possible prosecution when a
householder has acted excessively,73 whilst simultaneously providing better protection *J. Crim. L.
444 for householders74 by permitting the use of disproportionate force in circumstances such as that
identified in scenario 4 above:75
Conservatives argue that the defence the law offers a householder should be much clearer and that
prosecutions and convictions should only happen in cases where courts judge the actions to be
‘grossly disproportionate’.76
Notwithstanding these aims, the change in the law extends the level of violence that is permissible
without clarifying the ambit of the defence. The Law Commission explained that public support for the
view that the law should offer more protection to the homeowner77 is predicated on a fundamental
‘misunderstanding of the state of the present law, contributed to by incomplete understanding of
certain notorious cases’.78 The new provision, rather than protecting homeowners, could instead
operate to place homeowners at an increased risk of violent attack. There are legitimate concerns
that the level of force permitted in ‘startled householder’ cases could operate as a charter for
vigilantism79 and that it does not accord with the fact that most burglars do not want to come into
contact with the homeowner.80 Many will flee upon hearing a car *J. Crim. L. 445 pull into the
driveway or when realising that someone is in the property. In light of the new law, ‘startled
householders’ might become more inclined to intervene and ‘burglars, knowing that they could be
killed, might be more likely to carry weapons and/or use extreme violence. So [s. 43 of the Crime and
Courts Act 2013] could be wholly counterproductive’.81
Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal in Bowyer ruled that the loss of control defence should not be
made available to intruders who kill in this context.82 The defendant (B) knew his victim, because both
were engaged in a relationship with a part-time prostitute known as Katie Gilmore.83 B went to the
victim's home in order to carry out a carefully planned burglary. When the victim returned home, B
subjected him to a prolonged and violent attack with fatal consequences. At trial, B attempted to rely
on the loss of control defence. According to his evidence, when the victim returned home he had
rushed at B and a fight then ensued. B claimed that he feared serious violence at the hands of the
victim and that he lost his self-control when the victim shouted: ‘Katie's a prostitute, she's always
going to be a prostitute and she's going to be my number one earner’.84 The jury rejected the loss of
control defence and B was convicted of murder. Following his conviction, B appealed on grounds that
the trial judge had misdirected the jury in the context of the loss of control defence. The appeal was
unanimously rejected, with the court noting that the one criticism that could be made of the trial judge
was that he had left the partial defence to the jury:
At the very best, [Bowyer] suggests that he just snapped when, following the householder's return, he,
the householder, reacted violently to the presence of the burglar in his home and used deliberately
insulting remarks about the appellant's girlfriend. To that the somewhat colloquial answer is, ‘So
what?’ If either of these men was justified in losing his self-control, it was the deceased.85
R v Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer was decided prior to the implementation of the 2013 Act, but there is
nothing to suggest that the s. 43 revisions will impact upon the approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal in Bowyer. It would be ‘absurd’ to suggest that the understandable response of a homeowner
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confronted by an intruder could form the basis of a loss of control plea.
*J. Crim. L. 446 A significant number of commentators have suggested that s. 43 will not significantly
alter the current law on self-defence since householders who react with fatal consequences are rarely
prosecuted,86 suggesting that the change in the law may have more to do with political rhetoric than
principled reform. Nevertheless, the revised test has the potential to raise the bar dangerously in
terms of the amount of force which can legitimately be used in ‘startled householder’ cases: ‘Do we
really want to create a legal justice system where people are allowed to shoot dead someone who is
only trying to steal their TV?’.87 Paul Mendelle QC has vehemently argued that:
The law should encourage people to be reasonable, not unreasonable; to be proportionate, not
disproportionate … [the legislation has] in effect, sanctioned extrajudicial execution or capital
punishment for an offence, burglary, that carries a maximum of 14 years, which is the sentence that
Parliament decided was appropriate.88
The use of grossly disproportionate force may result in a murder conviction where the prosecution
successfully prove the requisite mens rea. 89 Determining the point at which force is to be regarded as
grossly disproportionate is as decipherable as assessment of how many angels can dance on the
head of a pin:
If I manage to tackle a criminal and get him to the ground, I kick him once, and that's reasonable, I
kick him twice and that's understandable, three times forgivable, four times, debatable, five times,
disproportionate, six times it's very disproportionate, seven times extremely disproportionate--eight
times, and it's grossly disproportionate. It is a horrible test. It sounds like state-sponsored revenge.90
*J. Crim. L. 447 It is disturbing that the government asserts that the line is crossed when it is
abundantly clear that no further force is required, for example stabbing a burglar or stamping on his
head while he is unconscious.91 Perplexed jurors will be required to engage in mental gymnastics in
order to determine whether the defendant's conduct is to be regarded as reasonable, disproportionate
or grossly disproportionate. There is also the question of how the changes will impact on the current
law of mistaken belief. As noted, in cases involving mistaken belief, jurors are required to answer the
hypothetical question of whether the force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances as he
mistakenly perceived them to be. In the case of R v Faraj, 92 the defendant threatened a gas repair
man with a knife, mistakenly believing him to be a burglar. The Court of Appeal adumbrated that ‘the
householder must honestly believe that he needs to detain the suspect and must do so in a way
which is reasonable’.93 The reasonableness of the defendant's response and the amount of force
used was to be assessed objectively based on the facts as the defendant believed them to be.94 It
appears that a new hypothetical test will need to be developed in ‘startled householder’ cases. Will
jurors now be asked to assess whether the force used by D was grossly disproportionate in the
circumstances as he mistakenly believed them to be? If the test is answered in the affirmative, the
defence will be unavailable. The greater emphasis placed ‘on what was believed at the time rather
than what was the real situation’ is likely to render the test to be applied in mistaken belief cases
ostensibly more subjective where the ‘startled householder’ is concerned;95 ‘[c]oupled with the
permitted use of greater force, this could result in a drastic shift’ in what is currently allowed.96
If the startled householder's self-defence plea fails, he may claim loss of self-control based upon the
fear trigger. As with scenario 1 above, the fact that D may have been mistaken as to the threat and/or
that the force used was excessive will not preclude the availability of the partial defence. In the
circumstances, D's conduct does not appear to be borne *J. Crim. L. 448 out of a considered desire
for revenge.97 The fact that D armed himself may support the assertion that he feared serious
violence.98 The ‘cumulative impact’ of the thing done (the sound of broken glass/the break-in) will
similarly be relevant in terms of establishing that D was afraid. D may argue that, when confronted,
his ‘fight-or-flight’ mode was engaged causing him to lose self-control. Further, the rejected
self-defence plea (that he used disproportionate force) may support the suggestion that D lost
self-control.
Arguments that the ‘startled householder’ defence can be justified on the basis that the general public
support the provision are fundamentally flawed. The new provision is dangerous in terms of the level
of violence that it permits and Parliament has failed to address the potential problems that the new
legislation creates. It is now the judiciary and fact-finders who are charged with interpreting and
applying this enigmatic piece of legislation and it may well be the general public who are put at risk.
The government's decision to amend the law arbitrarily in favour of one discrete category of
defendant is also odd. The general public were outraged by the House of Lords' failure to reduce
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Clegg's99 murder conviction to one of voluntary manslaughter and the decision became one of the
most politically sensitive in Northern Ireland when a campaign was launched to clear the soldier's
name,100 but Parliament did not see fit to extend the ‘startled householder’ defence to defendants who
use disproportionate force outside of the context of home invasion cases. New s. 76(5A) of the
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 effectively legitimises the use of disproportionate force in
self-defence with a successful plea resulting in an outright acquittal in ‘startled householder’ cases,
but not in cases like that of Clegg --this places the ‘startled householder’ in a better position than
every other case of self- *J. Crim. L. 449 defence, where the defence will fail if the use of force was
disproportionate. Defending the contentious proposition, Grayling, asserts:
Being confronted by an intruder in your own home is terrifying, and the public should be in no doubt
that the law is on their side. That is why I am strengthening the current law. Householders who act
instinctively and honestly in self-defence are victims of crime and should be treated that way.101
This rationale distinguishes Clegg from home invasion cases, but it cannot be convincingly reconciled
with cases involving prolonged and systematic violent domestic abuse suffered in the familial home.
The ‘abused woman’ who kills using disproportionate force in the home does not benefit from this
change in the law because the person who attacks her is not a stranger, but the person she lives with.
102 As previously noted, it will be more difficult for the ‘abused woman’, rather than the ‘startled
householder’ to claim the partial defence as a result of the ‘loss of control’ conceptualisation.103
The availability of an exculpatory defence where the ‘startled householder’ kills using disproportionate
force is fundamentally at odds with every other case in which self-defence applies. The rationale is
sound in principle; the defence is extended to consider the circumstances of the defendant. In order
to be entitled to an affirmative defence the defendant's conduct ought to be a proportionate response
to the perceived threat otherwise a partial defence would be apposite in terms of appropriate
standardisation of the defendant's culpability level.104 It is inequitable to allow a complete acquittal in
‘startled householder’ cases and to restrict self-defence where the ‘abused woman’ is concerned.
In the context of the ‘abused woman’, the proportionality requirement is heavily criticised ‘as reflecting
only those cases where adversaries are of comparable strength’, thereby failing to recognise that ‘a
discrepancy in physical strength may require the abused defendant to arm him or herself rendering it
more likely that such conduct would be considered excessive’.105 There is a ‘fundamental difference in
the method of killing by gender’.106 Women are much likely to use weapons than men and this has
significant implications at both prosecutorial and *J. Crim. L. 450 sentencing stage. In violent
altercations the use of bodily force is considered a mitigating factor,107 whereas the use of weapons in
like circumstances is regarded an aggravating feature of the offence:108
… yet again there has been a wholesale failure to recognise that women who kill men who abuse
them resort to weapons because of very specific gendered reasons, including their relative size as
compared to men, and their trained incapacity for self-defence. Women who use a weapon rather
than body force are likely to receive a longer sentence than men who punch, stamp, kick, beat, or
strangle their female victim. Modus operandi may well have an impact on final legal outcome.109
Additionally, the imminence requirement precludes the availability of self-defence to defendants who
kill whilst their abuser is off guard.110
Although the ‘all or nothing’ approach renders it too risky for the abused defendant to claim
self-defence,111 the Law Commission was satisfied that a reformulated provocation defence
represented an appropriate vehicle through which to afford a partial defence to those who kill in fear
of serious violence. The Commission considered that a separate partial defence predicated on
excessive force would artificially compartmentalise anger (in the context of provocation/loss of
self-control) and fear (in the context of self-defence), when in practice many cases involve a
combination of those emotions.112 It was felt that the objective requirement that, ‘a person of ordinary
tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted in the same way as the defendant’ would appropriately
limit the availability of the partial defence.113
The government's retention of the ‘loss of control’ requirement has raised the bar in cases where the
defendant kills out of a fear of serious violence, while s. 43 of the 2013 Act has lowered it in ‘startled
householder’ cases. Section 43 represents an acknowledgement of the psychological impact of the
circumstances on the defendant:
[T]his form of trespass differs from others insofar as a home--what signifies psychologically to the
occupant in terms of personal space, physical safety and security--is involved. The word ‘invasion’
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captures this and, indeed, the term ‘home invasion’ has become commonplace in countries like
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.114
*J. Crim. L. 451 If it is appropriate to consider the circumstances of the ‘startled householder’ for the
purposes of fact-finder evaluation in self-defence cases, it is equally important, in terms of appropriate
standardisation and distributive justice, to acknowledge the invasion of physical and psychological
integrity caused by domestic violence.115 The ‘abused woman’ who kills oscillates between being
categorised as a victim of domestic abuse and a defendant charged with murder. A successful claim
of self-defence may be justified because the defendant made the decision that others would in like
circumstances,116 but it is essential that jurors are aware of those circumstances in order to make a
fair evaluation. The impact of psychological abuse towards a victim has long been recognised117 and
the extension of self-defence in ‘startled householder’ cases is indicative of a step towards
recognising the contextual and psychological aspects of self-defence claims. It is essential to consider
the cumulative impact that domestic violence has on the ‘abused woman’ in cases of this context. A
new concessionary defence of psychological self-defence could provide the optimal solution.
A new partial defence
Recommendations for the introduction of a new partial defence predicated on the use of excessive
force in self-defence in England and Wales have previously been advanced by the Criminal Law
Revision Committee,118 a House of Lords Select Committee119 and the Law Commission.120 The need
for a partial defence in this context arises where the force used is unlawful because it was excessive
or where the attack was *J. Crim. L. 452 insufficiently imminent to satisfy the requirements of
self-defence.121 Supporters of the introduction of a new partial defence commonly cite ‘startled
householder’ 122 and ‘battered woman’ 123 scenarios as fundamental reasons to introduce a new
defence.
In New South Wales, self-defence124 , excessive self-defence125 , substantial impairment of the mind
126 and provocation127 are all possible exculpatory and partial defences that are available depending
upon the specific facts of the case.128 Where the ‘abused woman’ believed that her conduct was
necessary to defend herself against another and her actions were reasonable in the circumstances as
she perceived them to be, self-defence will apply. If the force used is excessive, the defendant may
be convicted of manslaughter129 based upon excessive force in self-defence.130 If the prosecution
establish that the defendant did not honestly believe that defensive actions were necessary, for
example, because the threat was not sufficiently imminent131 , she may claim provocation based upon
the domestic violence.
*J. Crim. L. 453 The New South Wales Legislative Council Select Committee on the Partial Defence
of Provocation did not deem it necessary to incorporate an equivalent ‘fear trigger’ in its
recommendations for reform to the partial defence of provocation. The Committee asserted that it
would be inappropriate to reform the provocation defence in a manner which would create an overlap
with excessive self-defence, albeit that a defensive element may exist in cases of ‘gross provocation
causing the defendant to feel a sense of being seriously wronged’.132 Self-defence and excessive
self-defence were regarded as ‘more appropriate vehicles [than provocation] to give effect to
community expectations that victims of prior domestic violence should receive some leniency under
the law’, but it is recognised that the legislation needs to be developed in order to ‘properly
accommodate the circumstances of domestic violence’.133 The Women's Domestic Court Advocacy
Service contends that the admissibility of ‘social framework’ evidence with a focus on the context of
domestic violence would assist in this regard.134 Section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)135 provides
a suitable framework on which to base such reform.136 The provision states that for the purposes of
murder, defensive homicide or manslaughter, in circumstances where domestic violence is alleged,
the following evidence may be admissible in assessing liability:
(a) the history of the relationship between the person and a family member, including violence by the
family member towards the person or by the person towards the family member or by the family
member or the person in relation to any other family member;
(b) the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a family member of that
violence;
(c) social, cultural or economic factors that impact on the person or a family member who has been
affected by family violence;
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(d) the general nature and dynamics of relationships affected by family violence, including the
possible consequences of separation from the abuser;
(e) the psychological effect of violence on people who are or have been in a relationship affected by
family violence;
(f) social or economic factors that impact on people who are or have been in a relationship affected by
family violence.137
*J. Crim. L. 454 There are obvious difficulties associated with introducing social framework
evidence. Where expert testimony on battered women syndrome138 is provided, this potentially has
the effect of recasting the defendant as helpless or psychologically deranged suggesting that her
conduct is irrational rather than understandable in the circumstances.139 The use of contextual
evidence must be circumscribed to avoid ‘placing the victim on trial’. The trial of Clayton Weatherston
marked the eventual demise of the provocation defence140 in New Zealand, following the defendant's
protracted televised testimony whereby he claimed that he had killed the victim because of ‘the
emotional pain that she [had] caused [him]’.141 Weatherston alleged that the victim had contracted an
STI following casual sex with a stranger whilst on a trip. He led evidence that she attacked him and
read extracts from her diary to the court which he claimed showed that she had a tendency towards
violence.142 Weatherston's unrepentant televised testimony was branded a ‘national disgrace’143 and
there was a prevailing view that Weatherston had used the provocation defence as a vehicle to place
the victim on trial.144 Despite the ostensible difficulties associated with the introduction of social
framework evidence, the fact remains that in order to understand the ‘circumstances’ of the ‘abused
woman’, contextual information must be adduced and the introduction of a social framework model,
with appropriate limitations, would assist in ensuring that such evidence is made available under the
same conditions in each case.
The introduction of a partial defence of self-preservation/psychological self-defence,145 predicated on
the notion of excessive self-defence in New South Wales combined with a ‘social framework’
provision akin to that in Victoria, provides a viable option for reform in England and Wales. This
suggestion builds on earlier recommendations by the Law Commission. In its Consultation Paper, the
English Law Commission posited several potential options for the development of a new partial
defence predicated on the use of excessive force in self- *J. Crim. L. 455 defence.146 Option A
involved an extension of the common law to afford a defence where the use of force is lawful based
upon the defendant's subjective belief, but the amount of force used exceeds that which is
reasonable. Option C involved the pre-emptive use of force in self-defence where the use of any force
would usually be considered unlawful because the threat is not sufficiently imminent.147
As a partial defence, self-preservation/psychological self-defence would assist in circumventing the
difficulties associated with requiring the ‘abused woman’ to prove a loss of self-control, and could
potentially be extended so that it may apply in cases akin to Clegg. 148 The social framework model
could also be developed so as to bring within its ambit the ‘startled householder’; fundamentally, the
circumstances of individual cases become relevant for the purposes of juror evaluation. As a partial,
rather than an affirmative, defence the recommendation avoids the problems associated with allowing
an outright acquittal in ‘startled householder’ cases where the defendant uses disproportionate force.
149
Academicians have asserted that the inclusion of a specific partial defence predicated on excessive
force in self-defence may lead to compromise verdicts of manslaughter where the defendant should
have been acquitted on the basis of self-defence.150 Yet, as previously noted, the concept of
self-defence tends to operate unfairly in cases where a female defendant has armed herself because
in her experience her unarmed resistance to an attack by him is likely to result in the escalation of that
attack.151 Women typically use weapons in self-defence which results in a higher likelihood of a
murder conviction.152 In this regard, the ostensibly ‘gender-neutral concept of reasonableness’
operates against the female defendant:153
*J. Crim. L. 456 Self-defence ‘as a win-or-lose option … encourages the use of partial defences of
[loss of self-control] and diminished responsibility when neither properly captures the nature of the
dilemma in which battered women find themselves. A compromise move would be the development
of a new partial defence to murder based on physical or psychological aspects, or self-preservation.154
Conclusion
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The loss of control requirement and ‘startled householder’ provision are emotive issues which are apt
for newspaper headlines. Declaratory statements that the loss of control requirement will prevent
gang members from claiming that they were provoked focus on very limited aspects of provocation
claims. The ‘startled householder’ provision places a premium on home invasion cases and ignores
other equally deserving defendants, perhaps because most voters have been or know someone who
has been affected by burglary. This policy-over-principle approach has rendered the loss of control
defence internally incoherent and at a doctrinal level this partial defence cannot be cogently aligned
with affirmative self-defence and full exculpation.
Amendments to the provocation defence were designed to accommodate the plight of abused
women. The fact that a woman in fear is more likely to resort to the use of a weapon or to kill when
the threat is no longer imminent renders it very difficult for her to claim self-defence. The Law
Commission's fear of serious violence trigger was introduced to provide an alternative route of
exculpation, albeit partial, in cases where self-defence is unsuccessful. The government's decision to
qualify the Law Commission's schematic template with the controversial ‘loss of control’
conceptualisation has effectively raised the bar for the ‘abused woman’. At a practical level, the
‘abused woman’ will struggle to claim the defence. At a doctrinal level, a defendant who
unsuccessfully attempts to claim self-defence under s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act
2008 will find it difficult to revert to the loss of self-control defence on the basis that the notion of an
out-of-control defendant acting reasonably is inherently contradictory.
This issue is unlikely to arise where the ‘startled householder’ kills an intruder. Where exculpatory
self-defence is rejected, the ‘startled householder’ may revert to the use of the partial loss of control
defence, without the contradiction that prevails in the ‘abused woman’ scenario. This is because s. 43
of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 legitimises the disproportionate use of force in self-defence, but
only in the context of home invasion cases, where a successful plea results in an outright acquittal.
The legitimisation of the use of disproportionate force under s. 43 unfairly places the ‘startled
householder’ in a better position than every other defendant claiming self-defence. The provision
does not appropriately reflect the defendant's culpability level and it cannot be reconciled with the
plight of the ‘abused woman’. It is inherently unjust to allow an affirmative defence in home invasion
cases and to preclude *J. Crim. L. 457 that same defence in cases where the battered woman kills
her abuser, simply because the person who intrudes on her physical and emotional integrity is known
to her. Where the defendant uses disproportionate force in self-defence, the availability of a partial
defence, rather than an affirmative defence is apposite in terms of criminal liability.
The implementation of a new partial defence of self-preservation/psychological self-defence provides
an appropriate avenue for reform in this regard. By basing the law on the New South Wales doctrine
of excessive self-defence, the partial defence avoids the problems associated with requiring the
‘abused woman’ to establish a loss of self-control, whilst acknowledging that when a woman kills her
abuser her conduct is often regarded as excessive because she is more likely to use a weapon. The
availability of the concessionary mitigation could be extended to bring within its ambit home invasion
cases, which would more appropriately reflect the ‘startled householder's’ culpability level than the
current position under s. 43 of the 2013 Act.
The novel concessionary mitigation ought to be supplemented with a carefully worded ‘social
framework’ provision, akin to that in Victoria, which requires the court to consider the contextual ambit
of self-defence claims. In all cases it is essential that the background to the defendant's plea is
considered when assessing criminal liability: ‘Social framework evidence is critical to changing the
way in which we understand self-defence and any of the other partial defences … Without that social
framework evidence, we do not understand either the position of the victim or the defendant’.155
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‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’:
a new partial defence for primary victims
who kill
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She said ‘I’m savin’ up my money and when I get the nerve I’ll run
But Jim don’t give up easily so I intend to buy a gun
He will never see the way he treats me is a crime
Somebody oughta lock him up but I’m the one ‘Who’s done the time’3
Abstract
This article provides an in-depth analysis of  the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act
2014 which had the effect of  repealing the Australian state of  Victoria’s only general ‘partial defence’ of
defensive homicide, and replaced the existing statutory self-defence in murder/manslaughter provisions and
general common law self-defence rules with a single test. The abolition of  defensive homicide means there is now
no general ‘partial defence’ to accommodate cases falling short of  self-defence. The change is likely to mean that
some primary victims will find themselves bereft of  a defence. This is the experience in New Zealand where the
Family Violence Death Review Committee recently recommended the reintroduction of  a partial defence, post-
abolition of  provocation in 2009. Primary victims in New Zealand are being convicted of  murder and
sentences are double those issued pre-2009. Both jurisdictions require that a new partial defence be introduced,
and accordingly, an entirely new defence predicated on a fear of  serious violence and several threshold filter
mechanisms designed to accommodate the circumstances of  primary victims is advanced herein. The proposed
framework draws upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for England and Wales, and a
comprehensive review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of  the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, but the novel
framework rejects the paradoxical loss of  self-control requirement and sexed normative standard operating
within that jurisdiction. The recommendations are complemented by social framework evidence and mandatory
jury directions, modelled on the law in Victoria. A novel interlocutory appeal procedure designed to prevent
unnecessary appellate court litigation is also outlined. This bespoke model provides an appropriate via media
and optimal solution to the problems faced by primary victims in Victoria and New Zealand.
NILQ summer 2015
1 Ariel Caten, ‘A Man’s Home Is His Castle’ (lyrics) on Faith Hill’s album, It Matters To Me (1995). 
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1
Introduction
The Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act)abolished the Australian state of  Victoria’s only general ‘partial defence’4 of  defensive
homicide and replaced the existing statutory self-defence in murder/manslaughter
provisions and general common law self-defence rules with a single test.5 In the absence of
a partial defence, self-defence becomes an all-or-nothing claim, where a successful plea
results in an outright acquittal, and an unsuccessful plea results in conviction for the offence
charged. The 2014 Act also expanded the admissibility of  social framework evidence (which
includes, inter alia, the history of  the relationship, cumulative impact of  family violence, and
social, economic and cultural factors that may impact on a family member) from homicide
to all self-defence cases.6 These amendments were complemented by the introduction of
new juror directions in cases involving family violence.7 Despite the aims of  the Victorian
Department of  Justice (VDoJ), this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to self-defence may have
unintended consequences in practice, with significant ramifications in intimate partner
homicide cases.8
This article commends the amendments to self-defence, but the impact of  these
reforms ‘should not be overstated’.9 The existence of  a partial defence is necessary to
capture cases that fall outside the scope of  self-defence, but do not warrant the murder
label.10 The evaluation undertaken by jurors in determining whether a partial defence
applies can serve an important role in assessing societal opinion of  the killing, thereby
assisting the sentencing judge in imposing sentence.11 It also has the effect of  involving
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)152
4 The conviction was actually for defensive homicide, rather than a reduction from murder to manslaughter
(although the effect was to substitute a murder conviction with the lesser offence); the Crimes Amendment
(Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act 2014, s 3(4). 
5 Ss 322N and 322K of  the 2014 Act abolished common law (s 322N) and statutory versions of  self-defence
(Crimes (Homicide) Act 1958, ss 9AC (self-defence in murder cases) and 9AE (self-defence in manslaughter
cases)).
6 Crimes Act 1958, s 322J, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act
2014. For a detailed exposition of  the relational nature of  domestic violence, see Thom Brooks, Punishment
(Routledge, 2012) ch 10.
7 Jury Directions Act 2013, ss 31 and 32, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive
Homicide) Act 2014, pt 4. 
8 This article takes as its main focus cases of  female on male intimate partner homicide, addressing the potential
impact of  the absence of  an applicable partial defence. It should be noted, however, that the impact is relevant
to both male and female defendants, both of  whom may suffer from domestic abuse. The feminine pronoun
will also be used throughout this article when referring to the primary victim, but this should not be
interpreted as implying that only women may be considered the primary victim, nor should it be read as
implying that the partial defence(s) are gender-specific. For a definition of  the term ‘primary victim’, see page
153 below. For an excellent analysis of  defensive homicide cases involving male defendants see, Kellie Toole,
‘Self-defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law’ [2012] 36 Monash
University Law Review 250.
9 Hansard, Legislative Council, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second
reading, 7 August 2014, Ms Pennicuik (Southern Metropolitan) 2419 citing Debbie Kirkwood, Mandy
McKenzie, Libby Eltringham, Danielle Tyson, Bronwyn Naylor, Chris Atmore and Sarah Capper, ‘Submission
on the Department of  Justice’s Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform-Consultation Paper’
(2013).
10 For a detailed analysis of  potential partial defences, see Thomas Crofts and Danielle Tyson, ‘Homicide Law
Reform in Australia: Improving Access to Defences for Women who Kill their Abusers’ (2013) 39 Monash
University Law Review 864.
11 See, generally, Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC), Fourth Annual Report (2014).
jurors in an important ‘dialogue with the legislature and prosecutors’.12 A comparative
analysis with the position in New Zealand demonstrates that primary victims are being
convicted of  murder and sentenced more harshly than if  a partial defence was available.
The Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC) defines the primary victim as an
individual experiencing ‘ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour from their intimate
partner’. The predominant aggressor is the principal aggressor in the relationship who ‘has
a pattern of  using violence to exercise coercive control’.13 These terms will be used
throughout this article. New Zealand has a restrictive sentencing regime and tighter self-
defence provision than Victoria, but these differences do not detract from the unfairness in
labelling the primary victim a murderer.14 As Quick and Wells point out, evading the
stigmatic murder label is often as important to primary victims as the sentence imposed.15
It is essential that Victoria and New Zealand adopt a more nuanced approach to
reforming homicide defences. The introduction of  a bespoke partial defence or offence
predicated on a fear of  serious violence provides a novel via media and optimal solution to
the problems faced by primary victims within Victoria and New Zealand. These innovative
proposals draw upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for England and
Wales, in addition to an in-depth review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of  the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009 (the 2009 Act), as enacted.16 The entirely new partial defence would
operate to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in
response to a fear of  serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another
identified individual.17 The defence is qualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms
designed to preclude the availability of  the defence in unmeritorious cases. These clauses
include a ‘normal person’ test and provisions stipulating that the defence is not available
where the defendant intentionally incited serious violence, acted in a considered desire for
revenge or on the basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the
defence might apply.18 In cases where sufficient evidence is raised that the partial defence
might apply, it is then for the prosecution to disprove the defence to the usual criminal
standard. The defence is complemented by bespoke provisions on social framework
evidence and mandatory juror directions where family violence is in issue. A new
interlocutory appeal procedure that would serve to prevent unnecessary appellate court
litigation is also advanced. The following analysis demonstrates not only the need for such
a partial defence within Victoria and New Zealand, but also the extent to which this newly
proposed model provides an advantageous framework for reform.
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12 Mike Redmayne, ‘Theorising Jury Reform’ in Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor
Tadros (eds), The Trial on Trial vol II (Hart 2006) 102, cited in Thomas Crofts, ‘Two Degrees of  Murder:
Homicide Law Reform in England and Western Australia’ (2008) 8(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law
Journal 187–210, 198.
13 FVDRC (n 11) 6. These terms are useful in that they are gender-neutral but, as Hamer identifies, they could
not be used in a forensic context. My thanks to Associate Professor David Hamer (University of  Sydney) for
making this point. See also n 8 above on use of  the feminine pronoun in this article. 
14 For detailed discussion on the abolition of  provocation and the restrictive sentencing regime operating in New
Zealand, see Warren Brookbanks, ‘Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand’ in Alan Reed and Michael
Bohlander (eds), Loss of  Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives
(Ashgate 2011) 271–90.
15 Oliver Quick and Celia Wells, ‘Getting Tough with Defences’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 514. See also Crofts
and Tyson (n 10).
16 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290 2004); Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter
and Infanticide (Law Com No 304 2006).
17 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(3).
18 Ibid s 54(5)–(6).
The decision to abolish partial defences in Victoria
In 2005, defensive homicide replaced provocation in a move intended to send a clear
message that killings borne of  male possessiveness, envy and rage were unacceptable.19 The
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) recommended abolition at a time when the
Court of  Appeal was considering the case of  Ramage.20 Ramage claimed he had lost control
and killed his estranged wife, Julie, when she asserted that sex with him ‘repulsed her’, and
said she was happy with another man.21 In a ‘dramatic’ display of  ‘victim blaming’ the trial
became ‘an examination, and ultimately crucifixion’ of  Julie, where her new relationship,
marital unhappiness and comments regarding her life without Ramage were closely
scrutinised.22 Julie was unhappy as a result of  Ramage’s controlling and oppressive
behaviour and the violence he inflicted on her, but a significant amount of  abuse evidence
was excluded on grounds that it was temporally too remote and/or ‘potentially highly
prejudicial’.23 Morgan’s observation that ‘dead women tell no tales, tales are told about
them’ is a remarkably apt epithet of  the case.24 Convicted of  manslaughter, Ramage was
sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, but released after a minimum non-parole period of
8 years. Following sentence, Julie’s sister expressed her disappointment, noting that a
murder conviction would have resulted in a higher sentence.25 The recommendations of  the
VLRC, coupled with public outrage regarding the decision reached in Ramage, influenced
the abolition of  the partial defence.26
In the absence of  provocation, the VLRC considered a new partial defence of  excessive
self-defence necessary to accommodate killings in response to domestic abuse, should self-
defence fail.27 The government responded by introducing defensive homicide. Designed to
apply to ‘understandable over-reaction’ scenarios, murder could be reduced to defensive
homicide where the defendant killed believing it necessary to defend herself/another, but
reasonable grounds for that belief  were absent.28 The test asked jurors to assess whether
the defendant believed her conduct was necessary to defend herself/another from death or
really serious injury. If  jurors concluded the defendant held that belief, or the prosecution
failed to disprove that beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant would be acquitted of
murder, and jurors were required to determine her liability for defensive homicide. The
defendant would be guilty where the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
defendant had no reasonable grounds for the belief.29
The repeated use of  defensive homicide in cases involving one-off  violent
confrontations between men of  comparable strength meant that defensive homicide might
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19 VLRC, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) (comments on provocation). Note, the VLRC recommended
the introduction of  excessive self-defence, not defensive homicide.
20 Ibid; Ramage [2004] VSC 508 [22] (Osborn J).
21 Ramage (n 20) [40] (Osborn J).
22 Graeme Coss, ‘The Defence of  Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ [2006] 18(1) Current
Issues in Criminal Justice 51, 54. See also, Phil Cleary, Getting Away with Murder: The True Story of  Julie Ramage’s
Death (Allen & Unwin 2005) 136.
23 Ramage [2004] VSC 391 [46] (Osborn J).
24 Jenny Morgan, ‘Critique and Comment: Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are
Told about Them’ (1997) Melbourne University Law Review 237.
25 AAP, ‘Provoked Wife Killer Gets 11 Years’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney 2004). 
26 Ibid. 
27 VLRC (n 19) 102.
28 Ibid para 3.101, citing Supplementary Submission 27 (Criminal Bar Association). 
29 Ibid 12–13.
be perceived to have failed to produce the results intended.30 The offence was criticised as
inherently complex, difficult to apply, and lacking common sense.31 It had the effect of
diverting attention away from the (in)adequacy of  self-defence. Popular opinion was heavily
influenced by evocative media reports, lamenting deals that could ‘get potential murderers
off  the hook’, and advocating ‘a stronger voice for crime victims’.32 Men who ‘escaped’
potential murder convictions include: Dambitis,33 who killed his victim with lumps of  wood
and his fists two days after being released from prison; Giammona,34 who stabbed another
prison inmate 16 times; a schizophrenic man who killed two men believing he was the clone
of  Hitler or Hitler’s grandson;35 Smith,36 who, in a drug-induced psychosis, stabbed his
victim 50 to 60 times because he allegedly called him gay and threatened him; and a drug
addict, with 91 previous convictions, who killed his victim during the course of  a drug-
related robbery.37
Between 2005 and 2014, there were 33 convictions for defensive homicide in Victoria:
28 out of  33 were of  men; 32 out of  the 33 victims were men; and 27 out of  the 28 men
killed another man; meaning that only five women were convicted of  the offence.38 It was
the case of  Middendorp,39 together with a comprehensive review produced by the VDoJ,
which operated as a catalyst for abolition. Middendorp was convicted of  defensive
homicide after he brutally stabbed his estranged partner, Jade, to death because she
attempted to bring a male friend into their home. According to Middendorp, Jade
threatened him with a knife and, because of  earlier violence, he believed he needed to
defend himself  from death or serious injury. The relationship was plagued by alcohol and
physical abuse. Earlier reports by Jade indicated that Middendorp was responsible for the
violence, but Middendorp blamed Jade, and her reliability was questioned at trial, where she
was obviously unable to defend herself.40 Like Julie Ramage, it was Jade who was put on
trial when she was described as ‘a troubled young woman’ who deserved the ‘prospect of
growing out of  her [drug and alcohol] addiction’.41 At the time of  the killing, Middendorp
was subject to bail conditions and a family violence intervention order as a result of  several
alleged offences against Jade.42 Middendorp was described as over 6 feet tall and 90kg,
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30 VDoJ, Defensive Homicide: Review of  the Offence of  Defensive Homicide (VDoJ Discussion Paper 
2010) 36.
31 VDoJ, Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform (VDoJ Consultation Paper 2013). See also, Adrian Lowe,
‘New Calls for State to Overhaul Homicide Laws’ (2010) The Age 6; and, Geoff  Wilkinson and Courtney
Crane, ‘A Law Meant to Protect Women Is Being Abused by Brutal Men’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2012) citing
Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering.
32 Michael, ‘Deals Could Get Potential Murderers off  the Hook in Victoria’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2012);
Robert Clark, ‘Giving a Stronger Voice to Crime Victims’ Herald Sun Law Blog (Melbourne 2012).
33 [2013] VSCA 329.
34 [2008] VSC 376.
35 Ball [2014] VSC 669.
36 [2008] VSC 617 [9].
37 Taiba [2008] VSC 589. See, generally, Matt Johnson, ‘Killer Blow: Defensive Homicide Laws Hijacked by
Thugs Will Be Scrapped’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2014). 
38 Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second
reading, 3 September 2014, Mr McCurdy, Murray Valley, 3144. For a contextual analysis of  these figures see,
DVRCV, Justice or Judgement? The Impact of  Victorian Homicide Law Reforms on Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate
Partners (DVRCV Discussion Paper No 9 2013).
39 [2010] VSC 202.
40 Ibid [7].
41 Ibid [17].
42 Ibid [4]. 
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compared to Jade who was smaller and weighed approximately 50kg.43 Middendorp
wrestled the knife from Jade and stabbed her four times in the shoulder before she managed
to stagger from the house. Witnesses observed Middendorp follow her, shouting, ‘she got
what she deserved’, and calling her ‘a filthy slut’.44
The facts in Middendorp bore the hallmarks of  a brutal killing borne out of  anger, sexual
jealousy and male possessiveness. Middendorp was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment
with a minimum non-parole period of  8 years. The verdict was vituperatively criticised as
‘laughable’, ‘too lenient’, ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘all about provocation’.45 There was
widespread concern that the precedent might result in similar verdicts in other femicide
cases. The case coincided with the VDoJ’s review which concluded that the offence had
been inappropriately used as a vehicle to drive provocation-type arguments; the (unclear)
benefit to having defensive homicide for primary victims was substantially outweighed by
the expense of  inappropriately excusing men who kill; and the shift in emphasis from self-
defence to defensive homicide implied that the primary victim’s response was irrational
rather than reasonable in the circumstances.46 Shortly thereafter, the offence was abolished
by the 2014 Act.
The decision to abolish defensive homicide was not unanimously supported. Indeed, a
number of  eminent scholars have advocated that reform should have focused upon plea-
bargaining practice in Victoria, rather than the relatively embryonic operation of  defensive
homicide.47 Middendorp is one of  a limited number of  defensive homicide convictions
reached by jury verdict. In this respect, it is apparent that any partial defence needs to be
framed in order to ensure that it is left to the jury in appropriate cases. The vast majority of
defensive homicide convictions were achieved via plea bargains, mandating that the Crown
withdraw related homicide charges.48 Although plea-bargaining is an expeditious and
financially beneficial way of  obtaining a conviction, the lack of  transparency associated with
this prosecutorial discretion circumvents juror – and therefore social – evaluation as to
whether an individual should be convicted of  murder or manslaughter. It also prevents
effective analysis of  the reasons for accepting such pleas.49 This lack of  transparency fuelled
‘public perceptions of  clandestine outcomes, inequality and a lack of  accountability’ in
relation to the application of  defensive homicide.50
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Amendments to self-defence: attempting to compensate for the lack of a 
partial defence?
The prospect of  having no partial defence for primary victims highlighted the need to
improve the law on self-defence and evidence admissibility. The 2014 Act replaced the
existing statutory self-defence provisions relating to murder/manslaughter51 and the
general common law self-defence rules with a single test.52 Self-defence represents an ‘all-
or-nothing’ claim, where a successful plea results in an outright acquittal, and an
unsuccessful plea results in conviction for the offence charged. This effectively mirrors the
law of  England and Wales.53 The test requires that the defendant believed force was
necessary in self-defence and the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived
by the defendant.54 The introduction of  s 322M of  the 2014 Act implies that self-defence
may be more accessible to primary victims in Victoria than it currently is in England and
Wales. Section 322M specifies that, in cases involving family violence, self-defence may
apply even where the threat is not imminent, or the force used is excessive.55 The
assumption is that reformulated self-defence will capture deserving cases, while other cases
where self-defence is unsuccessfully raised will be considered during sentencing.56 In
murder cases, s 322K(3) requires that the defendant believed the conduct was necessary in
order to defend herself/another from death or really serious injury. Section 322L further
precludes the availability of  the defence where the victim’s conduct is lawful, and the
defendant knows that the conduct is lawful at the time.57
The emphasis on family violence under s 322M challenges the stereotypical notion of
self-defence as a one-off  confrontation between two individuals of  equal strength. It
reflects contemporary recognition that a more nuanced approach must be adopted in cases
where the primary victim wards off  a physically stronger aggressor in a non-traditional self-
defence situation. Ramsey heralded the Victorian provisions on self-defence as a radical and
trendsetting example of  feminist-inspired reform.58 The cases of  SB, in which a nolle
prosequi was entered, and Dimotrovski, which resulted in a magistrates’ discharge, have been
‘cautiously’ cited as evidence that earlier amendments to self-defence are working in
practice.59 Yet, the assumption that these cases demonstrate success of  the new provisions
‘may be premature’.60 SB shot her stepfather after he demanded oral sex from her at
gunpoint. Dimostrovski stabbed her husband after he hit her in the face, pushed her to the
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53 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76. 
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ground and attacked their daughter.61 These cases did not proceed to trial because it was
recognised that both defendants were acting in self-defence; their actions complied with
‘traditional notions of  self-defence’.62 The problems presented by judicially invented
constructs of  imminence and proportionality were not at issue.63
Even with bespoke provisions dedicated to the unique circumstances of  family violence,
some primary victims may find themselves bereft of  a defence in homicide cases. Abolition
of  both provocation and defensive homicide renders self-defence ‘an all or nothing roll of
the dice for women in these circumstances, and if  they are unable to convince the court that
self-defence has been made out, then what these women will face is conviction for
murder’.64 Despite the problems associated with defensive homicide, a number of  legal
practitioners, academics and key stakeholders identified that abolition would be a
‘retrograde step’.65 ‘Introduced for sound reasons’, defensive homicide provided ‘a very
important and compelling safety net for women who experience, and respond to family
violence’;66 removal of  that safety net on grounds that men have been inappropriately using
it, in male-on-male combat, unfairly disadvantages primary victims.67
Five women were convicted of  defensive homicide, all of  whom might have faced a
murder conviction had the offence been abolished.68 One of  the most recent female-on-
male defensive homicide convictions did not involve family violence or a relationship
between the defendant and victim. Copeland,69 a 24-year-old heroin addict and prostitute,
stabbed her 68-year-old client in the back and left, taking $420 from his wallet. According
to Copeland, she feared that she would be raped or killed when he threatened her with a
knife during an argument regarding payment. It was ‘quite impossible’ to tell exactly what
happened, but had the evidence supported Copeland’s version of  events, self-defence
would have been available.70 The media labelled Copeland a ‘drug addled prostitute’,71 and
the sentencing judge was unsympathetic towards the mental illness from which she suffered.
Maxwell J noted that there was ‘no particular feature of  Copeland’s drug dependency which
made it peculiarly or unusually intractable’.72
Copeland is clearly very different from the other female defensive homicide convictions
that have involved significant history of  abuse in intimate partner relationships.
Consideration of  a defendant’s recognised medical condition would require the
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introduction of  a new partial defence equivalent to s 2 of  the Homicide Act 1957, as
amended, and not one predicated on a fear of  serious violence.73 It might be appropriate
to consider a defendant’s recognised medical condition as part of  the circumstances of  the
individual case where he/she fears serious violence, considered further below.74 The
remaining defensive homicide convictions of  primary victims illustrate the need for a partial
defence based upon a fear of  serious violence.
It has been suggested that the availability of  defensive homicide, or an alternative partial
defence, may result in defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offence rather than risk a
murder conviction in claiming self-defence. It is also possible that a halfway house
potentially encourages compromise manslaughter verdicts based upon an ostensible
disproportionate use of  force, for example, where a primary victim uses a weapon to kill an
aggressor.75 The case of  Edwards76 reflects circumstances in which the availability of
defensive homicide may have prevented a successful self-defence claim. According to
Edwards, the predominant aggressor threatened her life and repeatedly punched and kicked
her in the days preceding the fatal attack. Edwards said:
I went to sleep for while, and I was hoping that it all would be over when I woke
up. And when I woke up, he was still drunk . . . and then . . . he said that he was
going to cut my eyes out and cut my ears off. And disfigure me. And then he said
he was going to get some petrol from out the back and he was going to set me
on fire and ruin my pretty face so that no one would look at me ever again. And
I panicked.77
‘Wild and angry’, the predominant aggressor approached Edwards brandishing a knife.
During the struggle that ensued, he lost his balance and fell. Edwards then grabbed the
knife and stabbed him. It was accepted that Edwards believed it was necessary to defend
herself, but her plea meant she accepted there were ‘no reasonable grounds’ to believe she
was in ‘danger of  death or serious injury’. The wounds inflicted were ‘a disproportionate
response to the threat’.78 The reforms might assist primary victims like Edwards to claim
self-defence, but there is ‘little evidence to suggest that self-defence would become more
accessible’.79 The prosecution case, in stark contrast to Edwards’ version of  events, was that
she stabbed her sleeping husband. In this respect, there was (and remains) a risk that jurors
might reject self-defence. In the absence of  a partial defence, defendants like Edwards
might be convicted of  murder. There is no guarantee that the absence of  a partial defence
will prevent primary victims from pleading ‘guilty to murder in order to receive a discounted
sentence’ in such cases. Of  course, the bargaining power of  defence counsel will be
substantially reduced in the absence of  a partial defence.80
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Designed to accommodate the circumstances of  primary victims, s 322M specifies that,
where family violence is in issue, a person may believe that conduct is necessary, and the
response may be reasonable in the circumstances as perceived by them, even if  the person
is responding to harm that is not immediate, or the response involves the use of  force in
excess of  the threatened or inflicted harm. Priest has criticised the provision as a
‘breathtaking extension’ of  self-defence:
Taken to their logical (or, perhaps, their illogical) conclusion, these new
provisions suggest that a number of  ‘trivial’ acts of  ‘harassment’ (whatever the
term might embrace) by a family member, which do not involve actual or
threatened abuse, might permit a person to use disproportionate force to kill that
family member even where ‘harm’ is not ‘immediate’.81
As Priest identifies, s 322M appears to imply a different approach in family violence cases.
This might have unintended consequences for defendants who find themselves in a
potentially analogous situation to vulnerable family members, but for failing to fall within
that category. For example, in the context of  terrorist/hostage, human trafficking, or
other situations where ‘the threat is not immediate, but . . . more remote in time’ or,
arguably, ongoing.82 In such situations ‘there may not be a need to prevent immediate
harm but rather an immediate need to act to prevent inevitable harm’.83 The Judicial
College of  Victoria, however, has suggested that the common law approach regarding
immediacy and the reasonableness of  the force used will continue to apply.84 In practice,
the provision reiterates the common law principle that when acting in the ‘agony of  the
moment’ the defendant does not need to ‘weigh to a nicety the exact measure of  his
necessary defensive action’.85 A similar clause recommended by the VLRC would have
been of  general application.86 The VLRC proposal extended necessity in self-defence to
cases where the defendant ‘fears inevitable, rather than immediate harm’. The provision
was intended to clarify the common law position that the significance of  the defendant’s
‘perception of  danger is not its imminence. It is that it renders the defendant’s use of
force really necessary.’87 In this respect, whether the defendant/victim is a family member
and/or family violence is in issue would be more appropriately categorised as a matter of
evidence rather than a principle of  law.88 The effect would be to extend s 322M to all self-
defence cases.
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It is important to note that s 322M does not apply only to abused women, but extends
to other family members. The 2014 Act defines ‘family member’ and ‘family violence’ in
wide terms in order that ‘a fairly broad cohort of  persons and circumstances’ may be
brought within the new test.89 The term family member covers current and former marital
relationships; intimate personal relationships; parental relationships (step or biological);
guardians; a child in residence; and a person who is or has been a member of  the household.
The definition of  family violence includes, inter alia, physical, psychological and sexual
abuse, which may manifest as a single act, or several acts amounting to a pattern of
behaviour.90 It is apparent that the broad ambit of  this element of  the defence may have
unintended consequences in practice.
However, the extent to which s 322M will change the substantive approach is
questionable. A provision similar to s 322M was introduced in England and Wales in
relation to the use of  force by householders.91 Where a defendant is protecting
herself/another against a trespasser, force will only be regarded as unreasonable if  it is
‘grossly disproportionate’. Herring points out that s 43 makes ‘little change to the law
because the jury would, even under the standard approach, take into account the emergency
of  the moment when considering whether a householder was acting reasonably and would
be likely to only find a grossly disproportionate amount of  force to be unreasonable’.92 The
clause has been heavily criticised as a ‘triumph of  rhetoric over reason’ and it highlights the
dangers associated with enacting legislation specific to discrete categories of  offender that
may do little to change the substantive approach.93 The primary victim might face similar
problems. As Hollingworth J identified in Williams:94
what happens in such cases is that the victim of  family violence finally reaches a
point of  explosive violence, in response to yet another episode of  being attacked.
In such a case, it is not uncommon for the accused to inflict violence that is
completely disproportionate to the immediate harm or threatened harm from the
deceased.95
A woman is more likely to use a weapon, and it is not uncommon for substantially more
strikes to be inflicted than may have objectively been reasonable to incapacitate a
man.96 Hollingworth J acknowledged that viewing the infliction of  16 blows with an axe
in response to a minor or trivial threat as being a very serious example of  an offence
might not be the right conclusion where the defendant has suffered a history of
abuse.97 This implies that greater weight will be attached to the impact of  family
violence during sentencing, but such a defendant might still be convicted of  murder. In
cases involving excess force, an appropriate partial defence is an essential safety net for
primary victims.
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The amendments to self-defence are complemented by new jury directions designed to
assist jurors to understand the impact of  abuse, and how this can evoke ‘possibly the worst
behaviour from everybody in an unbelievably hot-tempered, violent home where domestic
family violence is prevalent’.98 By requiring the trial judge to provide a direction on family
violence where it is requested by counsel, unless there are good reasons not to, these
amendments are targeted towards proactively tackling misconceptions regarding family
violence. The trial judge will explain, inter alia, that family violence may be relevant to
assessment of  whether the primary victim was acting in self-defence; and that family
violence may include sexual and psychological as well as physical abuse.99 Importantly, the
trial judge may inform jurors that there is no typical, proper or normal response to family
violence. Jurors are to be advised that it is not uncommon for a primary victim of  family
violence to remain with an abusive partner, or to leave and return to that partner; and/or
not to report or seek assistance to stop such conduct.100 Social framework evidence is no
longer limited to homicide cases and may extend to all self-defence claims. Amendments to
the Evidence Act 2008 mean that the court can refuse to hear evidence where it
unnecessarily demeans the victim.101 This change does not limit the use of  evidence
providing an important contextual narrative or where there are good forensic reasons for
its admission.102 The effect is to address ‘the despicable practice of  gratuitous blame
directed at victims during homicide trials’, while simultaneously allowing evidence relating
to family violence to be admitted.103
A partial defence is still necessary
These provisions undoubtedly serve an important educative function in assessing the
impact of  family violence on the primary victim, but the extent to which they will
affect the outcome of  self-defence cases remains unclear. In this respect, the impact
of  these changes ‘should not be overstated’.104 The case law demonstrates that there
continues to be only limited understanding of  the relationship between social
framework evidence and defences. Section 322M must be considered in light of  the
other elements of  self-defence; namely, that in murder cases the defendant must fear
death or really serious injury.105 In a detailed study of  intimate partner homicide
between 2005 and 2013, it was revealed that ‘there continues to be a focus on physical
forms of  violence and a lack of  understanding of  the serious impact of  non-physical
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forms of  intimate partner violence, such as psychological coercion and intimidation,
and sexual forms of  violence’.106 Black107 was convicted and sentenced to 9 years’
imprisonment after pleading guilty to the defensive homicide of  her de facto husband.
Black stabbed him after he cornered her in the kitchen, repeatedly jabbing her with his
finger. In evidence, Black said:
He was coming closer and closer to me . . . and I was thinking because he was so
drunk he would probably want to force himself  on me sexually . . . and I was just
thinking what else could he do.108
The sentencing judge noted that the aggressor was unarmed and that stabbing him twice
might be viewed as disproportionate.109 The threat was described as ‘being limited to
intimidation, harassment, jabbing and prodding’.110 Black’s appeal against sentence was
dismissed, the Court of  Appeal concluding that the sentencing judge was ‘justified in
making the observation that the violence which confronted the appellant was not as serious
as many of  the other cases’.111 The cumulative impact of  family violence and how it
contributed to Black’s perception of  the danger she faced was clearly misunderstood.112
Where domestic violence has become the norm, the primary victim will have an acute
awareness of  the danger that she is in at the time of  the act, but may subsequently
understate the impact of  that abuse. Black downplayed the violence she had suffered saying,
‘[h]e was never physically violent towards me, but he’d poke me with his fingers and point
at me and jab me in the chest and forehead. He would sometimes force himself  on me
sexually.’113 In the absence of  a partial defence, there is a real risk that the primary victim
will be convicted of  murder, particularly where the impact of  family violence is
misunderstood by the legal profession.
These concerns are compounded by the fact that a move to make juror directions
mandatory where family violence is at issue was rejected by the Victorian Parliament in
favour of  judicial flexibility.114 There is a mandate requiring the trial judge to give
directions where necessary to avoid substantial miscarriage of  justice, but failure to make
the family violence directions mandatory is arguably a missed opportunity. As Kirkwood
et al point out, mandatory directions would have ‘an educative value for the judiciary and
legal practitioners’, as well as assisting ‘judges to better direct juries when family violence
is led, when the implications of  the evidence are not spelled out by the defence, or when
the evidence is used to argue for reduced culpability rather than an acquittal’.115 The onus
rests on defence counsel to raise the issue, and, in practice, they will need to be,
‘sufficiently aware of  family violence and to raise it at an early stage to avoid damage
being done without it’.116 There is a risk that the new jury directions will be inconsistently
applied, with potentially significant consequences in terms of  juror decision-making.
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Jurors serve a vital role in such cases, but it is essential that appropriate guidance is
available in order to help them in that role.
This lack of  understanding at both a legislative and a practical level suggests that
separating genuine from fabricated facts in order to prevent victim blaming might be
difficult to achieve in practice.117 There was significant debate during the trial of  Creamer
as to whether she was a victim of  domestic violence.118 The relationship between Creamer
and the aggressor was described as ‘largely, if  not entirely, dysfunctional’.119 Each engaged
in extra-marital affairs, encouraged by the aggressor.120 The aggressor frequently requested
that Creamer engage in group sex, which she ‘resented strongly’.121 On the weekend of  the
killing, Creamer believed that the aggressor had arranged for her to engage in group sex.
According to her evidence, the aggressor had hit her in the genitals with a knobkerrie while
she was sleeping, accused her of  having sex with his brother, and insisted that she smell his
semen-stained sheets before placing them over her head.122 Immediately before the fatal
act, the aggressor repeatedly smacked Creamer in the face and threatened to ‘finish her off ’,
before attempting to push his penis in her mouth and urinating on her.123 Creamer
managed to hit the aggressor in the genitals before grabbing a knife and stabbing him to
death. The prosecution asserted that, rather than being a victim of  domestic abuse, Creamer
had initially denied her involvement in the killing because she had no excuse. She was
portrayed as being jealous of  the aggressor’s extramarital affairs and annoyed at his decision
to leave her for his former wife.124 The forensic evidence did not fully accord with
Creamer’s account, and the sentencing judge rejected a significant proportion of  her
evidence, describing her as an ‘unsophisticated witness’.125 In particular, Coghlan J
suggested that the jury had rejected Creamer’s allegation that she had been raped previously
by the aggressor because Creamer chose to stay with him and had not disclosed such
evidence prior to trial.126
Toole notes that the availability of  defensive homicide worked to Creamer’s
advantage. Rather than ‘being obsessive, jealous and controlling . . . her husband
encouraged and facilitated [Creamer’s] affairs’.127 In this respect, Toole argues that
defensive homicide had the ‘potential to both protect and criminalise lethal conduct by
women in inappropriate and unintended ways’.128 In contrast, the Domestic Violence
Resource Centre Victoria (DVRSV) contends that this assessment demonstrates a ‘lack of
understanding about how psychological manipulation, sexual degradation and coercive
control are forms of  family violence’.129 The primary victim may feel unable to disclose
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details of  abuse because ‘of  a deep sense of  shame and self-blame’.130 It is worrying that
such abuse continues to be viewed at the ‘lowest end of  the spectrum’.131 The
amendments to prevent victim blaming and fact fabrication are welcome, but it may be
difficult in practice to reliably distinguish genuine from disingenuous facts, particularly
given the hidden nature of  domestic abuse.
Irrespective of  the changes to self-defence, it remains clear that some defendants will
fall outside the scope of  self-defence simply because the force used was excessive. In such
cases, a reduction from murder to manslaughter may be apposite in terms of  appropriate
standardisation of  the defendant’s culpability level.132 The suggestion that lower
culpability may be reflected in sentencing mitigation where self-defence fails ignores the
injustice associated with labelling the primary victim a murderer where she genuinely
believed force was necessary, but was mistaken regarding the level of  force. The murder
label unfairly stigmatises those who kill their abusers and it ‘obscures the family violence
to which s/he has been subjected’.133 The Victorian Sentencing Council acknowledged
that the removal of  provocation would result in significantly higher sentences for
provoked killers, given the increased maximum penalty and stigma attached to murder.134
The same can be said of  the abolition of  defensive homicide. Experience in New Zealand
is that primary victims are being convicted of  murder and sentenced more harshly than
if  a partial defence was available.135
The impact of abolishing the partial defence in New Zealand
The New Zealand criminal justice system has been described as ‘out of  step internationally
in the way it responds when the victims of  family violence kill their abusers’.136 Last year,
the FVDRC noted that there needs to be a radical change in the way New Zealand deals
with ‘dangerous and chronic cases of  family violence’.137 In particular, the FVDRC
advocated reintroducing a partial defence to New Zealand, post-abolition of  the
provocation defence in 2009.138 The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) had
previously recommended abolition, complemented by developments to the law on self-
defence. The NZLC advocated that priority should be given to drafting a new sentencing
guideline to ensure that ‘full and fair account’ may be taken of  provocative conduct and
other mitigating factors during sentencing.139 Provocation was abolished, but the remaining
recommendations were not taken forward. The result is that self-defence laws in New
Zealand remain demonstrably unsuited to primary victims who kill a predominant aggressor
and, despite appellate court guidance on the impact of  provocation in sentencing, primary
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victims are in a significantly worse position than if  a partial defence was available.140 As
Brookbanks stated:
By abolishing the provocation defence, the legislature has drawn a line in the
sand. Those who cross it, whatever their motive or disposition, can no longer
expect a sentencing court to look at their situation with such compassion or
understanding, as might have previously marked the court’s response as a
concession to their ‘human frailty’.141
The self-defence provision operating in New Zealand appears to reflect the approach
adopted in Victoria and England and Wales, but the manner in which it has been interpreted
renders it difficult for primary victims to successfully claim the defence.142 Section 48 of
the Crimes Act 1961 provides that: ‘[e]veryone is justified in using, in the defence of  himself
or another, such force, as in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to
use’.143 The relaxation of  the imminence requirement in Victoria and England and Wales
has not occurred in New Zealand, where ‘immediacy of  life-threatening violence’ is
required in order to justify killing in self-defence.144 In cases where the defendant had a
viable, non-violent option, the threat is not considered sufficiently imminent to satisfy self-
defence. This approach fails to recognise that when a primary victim kills an intimate
partner it will rarely be in the face of  an imminent attack, since by then ‘any attempt at self-
protection may be too late’.145 The apparently viable escape option is similarly not possible
for the primary victim who fears that she will be in even more danger should she attempt
to do so.146 The FVDRC noted that by focusing on the imminence of  the threat, the
primary victim’s circumstances are limited to a short time-frame. This results in vastly
different rulings in factually similar cases where self-defence is precluded in the absence of
an imminent threat.147 The problem with this arbitrary approach to culpability is that it
results in some primary victims being labelled murderers, while others receive an outright
acquittal. The availability of  a partial defence would assist in ameliorating this inherently
unjust bifurcatory divide between justified killings in response to an imminent threat and
ostensibly unjustified killings undertaken when a predominant aggressor is off-guard. The
circumstances of  the primary victim have been acknowledged to a limited extent in that
expert evidence is admissible to explain how she might be more aware of  covertly
threatening behaviour which may not appear objectively apparent. It remains clear, however,
that self-defence in its current form does not adequately accommodate the circumstances
of  primary victims.148 Like the VLRC, the NZLC recommended replacing the ‘imminence’
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requirement with the need for an ‘inevitable attack’, but these recommendations were not
acted upon.149
The absence of  a partial defence means that mitigating factors are considered solely
during sentencing in determining whether a life sentence would be ‘manifestly unjust’ and
in setting a minimum non-parole period. The restrictive sentencing regime operating in
New Zealand mandates that a murder conviction automatically attracts a life sentence,
unless the nature of  the offence and the circumstances of  the defendant would render such
a sentence ‘manifestly unjust’.150 The minimum non-parole period on a life sentence for
murder may not be less than 10 years or 17 years in the ‘most serious cases’.151 It is only in
‘limited circumstances when a finite sentence may be imposed’.152 There is no legislative
guidance on the impact of  the predominant aggressor’s conduct and/or provocation in
relation to the assessment of  whether to impose a life sentence, but the Court of  Appeal in
Hamidzadeh153 and Tauleki154 confirmed that both are potentially relevant mitigating
factors.155 In all cases, only ‘exceptional’ circumstances will result in the presumption of  life
imprisonment being overturned.
The type of  case in which the presumption has been rebutted include, inter alia,
mercy-killing cases156 and those involving serious domestic abuse.157 Sentences of  10
years’ and 12 years’ imprisonment were issued in the cases of  Rihia158 and Wihongi,159
respectively, which to date represent those cases in which a primary victim has been
convicted of  the murder of  a predominant aggressor post-abolition of  the provocation
defence.160 The low number is attributable to the rare cases in which a primary victim
responds with lethal force rather than signifying that this particular category of
defendant is being afforded an alternative defence.161 The horrific abuse and mental
impairments suffered by Rihia and Wihongi meant that their cases were ‘exceptional’.
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This resulted in the notorious presumption of  life imprisonment being overturned in
each case.162
A comparison between Rihia and the earlier manslaughter conviction of  Sualape
demonstrates the stark reality that primary victims are not only being convicted of  murder,
but sentences are double the length of  those imposed pre-2009 in factually similar cases.
Rihia was convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment after she pleaded guilty to the
murder of  her estranged husband. Their relationship was plagued by violence and alcohol
abuse.163 They had been drinking heavily throughout the day, during the course of  which
their seven-year-old daughter was removed by Child, Youth and Family Service staff  over
concerns regarding the alcohol consumption and the predominant aggressor’s presence at
the property. Fearing a retaliatory beating, and angry at the predominant aggressor’s
involvement in the removal of  their daughter, Rihia stabbed him in the chest during the
course of  an argument.164
Psychologists described Rihia as suffering from ‘complex post-traumatic stress
disorder’ and ‘borderline personality disorder’ characterised by ‘alcohol abuse,
emotional dysregulation, outbursts of  anger, and feelings of  abandonment’ induced by
familial violence.165 Rihia’s parents were alcoholics and she had been removed from
their care as a consequence of  abuse. Rihia was abused by her first husband, with the
result that her seven children were taken into care.166 The ‘extreme reaction’ to Rihia’s
despair at losing her daughter was described by the sentencing judge ‘as being rooted
firmly in the abuse’ she had suffered from the predominant aggressor and others.167
There were 36 reported incidents of  violence between Rihia and the predominant
aggressor. Police confirmed that in 33 out of  the 36 cases the predominant aggressor
was responsible, and the court said it was ‘reasonable to infer that there were more than
only three or four incidents a year’.168 The trial judge was satisfied that Rihia would not
have killed ‘had it not been for the significant impairment’ she suffered through years
of  alcohol and physical abuse.169
Sualape, in contrast, received a sentence reduction of  7.5 years to 5 years on grounds
that the initial sentence did not reflect the cumulative impact of  the abuse and
degradation she suffered, in addition to her vulnerability by reason of  ethnic and cultural
background.170 Sualape successfully argued that she was provoked to kill her abusive
partner of  over two decades after he said he was leaving her for another woman. The
initial sentencing judge described the killing as ‘brutal’. Sualape had questioned the
predominant aggressor over his decision to leave her before repeatedly hitting him over
the head with an axe in what Randerson J dubbed a ‘frenzied attack’ with a ‘strong
element of  deliberation about it’.171 It was not accepted that Sualape suffered from
battered-woman syndrome and the degree of  physical and emotional abuse was deemed
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to be exaggerated.172 According to Randerson J, it was the sexual infidelity which proved
to be the main trigger for a killing on the borderline between murder and manslaughter.
The jury’s verdict was termed ‘merciful’ in the circumstances.173 That ‘merciful’ decision
resulted in a sentence 2.5 years shorter than that imposed in Rihia, despite Randerson J’s
obvious misgivings regarding the verdict.
Upon appeal, Baragwanath J concluded that Randerson J had not attached sufficient
weight to the family abuse suffered by Sualape. The appellant’s role in what was described
as a ‘chronically dysfunctional marriage’ was governed by ‘traditional Samoan norms’.174
The appellant was responsible for the care of  her four children from a previous marriage,
five children with the predominant aggressor, his disabled mother, and eight of  his brother’s
children whose wife had died.175 The relationship involved physical and emotional violence,
including bashings, cutting with a machete, and the infliction of  a venereal disease,
consequent upon repeated infidelities.176 The aggressor was a world-renowned tattoo artist,
popular for p’ea tattoos which are designed to display cultural identity, and commonly used
as part of  a ‘right [sic] of  passage’ ritual into manhood.177 On one occasion, he organised
a tattooist convention which was of  cultural significance to the local Samoan community,
in which the appellant’s family were prominent, and attended with a lover with whom he
‘cohabited openly’.178 It was said that this brought great shame to Sualape’s family.
Baragwanath J held that essential considerations ought to have included: the exemplary
past behaviour of  the primary victim; the cumulative impact of  the sustained pattern of
abusive and insulting conduct of  the predominant aggressor; the gross humiliation of  the
appellant and her family by the aggressor’s conduct in Samoa; and the appellant’s
perception, from what appeared to be a position of  subordination in both her relationship
and culture, of  a lack of  realistic options available effectively to relieve herself  of  what was
progressively becoming an intolerable burden.179 Sualape’s actions were ‘more than a
jealous response by a jealous wife, but the consequence of  the victim’s treatment of  her
over two decades, and of  her limited perception of  means by which it might be resisted’.180
Randerson J’s view reflected a narrow interpretation of  Sualape’s circumstances, which
focused principally on the fatal attack and the exchange between the primary victim and
predominant aggressor immediately preceding it. By labelling sexual infidelity as the
triggering event, Randerson J implied that Sualape’s conduct was undertaken in response to
the predominant aggressor’s attempt to exercise personal autonomy in leaving a relationship
to commence a new one. In reality, his sexual infidelity constituted the final straw in the
living nightmare he had inflicted on her, and it was this combination that eventually tipped
her over the edge. In this respect, it is essential that sexual infidelity is considered as part of
the narrative leading to the fatal act. More recently, the Court of  Appeal in Hamidzadeh181
recognised that the ‘circumstances in which sexual infidelity may be treated as reducing
culpability is a difficult issue’.182 Their Lordships noted Lord Judge CJ’s comments, in
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Clinton, on the sexual infidelity exclusion in the loss of  control defence.183 Lord Judge
acknowledged that:
Sexual infidelity has the potential to create a highly emotional situation or to
exacerbate a fraught situation, and to produce a completely unpredictable, and
sometimes violent response. This may have nothing to do with any notional
‘rights’ that the one may believe she or he has over the other, and often stems
from a sense of  betrayal and heartbreak, and of  crushed dreams.184
The Court of  Appeal, in Hamidzadeh concluded, however, that ‘while an angry and
emotional response to the end of  a relationship may be understandable, the ordinary
expectation of  the community is that this ought not to justify the use of  violence, especially
where there are fatal consequences’.185 The problem is that in cases like Sualape the sexual
infidelity and revelation that the relationship is at an end constitutes ‘an important and
relevant component of  the cocktail of  events’ that combined to make the defendant lose
control.186 The sexual infidelity served to humiliate and degrade the victim in circumstances
which she was powerless to prevent. In this respect, the sexual infidelity formed part of  the
domestic abuse, in a similar way that taunts designed to belittle or denigrate the victim do.
As the Court of  Appeal identified in Clinton, to ‘compartmentalise sexual infidelity and
exclude it when it is integral to the facts as a whole . . . is unrealistic and carries with it the
potential for injustice’.187
The ruling in Sualape also highlights the problems associated with focusing on a narrow
time-frame in domestic abuse cases. Despite Randerson J’s misgivings regarding the
mitigatory force of  the abuse Sualape suffered and the respective (lack of) weight attached
to sexual infidelity, the sentence imposed was significantly shorter than that imposed in the
similar case of  Rihia. The problem with considering mitigation solely at the sentencing stage
is that it circumvents important juror and therefore societal evaluation as to whether a
manslaughter verdict and a corresponding lower sentence ought to apply. The role of  the
jury in such cases represents an important ‘bulwark against overzealous prosecutors and
cynical judges’.188 The jury verdict confers ‘a societal stamp of  approval that must be given
weight’. It tends to result ‘in both a finite sentence, and a sentence that is likely to be
somewhat shorter than the lowest available minimum term for murder’.189 In all cases,
however, it is essential that the defence is appropriately framed and sufficient guidance is
provided to jurors in order for them to perform their role effectively.
The via media : a new partial defence
It is essential that New Zealand and Victoria adopt a more ‘nuanced and less black and
white approach to reforming of  the criminal defences to homicide’.190 An optimal solution
would be to introduce a new partial defence predicated on a fear of  serious violence.191 This
entirely new defence draws upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for
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England and Wales, in addition to an in-depth review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, as enacted.192 The partial defence would operate to
reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in response to a fear
of  serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identified
individual.193 The defence is qualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms designed
to preclude the availability of  the defence in unmeritorious cases. These clauses include a
normal person test and provisions stipulating that the defence is not available where the
defendant intentionally incited serious violence, acted in a considered desire for revenge, or
on the basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence
might apply.194 In cases where sufficient evidence is raised that the partial defence might
apply, it is then for the prosecution to disprove the defence to the usual criminal standard.
The defence should be complemented by bespoke provisions on social framework evidence
and mandatory juror directions where family violence is in issue. An interlocutory appeal
procedure designed to prevent unnecessary appellate court litigation is also outlined. The
following analysis illustrates that this novel model provides an appropriate via media for the
introduction of  a new partial defence to Victoria and New Zealand, with the added benefit
of  developments based upon the experience of  the operation of  the loss of  control defence
in England and Wales.
The proposed defence requires that the defendant feared serious violence from the
victim against the defendant or another identified individual. This mirrors the ‘fear trigger’
operating under the loss of  control defence.195 It is also similar to defensive homicide,
which required the defendant to fear death or really serious injury. The proposed defence is
designed to be available where the defendant kills in response to an anticipated (albeit not
imminent attack); and where the defendant over-reacts to what she perceived to be an
imminent threat.196 Whether the defendant feared serious violence engages an entirely
subjective enquiry.197 The fear must be genuine but it need not be reasonable. Arguably, it
would be difficult to prove that the fear was genuine if  it were not based on reasonable
grounds. There is no need to extend the defence to circumstances falling short of  serious
violence, but social framework evidence should be utilised to explain why an ostensibly
trivial incident might cause the primary victim to fear such violence.198 The term violence
should be broadly construed as including psychological199 and sexual harm, in addition to
physical violence.200 It should also include coercive or controlling behaviour as identified
under the Serious Crimes Act 2015, which introduced a new offence based on such
conduct.201 The offence provides overdue recognition of  the impact of  coercive and
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controlling practices, and it is appropriate that the definition of  serious violence under the
new defence incorporates this form of  conduct.202
A fundamental difference between defensive homicide and the newly proposed defence
is that defensive homicide remained unqualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms.
The proposed defence is qualified by the normal person test which mandates that a person
of  the defendant’s age, with a normal degree of  tolerance and self-restraint and in the
circumstances of  the defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar way.203 The
VLRC was critical of  the normal person test because it involves ‘speculation about how a
person might have reacted in the circumstances’.204 This approach is necessary because it is
impossible to say how a person would have reacted in the circumstances, particularly where
there is evidence of  domestic abuse.205 The proposed test is similar to the normal person
test operating in relation to the loss of  control defence, with the exception that the term
‘sex’ is omitted. Use of  the term ‘sex’ overstates the ‘role of  sex and gender in explaining
D’s reaction’.206 In this respect, sex and gender are better considered by the judge and jury
as part of  the broader circumstances of  the case.207 Akin to the loss of  control defence,
‘circumstances’ in this context is a reference to all of  the defendant’s circumstances other
than those whose only relevance to the defendant’s conduct is that they bear on her general
capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.208 In cases where the defendant has a recognised
medical condition relevant to her fear of  serious violence then that might, like sex and
gender, form part of  the circumstances for consideration.209 A normal degree of  tolerance
means that, in evaluating the defendant’s conduct, the jury cannot take into account
irrational prejudices, such as racism and homophobia.210 A normal degree of  self-restraint
excludes characteristics such as bad temper, jealousy, irritability and intoxication. Unlike the
loss of  control plea, the proposed defence specifically excludes self-induced intoxication
from the assessment of  the defendant’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.211 This
statutory exclusion is designed to prevent unnecessary litigation in cases where the
defendant is voluntarily intoxicated.
In terms of  determining whether the proposed defence applies, the defendant’s fear of
serious violence is to be disregarded in cases where the defendant intentionally incited
serious violence. The intentional incitement clause is different from s 55(6)(a)–(b) of  the
2009 Act which stipulates that the defence will be unavailable where the defendant incited
something to be said or done for the purpose of  using it as an excuse to use violence. In
Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer, the Court of  Appeal held that the mere fact that the defendant was,
‘behaving badly and looking for and provoking trouble’ does not mean the defence is
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unavailable.212 This is because self-induced triggers are viewed in a narrow sense only for
the purposes of  the loss of  control defence.213 The exclusion will arguably only apply
where the defendant has ‘formed a premeditated intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm
to the victim, and incites provocation by the victim so as to provide an opportunity for
attacking him or her’.214 This approach was applied in Duncan,215 where a defendant
successfully claimed the partial defence after stabbing a love rival to death. Duncan was
shopping with his two children when he saw the victim. As a result of  seeing him, Duncan
purchased a small-bladed paring knife, removed the packaging and concealed it within a
carrier bag. His explanation was that some days before the victim had confronted him in a
similar location and threatened him with a knife. According to witnesses, Duncan then
proceeded towards the victim shouting at him. A fight ensued, during the course of  which,
the victim slashed Duncan across the face and body with a knife. It was at that point,
Duncan claimed to have momentarily lost self-control and stabbed the victim to death.
Duncan’s loss of  control plea was accepted by the Crown, Lord Thomas advocating that
the case should be seen:
As an acceptance of  a basis of  plea in a one-off  case in circumstances which we
have not gone in to. It should not be regarded as any precedent that where two
people arm themselves and a wound is caused in the course of  an intended knife
fight, that that would ordinarily give rise to a loss of  self-control.216
Despite the warning of  Lord Thomas, the case illustrates that the circumstances in which a
defendant’s conduct might be construed as having been done for the purpose of  using it as
an excuse to use violence are likely to be limited. The Law Commission of  England and
Wales opined that to exclude the defence ‘in the broader sense of  self-induced provocation
would be to go too far’.217 Such an approach might exclude deserving claims where the
incitement was induced by ‘morally laudable’ conduct, for example, ‘standing up for a victim
of  racism in a racially hostile environment’.218 The Law Commission did identify that ‘there
is much to be said . . . in denying a defence to criminals whose unlawful activities expose
them to the risk of  provocation by others’.219 The recommended intentional incitement
clause provides a via media between these ostensibly polarised approaches to self-induced
provocation.
The provision would operate where the defendant intentionally incited serious violence. The
defendant’s conduct must be done for the purpose of  inciting serious violence. In this
respect, the ‘mere fact that the defendant caused a reaction in others’ would not result in
the defence being excluded.220 The approach in Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer, that provocative
behaviour does not negate the defence, is equally applicable to the new proposal. This
ensures that confrontational circumstances do not automatically preclude the partial
defence, but, where the defendant intends to incite serious violence, the defence is
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precluded.221 This is important as the primary victim may feel responsible for inciting the
aggressor’s response because she is aware that doing X makes him angry, but it cannot be
said that it was her intention to have that effect. Contrary to the Law Commission’s
observation, judges and jurors would be in a position to ‘differentiate satisfactorily between
forms of  self-induced provocation in the broader sense which should, and which should
not, preclude a defence’.222 It is true that this would be a challenging task, given the
potential variables, but at present the exclusionary clause serves little purpose when viewed
in the narrow sense, since arguably cases of  premeditated killing would be excluded via
s 54(4) of  the 2009 Act in any event.
Section 54(4), which provides that the loss of  control defence is not available where the
defendant acted in ‘a considered desire for revenge’, forms part of  the proposed
framework.223 The clause operates to prevent the use of  the defence in premeditated, cold-
blooded killings, but it does not preclude the defence simply because the defendant was
angry at the victim for conduct which engendered a fear of  serious violence.224 The Royal
College of  Psychiatrists noted that:
Physiologically anger and fear are virtually identical, whilst many mental states
that accompany killing also incorporate psychologically both anger and fear . . .
[T]he abused woman who waits until the man is ‘helpless’ is likely, not merely to
be angry but also fearful that he will eventually kill her, and/or her children and
that there is no way of  preventing it other than by the death of  the man.225
The word ‘“considered” denotes something over and above simple revenge’226 and, as
such, the primary victim who claims ‘He deserved it!’ remains eligible to claim the
defence because jurors are in a position to distinguish genuine cases involving an
element of  retaliation from disingenuous claims.227 Nevertheless, it may be difficult ‘to
determine whether the killing was one motivated by a considered desire for revenge or
from other emotions’ and, for this reason, social framework evidence should be used to
explain why the primary victim may experience a complex array of  emotions at the time
of  the fatal act.228
The proposed legislative framework does not include the loss of  control requirement
which is integral to ss 54 and 55 of  the 2009 Act in England and Wales. By avoiding this
controversial requirement, the proposed partial defence is closely aligned with self-defence.
In cases where self-defence fails, the new partial defence might apply. At present, in
England and Wales, a defendant claiming self-defence on grounds of  a fear of  serious
violence may revert to a loss of  control claim where the initial plea fails.229 The problem is
that the defendant will have to revert from alleging that she was acting reasonably in the
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circumstances to asserting that she lost self-control. This is apt to cause juror confusion.230
Rejection of  the loss of  control requirement also avoids the inherent contradiction in
requiring the primary victim to simultaneously fear serious violence and lose self-control.
For these reasons, loss of  self-control does not form part of  the proposed defence herein.
The loss of  self-control requirement was introduced by the government of  England and
Wales in order to prevent the defence from being used inappropriately in cases of  cold-
blooded, gang-related or honour killings.231 A review of  jurisprudential authority suggests,
however, that a significant number of  loss of  control claims are being filtered out
unnecessarily by the loss of  self-control element. It is right that these claims are being rejected,
but the loss of  self-control requirement is unnecessary because these claims could be
filtered out by the alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the partial defence. As
previously stated, loss of  control and the newly proposed defence are unavailable where the
defendant ‘acted in a considered desire for revenge’.232 Lord Judge CJ, in Evans, advocated
that there ‘was no need to rewrite . . . the language of  the statute’.233 In all cases, ‘the greater
the level of  deliberation, the less likely it will be that the killing followed a true loss of  self-
control’.234 The ‘considered desire for revenge’ exclusion is a more appropriate instrument
for filtering out unmeritorious claims because, unlike the loss of  self-control mandate, the
‘words “considered”, “desire” and “revenge” are not words of  legal technicality. They are
words of  ordinary use.’235
The trial judge, in Jewell,236 refused to leave the partial defence to the jury where the
defendant prepared firearms and a survival kit 12 hours before he drove to the victim’s
home, armed with a shotgun and home-made pistol, and shot him without warning.237
Jewell’s explanation was that he feared serious violence from the victim who had allegedly
threatened to kill him the evening before. The killing ‘bore every hallmark of  a pre-
planned, cold-blooded execution’.238 There was a 12-hour ‘cooling period’ between the
alleged threat and the actual killing in which Jewell could have sought an alternative course
of  action, but failed to do so. The defence, however, was negated not by virtue of  s 54(4),
but by the loss of  self-control requirement. The trial judge considered the remaining
elements of  the defence ‘out of  an abundance of  caution’ but that assessment was
‘unnecessary as a dispositive conclusion’.239
The extent to which the loss of  self-control requirement impacts upon the utility of  the
alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the defence was similarly highlighted in the
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case of  Barnsdale-Quean.240 The defendant had purchased a rolling pin and chain two weeks
prior to the killing. On the day of  the killing, he collected the chain from a flat in which he
had stored it and the rolling pin from the kitchen. He tied two elasticated bands in a loop
at the end of  the chain, and carefully placed it over his wife’s head while she was subdued
due to antidepressant medication. He used the rolling pin as a tourniquet to strangle his wife
to death before stabbing himself  in an attempt to make it appear that she had committed
suicide after attacking him. Barnsdale-Quean claimed that he could not remember what had
occurred following his wife’s alleged attack. The trial judge ruled that there was no loss of
self-control on the facts or the defendant’s account. In the event that the defendant had lost
self-control, the defence would be negated by virtue of  s 54(4). The Court of  Appeal
advocated that it was unnecessary to reach a conclusion in respect of  s 54(4) because there
was no evidence of  loss of  self-control. These rulings demonstrate that s 54(4) is capable
of  filtering out unmeritorious cases in the absence of  the loss of  self-control requirement.
In all cases, should the outlined threshold filter mechanisms of  the proposed defence
be bypassed, the trial judge has the authority to reject a claim on the basis that no jury,
properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.241 The grounds
for the plea would be considered at a pre-trial hearing under case-management procedures.
The implementation of  an interlocutory appeal route would mean that the trial judge’s
decision could be challenged (only) before trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appellate
court litigation.242 In cases where family violence is in issue, the trial judge will be charged
to provide juror directions equivalent to those operating in relation to self-defence in
Victoria, considered above; the difference being that these directions ought to be
mandatory. This will ensure that appropriate directions are consistently provided in all cases,
rather than relying on ad hoc requests made by counsel.
Conclusion
The amendments to self-defence, social framework evidence and juror directions in Victoria
challenge the traditional male-oriented perception of  self-defence involving violent
confrontations between parties of  comparable strength. This view is incompatible with
killings in response to familial abuse and, as such, the changes in the law serve an educative
function, highlighting the need for greater understanding of  the circumstances of  the
primary victim in order to ensure that self-defence captures deserving cases outwith
traditional gender-biased notions of  self-defence. Nevertheless, there will continue to be
cases involving family violence that fall outside the scope of  revised self-defence. In the
absence of  an applicable partial defence, the primary victim may face a murder conviction
and longer sentence. This is the experience in New Zealand, post-abolition of  the
provocation defence in 2009. The injustice associated with labelling the primary victim a
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murderer and the longer sentences imposed have resulted in calls for the reintroduction of
a partial defence within that jurisdiction. The risk that primary victims may be convicted of
murder is unacceptable, irrespective of  the sentencing regime operating in these
jurisdictions.
The introduction of  a new partial defence, predicated on a fear of  serious violence,
provides an appropriate via media and optimal solution within both jurisdictions. The newly
proposed framework would sit cogently alongside developments to self-defence in Victoria,
providing a more comprehensive package of  defences covering the potential various
circumstances in which a primary victim may respond with lethal force. For New Zealand,
the proposed defence is far removed from provocation and earlier concerns regarding the
operation of  that defence. It ensures that a partial defence is available to the primary victim
who kills fearing serious violence from a predominant aggressor. The novel defence is
restricted by the threshold filter mechanism of  the normal person test, and alternative
clauses stipulating that the defence is not available where the defendant intentionally incited
serious violence, acted in considered desire for revenge, or on the basis that no jury,
properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.243 These
proposals should be complemented by social framework evidence and mandatory juror
directions, similar to those operating in Victoria. This would ensure that the partial defence
is available only in deserving cases. A new interlocutory appeal procedure would provide
defendants with an opportunity to challenge the judge’s refusal to admit the defence prior
to trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appellate court litigation. The abolition of  all
general partial defences in Victoria and New Zealand ought to be reconsidered, and this
new proposal provides an optimal framework on which to base a new defence.
‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’





There are mixed views regarding the legitimacy of retaining variations of the provoca-
tion defence. For some, it is inappropriate to afford a defence, or even a partial defence, 
to an individual who loses self-control and kills in response to the conduct of the vic-
tim.179 For those individuals, this type of case ought to be dealt with via self-defence or 
mitigation in sentencing. The problem with this approach is that it is not always possi-
ble for the primary victim to claim self-defence, and experience in NZ demonstrates 
that, even in jurisdictions where the mandatory life sentence has been abolished, sen-
tences are often higher than they would be if partial defences were available.180 Numer-
ous calls for the reintroduction of a ‘provocation-type’ partial defence in NZ have been 
made,181 resulting in the Minister of Justice asking the Law Commission, ‘as a matter or 
priority’, to consider the ‘position of victims of family violence (almost overwhelming-
ly women) who are driven to commit homicide, and what the consequences in law of 
their actions should be’.182  The research underpinning these publications has been used 
to submit a response, including a draft of the partial defence advanced in (ix), to the 
Commission.183  
 
The introduction of a new partial defence is the first step; reforms focus must remain on 
the availability of a appropriate defences and support for vulnerable offenders. The cur-
rent position in NZ as it applies to the victims of family violence is unacceptable. There 
is a need for a partial defence in cases of this context, and the models outlined in these 
publications provide optimal solutions for future reform to the law in Victoria and NZ. 
The proposals advanced also chart a pathway for developments to the problematic loss 
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The aim across all publications has been to provide optimal solutions for future reform 
where problems relating to the law as it applies to vulnerable offenders have been iden-
tified. The objective has been to provide a critical exposition of the problems vulnerable 
offenders face in claiming particular mental condition defences across specified juris-
dictions, before presenting optimal pathways for future reform based upon the law and 
experiences within these criminal justice systems.  
 
The aim of Part One was to investigate the extent to which the partial defences to mur-
der are capable of accommodating the circumstances of those who are vulnerable as a 
result of mental ill health, and those who exhibit symptoms of co-morbidity. In doing so 
an in-depth review of the partial defences to murder as they apply to offenders who 
raise the spectre of co-morbidity across E&W, Scotland, NSW, NZ and the US was 
provided. The analysis revealed that a failure to appropriately legislate for this discrete 
category of offender has resulted in unnecessary litigation. This litigation could have 
been prevented if voluntary and transient states of voluntary intoxication were excluded 
from the partial defence, whilst ensuring partial defences are not excluded on grounds 
of alcohol dependence syndrome. The reform recommendations presented continue to 
provide avenues for future reform, particularly in light of the Law Commission’s reform 
proposals on insanity and automatism.185 
 
The aim in Part Two was to examine the availability of insanity and automatism to the 
same category of offender, but with increased emphasis on the role of prior fault in pre-
cluding the availability of mental condition defences. Part Two provided a critical anal-
ysis of the insanity and automatism defences, and the interaction of mental condition 
defences with the doctrine of prior fault, with specific reference to the law in E&W, 
Scotland, Victoria and the US. The publications advanced an optimal template for fu-
ture reform to the unacceptable approach the criminal law adopts in relation to intoxi-
cated offending  and offenders who exhibit symptoms of co-morbidity. The proposals 
advanced reject the construction of criminal liability based upon cognitive states of im-
puted recklessness. In terms of fair labelling, this framework would introduce a new of-
fence of dangerous intoxication. The imposition of liability would be attached to the 
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offender's responsibility for creating a dangerous situation, rather than cognitive states 
of imputed mens rea. In terms of the variety of scenarios that arise in the context of in-
toxicated offending, dépecage standardisations, as outlined in (iv), ought to apply. In 
the context of medication non-compliance and co-morbidity, the Law Commission's 
recommended expansion of the problematic doctrine of prior fault was rejected, whilst 
the introduction of exclusionary clauses pertaining to intoxication simpliciter across 
mental condition defences was advanced. This reassessment provides a more balanced 
approach to reform. 
 
The aim of Part Three was to scrutinise the extent to which loss of control (and equiva-
lent provisions across selected jurisdictions) are available to primary victims who kill in 
response to family violence. The objective was to provide a detailed assessment of the 
application of the loss of control, provocation, extreme provocation, and (the former) 
defensive homicide defences as they apply to primary victims across E&W, Scotland, 
NSW, and the US. A common theme was identified across the jurisdictions considered; 
namely, a lack of understanding regarding the impact of familial abuse on the primary 
victim. The introduction of social framework clauses, tailored to the law within these 
jurisdictions, and modelled on the law in Victoria provides an optimal interim measure 
for reform. These reforms would complement the newly advanced mental condition de-
fence models advanced in Part Four.186 
 
The aim of Part Four was to broaden the analysis in Part Three to determine the extent 
to which self-defence is available to the primary victim, in addition to addressing the 
difficulties associated with raising self-defence and loss of control simultaneously. Part 
Four delivered a detailed exposition of the availability of self-defence to the primary 
victim, and the legitimacy of reverting to a partial defence where self-defence fails. This 
detailed exposition of the law on mental condition defences demonstrates the inadequa-
cy of the partial defences in cases involving the primary victim, and highlights a lack of 
consistency between the partial defences and self-defence. Two new partial defences are 
advanced to combat this issue based on self-preservation and fear of serious violence, 
which may be cogently aligned with self-defence. The need for reform is clear within all 
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jurisdictions examined, but is most needed in NZ and Victoria where partial defences to 
murder have been abolished.187  
 
In the context of mental condition defences, a rebalancing exercise must take place, 
which ensures that vulnerable offenders are at the centre of discourse, policy, and re-
form initiatives, in relation to this sensitive area of the criminal law.188 A recalibration 
of the aims of reform to mental condition defences, which focuses upon the vulnerable 
offender is required within these jurisdictions. A cultural shift needs to take place that 
recognises it is inappropriate to preclude mental condition defences to vulnerable of-
fenders on the basis that unmeritorious claims may be made. Mental condition defences 
must be fit for purpose, meaning they are available to vulnerable offenders in appropri-
ate cases, whilst being robust enough to prevent disingenuous claims. The options for 
optimal reform advanced demonstrate ways in which this might be achieved. In terms of 
intellectual originality, this work engages a shift in focus from unmeritorious offenders 
to vulnerable offenders who are often forgotten because of the ostensible contradiction 
in suggesting an individual who commits a violent crime is vulnerable. The publications 
represent an important advancement in the literature by illustrating not only how im-
portant it is to focus on vulnerable offenders, but how this can be achieved without run-
ning the risk of creating overly broad mental condition defences. The period of study, 
and very specific emphasis on vulnerable offenders at national and international level 




This five-year-period has allowed me to develop my approach to research, to find my 
writing style, and to grow as an individual. The initial research question focused on the 
inter-relationship between partial defences and intoxication doctrine from an Anglo-
American perspective. The emphasis shifted as the research highlighted a systematic 
failure to accommodate vulnerable offenders across identified jurisdictions. The com-
parative research proved particularly challenging;189 as I familiarised myself with the 
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relevant sources and approaches of relevant jurisdictions, it became easier to navigate 
the material. I was fortunate to be involved in the Substantive Series in Criminal Law 
from its inception, and have been supported by the editors. Together with the editors, 
we organised the first UK conference on the new partial defences to murder. This work 
provided the foundations for the research network I have developed. The research un-
derpinned my organisation of over 20 national and international conferences and events. 
These events led to my appointment as Risk and Vulnerability Research Coordinator for 
the Centre; QMUL Fighting Femicide Network member; SLS Executive Committee 
member; Ross Parson's University of Sydney Fellow; Editorial board member for the 
Journal of International and Comparative Law; Scientific Committee member for the 
International Academy of Law and Mental Health; and, peer reviewer for the Interna-
tional Journal of Law and Psychiatry, and the Journal of Criminal Law. These roles and 
events have provided a catalyst for collaborative work, Law Commission responses, and 
contribution invites. I have collaborated with leading experts across the jurisdictions 
identified, and am indebted to them for their advice, support and friendship. The oppor-
tunity to learn from the research approach of others, particularly in co-authored projects, 
proved both challenging and incredibly rewarding. I recently returned from my first 
sabbatical; the time and space I had to reflect on the completed and current work, in ad-
dition to ideas for future research proved invaluable; importantly, I was able to visit the 
University of Sydney to work on my research and present my findings; this was the first 
time I had travelled and resided outside of Europe alone; the experience instilled greater 
self-confidence, and the immersion in Sydney’s research culture allowed revisiting my 
research afresh. I am privileged to have had such a rich and diverse learning experience, 
and to be part of a dynamic, collegial and supportive research network. And, it does not 
end here. I am currently working on a co-authored publication that develops the re-
sponse submitted to the New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper; the article will be 
published in a special edition of the Journal of International and Comparative Law. Fol-
lowing publication, I intend to write an article on the position in South Australia in light  
of the recent Criminal Law Consolidation (Provocation) Amendment Bill 2015, with a 
view to publication in the Sydney Law Review.190  
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Adam Jackson, Natalie Wortley and Nicola Wake provide on overview of the insanity and automatism
defences
On October 18, 2012, the Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law,
Northumbria University, submitted a response to the Law Commission's scoping paper Insanity and
Automatism (Law Com SP, 2012). The response followed a two-hour seminar hosted by the Centre,
conducted under the Chatham House Rule. Those present at the seminar included: members of the judiciary
(Circuit Judges, Recorders and a District Judge); practising barristers and solicitors (including members of
the CPS); consultant psychiatrists; and academics from law and other disciplines.
The decision to take the relatively rare step of issuing a scoping paper can be explained on the basis of a
lack of empirical data vis-à-vis the practical operation of the defences. Despite the "vast wealth of academic
literature" (1.4) regarding the theoretical problems associated with the defences, the Law Commission noted:
Page 1
"We have no data on how often the plea [of insanity] is considered by practitioners as a possibility or entered
formally at trial. We have no data whatsoever on the use of the automatism defence." (1.5)
The aim of the paper was, therefore, "to discover how in the criminal law of England and Wales the defences
of insanity and automatism are working, if at all" (1.1).
The Law Commission framed the paper as a series of 76 questions from which we identified key issues for
discussion, including the relevance of insanity to prosecutors; definitional problems with the defence;
difficulties with the label "insanity"; and disposal options following the special verdict. Part I of this article
provides an overview of the two defences. Part II considers the difficulties associated with the practical
application of the defences and outlines our response to the paper.
In most cases where mental disorder is in issue, the court will be required to consider whether the defendant
is fit to plead. A defendant is unfit to plead if he lacks sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of criminal
proceedings (R. v. Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 30; R. v. John M [2003] EWCA Crim 3452). If the Judge
determines that the defendant is unfit to plead, a jury will be empanelled to determine whether the defendant
committed the actus reus of the offence (s.4 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964). If the accused is
considered fit to plead, the defences of insanity or automatism may be available. In murder cases the
defendant may be eligible to plead diminished responsibility (considered below).
Insanity
The defence of insanity is a common law construct "founded on nineteenth century legal concepts which
have not kept pace with developments in medicine and psychiatry" (1.3). To establish a defence of insanity,
the defendant must prove that "at the time of the committing of the act, he was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he
did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong" (M'Naghten rules (1843) 10 Cl & Fin
200, p.210).
The defendant's powers of reasoning must have been impaired at the time of the alleged offence. An inability
to control emotions or resist impulses does not support the defence (Kopsch (1927) 19 Cr App R 50).
Similarly, a momentary lapse of concentration does not constitute a defect of reason, even if caused by
mental illness or mental disorder:
"The M'Naghten rules ... do not apply and never have applied to those who retain the power of reasoning but
who in moments of confusion or absent-mindedness fail to use their powers to the full" (Clarke [1972] 56 Cr
App R 225).
The defendant's defect of reason must have arisen from a "disease of the mind", a phrase which has been
widely interpreted:
"The law is not concerned with the brain but with the mind, in the sense that 'mind' is ordinarily used, the
mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding (...) the condition of the brain is irrelevant and so is
the question of whether the condition of the mind is curable or incurable,
(2012) 176 JPN 731 at 732
transitory or permanent" (Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399).
Defendants have been regarded as being legally insane when suffering from conditions that would not
constitute "mental disorder" under the Mental Health Act 1983, such as arteriosclerosis (Kemp); epilepsy
(Sullivan [1984] AC 156); diabetes (Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9); and sleepwalking (Burgess [1991] 2 QB
92). The arbitrary effect of the internal/external factor delineation is such that a glycaemic condition will
amount to insanity if it is caused by failing to take insulin but will amount to automatism if caused by taking
an incorrect amount of insulin, or by taking insulin and then failing to eat (see further below, "Insanity or
Automatism?"). The labelling of diabetics, epileptics and sleepwalkers as insane has been heavily criticized.
Page 2
Indeed, in Hennessy and Sullivan, the defendants changed their pleas to guilty following rulings that their
conditions amounted to insanity rather than automatism. There are concerns that the stigma attached to the
label "insanity" deters defendants from relying upon the defence.
The final element that must be proved is that the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act, or
did not know that it was wrong. In Codere (1917) 12 Cr App R 21, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that
"nature and quality" referred to the physical character of the act; it must be proved that the defendant "did not
know what he was doing" (Sullivan [1984] AC 156, Lord Diplock). Reliance on the cognitive limb is
uncommon because "it will be very rare indeed for a person with a relevant physical condition not to know
the nature and quality of his or her actions" (2.38).
Alternatively, the defendant might argue that he did not know that his act was wrong in the sense that it was
legally wrong (Windle [1952] 2 QB 826; Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978). In Windle, the defendant killed
his wife while suffering from folie à deux. Afterwards he asked police: "I suppose they will hang me for this?"
The defence of insanity was unavailable because "it could not be challenged that the appellant knew that
what he was doing was contrary to law ..." (p.834).
This narrow interpretation of the "wrongness" limb severely limits the ambit of the defence. As the Butler
Committee pointed out:
"Knowledge of the law is ... a very narrow ground of exemption, since even persons who are grossly
disturbed generally know that murder and arson are crimes." (Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal
Offenders (Cmnd 6244, 1975))
In Johnson, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that other jurisdictions have not followed the approach in
Windle and that lower courts have sometimes approached the issue "on a more relaxed basis" (para.23).
The court considered itself bound by Windle but observed that "there is room for reconsideration of the rules"
(para.24).
Disposals
The disposal options available following a successful insanity plea or a finding that the defendant is unfit to
plead are a hospital order (with or without a restriction order), a supervision order, or an absolute discharge
(s.5 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, as amended). However, a hospital order can only be
made if the court is satisfied based upon the evidence of two registered medical practitioners that the
defendant is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be
detained in hospital for medical treatment. The court must also be of the opinion that a hospital order is the
most suitable method of dealing with the defendant (s.37 of the Mental Health Act 1983; s.5A of the 1964
Act, substituted by s.24 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004).
Automatism
Unlike the insanity defence, a successful automatism plea results in an outright acquittal. Lord Denning
defined automatism as "an act done by the muscles without any control of the mind ... or an act done by a
person who is not conscious of what he is doing" (Bratty [1963] AC 386, 401). The defence requires a
"complete destruction of voluntary control" (A-G's Reference (no.2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91 105 (Lord Taylor
CJ)). The defendant is required to satisfy the evidential burden and, if the prosecution subsequently fails to
disprove automatism beyond all reasonable doubt, the defendant will be acquitted.
Insanity or Automatism?
As previously noted, the test of whether a condition is one of insanity or automatism is determined by
Page 3
reference to whether the cause was internal or external, respectively. The rationale for the internal/external
factor delineation is that involuntary conduct triggered by internal factors is more likely to recur than actions
induced by external causes. The test was, therefore, designed as a form of "social protection" (Ashworth,
Principles of Criminal Law, 4th ed, OUP, 2009, p.90). That protection is afforded by ensuring that an outright
acquittal remains unavailable to the defendant whose condition is induced by internal factors.
The artificiality of the internal/external dichotomy is clearly demonstrated in cases involving diabetic
defendants. Hennessy was charged with taking a motor vehicle without consent and driving whilst
disqualified. He sought to rely on automatism on grounds that, at the time of the offence, he was suffering
from stress, anxiety, depression and hyperglycaemia, as a result of forgetting to take insulin. Lord Lane CJ
ruled: "stress, anxiety and depression can no doubt be the result of the operation of external factors, but they
are not ... capable in law of causing or contributing to a state of automatism" (p.14). Furthermore,
hyperglycaemia "caused by an inherent defect and not corrected by insulin is a disease, and if ... it does
cause a malfunction of the mind ... the case may fall within the M'Naghten rules" (ibid).
In contrast, the defendant in Quick [1973] QB 910 raised the automatism defence when charged with an
offence contrary to s.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The defence argued that, at the
material time, Quick was suffering from hypoglycaemia as a consequence of drinking spirits and consuming
very little food after taking insulin. Lawton LJ considered that Quick's "mental condition ... was not caused by
his diabetes but by his use of the insulin", which could be categorized as an external factor. The court further
identified that, in cases where the defendant induces his own state of automatism (for example, through
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alcohol consumption), the rules relating to the defence are superseded by traditional intoxication doctrine.
The Law Commission highlights a similar problem with "psychological blow" cases (2.51). Although it was
identified in Hennessy that reaction to stress, anxiety and depression is to be categorized as an internal
factor, the court in T [1990] Crim LR 256 considered that an extremely shocking event (rape) resulting in
post-traumatic shock disorder constitutes an external factor for the purposes of the automatism defence (see
also R. v. Narbrough [2004] EWCA Crim 1012).
Diminished Responsibility
The problems associated with successfully pleading the insanity and automatism defences resulted in the
implementation of the concessionary defence of diminished responsibility. The partial defence represented a
relaxation of the "rigid dichotomy between sane or insane, responsible or not responsible, bad or mad" (Law
Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com CP No.173, 2003), para.6.8). In order to reflect
contemporary "developments in diagnostic practice", Parliament recently made significant revisions to the
diminished responsibility plea in s.52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, (Ministry of Justice, Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide (MoJ CP No.19, 2008), para.49). The reformulated plea has the effect of
reducing a murder conviction to one of voluntary manslaughter where the defendant suffers from an
"abnormality of mental functioning" arising from a "recognized medical condition".
The jury must be satisfied that the medical condition substantially impaired the defendant's ability to (a)
understand the nature of his conduct; (b) form a rational judgment; or (c) exercise self-control. Finally, the
jury is required to assess whether the mental abnormality provides an explanation for the killing in that "it
causes, or is a significant contributory factor, in causing the person to carry out that conduct" (Homicide Act
1957, s.2, as amended). The partial defence is easier to prove than insanity and for some defendants the
prospect of a manslaughter verdict is preferable to a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In Part I we have outlined the automatism and insanity defences by way of background. In Part II, we
consider issues raised by the paper and provide an overview of the Centre's response.
To be concluded next week.
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Adam Jackson, Natalie Wortley and Nicola Wake outline their response to the Law Commission's scoping
paper
On October 18, 2012, the Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies at Northumbria University Law
School submitted a response to the Law Commission's scoping paper Insanity and Automatism (Law Com
SP, 2012). In Part I, (see, p.731 ante)we provided an overview of the defences. In this part of our article we
outline the central tenets of the response submitted by the Centre.
The Law Commission raised a number of questions aimed at ascertaining how many persons in the criminal
justice system suffer from mental disorders. Our members identified a limited amount of data available from
the Northumbria and Teesside area as a result of ongoing projects aimed at diverting those with mental
health problems from the criminal justice system (North East Offender Health Commissioning Unit
(NEOHCU)).
Page 1
The available data suggests that those with mental disorders constitutes 14 to 15 per cent of the total
caseload of Newcastle Crown Court. Current statistics from the last quarter show that, of that number, 23 per
cent have serious mental disorders and are referred to acute mental illness specialists; the other 77 per cent
are dealt with by the court after assessment by the mental health team and with a follow up by nursing staff
and/or secondary services where necessary. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who could meet the
criteria necessary for a successful plea of insanity are rare. Thus far under the scheme only two people have
been identified as being potentially capable of satisfying the M'Naghten criteria but both individuals were
"sectioned" from court under the Mental Health Act 1983. A far greater proportion of those with mental
disorders are identified as potentially being unfit to plead (there are currently 35 cases before Newcastle
Crown Court in which fitness to plead issues have been raised).
Decision to Prosecute
Another question raised by the paper was the extent to which the possibility that the accused will plead
insanity or automatism should inform the decision to prosecute. Although our members felt that the possibility
of such pleas should be considered, prosecutors observed that the information available at the charging
stage is often inadequate and incomplete. As a consequence many defendants are charged before relevant
issues (including mental disorder) are identified.
Our discussions highlighted that there is conflicting guidance available to the CPS when determining whether
to charge in cases involving persons with mental disorders. The CPS Guidance on Mentally Disordered
Offenders is based on Home Office circ.12/95, which states: "The existence of mental disorder at the time of
the offence or the possible detrimental effect of prosecution on a person's mental health are factors tending
against prosecution. But ... [t]he needs of the defendant must be balanced against the needs of society; if the
offence is serious, it remains likely that a prosecution will be needed in the public interest" (para.14).
In contrast, the guidance set out in an earlier circ.66/90, places greater emphasis on the importance of
having regard to the welfare of the accused when determining where the public interest lies. That both
circulars remain in force exemplifies the lack of a clear and consistent approach to mental disorder in the
criminal justice system. Furthermore, the CPS guidance states that prosecutors require information and
evidence regarding mental health problems at the earliest opportunity. It appears that, in practice, such
information is rarely available.
Definitional Problems
If the defendant is charged, our evidence suggests that the insanity defence is only considered as a last
resort. Our members observed that, although mental disorder is an issue that is frequently raised in
mitigation, the details are rarely explored in open court. Advocates tend to employ vague terms, such as
"mental health problems" or "mental health issues", suggesting that a degree of stigma continues to be
attached to mental disorder generally. A number of our members considered that the label "insanity" is
particularly problematic. Some practitioners felt that it would be difficult to discuss "insanity" without causing
offence and potentially
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a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship. Furthermore, narrow interpretation of the term "defect of
reason" and accordingly the inability to plead insanity in cases involving emotional/volitional conditions is
outdated in terms of contemporary medical development and is difficult to reconcile with the revised
Homicide Act 1957, s.2(1), (see, p.733 ante)which recognizes a range of emotional, behavioural and
cognitive disorders.
This narrow construal is to be contrasted with the wide interpretation of the term "disease of the mind". We
noted in Part I (see, p.732 ante)that the courts' preoccupation with the internal/external factor dichotomy has
led to absurd results in practice. The Law Commission asked whether these problems might be remedied via
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the introduction of a mental/physical cause test. We are of the opinion that this form of assessment would
pose similar problems to those encountered under the current test. The present delineation is based on
rather nebulous considerations. For example, many factors, both internal and external, can affect the blood
sugar level of a person suffering from diabetes. Similar problems arise in post-traumatic stress disorder
cases, where genetics, psychological, physical, and social factors contribute to the condition. In such cases,
it remains unclear as to when/ whether an extremely shocking event will cease to operate as an external
cause and be regarded as an internal factor as a result of more long-term psychological damage.
The fundamental problem in this area is that descriptions of medical conditions are not black and white; they
are "usually catch-all categories that include many different underlying malfunctions" which readily cannot be
categorized as physical or mental, internal or external -- there are infinite shades of grey (Kirsten Weir, "The
roots of mental illness: How much of mental illness can the biology of the brain explain?", (2012) Monitor on
Psychology 43 (6) 30). See also, R. v. Petrolini [2012] EWCA Crim 2055). Having a defence based upon
inadequate legal definitions of these conditions will inevitably lead to interpretational difficulties and
unsatisfactory results.
In response to questions concerning interpretation of the "wrongness limb", our members noted that,
although the term is to be interpreted as meaning "legally wrong" (Johnson [2008] Crim LR 132), evidence
suggests that psychiatrists understand the term in the wider sense of "moral wrongness". In practice, it will
be rare that the defendant is unaware that what they are doing is "legally wrong" and, as such, it is almost
impossible for a defendant to claim the defence using this limb if it is strictly applied. In relation to the "nature
and quality limb", one of our members suggested that a defendant charged with murder might prefer to claim
diminished responsibility where he "does not understand the nature of his conduct" (Homicide Act 1957,
s.2(1A)(a) as amended). The concessionary defence is easier to establish and to some a manslaughter
verdict is preferable to a special verdict.
The Trial Process
In terms of establishing the defence, the Law Commission asked whether the reverse burden of proof causes
unfairness and/or it deters defendants from pleading insanity. Given that the insanity defence relies upon
expert evidence, the imposition of a burden of proof upon the accused is arguably unavoidable. In order to
satisfy a persuasive burden, the prosecution would need to have the accused examined by a psychiatrist.
There is, at present, no means by which an accused person can be compelled to submit to a psychiatric
examination and to introduce such powers would potentially breach art.8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). In H v. UK (Application No.15023/89, unreported, April 4, 1990), the European
Commission of Human Rights held that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to establish insanity did
not violate the presumption of innocence so as to result in an unfair trial under art.6 of the ECHR. In R. v.
Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] QB 1112, Lord Woolf CJ described incompatibility arguments based upon the
reverse burden in cases of this type as "manifestly ill-founded" (para.19). The Scottish Law Commission also
considered the incidence of the burden of proof in its report Insanity and Diminished Responsibility and
concluded that "[p]lacing a legal burden of proving the defence can be a proportionate qualification to the
rights of an accused person under art.6 provided that there are clear reasons for doing so" (Scottish Law
Com, 2004, para.5.21).
The Law Commission was similarly concerned that the enhanced role of psychiatric evidence and the
requirement to have a jury verdict may create difficulties in practice. Our members were of the view that the
enhanced role of medical expert testimony in the trial process generally is a real concern. Jurors are required
to choose between conflicting testimony delivered by experts in the field and often cases appear to be
determined by which expert the jury prefers (see, for example, R. v. Brown (Robert) [2011] EWCA Crim
2796). There was some suggestion that the insanity defence could be more closely aligned with the law on
fitness to plead; some of our members thought that it would be preferable for the trial Judge to have the
authority to determine whether a defendant suffers from insanity, based upon psychiatric reports, rather than
leaving the defence to the jury.
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Disposal
In addition to the foregoing issues, the Law Commission asked for views as to whether the limited range of
disposal options following a special verdict deters people from pleading insanity. Flexibility of disposal was
introduced by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 and our members felt that
the range of disposals was no longer particularly "limited". As noted above, the number of defendants raising
unfitness to plead is increasing, even though the same range of disposals is available following a finding of
unfitness where the court is satisfied that the accused did the act or made the omission charged.
MacKay's research has identified a "gradual but steady rise in the number of [not guilty by reason of insanity]
verdicts" and suggests that "the legislative changes contained in the 1991 and 2004 Acts are having an
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ongoing effect" (supplementary material to the scoping paper, Appendix E, E.5 and E.19). The introduction of
sentences of imprisonment for public protection ("IPPs") (s.225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) may have
contributed to this increase. In a serious case, a defendant who meets the M'Naghten criteria has a choice
between risking an IPP following conviction and pleading not guilty by reason of insanity with the risk of a
hospital order (with or without a restriction order attached). Practitioners observed that defendants fear IPPs
more than any other type of sentence or disposal.
Conversely, some of our members felt that defendants may be deterred from pleading insanity by the risk
that a hospital order may be imposed, preferring instead the more palatable fixed prison term. There appears
to be no way to circumvent this difficulty, since, as, whatever label is attached to the defence, and however it
is defined, a hospital order would inevitably have to be an available disposal option or sentence.
Conclusion
This article highlights a range of possible reasons for the low number of special verdicts. The consensus
amongst our practitioner members was that the defence would consider fitness to plead before insanity. Our
members also indicated that practitioners try to avoid the use of the insanity defence for reasons including:
the difficulty of discussing the issue of insanity with a client; the fact that those potentially suitable for an
insanity defence may be identified as unfit to plead or may otherwise be diverted from the criminal justice
system; the low probability of success under the M'Naghten test; and the fact that, given the court can pass a
hospital order following conviction just as it can following a special verdict, the "correct" result may be
reached without recourse to a complex defence with a low probability of success.
It is hoped that a consultation period will further assist the Law Commission in clarifying the current scope of
these defences, in order to inform any future reform recommendations. At present it is clear that the data
concerning the ongoing use of these defences is severely limited. However, this may be due, in part, to the
availability of other criminal justice initiatives (such as diversion projects and fitness to plead). A more holistic
approach seems to be being adopted in relation to such initiatives and we think it essential that any reforms
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The defendant (W), who suffered from alcohol dependency syndrome, had a strong craving for
alcohol and would drink any that was available to him. After drinking continuously over a 48-hour
period, and consequently in an extremely drunken state, he was invited to the deceased's (F) home
where he fell asleep on the sofa. According to his own evidence W awoke to find F, who was openly
homosexual, attempting to perform sexual acts upon him. W stated that he then lost his self-control
and repeatedly struck F with a meat cleaver, killing him.
At his trial for murder before Wolverhampton Crown Court on 11 October 2006, W raised an
evidential basis for the partial defences of both provocation and diminished responsibility. The partial
defence *J. Crim. L. 18 of diminished responsibility in s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 states: ‘Where a
person kills … he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes
or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and
omissions in doing … the killing’. In relation to the defence, the evidence, inter alia, was that W
suffered from alcohol dependency syndrome. This condition is an accepted psychiatric state and it
has been found that where alcohol dependency syndrome does not result in brain damage it can
produce changes in the brain which may impair judgement or cause loss of self-control.
In relation to the defence of diminished responsibility the judge directed the jury in two stages:
1. The initial direction addressed the possible relevance of brain damage consequent on alcoholism.
The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that it was more likely than not that the
defendant's responsibility for the killing was substantially reduced by reason of the alcohol
dependency syndrome, it would be open to them to return a verdict of manslaughter.
2. In the second stage the trial judge considered the possibility that the defendant's alcohol
dependency syndrome had caused him no brain damage. In this situation a verdict of manslaughter
would be available to the jury if they deemed it more likely than not that the defendant's alcohol
consumption was truly involuntary. In the context of involuntary consumption the trial judge made two
points: (i) a man's act is only involuntary if he could not have acted otherwise; and (ii) an alcoholic
who chooses to accept a drink after he has reached his normal quota should not be perceived as
drinking involuntarily.
The jury rejected both partial defences and W was convicted of murder. W appealed, arguing that the
jury had been misdirected in relation to diminished responsibility.
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, the court found that the two-stage direction to the jury had been
based upon the test laid down in R v Tandy [1989] 1 All ER 267. This direction had been explained by
Rose LJ in R v Dietschmann [2001] EWCA Crim 2052 as having established that drink is only capable
of giving rise to a defence under s. 2 if it causes damage to the brain or produces an irresistible
craving so that consumption is involuntary. The House of Lords later decision in R v Dietschmann
[2003] 1 AC 1209 required a reassessment of the way in which Tandy had been applied. Whilst a jury
would be more likely to conclude that the defendant suffers from an abnormality of the mind where
brain damage has occurred, the absence of brain damage would not preclude the defence.
Accordingly, the acute distinction between cases where brain damage has occurred as a result of
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alcohol dependency syndrome and those where it has not is no longer appropriate.
With regard to the second stage of the direction the appellate court concluded that the trial judge had
erred in two respects. When the judge *J. Crim. L. 19 stated that a man's act is only involuntary if he
could not have acted otherwise, he effectively implied that there was no such thing as an irresistible
craving. Similarly, stating that the defendant who chooses to accept a drink after he has reached his
normal quota is not drinking involuntarily essentially directed the jury to accept that such a choice was
voluntary, irrespective of whether it was made by an alcoholic. In context, this tacitly implied that
unless every drink consumed by W that day was involuntary, his alcohol dependency syndrome was
to be disregarded. The court in this case viewed such a position as being inconsistent with the House
of Lords decision in Dietschmann. When asked to decide whether the defendant's mental
responsibility was substantially impaired the jury should have been directed to focus, exclusively, on
the effect of alcohol consumed as a result of the disease or illness and ignore the effect of alcohol
consumed voluntarily. As a result, the murder conviction was quashed and a verdict of manslaughter
on the grounds of diminished responsibility was substituted.
COMMENTARY
This case is the latest contribution to the plethora of authorities which have involved the misdirection
of a jury in respect of alcohol dependency syndrome in the context of diminished responsibility.
Establishing alcohol dependency syndrome as a condition which could be brought within the ambit of
s. 2 was always going to be problematic. The underlying reason for this is that the general philosophy
of criminal law has always been that criminal acts committed under the influence of self-induced
intoxication are not for that reason excused, save in the context of specific intent offences, and denial
of mens rea at the time of the relevant act: R v Majewski [1977] AC 443. The present case is perhaps
indicative of a judicial reluctance to deviate from this established doctrine. Moreover, a consideration
of past precedents appears to indicate that this legal recognition may have been significantly hindered
by a broad misapplication of the legal principles distilled from the much earlier case of R v Gittens
[1984] 3 WLR 327, CA.
The Gittens authority established that the task for the jury is to consider whether the abnormality of
the mind, induced by disease or illness, substantially impaired the defendant's mental responsibility
for his fatal acts despite the disinhibiting effect of the drink. Much of the controversy relating to the
specimen jury directions deduced from Gittens appeared to centre upon Professor John Smith's
commentary of the case (see [1984] Crim LR 554). Professor Smith had understood the
aforementioned Gittens questions as: ‘Have the defence satisfied you on the balance of
probabilities--that if the defendant had not taken drink--(i) he would have killed as in fact he did? And
(ii) he would have been under diminished responsibility when he did so?’ Both R v Atkinson [1985]
Crim LR 314 and R v Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470 had used adapted versions of these questions. Whilst
it could be suggested that this was no more than a simple misapplication of the legal principles, it
could be similarly contended that this demonstrated a judicial bulwark set against any liberal
expansion of this concessionary defence. The present case *J. Crim. L. 20 certainly lends credence
to such a suggestion since despite the House of Lords' recent clarification of the Gittens principles,
the judge opted to apply the earlier and more restricted precedent of Tandy. Whatever the rationale,
both Atkinson and Egan were erroneous on the basis that they failed to recognise that the
abnormality of the mind and the effect of alcohol may each play a part in impairing the defendant's
mental responsibility for the killing.
These erroneous decisions contributed to a widely held, yet misguided view, on the manner in which
judges should direct the jury in relation to alcohol dependency syndrome. In relying upon the
precedent of Tandy the judge in the present case erred in the same respect. The appellant (T), an
alcoholic, strangled her 11-year-old daughter after consuming almost a whole bottle of vodka in
preference to her customary drink. T was denied the defence of diminished responsibility on the basis
that she had chosen to drink. Consequently it could not be said that her resultant abnormality of the
mind was involuntarily induced by alcoholism. Chronic alcoholism could only amount to a disease of
the mind if the repeated intake of intoxicants had damaged the brain or where the defence were able
to establish that the alcoholism had reached a level where the appellant's drinking had become
involuntary. The defence therefore extended to those who could resist the impulse to drink, but not
those who could have abstained from it.
Whilst the decision in Tandy and the first instance judgment in the present case could be reconciled
with the previous cases of Atkinson and Egan, they could not be reconciled with the earlier case of
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Gittens and the more recent House of Lords decision in Dietschmann above. In Dietschmann, the
defendant (D) had killed his victim by repeatedly punching and kicking him in the head. Charged with
murder, D sought to rely on the partial diminished responsibility defence. The evidence suggested
that whilst suffering from an abnormality of the mind D was also heavily intoxicated. Under the
decision in Tandy the voluntary intoxication on the part of D would exempt him from the defence. In
Dietschmann, however, the House of Lords reaffirmed the Gittens guidelines when it stated that the
defence would be available to D if, after having established a disease of the mind, the jury were
satisfied that despite the disinhibiting effect of the drink the defendant's mental abnormality
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the fatal acts. Thus, whilst the decision in
Dietschmann required a reassessment of the law as it had been applied in Tandy, it had not
introduced any new law. The case merely clarified the position in Gittens.
The decisions in both Dietschmann and the present case are evidently not the paradigm shift towards
liberally extending this concessionary defence which on first blush they may appear. Traditionally
Gittens had established the relevant legal principles necessary to bring alcohol dependency
syndrome within the remit of diminished responsibility. It could perhaps be suggested that rather than
confusion surrounding the application of Gittens, the cases of Atkinson, Egan and Tandy are
evidence of an underlying reluctance to extend the partial defence. Moreover, the House of Lords'
recent clarification in Dietschmann should have settled *J. Crim. L. 21 confusion surrounding the
issue of alcohol dependency syndrome, yet the judge in this case chose to provide a restricted
specimen jury direction. This extrapolation appears to be indicative of the courts' determination to
control the possible expansion of the diminished responsibility defence. Nevertheless the binding
decision in Dietschmann signifies that it is no longer appropriate to impose such arbitrary limitations.
Moreover the Court of Appeal's recognition of this is perhaps reassuring as it suggests, theoretically
at least, that in future it will be more difficult to obviate the principles ascribed in Gittens and
reaffirmed in Dietschmann.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2009, 73(1), 17-21
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*J. Crim. L. 197 Over the weekend of 19-21 November 2010, Dowds (D) fatally stabbed his partner
after having consumed vast quantities of alcohol. According to his evidence, both were habitual binge
drinkers and there had been a long history of violence between them, mostly initiated by her, and
usually when one or both had been drinking. The facts suggest that the fatal argument took place in
the early hours of Saturday 20 November because the victim made an interrupted 999 call at that
time. On the *J. Crim. L. 198 evening of Sunday, 21 November, D telephoned the police to report
that his partner was dead. D asserted that he had no recollection of the events which led to the death
of the victim, but he did not dispute that he must have been responsible for her wounds.
At his trial for murder, the jury were required to consider whether, in light of the intoxication, D had
been capable of forming the requisite intention to kill or cause serious bodily harm. The trial judge
also left the loss of control defence, under ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (‘the 2009
Act’), to the jury. Section 54(1)(a) and (7) of the 2009 Act reduces a conviction of murder to one of
voluntary manslaughter where the defendant kills subject to a loss of control; the loss of control must
be attributable to at least one of two qualifying triggers. The first qualifying trigger is satisfied by a
thing said or things done or said (or both), which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave
character, and caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (the ‘seriously
wronged’ trigger). The second qualifying trigger requires D to fear serious violence from V against D
or another identified person (the ‘fear’ trigger) (2009 Act, s. 54(1)(b) and s. 55(3),(4)(a)-(b), (6)(c)).
The jury were required to determine whether D had lost his self-control, as a result of an attack by the
victim, which caused him to fear serious violence.
At the outset of the trial Wait J ruled that transient acute intoxication is insufficient to raise the partial
defence of diminished responsibility under the revised parameters of s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957
(‘the 1957 Act’). For the purposes of the partial defence, it was not contended that D was an alcoholic
or clinically dependent on drink. He was a heavy but elective drinker. He held down a responsible
occupation which required him to be alert and clear-thinking. D was convicted of murder before
Wolverhampton Crown Court after the jury rejected the loss of control defence and concluded that D
had intended to cause serious bodily harm.
D appealed on the ground that the diminished responsibility defence should have been left to the jury.
Counsel for the defence argued that the amendments made to s. 2 of the 1957 Act (by s. 52 of the
2009 Act) mean that voluntary intoxication may now give rise to the concessionary defence and thus
reduce a murder conviction to one of voluntary manslaughter. The defence's argument was that s.
2(1) of the 1957 Act (as amended) requires that at the time of the killing the defendant must have
been suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ arising from a ‘recognised medical
condition’. The ICD-10 contains at F10.0, the condition of ‘Acute Intoxication’. Acute intoxication is,
therefore, a ‘recognised medical condition’; that is the condition in which D was in when he killed the
victim. Intoxication involves an impairment of mental functioning and it might well, depending on the
facts, affect D's ability to understand the nature of his conduct, form a rational judgement and/or
exercise self-control. Accordingly, the diminished responsibility defence ought to have been left to the
jury (at [33]).
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HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEAL, voluntary acute intoxication, whether from alcohol or an
alternative substance, is not capable of founding *J. Crim. L. 199 diminished responsibility. This is in
line with the position prior to the 2009 Act reforms (R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261; R v
Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10; R v Wood [2008] EWCA 1305; R v Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593).
The defendant's argument is counter to the established principle that voluntary intoxication is not a
defence, save upon the limited question of whether a ‘specific intent’ has been formed. Hughes LJ
referred to the speeches of Lord Elwyn-Jones LC and Lord Edmund-Davies in DPP v Majewski [1977]
AC 443:
Although there was much reforming zeal and activity in the 19th century, Parliament never once
considered whether self-induced intoxication should be a defence generally to a criminal charge. It
would have been a strange result if the merciful relaxation of a strict rule of law had ended, without
any Parliamentary intervention, by whittling it away to such an extent that the more drunk a man
became, provided it stopped short of making him insane, the better chance he had of an acquittal …
The common law rule still applied but there were exceptions to it … [defined] by reference to specific
intent. (Lord Elwyn-Jones LC (at 471H) and Lord Edmund-Davies (at 494F) in DPP v Majewski [1977]
AC 443, approved of Lawton LJ's ruling in the Court of Appeal)
Accordingly, their Lordships ruled that had Parliament intended to alter the law on voluntary
intoxication it would undoubtedly have made this intention explicit (at [35]). It was not possible to infer
such an intention from the adoption in the new formulation of the expression ‘recognised medical
condition’ (ibid.). Parliament ‘did not include writing the terms of the ICD-10 and/or DSM-IV into the
legislation’ (ibid.) because of ‘the divergence between the level of impairment which may bring a
patient within a DSM-IV classification and the level necessary to have legal impact’ (at [30]). The
WHO ICD-10 is ‘primarily a diagnostic tool for doctors and a statistical tool for public health
professionals’ (at [29]). The DSM-IV is designed to ‘provide a guide for clinical practice’ (at [30]). The
introduction to the DSM-IV provides that ‘in most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a mental disorder
is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a “mental disorder”, “mental disability”,
“mental disease” or “mental defect”’ (ibid.). As such, a number of conditions which are included within
these classificatory systems ‘raise important additional legal questions when one is seeking to invoke
them in a forensic context’ (at [31]). Accordingly, the presence of a ‘recognised medical condition’ is a
necessary, but not always a sufficient condition to raise the issue of diminished responsibility (at [40]).
On these grounds voluntary acute intoxication does not give rise to the partial defence. The fact that
D's condition was a transitory or temporary one was a relevant factor. However, that does not rule out
the possibility that there may be genuine recognised medical conditions, which although temporary,
might fall within the ambit of s. 2 of the 1957 Act.
COMMENTARY
The decision in the present case should be contrasted with the earlier case of Clinton noted above
(pp. 193-7). The key question in the present case was whether acute intoxication per se is a suitable
ground to claim *J. Crim. L. 200 the diminished responsibility defence under the revised parameters
of s. 2 of 1957 Act. Prior to the enactment of the 2009 Act, both the House of Lords and Court of
Appeal concluded that acute intoxication per se was incapable of satisfying the diminished
responsibility plea (R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261; R v Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10; R v Wood
[2008] EWCA 1305; R v Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593). This was because acute intoxication could
not constitute an ‘inherent cause’ nor was it a condition of arrested or retarded development, disease
or injury (1957 Act, s. 2).
The appellant in the present case contended that voluntary acute intoxication may satisfy the newly
ordered diminished responsibility plea since acute intoxication is a recognised medical condition for
the purposes of the ICD-10 (at [33]). To raise the revised plea successfully, the defendant must now
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that at the time of the killing he was suffering from an
‘abnormality of mental functioning’ arising from a ‘recognised medical condition’ (2009 Act, s.
52(1)(a)). This terminology replaced the Law Commission's original ‘underlying condition’ mandate
which would have required the defendant to have been suffering from ‘a pre-existing mental or
physiological condition other than that of a transitory kind’ (Law Commission, Partial Defences to
Murder, Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004) paras 1.17 and 5.97). The ‘underlying condition’
requirement would have impliedly excluded extreme drunkenness from satisfying the diminished
responsibility plea since it is described in the ICD-10 as a temporary ‘condition that follows
administration of psychoactive substances resulting in disturbances in levels of consciousness,
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cognition, affect or behaviour, or other psycho-physiological functions and responses’ (World Health
Organisation, ICD-10, ‘Mental and Behavioural Disorders Due to Psychoactive Substance Abuse’, ch.
V, F10-F19 available at http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/, accessed 10 April
2012). Accordingly, the change in terminology suggests that transient conditions may satisfy the
partial defence (at [39]).
In stark contrast, the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement was, as their Lordships identified,
designed to ‘encourage reference within expert evidence to diagnosis in terms of one or two of the
internationally [recognised] classificatory systems of mental disorders (WHO ICD10 and AMA DSM)’
(at [28], evidence from the Royal College of Psychiatrists quoted by the Law Commission in Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com. Report No. 304 (2006) para. 5.114). The above definition,
taken from the ICD-10, identifies acute intoxication as a ‘recognised medical condition’ and, therefore,
extreme drunkenness potentially satisfies that aspect of the concessionary defence; see N. Wake,
‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility? A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 76
JCL 71 at 73-4. This argument is clearly outwith the scope of traditional intoxication doctrine per se
which establishes that voluntary intoxication does not negate the defendant's criminal liability, save in
the limited context of specific intent offences and operatively as a denial of the requisite mens rea at
the time of the relevant act (R v Majewski [1977] AC 443; A. Simester, ‘Intoxication Is *J. Crim. L.
201 Never a Defence’ [2009] Crim LR 3; S. Gardner, ‘The Importance of Majewski’ (1984) 4 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 279; J. Horder, ‘Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity’ (1993) 52 CLJ 298).
The Court of Appeal, therefore, concluded that ‘voluntary acute intoxication, whether from alcohol or
other substance, is not capable of founding diminished responsibility’ (at [41]). Their Lordships noted
that ‘the presence of a “recognised medical condition” is a necessary, but not always a sufficient,
condition to raise the issue of diminished responsibility’ (ibid.). The effect is to imply that in certain
cases the defendant will be required to prove something beyond a ‘recognised medical condition’
before he or she may satisfy that aspect of the partial defence. However, the Court of Appeal
provided no further guidance in relation to this implicit requirement.
The decision to exclude acute intoxication per se from satisfying the partial defence is unsurprising.
However, the issue in the present case could have been circumvented had Parliament explicitly
excluded acute intoxication from the concessionary defence. This is the position under s. 51B(3) of
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by s. 168 of the Criminal Justice and
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, which provides:
The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other substance at the time of
the conduct in question does not of itself--
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1), or.
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes.
The provision is designed to prevent the acutely intoxicated defendant from successfully claiming
diminished responsibility, unless that intoxication co-existed with an additional medical condition
(Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, Cm 195 (2004) para.
3.39). This approach is in line with the English position prior to the 2009 Act reforms (see R v
Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10; R v Wood [2008] EWCA 1305; R v Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593).
Notwithstanding these principles, an exclusionary clause as elucidated above, would not detract from
the fact that the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement in the revised diminished responsibility
plea is simply too broad. The Court of Appeal noted that the international classificatory systems
identify an array of ‘disorders’ (for example, the ICD-10 includes, ‘unhappiness’ (R45.2), ‘irritability
and anger’ (R45.4), ‘suspiciousness and marked evasiveness’ (R46.5), ‘pyromania’ (F63.1),
‘paedophilia’ (F65.4), ‘sado-masochism’ (F65.5) and ‘kleptomania’ (F63.2)). The DSM-IV includes,
‘exhibitionism’ (569), ‘sexual sadism’ (573) and ‘intermittent explosive disorder’ (663/667), which raise
important legal questions for the courts (at [31]). Although these systems were not explicitly written
into the statutory formula, the rationale for including the ‘recognised medical condition’ requirement
was ‘to ensure a greater equilibrium between the law and medical science’ (R v Brown (Robert)
[2011] EWCA Crim 2796 at [23]; Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com.
Report No. 304 (2006) para. *J. Crim. L. 202 5.114). The idea that the courts will be required to
determine which recognised medical conditions are valid for the purposes of the partial defence is
inimical to this aim.
The antithetical rulings in Clinton and the present case are indicative of the inherent problems
associated with tautological and imprecise legislative drafting. Their Lordships in Clinton adopted a
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remarkably inclusionary approach to sexual infidelity in the context of ss 54-56 of the 2009 Act, which
the Court of Appeal considered to be consistent with ‘the views expressed in Parliament by those who
were opposed in principle to the enactment of s. 55(6)(c)’ (R v Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2 at [40]).
In the present case, the exclusionary approach to acute intoxication (and other recognised medical
conditions above) may have raised the bar for future diminished responsibility claims. If Clinton and
the present case are representative of the judgments that we are to expect in the wake of the 2009
Act, it may well be that the new provisions will prove more problematic than their predecessors.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2012, 76(3), 197-202
© 2016 Vathek Publishing
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The appellant (S) was convicted of murder before the Crown Court at Blackfriars after the jury
rejected the partial defence contained within s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. Three constituent
elements are contained within the section: (1) at the time of the killing the defendant must have been
suffering from an abnormality of the mind; (2) the abnormality of the mind must have arisen from a
condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind or any inherent causes, or must have been
induced by disease or injury; and (3) the abnormality of the mind must have substantially impaired the
defendant's mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in the commission of the fatal offence.
S had been drinking heavily in the 10 days leading up to the killing and particularly heavily on that
day. In the early evening of 29 August 2006 the deceased struck the appellant, causing a laceration
across his nose and bleeding under his eye. Much later that night the appellant subjected the
deceased to an attack of extreme violence which resulted *J. Crim. L. 17 in fatal injuries. There were
numerous blunt force impacts as well as injuries to the deceased's head caused by a sharp jagged
object. His body was found in the early hours. The cause of death was brain damage and blood loss.
It was contended that S had been for many years and was at the time of the killing a chronic
alcoholic. Medical experts called for both S and for the Crown unanimously agreed that at the time of
the killing the appellant suffered from alcohol dependency syndrome which had not produced brain
damage. There was dispute, however, as to the effect of that syndrome on S's responsibility for his
actions. The medical expert for the defence was of the view that the alcohol dependency syndrome,
from which S suffered, constituted an abnormality of the mind which substantially impaired his
responsibility for the killing. The medical expert on behalf of the Crown adduced that, however chronic
the alcoholism, an alcoholic always had a choice whether to drink at all, and if he did, in the amount
that he drank.
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND ORDERING A RETRIAL , the abnormality of the mind must
have arisen from a condition of arrested or retarded development or any inherent causes, or it must
have been induced by disease or illness. In cases where the alcohol dependency syndrome results in
brain damage it would arguably be easy for the jury to conclude that the defendant falls within s. 2(1)
of the 1957 Act. Where it does not, the interrelationship between alcohol dependency syndrome and
the partial defence of diminished responsibility becomes significantly more complex.
The judge had artificially restricted the guidelines derived from the earlier case of R v Tandy (1988)
152 JP 453 where Watkins LJ said that:
for a craving of drink in itself to produce an abnormality of the mind, induced by the disease of
alcoholism, the alcoholism had to have reached such a level that the brain was damaged, or the
craving had to be such as to render the defendant's use of the drink involuntary because she could no
longer resist the impulse to drink.
Accordingly, if it could be proved that the defendant's first drink of the day was voluntary, she would
be precluded the partial defence.
This case was indistinguishable from the first instance direction in R v Wood (Clive) [2008] EWCA
Crim 1305, [2009] 1 WLR 496, and for the same reasons set out in that case, the judge had
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misdirected the jury.
Their Lordships therefore deemed it appropriate to outline the manner in which judges in future cases
should direct juries where the abnormality of the mind is inextricably linked to alcohol consumption.
The impact is to create a three-part test in order to determine whether the alcohol dependency
syndrome falls within s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. The jury should be directed to decide:
1. Whether the defendant was indeed suffering from an abnormality of the mind at the time of the
killing: R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396. A finding of alcohol dependency syndrome will not necessarily
mean that the defendant has established the requisite abnormality *J. Crim. L. 18 of the mind. This
depends on the jury's findings pertaining to the nature and extent of the syndrome, and whether, in a
wider context, his consumption of alcohol before the killing is fairly to be regarded as the involuntary
result of an irresistible craving or compulsion to drink.
2. Whether that abnormality of the mind was induced by disease or illness.
3. Assuming the above two questions are answered in the affirmative, directions about whether the
defendant's mental responsibility for what he did was substantially impaired should be addressed in
conventional terms. The jury should be assisted with the concept of substantial impairment, and may
be properly invited to reflect on the difference between a failure by the defendant to resist his
impulses to behave as he actually did, and an inability consequent on it to resist them.
In answering the questions, the jury should be directed to consider all the evidence including the
opinions of the medical experts. The issues likely to arise in this kind of case and on which they
should be invited to form their own judgment will include:
1. the extent and seriousness of the defendant's dependency, if any, on alcohol;
2. the extent to which his ability to control his drinking or to choose whether to drink or not, was
reduced;
3. whether he was capable of abstinence from alcohol; and, if so,
4. for how long; and
5. whether he was choosing for some particular reason to decide to get drunk or to drink even more
than usual.
COMMENTARY
The defence of diminished responsibility has always raised complex and difficult issues for the jury
and a decision in cases of this context will rarely be straightforward. This is especially true in cases
where the underlying mental disorder is related to alcohol consumption.
For many years the extrapolation of case precedents indicated that the accused would have to argue
that the alcohol had injured his mind. Accordingly, the defendant who was simply under the influence
of alcohol or narcotics at the time he committed the offence would not be covered. More recently,
however, Lord Hutton conjectured the correct analysis to apply in cases involving evidence of both
mental disorder and intoxication. In R v Dietschmann [2001] EWCA Crim 2052, Lord Hutton asserted
that the appropriate direction to juries in such cases was not whether the defendant would have
carried out the killing in the absence of intoxication, but whether, if he did kill, he killed under
diminished responsibility. Accordingly, the House of Lords made it clear that evidence of intoxication
on the part of the defendant does not preclude the defence.
Subsequently, in Wood above, the Court of Appeal attempted to apply the reasoning in Dietschmann
to a case involving a defendant whose *J. Crim. L. 19 underlying mental condition is itself related to
alcohol abuse. In the leading judgment Sir Igor Judge P stated:
In our judgment, R. v. Dietschmann requires a reassessment of the way in which R. v. Tandy is
applied in the context of alcohol dependency syndrome where observable brain damage has not
occurred. The sharp effect of the distinction drawn in R. v. Tandy between cases where brain damage
has occurred as a result of alcohol dependency syndrome and those where it is not, is no longer
appropriate. Naturally, where brain damage has occurred the jury may be more likely to conclude that
the defendant suffers from an abnormality of mind induced by disease or illness, but whether it has
occurred or not, logically consistent with R. v. Dietschmann, the same question (ie, whether it has
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been established that the defendant's syndrome is of such an extent and nature that it constitutes an
abnormality of mind induced by disease or illness) arises for decision. This is for the jury. ([2008]
EWCA Crim 1305 at [41])
Their Lordships in Wood asserted that the jury should ‘focus exclusively on the effect of alcohol
consumed by the defendant as a direct result of his illness or disease and ignore the effect of any
alcohol consumed voluntarily’ ([2008] EWCA Crim 1305 at [41]). The words ‘and ignore the effect of
any alcohol consumed voluntarily’ may appear to require the jury to ‘separate out’ each and every
drink consumed by the defendant in order to decide whether the consumption was voluntary or
involuntary. This would be unrealistic, when, at some levels of severity, what may appear to be
‘voluntary’ drinking may be inseparable from the defendant's underlying syndrome.
It is arguably unsurprising that the Crown viewed the present case as an opportunity to provide further
guidance to juries pertaining to the concessionary defence where the only basis for the alleged
abnormality of the mind arose from alcohol dependency syndrome without discernible brain damage.
In cases such as the present one and that of Wood, juries will be called upon to answer questions
relating to the operation of the mind on which they would be unfamiliar. This unenviable task is made
even more difficult by virtue of the fact that juries will be relying on medical expert evidence from
professionals who are required to address questions in legal and not medical terms. In reality,
however, this three-tier threshold test will arguably do little to assist in determining when the
concessionary defence will be available. The jury will inevitably be required to make the necessary
judgments not just on the basis of expert medical opinion, but also by using their collective common
sense and insight into the practical realities which underpin each individual case: R v Byrne [1960] 2
QB 396. In practical terms it is often more a question of which medical expert the jury find more
convincing--the defence or the Crown.
Nevertheless, one of the recurring problems identified in such cases is that judges consistently give
inaccurate directions to jurors in relation to the partial defence. Accordingly, the guidelines in Wood
and the present case will only be of assistance to the jury if they are applied correctly by the judiciary.
Whether the reaffirmation of those principles in Dietschmann and Wood combined with their
extension in the present case will *J. Crim. L. 20 mitigate the issues associated with specimen jury
directions remains to be seen. Seemingly, however, the unenviable decision that jurors face should
be made much less arduous if they are given clear guidelines at the outset.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2010, 74(1), 16-20
© 2016 Vathek Publishing
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After drinking heavily over a 48-hour period, and consequently in an extremely drunken state, the
appellant (W) was provided accommodation by the deceased (F). F was openly homosexual and W
fully appreciated F's sexual orientation before he joined the deceased at his home. According to W,
he awoke to find F making unwelcome homosexual advances to him; thereupon he had lost his
self-control and hit the victim repeatedly with a meat cleaver causing death.
The appellant was convicted of murder before Wolverhampton Crown Court after the jury rejected the
partial defence of diminished responsibility under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. Although the
medical experts were unanimous in their opinion that W did suffer from alcohol dependency
syndrome there was considerable dispute as to *J. Crim. L. 301 whether the alcohol consumed by W
had been completely ‘involuntary’. As a result, W was sentenced to life imprisonment and the
minimum term to be served was fixed at 18 years.
On appeal, the appellant successfully argued that the judge's direction to the jury on the meaning of
‘involuntary’ had contradicted the House of Lords decision in R v Dietschmann [2003] 1 AC 1209,
where it was identified that the primordial question for the jury in such cases is not whether the first
drink was involuntary but whether ‘the defendant has satisfied you that, despite the effect of the drink,
his mental abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal acts?’. On 20 June
2008, the verdict of murder was quashed and a conviction of manslaughter was substituted on
grounds of diminished responsibility, pursuant to s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (see R v Wood
(Clive) [2008] EWCA Crim 1305, (2009) 73 JCL 17, commentary N. Wake).
The prosecution did not seek a retrial and so it fell to a differently constituted Court of Appeal to
sentence the appellant. The Court of Appeal noted that in determining sentencing in cases involving
diminished responsibility two considerations were relevant:
1. In the absence of any medical disposal, the first issue was whether the case required a sentence of
imprisonment for life under s. 225(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘the 2003 Act’), or
imprisonment for public protection under s. 225(3) of the 2003 Act, as amended by the Criminal
Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
2. If either sentence was necessary, the minimum term to be served by W had to be assessed. It was
submitted for the defendant that, in manslaughter cases, culpability rather than harm should be the
primary consideration in determining the sentence, in accordance with s. 143(1) of the 2003 Act.
HELD, IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the mere fact that the case was one of
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility did not preclude a sentence of
imprisonment for life. Under s. 225(2) of the 2003 Act, ‘(a) if the offence is one in respect of which the
offender would … be liable to imprisonment for life, and (b) the court considers that the seriousness of
the offence is such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life, the court must
impose a sentence of imprisonment for life’. In reality, this sentence will be rare, usually reserved for
particularly grave cases, where the defendant's responsibility for his actions, although diminished,
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remains high.
Once a sentence of life imprisonment was passed, it was then necessary to consider the tariff.
Schedule 21 to the 2003 Act provides a range of suggested minimal custodial sentences to which the
court should have regard. This indicates that, in homicide cases, although the result, the death of the
victim is identical, the gravity of each individual offence is not. Accordingly, a consideration of either
culpability or harm should not be paramount nor should they be exclusive when determining
sentence. Where diminished responsibility is established it serves merely *J. Crim. L. 302 to reduce
the defendant's culpability for his actions in the killing; the remaining circumstances of the homicide
are left unchanged.
The salient feature of this offence was not simply that F had been killed, but that he had been killed in
the course of a sustained attack of repeated ferocity. The suggested levels of sentence in Sched. 21
represented the time actually to be spent in custody and the court was of the opinion this was not yet
clearly understood. Accordingly, a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment was the equivalent of a
determinate sentence of 60 years' imprisonment. A significant difference between sentences for
murder and sentences for manslaughter, which were often close to murder, would be inimical to the
administration of justice. This means that the actual sentences imposed in cases of diminished
responsibility manslaughter decided before the 2003 Act came into effect should be treated with the
utmost caution.
At the original trial, the judge decided that the sentence for murder should have been one of a
minimum tariff of 18 years and the court found no reason to disagree with this suggestion. The tariff
then had to be reduced to take account of the reduced culpability through diminished responsibility,
but this was a grave attack and one where the offender had a high degree of culpability. Bearing in
mind the protection of public concern, the minimum sentence is fixed at 13 years.
COMMENTARY
This case may be viewed as atypical; the partial defence of diminished responsibility applies, but a
sentence of life imprisonment was still imposed. Murder is recognised as the gravest crime in the
legal system, justifying the severest punishment, a mandatory life sentence. Murder is committed
when a defendant unlawfully kills another person with an intention to kill or an intention to do serious
harm. It includes, inter alia, premeditated assassinations, serial or sexual killings, but also includes far
less culpable killings such as euthanasia which can be carried out in an act of compassion and the
abused woman who kills her abuser through fear of further violence. Notwithstanding, the context of
the killing these individuals will all be subject to the same mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
unless a partial or full defence applies.
In cases where the partial defence of diminished responsibility can be established, and a conviction of
manslaughter substituted the trial judge has substantial discretion in relation to sentencing. The killing
remains intentional but the material facts become an element of consideration at the sentencing
stage. In the present case, W's level of activities before the attack began and after its conclusion
revealed evidence of planning and preparation. The main weapon used in the attack on the
deceased, the meat cleaver, was taken to F's flat. Despite normally carrying the weapon in a rucksack
W, at some point, removed the meat cleaver and concealed it within his jacket. The post-mortem
report evidenced extensive external injuries, consistent with having been caused by a meat cleaver
and a lump hammer. Police investigations linked both weapons to W. These investigations further
revealed steps W had taken to conceal his crime after he had committed the fatal act. Moreover, at
police *J. Crim. L. 303 interview W stated that he ‘hated gays’, but later attempted to pass this off as
words spoken in the confusion surrounding his arrest. Evidently, this case highlights a situation where
specific features of homicide are common to both murder and manslaughter. W's culpability had been
diminished, but it was far from extinguished.
In determining whether to impose a discretionary life sentence or imprisonment for public protection,
the Court of Appeal relied on the authority of R v Chambers (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 190. In Chambers,
the appellate court had to consider the propriety of the imposition of a 10-year sentence on a
defendant (C). C had removed his mother-in-law from her house via subterfuge before effecting an
entry and stabbing his wife 23 times in the presence of their child. Medical evidence showed that at
the time of the killing C was suffering from an anxiety-depressive state. The trial judge accepted that
this substantially impaired C's mental responsibility for his actions in the commission of the offence. C
was sentenced to life imprisonment with a determinate period of 10 years. Upon appeal it was
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established that, in determining sentence, the court must have regard to two factors:
1. the degree of the defendant's responsibility for his actions; and
2. the period of time, if any, for which the accused would continue to be a danger to the public.
The only factor which should influence whether the sentence should be imprisonment for life ought to
be the seriousness of the offence. In Chambers, as with the present case, the facts indicated a
considerable degree of preparation. This suggested that C retained a substantial degree of
responsibility for his acts, notwithstanding evidence of the partial defence. On this basis, the Court of
Appeal reaffirmed the trial judge's approach to sentencing, but reduced the determinate period to
eight years' imprisonment.
These principles were recently reinforced in the case of R v Kehoe [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 9. In Kehoe,
the appellant (K) appealed against a sentence of life imprisonment imposed following her guilty plea
to manslaughter. K, who had been drinking with others, disclosed to a friend that having been
provoked she had stabbed the victim. As in the present case, K had a number of previous convictions
for offences involving violence. The psychiatric reports revealed, inter alia, that K's psychological
development had been distorted as a consequence of suffering considerable abuse during her
childhood. A pre-sentence report also suggested that she posed a high risk of harm. The judge
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with a notional determinate term of nine years and a fixed
minimum term of four-and-a-half years. Upon appeal the court concluded that the specified term of
nine years was manifestly excessive and applicable to cases of a wholly different nature. The
implications of the Kehoe decision is that sentences of life imprisonment should be reserved for cases
of the utmost seriousness, not necessarily those where the defendant poses a high risk of danger. As
Openshaw J stated, ‘When an offender meets the criteria of dangerousness, there is no longer any
need to protect the public by passing a *J. Crim. L. 304 sentence of life imprisonment for the public
are now properly protected by the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment for public protection …
We think that now, when the court finds that the defendant satisfies the criteria for dangerousness, a
life sentence should be reserved for those cases where the culpability of the offender is particularly
high or the offence itself particularly grave’ (at [17]).
Nevertheless, conflicting authority suggests that considerable emphasis is being placed on risk
assessment rather than the seriousness of the offence. In R v Walsh [2007] EWCA Crim 1454, [2008]
1 Cr App R (S) 33 (p.178), the court justified the imposition of a life sentence through psychiatric
evidence which indicated that the offender was very dangerous. This position is erroneous. As Crane
J stated (R v Costello [2006] EWCA Crim 1618, [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 51 (p.286)), ‘whether a
sentence of custody for life or a sentence of public protection is appropriate … the public is
safeguarded for the future’. As a result, there is no need to impose a life sentence unless the offence
is a particularly grave one. In most instances the offender will remain subject to s. 28 of the Crime
Sentences Act 1997 despite the sentence received. The effect being that the offender will not be
released from prison until the Parole Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection
of the public that the prisoner be confined (s. 28(6)(b)).
In reality the distinction between a discretionary life sentence and imprisonment for public protection
in cases such as the present one is nominal. In order to impose the former the court must be satisfied
that the offence itself was serious enough to justify a sentence of life imprisonment. It could perhaps
be argued that once it has been established that W did not commit murder it is unfair to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment. If it is acknowledged that W's culpability was reduced can it really be
said that the homicide was sufficiently serious to impose such a sentence? Nevertheless, the court
recognised that W's responsibility in the commission of the homicide was diminished and accordingly
his life sentence was reduced by five years. In this respect, it could perhaps be argued that the
discretionary life sentence serves as little more than a labelling exercise. Ultimately, however, the
practical consequence of assessing the seriousness of the homicide is that decisions such as the
present one will be rare in practice. This is largely due to the fact that the court is already satisfied
that a lower level of culpability has been established. In most instances, where the concessionary
defence can be established, a sentence of imprisonment for public protection will be imposed.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2009, 73(4), 300-304
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Psychiatry and the new diminished responsibility plea: uneasy bedfellows?
Nicola Wake
Subject: Sentencing
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Case: R. v Brown (Robert) [2011] EWCA Crim 2796; [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 27 (CA (Crim Div))
*J. Crim. L. 122 In this case the Court of Appeal considered whether the words ‘substantially
impaired’ under s. 52(1)(b) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (‘the 2009 Act’) imported a different
test from that which was applied to the term ‘substantial impairment’ contained within the original s.
2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’). In essence, the primary issue was whether the ‘less
than total but more than trivial’ ruling adumbrated in R v Ramchurn [2010] EWCA Crim 194 continued
to apply to the revised plea. The Court of Appeal also reviewed the relationship between Sch. 21 to
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘the CJA 2003’) and sentencing in manslaughter cases.
On 31 October 2010, the appellant (B) met his estranged wife at her home and killed her by
repeatedly and violently striking her over the head with a hammer. The children of the couple were in
a room two doors away when their mother was attacked. The daughter witnessed her father (B)
wrapping up her mother's body before placing it into the car. As B drove the children to his house, his
son asked if B was taking the victim to hospital, but B never did so, and he failed to call an
ambulance. Having left the children with his girlfriend, B drove to Great *J. Crim. L. 123 Windsor
Park. On an earlier occasion, he had dug a large hole and buried a garden box in a remote area of
the park. B dragged the body 100m from the track and wrapped it in plastic sheeting, before burying
the body in the pre-arranged grave. B returned to his own home, changed, and then went out to
dispose of his blood-stained clothing. B was subsequently arrested.
At trial, B pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility on grounds of an
adjustment disorder. Section 2 of the 1957 Act which, to reflect reduced mental responsibility,
changes the categorisation of the offence from murder to manslaughter was significantly amended by
s. 52 of the 2009 Act. The revised plea, in s. 2 (1) of the 1957 Act, requires the following: at the time
of the killing the defendant must have been suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’
arising from a ‘recognised medical condition’; that ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ must have
‘substantially impaired’ the defendant's ability to ‘understand the nature of the defendant's conduct,
form a rational judgement or exercise self-control’; and, finally, the abnormality must provide ‘an
explanation for the killing’, i.e. it must be the ‘cause, or a significant contributory factor in causing the
defendant to kill’.
B was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter before Reading Crown Court after the jury
accepted the concessionary defence under the revised parameters of s. 2 of the 1957 Act. B was
further convicted of obstructing a coroner in the course of his duty. The key issue at B's trial was
whether the defendant's ability to exercise his self-control had been substantially impaired for the
purposes of s. 2 of the 1957 Act. Cooke J was of the view that, although the jury concluded that B's
culpability was diminished, it remained cogent. The trial judge considered previous authorities, which
dealt with the necessary correlation between sentences for murder and voluntary manslaughter. He
assessed the length of the minimum term which would have been imposed if the jury had convicted B
of murder, as at least 28 years. Taking into account the guilty plea, the judge assessed the sentence
at 24 years' imprisonment for manslaughter, with two years' imprisonment, to run consecutively, for
the offence of obstruction, less time spent in custody on remand. The jury had concluded that B's
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abnormality of mental functioning substantially impaired B's ability to exercise his self-control. B
appealed on the ground that the sentence was disproportionate in light of the jury's verdict. Counsel
for B contended that B's diminution in responsibility, and therefore culpability, was either overlooked
or insufficient allowance was attributed to it during sentencing.
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEAL, the court considered that s. 52(1)(b) of the 2009 Act did not
require a revised interpretation of the term ‘substantial impairment’ for the purposes of the reformed s.
2(1) of the 1957 Act. It was noted that when Parliament enacted the 2009 Act it was aware of the way
in which the court had interpreted the term ‘substantial impairment’ for many years (R v Ramchurn
[2010] EWCA Crim 194). In the present case Cooke J had directed the jury that the reference *J.
Crim. L. 124 to ‘substantially impaired’ required the defence to satisfy the jury that the impairment
was more than minimal. Accordingly, Cooke J was entitled to conclude that B's responsibility for the
death of his wife, although diminished, remained significant.
The Court of Appeal further considered the correlation between the minimum term guidelines for
murder, under Sch. 21 to the CJA 2003, and sentencing in manslaughter cases. In murder cases, the
sentencing judge must assess the minimum term to be served for the purpose of punishment and
deterrence, prior to considering the issue of release. In most manslaughter cases, the sentence will
not reflect the minimum term to be served; rather, it specifies the term, half of which will be served.
Accordingly, their Lordships commented that, although it may be helpful, it is unnecessary for judges
to set out an exact arithmetical computation of the sentence which would have been passed if there
had been a conviction for murder. In the instant case, the total sentence imposed on B (making
allowance for the mitigation arising from his diminished responsibility but also considering all of the
aggravating features of the case) was not excessive.
COMMENTARY
The original diminished responsibility plea was radically altered by s. 52 of the 2009 Act, amending s.
2 of the 1957 Act, and the fundamental reformulations became effective on 4 October 2010 (see the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 4, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order
2010 (SI 2010 No. 816), art. 5). (For discussion, see M. Bohlander and A. Reed (eds), Loss of Control
and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate
Publishing: London, 2011); R. Mackay, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009--Partial Defences to
Murder (2): The New Diminished Responsibility Plea’ [2010] Crim LR 290; R. Mackay and B. Mitchell,
‘Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Monitoring the New Partial Defences’ (2011) 3
Archbold Review 5.)
The present case is not atypical of the diminished responsibility cases that preceded the 2009 Act. It
is, however, the first to require the Court of Appeal to assess the novel terminology contained within
the revised s. 2 of the 1957 Act. The judgment reaffirms key principles of R v Ramchurn [2010]
EWCA Crim 194 and R v Wood (Clive) [2009] EWCA Crim 651 in terms of the interpretation of the
diminished responsibility plea and sentencing procedures in manslaughter cases, respectively.
The original diminished responsibility plea required the defendant to establish that at the time of the
killing he was suffering from an ‘abnormality of mind’ either arising ‘from a condition of arrested or
retarded development of mind or any inherent causes’ or having been ‘induced by disease or injury’
(see R. Mackay, ‘The Abnormality of Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility’ [1999] Crim LR 117 at
118). In 2006, the Law Commission noted that the phrase ‘abnormality of mind’ was not a psychiatric
term, nor was there ‘an agreed psychiatric meaning’ to the aforementioned permissible causes of that
abnormality (Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Cm 304 (2006) para. 5.111).
*J. Crim. L. 125 The amendments made under s. 52 of the 2009 Act were, therefore, designed to
align the mitigating doctrine with ‘developments in diagnostic practice’ (Ministry of Justice, Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law, Ministry of Justice CP19/08 (2008)
para. 49). The revised plea now requires an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ arising from a
‘recognised medical condition’. Although, see R v Dowds (Stephen Andrew) [2012] EWCA Crim 281,
in which the Court of Appeal noted that the presence of a recognised medical condition was a
necessary, but not always a sufficient condition, to raise the partial defence (at [13], [17], [35]-[41]).
(For further discussion, see N. Wake, ‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility?
A Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 76 JCL 71.)
Their Lordships, in the present case, noted that this limb of the concessionary defence was
implemented ‘to ensure a greater equilibrium between the law and medical science’ (at [23]). The
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Royal College of Psychiatrists suggested that the importation of the ‘recognised medical condition’
requirement would ‘encourage reference within expert evidence to diagnosis in terms of one or two of
the accepted internationally classificatory systems of mental disorders (WHO ICD-10 and AMA DSM)’
(Law Commission, above at para. 5.114 (Royal College of Psychiatrists)). Notwithstanding, in Dowds
above, Hughes LJ observed that Parliament did not write the ICD-10 and/or DSM-IV into the
legislation because of the extent of conditions contained therein, which are demonstrably unsuited to
the concessionary defence ([2012] EWCA Crim 281 at [27]-[28], [30] and [35]).
Although expert witnesses, in the instant case, did refer to the ICD-10 when assessing the
‘recognised medical condition’ requirement, they disagreed as to whether B's adjustment disorder
constituted an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ for the purposes of the partial defence. It would
appear, therefore, that the common disagreement between expert witnesses regarding the
‘abnormality of mind’ requirement under the original plea has been inherited in relation to the
‘abnormality of mental functioning’ limb of the newly ordered defence. Dr Alcock, for the defence, was
of the view that B ‘met the diagnostic criteria for an adjustment disorder’, as defined in the ICD-10 (at
[14]). In contrast, Dr Philip Joseph, for the prosecution, rejected the diagnosis of ‘adjustment disorder’
or indeed any other form of mental disorder which amounted to an abnormality of mental functioning
(ibid.).
Commenting on the original diminished responsibility plea, Judge LJ suggested that where ‘the
outcome of the trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement between
distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe, to proceed’ (R v
Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725, and see also B. McSherry, ‘Expert Testimony and the Effects of Mental
Impairment: Reviewing the Ultimate Issue Rule’ (2001) 24 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
13). The present case suggests that this issue will remain a pertinent one under the revised partial
defence which continues to remain largely ‘in the hands of expert witnesses’ (O. Quick and C. Wells,
‘Getting Tough with Defences’ [2006] Crim LR 117). As Gibson notes, ‘the jury will *J. Crim. L. 126
have to consider carefully instances where medical experts disagree’ (M. Gibson, ‘Intoxicants and
Diminished Responsibility: The Impact of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009’ [2011] Crim LR 909 at
920).
In the instant case, the jurors were persuaded by Dr Alcock's testimony and were therefore required
to determine whether B's ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ substantially impaired his ability to
‘exercise self-control’. Unlike the original diminished responsibility plea, which required that the
‘abnormality of mind’ substantially impaired the defendant's ‘mental responsibility’ for the killing, the
reformulated plea clarifies which aspects of the defendant's functioning must be impaired in order for
the partial defence to succeed; namely, his ability to ‘understand the nature of his conduct; form a
rational judgement; or exercise self-control’ (Law Commission, above at paras 5.110-5.112).
The term ‘substantial impairment’ is one of few remnants of the original diminished responsibility plea.
The present case reaffirms the ruling adumbrated in Ramchurn, in which the Court of Appeal reflected
that ‘substantially impaired’ within s. 2(1) of the 1957 Act meant something more than trivial, but less
than total (at [23]) (see also A. Reed and N. Wake, ‘Anglo-American Perspectives on Partial
Defences: Something Old, Something Borrowed and Something New’ in Bohlander and Reed (eds),
above at 191).
The Court of Appeal, in Ramchurn, referred to R v Mitchell [1995] Crim LR 506, which established
that the word ‘substantial’ is a word ‘for which one should not try to find a synonym. It is a word which
members of the jury, with their own common sense, can tell what it means’. Professor Sir John Smith
noted that Mitchell was ‘a welcome departure’ from a prevailing trend which required ‘the jury to be
directed to do what their common sense would naturally lead them to do anyway’ ([1995] Crim LR 506
at 506-7).
Although the question of ‘substantial impairment’ is one for the jury, counsel for the defence and the
Crown in the present case expressed views as to whether B's ability to exercise his ‘self-control’ had
been ‘substantially impaired’ (Law Commission, above at para. 5.198). Dr Alcock noted that the effect
of the adjustment disorder was to ‘substantially impair’ the defendant's ability to exercise his
‘self-control’ at the time of the killing (at [14]). In contrast, Dr Philip Joseph suggested that ‘if [B] did
suffer from [an adjustment] disorder, its extent would only be of relevance if the jury concluded that
the defendant had killed his wife without any premeditation’ (ibid.). Similarly, in R v Clinton [2012]
EWCA Crim 2 (the first case to require the Court of Appeal to consider a combined plea of loss of
control and diminished responsibility following the 2009 Act reforms), psychiatrists noted that the
effect of the defendant's (C's) ‘depressed state’ would have meant that C was ‘more likely to lose
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self-control following his wife's graphic account of sexual activity with other men and her taunts that
he lacked the courage to commit suicide’ (at [33]).
In a study of the original diminished responsibility plea, Professor Mackay identified that although a
minority of psychiatrists restricted themselves to a consideration of whether the defendant was, in
fact, *J. Crim. L. 127 suffering from an ‘abnormality of the mind,’ almost 70 per cent expressed an
opinion on the meaning of ‘substantial impairment’ (Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Cm
290 (2004) para. 5.51). The present case suggests that the role confusion concerns inherent in s. 2 of
the 1957 Act have not been alleviated by the statutory reforms (R v Ramchurn (2011) 75 JCL 12,
commentary by N. Wake).
The explicit requirement that the defendant's ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ provides an
‘explanation for the killing’ is a new addition to the diminished responsibility plea (J. Chalmers, ‘Partial
Defences to Murder in Scotland: An Unlikely Tranquility’ in Bohlander and Reed (eds), above at 176).
The provision asserts that an explanation will be provided if ‘it causes, or is a significant contributory
factor in causing the person to carry out that conduct’. Ashworth suggested that the causal element
would ‘direct attention to the interaction of the medical condition with any other causal factor’, and the
present case appears to support this proposition (see A. Ashworth, ‘Diminished Responsibility:
Defendant Diagnosed as Suffering from Alcohol Dependence Syndrome But Having Sustained No
Brain Damage as Result’ [2008] Crim LR 976 at 978).
Dr Alcock advised that B had developed an adjustment disorder ‘as a consequence of a number of
life events from around April 2010 and thereafter, on a background of increasingly stressful life events
commencing from 2007’ (at [14]). His suggestion appears to imply that several factors were operating
upon B at the time of the fatal act. The Court of Appeal noted, in Clinton, that both sexual infidelity on
the part of the victim and C's ‘abnormality in mental functioning’ should be left to the jury when
considering whether C's ability to ‘exercise self-control’ was ‘substantially impaired’ (at [28]). This is in
line with the Ministry of Justice CP19/08 recommendation that ‘[the impairment] need not be the sole
cause of the defendant's behaviour’ but ‘it should be a significant contributory factor in causing the
conduct--that is, more than a merely trivial factor’ (Ministry of Justice, above at para. 95).
In addition to providing guidance on the interpretation of the revised diminished responsibility plea,
the present case reaffirms the principle, established in Wood (Clive), that in manslaughter cases the
court should have regard to the minimal custodial sentences stipulated in Sch. 21 to the CJA 2003
(see R v Wood (Clive) (2009) 73 JCL 300, commentary by N. Wake). In diminished responsibility
cases, a variety of options is available to the sentencing judge. If the psychiatric reports recommend
and justify it, and there are no contrary indications, the judge will make a hospital order. If the
defendant constitutes a danger to the public for an unpredictable period of time, the appropriate
sentence will, in all probabilities, be one of life imprisonment. In cases where the evidence suggests
that the defendant's responsibility for his conduct was so grossly impaired that his degree of
responsibility for them was minimal, then the judge will have the discretion to impose a lenient
sentence; if there is no danger of repetition, this may take the form of an order which will afford the
defendant supervised freedom. In cases where *J. Crim. L. 128 there is insufficient basis for a
hospital order; but in which the defendant's degree of responsibility is not minimal, the judge should
pass a determinate sentence of imprisonment; the length of such a sentence will depend on the
judge's assessment of the degree of the defendant's responsibility and his view of the period of time,
if any, for which the defendant will continue to be a danger to the public (R v Chambers (1983) 5 Cr
App R (S) 190 at 193-4; see also Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Homicide: Murder and Manslaughter’,
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/homicide_murder_and_manslaughter/ ).
The Court of Appeal, in the present case, acknowledged that the trial judge will only be required to
assess the minimum term that the defendant must serve in rare cases, and where the seriousness of
the offence justifies a sentence of imprisonment for life. In other manslaughter cases, the trial judge
specifies the maximum term, only half of which will be served (at [24]). It is therefore unnecessary for
judges seeking to apply the Wood (Clive) principle to set out the exact arithmetical computation of the
sentence which would have been passed if there had been a conviction for murder. Notwithstanding,
their Lordships suggest that the computation adopted by the trial judge in the instant case provided a
helpful method of approach. The judge identified the necessary features of the case, both the
aggravating and mitigating factors, before applying an appropriate discount for the defendant's
reduced level of culpability. The Court of Appeal reiterated that sentencing in such cases is a
fact-specific decision to be made by the judge, consistently with the medical evidence and the jury
verdict. As noted in Wood (Clive), a significant difference between sentences for murder and
sentences for manslaughter, which were often close to murder, would be inimical to the administration
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of justice.
The facts of the present case, in requiring the court to focus on the less contentious aspects of the
reformulated defence, gave rise to a straightforward application of the diminished responsibility plea.
The ruling reaffirms the views of academics who estimated that the ‘less than total but more than
trivial’ principle advocated in Ramchurn would remain authoritative under the new law (see, for
example, Reed and Wake, above at 191; R. Fortson ‘The Modern Partial Defence of Diminished
Responsibility’ in Bohlander and Reed (eds), above). The case further suggests that the ‘recognised
medical condition’ requirement does encourage reference within expert evidence to diagnosis in
terms of the ICD-10 (Law Commission, above at para. 5.114). However, the judgment also embodies
undertones of familiar conflict between psychiatry and the law (S. Morse, Law and Psychiatry
Rethinking the Relationship (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984)). It highlights that role
confusion pervading the original plea has endured in the wake of the 2009 amendments.
Medical experts continue to express an opinion on the meaning of the term ‘substantial impairment’.
They also continue to disagree on the issue of the defendant's ostensible ‘abnormality’. In the instant
case, expert witnesses differed first as to whether B suffered from a ‘recognised medical condition’
and, secondly, if the jury were satisfied that he *J. Crim. L. 129 did so, on the extent to which the
disorder could constitute an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’. The fact that the latter is a legal and
not a medical term demonstrates that the ‘[l]aw and psychiatry are based on opposing paradigms,
they cannot work together’ (L. Kennefick, ‘Introducing a New Diminished Responsibility Defence for
England and Wales’ (2011) 74 MLR 750 at 765).
The jury are therefore left with the unenviable task of deciding between the competing views of
reputable medical experts (Quick and Wells, above). It would appear that, like its predecessor, the
new diminished responsibility plea will also be determined by which evidence the jury find more
convincing--the expert testimony provided on behalf of the defence or that provided for the Crown.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2012, 76(2), 122-129
© 2016 Vathek Publishing
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Substantially impaired
On 2 April 2005, the appellant (R) met with the victim and killed him by strangulation. R then told his
wife that he had kept gloves and a rope in his car and that he had used the rope from the car to kill
the victim. After having been arrested, R gave a number of false accounts including a false alibi, and
then sought to persuade a number of witnesses to give false evidence or change their statements, in
an endeavour to escape conviction.
After being charged with murder, R pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished
responsibility under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. A successful pleading of the partial defence
requires the following: at the time of the killing the defendant must have been suffering from an
abnormality of the mind; the abnormality of the mind must have arisen from a condition of arrested or
retarded development of the mind or any inherent causes or must have been induced by disease or
injury; and the abnormality of the mind must have substantially impaired the defendant's mental
responsibility for his acts or omissions in the commission of the fatal offence.
R was convicted of murder before Ipswich Crown Court after the jury rejected the concessionary
defence of diminished responsibility. R appealed after the trial judge provided two directions as to the
meaning of ‘substantially’ within ‘substantially impaired’. In the summing-up, the judge had provided
the jury with specimen directions as advocated by the Judicial Studies Board. The relevant passage
for the present purpose reads:
‘Substantially impaired’ means just that. You must conclude that his abnormality of the mind was a
real cause of the defendant's conduct. The defendant need not prove that his condition was the sole
cause of it, but he must show that it was more than a merely trivial one which did not make any real or
appreciable difference to his ability to control himself. (at [13])
Having retired to consider its verdict, the jury sought further assistance from the trial judge regarding
the difference between ‘trivial’ and ‘substantial’. In answering the request the judge gave a further
direction. He said:
… ‘Substantial’ does not mean ‘total’. That is to say the mental responsibility need not be totally
impaired, so to speak, destroyed altogether. The other end of the scale, ‘substantial’ does not mean
‘trivial’ or ‘minimal’. It is something in between and Parliament has left it to you to say on the evidence
was the mental responsibility impaired and if so, was it substantially impaired?
*J. Crim. L. 13 The word ‘substantial’ means more than some trivial degree of impairment which
does not make any appreciable difference to a person's ability to control himself but it means less
than total impairment. (at [14])
R appealed arguing that in each direction the trial judge had provided a different definition. R
contended that the judge had either erred in law or that s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 lacked the
necessary certainty to comply with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEAL, provided the language the trial judge uses does not exaggerate
the burden on the defendant, or improvise some extra-statutory additional obligation on the meaning
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of ‘substantially impaired’, no valid ground for complaint would exist. The main issue before the court
concerned the correctness of the directions of law given by the judge regarding the term ‘substantially
impaired’. The trial judge directed the jury in conventional terms in relation to the partial defence when
he advised that the jury is entitled and indeed bound to consider not only the medical evidence, but
the evidence on the whole facts and circumstances of the case.
The court rejected the suggestion that the second direction may have had the effect of undermining
the earlier direction in the summing-up, referring to R v Lloyd (1966) 50 Cr App R 61, where it was
accepted that there were different ways of explaining the same concept, and if necessary explaining
its relevance to the jury. In the circumstances of this trial (with the jury requiring further elucidation of
the concept of ‘substantial’ in the context of impairment) mere repetition of the trial judge's earlier
directions would not have helped.
The court was of the view that the trial judge's directions were sufficient to enable the court to say with
certainty that the jury was not satisfied that R's mental responsibility for his actions at the time of the
killing was substantially impaired.
COMMENTARY
The present case is another in a surfeit of authorities highlighting the problems associated with s. 2 of
the Homicide Act 1957. The s. 2 provisions have been subject to attack recently as having
insuperable definitional problems. In 2003, the Home Secretary requested the Law Commission to
consider and report on whether there should continue to be partial defences to murder and, if so,
whether they should remain separate partial defences or should be subsumed within a single partial
defence: Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004). The Law
Commission drew attention to Buxton LJ's contemptuous criticism that s. 2 of the 1957 Act definition
is ‘disastrous’ and ‘beyond redemption’ (Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004) para. 5.43). It has been
suggested that s. 2 encourages role confusion between jury, judge and psychiatrists. As a
consequence of this poor wording and resultant role confusion, it is possible to adopt both narrow and
wide interpretations of the provision. This often results in a ‘gross abuse’ of the partial defence (ibid.
at para. 5.43).
Notwithstanding the pervasive difficulties associated with s. 2(1), the issue raised in the present case
concerning the interpretation of the term *J. Crim. L. 14 ‘substantial impairment’ is infrequently
considered. In this case, the Court of Appeal noted that the 1995 authority of R v Mitchell [1995] Crim
LR 506 was the last occasion when an appellate court had been required to consider interpretation of
the term. Previously, the case of Lloyd had taken the approach that the term meant something ‘more
than trivial but less than total’. The court in Mitchell suggested that Lloyd amounted to authority that
the word ‘substantial’ is a word ‘for which one should not try to find a synonym. It is a word which
members of the jury, with their own common sense, can tell what it means’. As Professor Sir John
Smith noted, Mitchell ‘is a welcome departure from the current trend towards requiring the jury to be
directed to do what their common sense would naturally lead them to do anyway’ ([1995] Crim LR 506
at 506-7).
Despite the common-sense approach adopted by the courts, the role confusion alluded to previously
is exacerbated when the court is required to consider the adumbration of ‘substantial impairment’. In a
study undertaken on behalf of the Law Commission, Professor Mackay identified that although a
minority of psychiatrists restrict themselves to a consideration of whether the defendant was, in fact,
suffering from an ‘abnormality of the mind’, almost 70 per cent express an opinion on the meaning of
‘substantial impairment’ (Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004) para. 5.51). The question of ‘substantial
impairment’ is arguably not a matter of medical science, but a question which should be left to the jury
(ibid. at para. 5.198). In other jurisdictions this problem does not arise. Under the New South Wales
Law Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997, for example, no expert testimony shall
be given in relation to the term ‘substantial impairment’. The Attorney-General commented that this
would make the defence both ‘stricter’ and ‘tighter’ (Hansard, NSW Legislative Council, Second
Reading, 25 June 1997, 11065).
Notwithstanding the problems inherent within s. 2 of the 1957 Act, the Law Commission
recommended that ‘pending any full consideration of murder, section 2 should remain unreformed’
(Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004) para. 5.86). Despite this, the Law Commission advanced a
‘tentative suggestion’ (developed from a definition proposed by the Law Reform Commission of New
South Wales) on how s. 2 of the 1957 Act might be reformed (ibid. at para. 5.93).
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The Commission suggested that the current formulation could be improved by deleting the reference
to ‘substantial impairment of responsibility’. It was recommended that this term be replaced with an
explicit test, namely whether the substantially impaired capacity to understand, etc. was a significant
cause of the defendant's act in carrying out or taking part in the killing. The Commission suggested ‘a
significant cause’ to make it clear that it need not be the sole cause, but it must have had a real effect
on the defendant's conduct.
From 4 October 2010, s. 52(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (2009 Act) replaces the
pre-existing definition of ‘diminished responsibility’, as it appears in s. 2(1) of the 1957 Act, with new
subss (1), (1A) *J. Crim. L. 15 and (1B). This new plea is largely derived from the revised definition
of diminished responsibility proposed by the Law Commission. Maria Eagle, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Justice, suggested that the revised plea ‘is really just a clarification of the
way in which the defence works’. Nevertheless, s. 2(1), (1A) and (1B), as substituted for s. 2(1), is
radically different from its antecedent, and the scope of the availability of the concessionary defence
has been significantly altered.
New s. 2(1), (1A) and (1B) of the Homicide Act 1957 provides as follows:
(1) A person (‘D’) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D
was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which--
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D's ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(1A) Those things are--
(a) to understand the nature of D's conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning provides an
explanation for D's conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out
that conduct.
The term ‘substantial impairment’ contained within s. 2(1)(b) is one of very few remnants of the
original diminished responsibility plea. Seemingly, therefore, the common-sense approach adopted in
the cases of Lloyd, Mitchell and the present case will remain. Parliament has chosen to ignore the
Law Commission's suggestion that the revised plea could specifically exempt expert testimony on the
term ‘substantial impairment’ which would be in line with the position in NSW. In light of this,
Professor Mackay has suggested that medical experts will continue to provide their opinion on the
term ‘substantial impairment’ ([2010] Crim LR 290). It may be that Parliament was of the view that an
express exemption would restrict the scope of the concessionary defence. In NSW the exemption has
resulted in fewer pleas and the success rate of the plea in jury trials is lower: Judicial Commission of
NSW, Partial Defences to Murder in New South Wales 1990-2004, Research Monograph 28,
Guideline 20 (2006).
Nevertheless, it is futile to examine the potential scope of the term ‘substantial impairment’ in
sequestration from new subs. (1A) which is inevitably restrictive. The only activities of the mind which
are to be included are the three specified in subs. (1A). As Rudi Fortson QC highlights, new s. 2(1) of
the 1957 Act ‘will no longer involve a moral question [as to whether D's responsibility was
substantially impaired], but a factual one’: Criminal Bar Association of England and Wales, Homicide
Reforms under the CAJA 2009, Seminar 16 October 2010.
*J. Crim. L. 16 The first element of subs. (1A) requires a substantial impairment of D's ability to
understand the nature of his conduct. This element of the partial defence bears a resemblance to the
first limb of the M'Naghten Rules (1843) 10 CJ & F 200 at 210, which require D to prove that D ‘did
not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing’. Professor Mackay has suggested that the
terminology used in s. 2(1A)(a) of the 1957 Act appears more like a partial insanity plea than a plea of
diminished responsibility ([2010] Crim LR 290 at 296). Mackay contends that subs. (1A)(a) has the
potential to widen the ambit of the concessionary defence to include D who unsuccessfully claims
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insane automatism. This might include, for example, D ‘who is unable to understand the nature of his
conduct’ as a result of being only partially conscious when he kills V. The second and third elements
of subs. (1A) are modelled on the leading judgment in R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396:
‘Abnormality of mind’ … appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its
aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational
judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control
physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment. ([1960] 2 QB 396 at 403, emphasis supplied)
It might be suggested that the omission of the terms ‘as to whether an act is right or wrong’ and
‘physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment’ serves to widen the potential ambit of the
new plea. Nevertheless, as Mackay suggests, when the three alternatives under subs. (1A) are
considered alongside the remaining elements of the provision, there is a concern that these three
things will be more restrictive in scope than those which fell under s. 2(1) of the 1957 Act as originally
enacted.
Ultimately, the new provision does not detract from the fact that, in cases such as the present one,
the members of the jury will inevitably be called upon to use their collective common sense in
deciding whether D's ‘mental responsibility’ or indeed ‘D's ability’ was ‘substantially impaired’.
Seemingly, in cases of this nature, the decision will be dependent upon whom the jury find more
convincing--the defence or the Crown. Similarly, Parliament does not appear to have taken the
opportunity to alleviate the role-confusion concerns which were inherent in s. 2 of the 1957 Act
through this revised plea. As a final note, it is perhaps worth echoing the salutary warning of one of
the Law Commission's consultees: ‘Change is always subject to the risk of unintended consequences
together with an inevitable degree of speculation as to the extent of the need for change’ (Law Com.
Report No. 290 (2004) para. 5.81). Whether the common-sense approach advocated in the present
case does endure in the wake of the amendments to s. 2 of the 1957 Act remains to be seen.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2011, 75(1), 12-16
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*J. Crim. L. 193 On 15 November 2010, the appellant (C) killed his wife by striking her repeatedly
with a wooden baton before strangling her with a ligature. The victim's body was found on the living
room floor semi-naked. C was found in the loft with a noose around his neck. Two weeks before her
death, the victim left C and their two children to begin a ‘trial separation’. Both parties had a history of
clinical depression and their marriage was fraught with financial difficulties. The day before the killing,
the victim informed C that she had been having an affair with a man, Mr Montgomery, whom she had
met via a social networking site.
On the day of the killing, C accessed several websites containing material on suicide; among the
searches were entries referring to ‘sleeping pills’, ‘how to hang yourself’ and ‘the best suicide
methods’. C also accessed the victim's Facebook account where he ‘tortured’ himself over
photographs of the victim and Mr Montgomery. The victim's relationship status indicated that she was
‘separated’ and ‘open to offers’. C also found sexually explicit photographs which confirmed that his
wife had been having an affair. When confronted, the victim informed C that she had engaged in
sexual intercourse with five different men, going into graphic detail. The victim subsequently noticed
that C had accessed suicide websites and proceeded to taunt him. She told him that he did not have
the nerve and that ‘it would have been easier if you had, for all of us’. The attack on the victim
followed. C took explicit photographs of the victim in several different positions post mortem, and sent
abusive messages to Mr Montgomery via SMS. C then composed a ‘note to everyone’ before
preparing the noose.
At his trial for murder, C attempted to raise the partial defences of diminished responsibility and loss
of control. The latter is contained in ss 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (‘the 2009 Act’).
Section 54(1)(a) and (7) of the 2009 Act reduces a conviction of murder to one of voluntary
manslaughter where the defendant kills subject to a loss of control. The loss of control must be
attributable to at least one of two qualifying triggers. The first qualifying trigger is satisfied by a thing
said or things done or said (or both) which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character,
and caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger).
The second qualifying trigger requires D to fear serious violence from V against D or another
identified person (the ‘fear’ trigger).
*J. Crim. L. 194 To raise the defence successfully, the defendant must have lost his self-control in
response to the ‘seriously wronged’ and/or ‘fear’ trigger( s). The statutory formulation excludes sexual
infidelity as a permissible qualifying trigger and mandates, in effect, that the partial defence will only
be left to the jury if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence on
which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude that the
defence might apply. The primary issue in this case was whether ‘sexual infidelity’ ought to be
excluded where it did not constitute a thing done or said, but provided a context in which particular
words were used.
The trial judge considered that the remarks allegedly made by the victim concerning her sexual
infidelity were to be disregarded. The court observed that the remaining facts, vis-à-vis the taunts,
were insufficient to constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character. The trial judge
proceeded to leave diminished responsibility to the jury. C was convicted of murder before Reading
Crown Court after the jury rejected the diminished responsibility defence under the revised
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parameters of s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’). C appealed on the ground that the loss
of control defence should have been left to the jury.
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, sexual infidelity should be considered where it formed an
essential part of the context in which to make a just evaluation as to whether an ostensible qualifying
trigger satisfied the partial defence. The Court of Appeal noted that there are three components to the
loss of control defence. The first component, under s. 54(1)(a), requires the killing to have resulted
from the defendant's loss of control. Section 54(2) provides that the loss of control need not be
sudden.
The second component requires the loss of control to arise from the ‘fear’ and/or ‘seriously wronged’
trigger(s) (2009 Act, ss 54(1)(b) and 55(2), (3) and (4)(a)(b)). The ‘seriously wronged’ trigger requires
objective evaluation. Section 55 (6)(a)-(b) precludes the mitigation from the defendant who, looking
for trouble to the extent of inciting or exciting violence, loses his control. Under s. 55(6)(c), the fact
that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. In this respect, the statutory
provision is unequivocal: ‘loss of control triggered by sexual infidelity cannot, on its own, qualify as a
trigger’ (at [20]). The exclusionary clause is more problematic where the defendant relies on an
admissible trigger (or triggers) for which sexual infidelity provides an appropriate context. In this
situation, the jury should be directed:
(a) as to the statutory ingredients required of the qualifying trigger or triggers;
(b) as to the statutory prohibition against sexual infidelity on its own constituting a qualifying trigger;
(c) as to the features identified by the defence (or which are apparent to the trial judge) which are said
to constitute a permissible trigger or triggers;
*J. Crim. L. 195 (d) that, if these are rejected by the jury, in accordance with (b) above, sexual
infidelity must then be disregarded;
(e) that if, however, an admissible trigger may be present, the evidence relating to sexual infidelity
arises for consideration as part of the context in which to evaluate that trigger and whether the
statutory ingredients identified in (a) above may be established (at [49]).
The third component requires the jury to assess whether a person of D's sex and age, with a normal
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same
or a similar way to D (the ‘ordinary person’ test) (2009 Act, s. 54(1)(c)). Section 54(3) states that the
defendant's circumstances extends to ‘all’ of the circumstances except those bearing on his general
capacity for tolerance and self-restraint. In this regard, the issue of ‘sexual infidelity’ should, in
appropriate cases, be considered when assessing the third component of the concessionary defence.
The Court of Appeal considered that, in the instant case, ‘[t]he totality of the matters relied on as a
qualifying trigger, evaluated in the context of the evidence relating to the wife's sexual infidelity, and
examined as a cohesive whole, were of sufficient weight to leave to the jury’ (at [77]). The trial judge
had erred in ruling that the victim's sexual infidelity should be disregarded. Accordingly, the appeal
against conviction was allowed and a new trial ordered.
COMMENTARY
The instant case may be considered alongside the recent Court of Appeal ruling in R v Dowds [2012]
EWCA Crim 281, noted below (pp. 197-202). The interpretation and subsequent application of the
2009 Act in both cases highlight that the new loss of control defence and the heavily revised
diminished responsibility plea are in some respects too broad and in others too narrow. The judgment
in the present case demonstrates a judicial willingness to ignore the sexual infidelity limb of the loss of
control defence ‘on the assumption that legislation is not enacted with the intent or purpose that the
criminal justice system should operate so as to create injustice’ (at [39]). In Dowds, the Court of
Appeal adopted a restrictive view of the diminished responsibility plea on the basis that there is a
‘divergence between the level of impairment which may bring a patient within a DSM-IV classification
and the level necessary to have legal impact’ for the purposes of the ‘recognised medical condition’
requirement (Dowds at [30]). The language in both cases may be compelling, but the notion that the
judiciary is simply ignoring legislation on public policy grounds is disturbing, not least because it sets
an uncertain precedent for future cases.
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The ‘sexual infidelity’ prohibition has been described as a ‘formidably difficult provision’ and to be the
most ‘critical problem’ as regards the loss of control defence (at [13]-[14]). It is unnecessary to restate
the problems associated with defining the term ‘sexual infidelity’ and/or assessing the scope of the
‘words and acts constituting’ it, which are well *J. Crim. L. 196 documented (see D. Ormerod, Smith
and Hogan's Criminal Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) 521). The Court of Appeal in the
present case suggested that the compartmentalisation of sexual infidelity may ‘not be unduly
burdensome … where it is the only element relied on in support of a qualifying trigger’, in which case
it must be disregarded (at [39]). In most cases, however, sexual infidelity will be integral to the facts
and to ‘compartmentalise sexual infidelity and exclude it when it is integral to the facts as a whole …
is unrealistic and carries the potential for injustice’ (at [39]). Accordingly, their Lordships ruled that
where ‘sexual infidelity is integral to and forms an essential part of the context in which to make a just
evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of subsections 55(3) and (4), the
prohibition in section 55(1) (c) does not operate to exclude it’ (at [39]). The effect is that the victim's
actions beyond his or her sexual infidelity (for example, the victim's taunts about C's failed suicide
attempt) may satisfy the qualifying trigger(s) when considered in the context of that infidelity (V. Baird,
“‘Infidelity Plus”--the new defence against murder’, Guardian, 2012, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jan/23/infidelity-plus-defence-murder, accessed 8
April 2012).
In the present case, the fact that the victim's taunts per se were regarded insufficient to satisfy the
seriously wronged trigger was considered immaterial. Accordingly, following this case, the ‘sexual
infidelity’ exclusion operates where it is the only element relied on in support of a qualifying trigger (at
[37]). It is difficult to see when ‘sexual infidelity’ will be the only element to be relied upon in support of
a qualifying trigger. As their Lordships stated, ‘daily experience in both criminal and family courts
demonstrates that breakdown of relationships, whenever they occur, and for whatever reason, is
always fraught with tension and difficulty …’ (at [16]).
The nub of the problem is arguably Parliament's egregious focus on ‘sexual infidelity’ as a catch-all
term for those cases where a defendant kills out of sexual jealousy and/or envy (Memorandum from
Jeremy Horder to the House of Commons (Coroners and Justice Bill, Committee Stage, 3 February
2009, CJ 01)), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmpublic/coroners/memos/ucm102.htm,
accessed 8 April 2012)). The rationale underpinning the controversial exclusion appears to be to
prevent the loss of control defence from being made available to those who kill out of envy, jealousy
and proprietorialness (ibid.). As Horder notes, however, ‘by focusing on the quaint notion of sexual
“infidelity” … [the prohibition] distinguishes between sexual jealousy (possessiveness about
something you have) … at the unjustified expense of sexual envy (possessiveness about something
you do not have)’ (ibid.). Although infidelity killings may be prompted by sexual jealousy, such killings
may also arise in response to extreme breaches of trust, excessive taunting and sexual humiliation
(A. Reed and N. Wake, ‘Sexual Infidelity Killings: Contemporary Standardisations and Comparative
Stereotypes’ in M. Bohlander and A. Reed (eds), Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility:
Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing: London, 2011) 129.
Further, *J. Crim. L. 197 envy and proprietorialness are more readily associated with stalking and
the obsessed stalker who may or may not have had a prior relationship with the victim (Memorandum
from Jeremy Horder to the House of Commons above). It appears paradoxical to exclude the former
case automatically whilst leaving the latter to be considered by the trial judge.
The recent Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking Law Reform concluded that stalking is
becoming increasingly common, particularly with the growth in use of social network sites (L.
Richards, H. Fletcher and D. Jewell, Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking Law Reform.
Main Findings and Recommendations (2012), available at
http://www.protectionagainststalking.org/InquiryReportFinal.pdf, accessed 8 April 2012). Despite this,
the sexual infidelity exclusion fails to extend to cases like that of R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312,
where an envious stalker stabbed his former girlfriend's new paramour, because such cases do not
include any form of sexual infidelity (referred to in the judgment of the present case at [18]).
Nevertheless, defendants like Stingel will remain ineligible to claim the loss of control defence since
the trial judge has the authority to remove pleas predicated on possessiveness and jealousy from jury
consideration (Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Cm 290 (2004) para. 3.150; R v Smith
(Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 at 169). In this regard, the sexual infidelity prohibition is superfluous since
the loss of control defence will only be left to the jury if sufficient evidence is raised in relation to the
defence which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude
that the defence might apply. Despite the confusing rationale, the controversial exclusion remains part
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of the loss of control defence. Nevertheless, the present ruling indicates that the prohibition will rarely
be invoked since it is unlikely that sexual infidelity will be raised in isolation from other factors.
Nicola Wake
J. Crim. L. 2012, 76(3), 193-197
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CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE SCENE 
Question 1: Should the Commission’s review and any recommendations for 
reform be limited to the victims of family violence who commit homicide? 
 
No. There is concern that the narrow focus on victims of family violence 
potentially neglects other vulnerable offenders within the criminal justice system. 
For present purposes2, these can be grouped into three categories: (a) those in 
family violence-type situations, but where there is no familial link or 
guardian/intimate relationship (‘fear’ cases); (b) those who suffer from a 
recognised medical condition short of insanity (‘diminished responsibility’ 
cases); and, (c) those who kill a terminally ill friend or relative (‘mercy killing’ 
cases).   
 
Categories (b) and (c) would require the consideration of alternative defence 
models, and while other jurisdictions have considered iterations of provocation, 
excessive self-defence and diminished responsibility (with reference to mercy 
killers) at the same time 3, it is not uncommon for these defences to be considered 
separately. 4   In the context of this review, it makes sense to consider self-
defence and the potential introduction of a new partial defence for those who kill 
in fear simultaneously, not least because a failure to assess how the two might 
operate in conjunction with one another has the potential to create difficulties in                                                  
1 Nicola Wake is Senior Lecturer in  Law and Risk and Vulnerability  Research Coordinator for 
the Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Northumbria, England. 
Contact nicola.wake@northumbria.ac.uk if you have any questions regarding the content of this 
submission or would like any further in formation. I am incred ibly gratefu l to Professor Alan 
Reed (Associate Dean for Research and Innovation, Northumbria University) for his very  helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this response. Any errors or omissions remain my own. 
2  It is clear that vulnerable categories of offender within the criminal justice system are not 
limited to these three categories (for example, young offenders may be categorised as 
vulnerable), but these categories are useful for present purposes. 
3 See, for example, Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, 2004) 
(E&W). 
4 See, for example, NSW Select Committee, The Partial Defence of Provocation (NSWSC, 2013) 
(NSW). 
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practice. 5 It is worthy of note, however, that the actions of a primary victim6 
attempting to defend themselves/another from familial violence will rarely result 
in homicide, and, as such, it is important that any reform recommendations to 
self-defence address instances of defensive conduct not amounting to lethal 
force. 
 
Given that category (a) is most relevant to the area under consideration by the 
Law Commission, the analysis that follows focuses solely upon this category. 
The review addresses three situations that may be likened to familial violence, 
i.e. the victim is subjected to prolonged and systematic psychological, sexual, 
and/or physical harm. The situations selected include individuals subjected to 
human trafficking, those trapped by ostensible gang membership, and third party 
abuse. The situations identified are non-exhaustive, but are used to highlight 
potential problems with focusing solely upon victims of family violence. These 
examples demonstrate that those experiencing fear, anguish and desperation in 
the face of abuse, ought to have the same criminal justice system options 
available to them whether that abuse emanates from an intimate partner/family 
member or a stranger/third party; the mental state of the victim in these cases is 
broadly comparable, and this is why reform recommendations should not be 
arbitrarily restricted based upon relationship status. In all three situations 
outlined, it is recognised that women and children are particularly vulnerable. 
 
Trafficking (and family violence) 
The first family-violence-type scenario addressed relates to human trafficking. 
The Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking as: 
 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force                                                  
5 For example, the d ifficult ies associated with changing from a self-defence to a loss of control 
claim in England and Wales have been highlighted in the literature; Nico la Wake, ‘Battered 
Women, Start led Householders  and Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian  
Perspectives’ (2013) Journal of Criminal  Law,  77(5), 433-457 (ISSN: 1740-5580). Dawes, 
Hatter & Bowyer [2013] WLR (D) 130. 
6 The ‘primary vict im’ is the person ‘who in  the abuse history of the relationship) is experiencing 
ongoing coercive and controlling behaviours from their intimate partner’; Family Vio lence Death 
Review Committee, Fourth Annual Report (FVFRC, 2014) 74 (NZ). 
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or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.7   
 
It is foreseeable, although it may be rare, that a victim subject to human 
trafficking, like the primary victim, may kill a trafficker (an abuser) out of fear 
and desperation. As with the primary victim, the victim of human trafficking is in 
a position of vulnerability and is therefore more likely to act when the trafficker 
is off-guard and, where available, with the use of a weapon. If amendments to the 
present law are limited to cases involving familial violence, this vulnerable 
category of offender would potentially be unable to raise a defence largely on the 
basis that the attacker was not a family member or relative. The relationship 
between the victim and the trafficker would likely need to be construed as one of 
dependency in order for a familial violence defence to operate; the problem with 
focusing primarily on familial violence is that not all abusive relationships 
include a familial link with the predominant aggressor. 
 
The following victim testimonies are derived from the US Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report 2015. The report notes that they are designed to be 
‘illustrative only’. 8 For present purposes, these illustrations are used to highlight 
situations where, were the victim to use lethal force, in order to effect an escape, 
most would expect that some form of mitigation ought to be available.9 
                                                 
7 The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and 
Children (The Palermo Protocol), ratified 19 July 2002. 
8  US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (US DoS, 2015) available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2015/243362.htm> accessed 14 December 2015. 
9 Thankfully, support was afforded to these victims before the situations reached the level of 
lethal v iolence; ibid. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and, as such, it is appropriate that 
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 Natalie and Dara, eager to earn money and go to 
school, left Nigeria with the help of men who 
arranged their travel and convinced them good jobs 
awaited them in Cote d’Ivoire. Once there, Natalie 
and Dara were instead forced to have sex with men 
every night to pay back a $2,600 ‘travel debt’.10 
 When 14 years old, Cara met Max while on vacation 
in Greece with her mother. She fell in love with him 
and, after only a few weeks, Max persuaded her to 
move in with him, rather than return to England. He 
soon broke his promise to take care of her and forced 
Cara to have sex with strangers. Max first convinced 
her that the money she made was helping to keep 
them together; he later threatened to kill her mother 
if she tried to stop.  In time, Max gave Cara to 
another trafficker who forced her to send postcards to 
her mother depicting a happy life in Athens.11 
 Tanya was only 11 years old when her mother traded 
her to a drug dealer for sex, in exchange for heroin. 
Tanya was raped, forced to commit sexual acts whilst  
being video recorded, and made to take heroin.12 
 At 13 years old, Effia moved to the United States with 
family friends, excited to learn English and go to 
school-something her parents in Ghana could not  
afford. When she arrived, these so-called friends 
forbade her from attending school and forced her to 
clean, cook and watch their children for up to 18 
hours a day. The father physically and sexually 
                                                                                                                                    
defences are available to those who kill in similar circumstances. Defences should not be 
arbitrarily restricted to a specific relationship dynamic. 
10  This example is taken verbatim from the Trafficking in Persons Report, ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 This example is derived, mutatis mutandis, from the Trafficking in Persons Report (n 8). 
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abused her. Effia received no payment and could not  
use the telephone or go outside.13 
 
The global increase in human trafficking and modern day slavery means that 
there is a greater chance that victims may use violence in order to escape. New 
Zealand is recognised as ‘a destination country for foreign men and women 
subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking within the country’.14 That the New 
Zealand government has instigated its first human trafficking prosecution this 
year, 15 and two traffickers have been convicted in child sex trafficking cases, 
highlights that human trafficking is a live issue in New Zealand, as it is in many 
other jurisdictions. 16 The New Zealand Law Society have suggested that the case 
may be ‘merely the tip of the iceberg and New Zealand should have growing 
concern about human trafficking and forced labour exploitation.’ 17 It is possible 
that a case may arise where a victim of human trafficking kills in order to escape 
the terrifying and bleak existence to which they have been subjected. The 
feelings of fear, desperation, and helplessness are likely to be similar to those 
experienced by the primary victim. The question that ought to be asked is 
whether it is primary victims only that the recommendations ought to protect or 
whether it is victims of abuse more generally who find themselves in the same or 
a similar situation to the primary victim, but for the intimate relationship or 
familial link? It may be that the latter case is rare, but so too are cases where the 
primary victim kills a predominant aggressor; nevertheless, most would agree 
that these vulnerable individuals merit the compassion of the law. 
 
Ostensible gang membership 
The second situation identified is that of ostensible gang membership. Criminal 
gangs may exploit victims of human trafficking, but not all gangs are involved in 
human trafficking. All criminal gangs may create or foster a situation whereby                                                  
13 This example is taken verbatim from the Trafficking in Persons Report, ibid. 
14 ibid 260. 
15  Charles Anderson and Jess Pullar, ‘Trio plead not guilty in New Zealand’s first human 
trafficking trial’ (2015) available at: <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/73817107/trio-plead-
not-guilty-in-new-zealands-first-human-trafficking-trial> accessed 14 December 2015.    
16 (n 8) 260. 
17 New Zealand Law Society, ‘Modern day slavery and human trafficking’ available at : 
<https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/lawtalk/lawtalk-archives/issue-851/modern-day-slavery-and-
human-trafficking> accessed 14 December 2015.  See, generally, (n 8). 
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ostensible members are, in fact, victims of the gang who feel unable to escape. In 
many instances it can become very difficult to identify a victim. Potential victims 
may be reluctant to disclose details of the trafficking or gang membership for 
fear of punishment by the authorities, and/or traffickers/gang members. 18  A 
trafficker or gang member may become romantically involved with the victim, 
thereby adding to the difficulty in distinguishing between the victim and the 
perpetrator.19   
 
The Commission note that ‘gangs are environments that compound and 
exacerbate traditional assumptions about women’s roles and violence towards 
women’. 20 There are two circumstances to consider. Firstly, the circumstances of 
individuals who are involved in intimate relationships with gang members and 
are being subjected to abuse within the relationship.  The second type of 
circumstance covers individuals who are not in an intimate relationship with a 
gang member, but are being subjected to abuse by one or more gang members. 
The parameters of the present review may assist individuals engaged in 
relationships with gang members, by raising awareness that the individual is, in 
fact a victim of familial violence and not a willing participant in the gang. At 
present, there is a lack of awareness of the dynamics of familial abuse in gang-
related contexts. The review is less likely to assist those who are not in an 
‘intimate relationship’ with a gang member. 
 
It is worth noting at the outset, that distinguishing between genuine and 
ostensible gang membership will often be difficult. The criminal law has adopted 
a strict exclusionary approach to those who voluntarily associate with criminal 
gangs. For example, in both New Zealand and England and Wales, those who 
engage with gang members are unable to avail themselves of the defence of 
duress by threats due to their prior fault in associating with the gang. 21  The                                                  
18 See, generally, UK Home Office, Victims o f modern slavery (UKHO, 2015) availab le at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450834/Vict ims_
of_modern_slavery_frontline_staff_guidance_v2_0_ext.pdf> accessed 14 December 2015. 
19  ibid 18. Of course, ‘romantic attachments’ may be covered by the parameters of this 
consultation. 
20 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of family violence who commit homicide 
(NZ Law Com, IP No 39, 2015) para 2.32. 
21 Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20 (CCA); Shepherd (1988) 86 Cr App R 47 (CA); Sharp [1987] QB 853 
(CA); Ali [1995] Crim LR 303, CA; Baker & Ward [1999] 2 Cr App R; Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. 
 7 
principle established by the House of Lords in Hasan 22  is that the excuse of 
duress by threats is not available to someone who has voluntarily put himself in a 
position in which he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of 
being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence. 23 More recently, in 
England and Wales, gang membership has been utilised to restrict the availability 
of the loss of control defence. In Gurpinar & Kojo-Smith,24 the Court of Appeal 
appeared to suggest that an ordinary person would not act in the same or a 
similar way to a gang member. The problem is that in some cases, ostensible 
gang membership may occur, particularly in the context of abuse. In these cases, 
focusing on the gang membership, in the absence of appropriate consideration of 
the abuse has the potential to lead to unjust convictions/sentences. As the 
Commission identify,25 this problem was illustrated in the case of Wihongi26: 
 
 
Wihongi stabbed her estranged partner, Mr Hirini, 
following an argument over him taking several thousand 
dollars in compensation she had received, during the 
course of which he demanded sexual intercourse. Before 
issuing the eight-year sentence, Justice Wild of the High 
Court described Wihongi’s ‘history of victimhood’. At the 
age of 13, Wihongi suffered an anoxic brain injury 
following a drugs overdose in response to an argument 
with her mother. Upon leaving hospital, she was unable 
to walk or speak properly and when she eventually 
returned to school she lasted less than one month before 
leaving and never going back. From that point, Wihongi 
had consistently abused alcohol and, at the age of 14, 
was sexually abused by her drug and alcohol counsellor. 
Shortly thereafter, Wihongi began a relationship with Mr                                                  
22 Hasan, ibid. 
23 Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 716 [12]. 
24 [2015] EWCA Crim 178. 
25 NZ Law Com, IP No 39, 2015 (n  20) para 2.33. The Commission note, in part icular, that 
provocation was relevant at sentencing despite not being raised at trial (the offence having taken 
place prior to the repeal of provocation); para 5.39. 
26 HC Napier CRI 2009-041-2096 [2010] NZHC 2034 (30 August 2010). 
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Hirini’s older brother who prostituted her for money and 
drugs over a six-month period.  At the age of 16, she 
commenced a  ‘tempestuous and chaotic’ relationship 
with Mr Hirini, a ‘Black Power’ gang member. The 
relationship was marked by alcohol abuse and domestic 
violence and Wihongi was gang-raped many times by 
members of the  ‘Black Power’ gang.  At the age of 19, a 
member of the gang threatened to harm Wihongi’s baby 
daughter before raping her in her own home. When she 
was 26, an intruder broke into her home and hit her over 
the head with a full bottle of beer in front of her children. 
Justice Wild was of the opinion that Hirini’s demand for 
sexual intercourse triggered Wihongi’s loss of self-
control.  He considered that Wihongi’s violent response 
may have been the product of  ‘an overwhelming sense of 
anger, threat and fear driven by a combination of 
cognitive impairment, the effects of repeated trauma, 
personality dysfunction and the chaotic and conflicted 
relationship she had with the victim.’ Women’s Refuge 
extolled the sentence of the High Court as ‘brave and 
right’, but the Court of Appeal subsequently substituted 
the eight-year prison term with a  sentence  of  12  years  
on  grounds  that Wihongi represented  a  ‘high  risk  of  
reoffending’  due  to  her  association  with  the gang.27 
 
It is clear that there is a lack of understanding regarding the nature of intimate 
partner violence in gang related settings. The problem is that once a primary 
victim becomes associated with a gang, dissociation from that gang can be very 
difficult. Gang members may demand money or force the individual to commit a 
crime. In other instances the gang member may be punished before being 
allowed to leave the gang. In cases involving the primary victim, they may                                                  
27  Extract taken verbatim from Nico la Wake, Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive 
Restriction Model and Abolition of the Provocation Defence’ in Ben Livings, Alan Reed and 
Nico la Wake (eds) Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives 
from Law and Medicine (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015) 365-405 [references omitted]. 
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simply not be able to leave the gang because they are too frightened to do so, or 
alternatively because the predominant aggressor and other gang members will 
not allow it. 
 
In cases, where there is no intimate relationship between the individual and the 
gang member, that individual may continue to be vulnerable to abuse from gang 
members. Vulnerable individuals, particularly women and children who have 
been repeatedly failed by the system in devastating ways may seek refuge in a 
gang; for these individuals, the gang may offer protection from traumatic familial 
abuse. 28 The problem is that such protection comes at a high price, particularly 
for women, who may be subjected to psychological, sexual and violent abuse by 
members of the gang. It is common for intimate relationships to exist between 
gang members, but this is not always the case, and it is therefore important to 
ensure that any revisions to self-defence and/or the introduction of a new partial 
defence do not unjustifiably exclude vulnerable categories of offender on the 
grounds that there is no familial link between the offender and their abuser.  
 
Third party abuse 
Outside the context of gang membership and human trafficking, abuse may be 
committed by a third party, not necessarily a partner or relative.  An individual in 
a position of trust, for example, a teacher, a counsellor, a health worker in 
relation to a child or vulnerable adult, may abuse that position. In cases where 
the individual is particularly vulnerable it is sadly not uncommon for this abuse 
to be repeated by the perpetrator. In such situations, the vulnerable individual 
may feel trapped, frightened and desperate to escape the situation. It is possible 
in these circumstances that an individual may respond to that abuse with 
violence. As previously noted, recommendations for reform ought to cover 
familial violence-type situations, rather than being limited to cases involving 
family violence. 
 
                                                 
28 Glennis Dennehy, ‘Troubled journeys: an analysis of women's reality experience within  New 
Zealand gangs’ (University of Canterbury, 2000) available at: 
<http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/5629> accessed 14 December 2015.  
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The ‘fear that any perceived widening of defences to homicide may be 
successfully utilised by “undeserving” defendants’29 is not an adequate reason to 
exclude entire categories of vulnerable offenders, where the fatal conduct is in 
response to genuine fear; any new defence in this area ought to capture deserving 
cases, whilst being robust enough to exclude unmeritorious cases. The lack of 
appropriate defences/partial defences in this context is inherently unjust. It is 
inappropriate to label as murderers those whose responsibility has been 
substantially impaired by the abuse they have suffered. The presumption in 
favour of life imprisonment in New Zealand, combined with the strict sentencing 
regime, means that such individuals are also likely to receive lengthy prison 
sentences. The Law Commission is urged to consider vulnerable offenders who 
kill in fear outside the family violence situation, but where the circumstances of 
the case may be liked to family violence cases. 
 
CHAPTER 2: FAMILY VIOLENCE 
Question 2: We welcome feedback on our discussion of family violence and the 
circumstances of primary victims who kill their abusers. 
 
The recommendation that the ‘overall architecture’ of family violence be 
considered in these cases is a welcome one.30 It is important to assist the jury 
(and the criminal justice system) in understanding the circumstances of the 
primary victim. A shift to considering the circumstances of the primary victim is 
important because this should encourage a departure from the psychologising of 
victims of domestic abuse through ‘battered woman syndrome’ or ‘battered 
person syndrome’; casting the primary victim’s response as irrational as opposed 
to reasonable in the circumstances is inherently unfair. A shift to considering the 
circumstances of family violence is needed in cases of this context. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW-IS THERE A 
NEED FOR REFORM 
Question 3: Should it be possible for a defendant who is a victim of family 
violence to be acquitted on the basis that he or she acted in self-defence where:                                                  
29 (n 20) para 1.20. 
30 ibid, para 2.50. 
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(a) the harm sought to be avoided was not imminent or immediate; and/or 
(b) the fatal force was not proportionate to the force involved in the harm or 
threatened harm? 
 
(a) A reassessment of the interpretation and application of self-defence is 
required. The focus ought to be on whether the defendant believed that 
force was necessary. The use of force may be necessary, even in cases 
where it is not regarded imminent in the traditional sense. For example, 
the primary victim may experience a state of on-going fear linked to 
abuse. In most cases, therefore, the threat to the primary victim may be 
almost always imminent. Unfortunately, the current restrictive 
interpretation of imminence excludes fear of an overarching, on-going, 
impending threat to the life of the primary victim, and to those to whom 
she is responsible. It is not a change to the current wording of the defence 
that is required, but further clarification as to what imminence may mean 
in the context of abuse. The significance of the primary victim’s 
‘perception of danger is not its imminence. It is that it renders the 
defendant’s use of force really necessary.’31 Future reforms must assist in 
changing engrained perspectives of familial violence, and a reassessment 
of current provisions would be a useful starting point. It may be that an 
additional clause is needed which clarifies the ‘necessity’ requirement 
and/or bespoke jury directions advising jurors that a pattern of abuse 
suffered by the defendant may cause the defendant to believe that force is 
necessary, depending upon the circumstances of the case.  
 
(b) Similarly a reassessment of the concept of reasonableness/proportionality 
is required in cases involving familial violence. For example, it may be 
reasonable for the primary victim to use a weapon in the circumstances, 
as she perceives them to be. The predominant aggressor has exerted 
dominance over the primary victim for a significant period of time so the 
primary victim knows that she cannot defend herself without the use of a                                                  
31 Lavellee [1990] 1 SCR 852. 
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weapon. She may have previously been severely beaten for attempting to 
defend herself. This fear means that it may be reasonable or 
proportionate to strike more than once or even a number of times. This is 
not about saying that disproportionate force can be utilised, but about 
recognising that the concepts of proportionality and/or reasonableness 
ought to be interpreted in light of the context that force is used. This 
means that what is reasonable/proportionate will often depend not only 
upon the threat of harm, but also the respective sizes of the parties, and 
the circumstances (history) of the defensive conduct.  
 
Question 4: If the answer to question 3 is yes, do you consider that legislative 
reform is necessary to achieve that objective? 
 
As previously noted, additional clauses could be inserted into the current law that 
explain the concepts of necessity (imminence) and proportionality in the context 
of family-violence-type situations (this point is explored further in relation to 
questions 8-13 below). Alternatively, bespoke jury directions, designed to 
explain the concepts or necessity and proportionality could be provided.   
 
Question 5: Do you consider there is a case for reform to recognise reduced 
culpability of victims of family violence (where self-defence does not apply)? 
 
There is a need to introduce a partial defence (PD) or an alternative homicide 
offence (AO) capable of recognising the reduced culpability of the primary 
victim who kills in cases where self-defence does not apply. The benefits 
associated with recognising reduced culpability include, inter alia: 
 
 A potential reduction in the number of murder charges being brought in 
these cases, because it is possible to charge an alternative offence (AO). 
 The primary victim is less likely to plead guilty to murder on the basis 
that there is a ‘fall back’ option should self-defence fail (PD or AO); 
 Some cases may not justify an acquittal on the basis of self-defence, but 
the circumstances are such that a murder conviction would not accurately 
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reflect societal expectations and the reduced culpability level of the 
primary victim (PD or AO); 
 A clear message as to why jurors reached their decision is provided in 
cases where the primary victim is convicted if an AO or a PD is accepted. 
 The availability of an AO or PD would help to reduce the current practice 
of jury nullification (manslaughter verdicts being returned on grounds 
that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea, despite significant 
evidence that the defendant did have the relevant mens rea) that appears 
to be operating in relation to these cases. 
 Conviction of an AO or the successful raising of a PD would also send a 
clear message to the sentencing judge that the case is one that society 
recognises as carrying a lower level of culpability.  
 In terms of fair labelling, in most cases (if not all) it will be inherently 
unfair to label the primary victim a murderer. 
 
The Issues Paper raises valid concerns regarding the introduction of an AO or 
PD, but the benefits to introducing a new provision far outweigh the potential 
issues identified. 
 
Question 6: Do you consider there is a need to improve understanding of the 
dynamics of family violence by those operating in the criminal justice system? 
 
The problems associated with understanding the dynamics of family violence 
cannot be resolved by legislative amendments alone. Individuals within the 
criminal justice system need to be in a position to recognise when domestic 
violence is in issue for the purposes of dealing with the primary victim, and 
providing appropriate instruction/direction, etc. 
 
Question 7: Do you think there are currently problems with introducing family 
violence evidence, including expert witness evidence, in criminal trials? 
 
Problems with introducing family violence evidence 
The lack of a formal direction requiring that family violence evidence be 
admitted where it is in issue means that in some cases appropriate guidance may 
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not be provided to the trial judge and the jury. This could be rectified by 
legislative amendments relating to the admissibility of social framework 
evidence, and specific jury directions, considered further below. 
 
There is a genuine concern that evidence could be used to demean the victim. 
The trial of Clayton Weatherston provides a fundamental example of this issue.32 
Following the defendant's protracted televised testimony whereby he claimed 
that he had killed the victim because of ‘the emotional pain that she [had] caused 
[him]’. 33 Weatherston alleged that the victim had contracted an STI following 
casual sex with a stranger whilst on a trip. He led evidence that she attacked him 
and read extracts from her diary to the court that he claimed showed that she had 
a tendency towards violence. 34  Weatherston's unrepentant televised testimony 
was branded a ‘national disgrace’ 35  and there was a prevailing view that 
Weatherston had used the provocation defence as a vehicle to place the victim on 
trial. 36  Despite the ostensible difficulties associated with the introduction of 
social framework evidence, the fact remains that in order to understand the 
‘circumstances’ of the primary victim, contextual information must be adduced 
and the introduction of a social framework model, with appropriate limitations, 
would assist in ensuring that such evidence is made available under the same 
conditions in each case. The difficulties identified could also be avoided by 
legislatively authorising the trial judge to refuse to hear evidence that 
unnecessarily demeans the victim.37  This authorisation should not limit the use 
of evidence providing an important contextual narrative or prevent the use of 
evidence where there are good reasons for its admission. The effect of such a 
clause would be to address ‘the despicable practice of gratuitous blame directed                                                  
32  Clayton Robert Weatherston v The Queen [2011] NZCA 276, 2. This analysis of the 
Weatherston case is derived from ‘Battered Women, Startled  Householders  and Psychological 
Self-Defence:  Anglo-Australian  Perspectives’ (n 5) 454-6. 
33 Weatherston, ibid. 
34 ibid, 25. 
35 Jarod Booker, ‘Jury finds Weatherston guilty of murder’, New Zealand Herald, 22 Ju ly 2009, 
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10585763, 
accessed on 14 August 2013. See also Hamidzadeh v R  [2012] NZCA 550 (28 November 2012), 
the first case to consider the impact of provocative words or conduct on sentencing for murder. 
For a detailed analysis of the Hamidzadeh case see, Warren brookbanks, ‘Provocation and 
Sentencing’ (2013) (April) New Zealand Law Journal 120-4. 
36 Booker ibid, 144. 
37 See, for example, Ev idence Act 2008 (Vic), section 135 (d). See generally, Jeremy Gans and 
Andrew Palmer, Uniform Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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at victims during homicide trials’, whilst simultaneously allowing evidence 
relating to family violence to be admitted.38 
 
There is also genuine concern that the predominant aggressor might attempt to 
manipulate the system by invoking family violence provisions where this is 
unwarranted. The surreptitious nature of family violence, combined with 
manipulation exhibited by the predominant aggressor may render it difficult in 
some cases to distinguish between genuine and disingenuous claims. 39 This may 
leave the relevant defence(s) open to abuse, in addition to creating suspicion in 
genuine cases. There is significant literature on this issue40, and the Victorian 
case of Creamer41 provides a pertinent illustration of the potential difficulties. 
 
The relationship between Creamer and the aggressor 
was described as 'largely, if not entirely, dysfunctional.'42 
Each engaged in extra-marital affairs, encouraged by the 
aggressor. 43  The aggressor frequently requested that 
Creamer engage in group sex, which she 'resented 
strongly'. 44  On the weekend of the killing, Creamer 
believed that the aggressor had arranged for her to 
engage in group sex. According to her evidence, the 
aggressor had hit her in the genitals with a knobkerrie 
while she was sleeping, accused her of having sex with 
his brother, and insisted that she smell his semen stained 
sheets before placing them over her head.45 Immediately 
before the fatal act, the aggressor repeatedly smacked 
Creamer in the face and threatened to 'finish her off',                                                  
38 Hansard, Legislat ive Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 
2014 (Vic), second reading 3 September 2014, Mr McCurdy, Murray Valley, 3138. 
39 See, for example, the cases of Creamer [2011] VSC 196 and Sherna [2011] VSCA 242; [2009] 
VSC 526. 
40 See, in particular, DVRCV, Justice or Judgement? The Impact of Victorian Homicide Law 
Reforms on Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate Partners (DVRCV Discussion Paper No 9 
2013). 
41 Creamer (n 39).  
42 ibid [6]. 
43 ibid [7]. 
44 ibid [7] and [14]. 
45 ibid [17] and [19]. A knobkerrie is a South African weapon in the form of a stick with a knob 
on the end of it [20]. 
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before attempting to push his penis in her mouth and 
urinating on her. 46  Creamer managed to hit the 
aggressor in the genitals before grabbing a knife and 
stabbing him to death. The prosecution asserted that 
rather than being a victim of domestic abuse, Creamer 
had initially denied her involvement in the killing 
because she had no excuse. She was portrayed as being 
jealous of the aggressor's extramarital affairs and 
annoyed at his decision to leave her for his former wife.47 
The forensic evidence did not fully accord with 
Creamer's account, and the sentencing judge rejected a 
significant proportion of her evidence, describing her as 
an 'unsophisticated witness'. 48  In particular, Coghlan J 
suggested that the jury had rejected Creamer's allegation 
that she had been raped previously by the aggressor 
because Creamer chose to stay with him, and had not 
disclosed such evidence prior to trial.49  
 
Toole notes that the availability of defensive homicide 
worked to Creamer's advantage. Rather than 'being 
obsessive, jealous and controlling...her husband 
encouraged and facilitated [Creamer's] affairs’.50 In this 
respect, Toole argues that defensive homicide had the 
'potential to both protect and criminalise lethal conduct 
by women in inappropriate and unintended ways’. 51  In 
contrast, the Domestic Violence Resource Centre 
Victoria contends that this assessment demonstrates a 
'lack of understanding about how psychological 
manipulation, sexual degradation and coercive control                                                  
46 ibid [21]-[22]. 
47 ibid [10]-[12]. 
48 ibid [16]. 
49 ibid [32]. 
50 Kellie Toole, 'Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before the New Victorian 
Law' [2012] Monash University Law Review 36, 250, 283. 
51 ibid 286. 
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are forms of family violence'.52 The primary victim may 
feel unable to disclose details of abuse because 'of a deep 
sense of shame and self-blame'.53 It is worrying that such 
abuse continues to be viewed at the 'lowest end of the 
spectrum'.54 The amendments to prevent victim blaming 
and fact fabrication are welcome, but it may be difficult 
in practice to reliably distinguish genuine from 
disingenuous facts, particularly given the hidden nature 
of domestic abuse.55 
 
The difficulties associated with distinguishing genuine from disingenuous claims 
will always be a potential issue in the context of familial abuse. The best way to 
reduce the risks identified above is to ensure that any legislative reforms are 
combined with a comprehensive education package designed to assist those 
within the legal system to appropriately respond to such cases.56 
 
Problems with expert evidence 
In relation to expert evidence, more specifically, a fundamental issue is the 
continued use of the term ‘battered woman syndrome’. 57 In England and Wales 
and New Zealand, recognition of battered woman syndrome initially permitted 
the introduction of medical evidence to help jurors to understand the 
psychological effects of domestic abuse, whilst contemporaneously depicting the 
abused defendant as extraordinary or irrational. Where expert testimony on 
battered women syndrome is provided, this potentially has the effect of recasting 
the defendant as helpless or psychologically deranged suggesting that her 
                                                 
52 DVRCV (n 40) 28. See also, Evan Stark, ‘Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered 
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control’ (1995) 58 Albany Law Review 973. 
53 DVRCV ibid 27. 
54 Creamer [2012] VSCA 182 [41]. 
55 Extract from Nicola Wake, ‘‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’: a  new partial defence 
for primary victims who kill’ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2) 151-77. 
56 See Danielle Tyson, Debbie Kirkwood, and Mandy Mckenzie,  ‘Family Vio lence in Domestic 
Homicide Cases: A Case Study of Women who Killed Int imate Partners Post-Legislative Reform 
in Victoria, Australia’ Violence Against Women International Journal (forthcoming 2016).  
57  Equal Justice Project, Battering the Law (Equal Justice Project) available at: 
<http://equaljusticeproject.co.nz/2013/09/battering-the-law/> accessed 14 December 2015.  See, 
generally, Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (Harper and Row, 1979). 
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conduct is irrational rather than understandable in the circumstances.58 Although 
a cycle of abuse may result in a psychological condition, this is not always the 
case, and the continued categorisation of the abused woman who kills as ‘less 
than rational rather than less culpable’ is inherently unfair. 59 The introduction of 
social framework evidence would assist in reducing issues associated with the 
use of expert evidence in cases involving familial abuse. 
 
Henderson and Seymour have also recently identified general problems with the 
use of expert evidence. These issues are outlined in the following extract: 
 
The problems identified with expert evidence in the 
literature are, in summary:  
 Concerns that flawed expert evidence is being presented 
to courts, including flaws resulting from deliberate 
dishonesty, incompetence and/or bias;  
 Concerns that juries and also judges are not competent 
to assess expert evidence and therefore will not notice its 
flaws;  
 Concerns that, regardless of the quality of the evidence, 
juries especially may be overwhelmed by the authority or 
charisma of the expert and allow the expert to usurp their 
function as fact-finders;  
 Concern that the traditional safeguards of the 
adversarial trial are insufficient to notify the judge and 
jury as to the flaws in expert evidence;  
 Concern over the sufficiency of the adversarial model of 
trial in its dealings with expert evidence;  
 Concerns over the treatment of expert witnesses by the 
courts and by lawyers. 
                                                 
58 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs, and Julia Tolmie,  ‘Defending Battered Women on Trial: The 
Battered Women Syndrome and its limitations’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 369. 
59  NSW Legislat ive Council Select Committee, The Partial Defence of Provocation (NSW 
LCSC, 2013) para 2.49 cit ing Julia Stubbs. See, generally, Celia Wells, ‘Battered Woman 
Syndrome and Defences to Homicide: Where Now?’ (1994) Legal Studies 266, and Stanley Yeo, 
‘Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia’ (1993) 143 New Law Journal 13. 
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The picture is complex and nuanced. It includes issues 
with the substance of expert evidence, the experts 
themselves and with the courts.60 
 
The report suggests that many of these problems are ‘solvable’ 61 , noting, in 
particular, that making expert evidence easier to understand would assist. In the 
context of the Law Commission’s current work, the introduction of jury 
directions, social framework evidence and a comprehensive education package 
would undoubtedly assist in ensuring that expert evidence is easier to understand. 
The guidance would also assist experts by informing them of the type of issues 
they may be asked to comment upon, thereby ensuring a more consistent 
approach in this type of case.  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF SELF-DEFENCE 
Question 8: Which of these three options for reform of self-defence would you 
prefer, and why? 
 
 Option 1: Introduce a new provision that clarifies that, under section 48, 
the force used by the defendant may be reasonable even though the 
defendant is responding to a harm that is not immediate or uses force in 
excess of that involved in the harm or threatened harm. 
 
As identified by the Commission, the relaxation of the immediacy requirement 
and to some extent the proportionality requirement that has occurred in other 
jurisdictions has not occurred in New Zealand. This means that ‘immediacy of 
life threatening violence’ and the absence of a viable, non-violent escape option 
is required before self-defence is engaged. 62  Option 1 would represent a 
relaxation of the restrictive approach currently operating in New Zealand, but a                                                  
60 Extract from Emily Henderson and Fred Seymour, Expert witnesses under examination in the 
New Zealand criminal and family courts (The Law Foundation, 2013). 
61 See, New Zealand Law Society, Many expert witness problems are solvable (NZ Law Society, 
2013) availab le at: <http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/lawtalk/lawtalk-archives/issue-816/many-
expert-witness-problems-are-solvable> accessed 14 December 2015. 
62 Wang (1989) 4 CRNZ 674, 683. For an analysis of the problems this poses for primary v ictims 
see, Elisabeth McDonald, ‘Criminal Defences for Women’ in Women in the Criminal Justice 
System (New Zealand Law Society 1997) 46-9. 
 20 
key issue in relation to option 1, is how broadly a lack of immediacy and/or use 
of force in excess of that involved in the harm or threatened harm ought to be 
construed.   
 
In England and Wales, for example, a lack of imminence will not necessarily bar 
a successful self-defence claim. 63 Nor does the defendant have to ‘weigh to a 
nicety the exact measure of his defensive action’. 64  This does not mean that the 
primary victim will be able to avail themselves of an affirmative defence. In 
cases where the primary victim has caught an abuser off-guard and/or excessive 
force is used, the conduct will not fall within the parameters of the defence. In 
this respect, self-defence is an ‘all or nothing’ option in England and Wales. A 
stark illustration of the impact of this approach was provided in the controversial 
case of Clegg. 65 The case involved a British soldier on patrol in Northern Ireland 
who opened fire on the occupants of a stolen car that had failed to stop at a 
checkpoint.  According to his evidence, the defendant believed that the life of his 
colleague on the opposite side of the road was in danger. He fired three shots at 
the windscreen of the car and a fourth shot at the side of the car as it was passing. 
The trial judge ruled that the final shot, which killed the rear-seat passenger, was 
not fired in self-defence. The certified question of law in Clegg was whether a 
soldier on duty, who kills a person with the requisite intention for murder, but 
who would be entitled to rely on self-defence, but for the excessive use of force, 
is guilty of murder or manslaughter. 66 The court considered that had Parliament 
intended to create a qualified defence in cases where the defendant uses 
excessive and unreasonable force in preventing crime it would have done so 
under s. 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. The court acknowledged the severity of 
its ruling67 and the boundaries of jurisprudential precedent: 
 
I can find no escape from the conclusion that if a crime 
was committed, it was murder if the shot was fired with                                                  
63 Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105 (HL). 
64 Palmer [1971] AC 814; Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (E&W), section 76 (7).  
65 [1995] 1 AC 482, HL. Th is analysis of Clegg is derived from Nicola Wake, ‘Polit ical Rhetoric 
or Principled Reform of Loss of Control? Anglo-Australian Perspectives on the Exclusionary 
Conduct Model’ (2013) Journal of Criminal Law 77(6) 512-542.  
66 Clegg ibid, 489. 
67 ibid 491-2. 
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intent to kill or seriously wound. To hold that it could be 
manslaughter would be to make entirely new law. If a 
plea of self-defence is put forward in answer to a charge 
of murder and fails because excessive force was used 
though some force was justifiable, as the law now stands 
the accused cannot be convicted of manslaughter. It may 
be that a strong case can be made for an alteration of the 
law to enable a verdict of manslaughter to be returned 
where the use of some force was justifiable but that is a 
matter for legislation and not for judicial decision.68 
 
Notwithstanding the problems associated with this ‘all or nothing’ approach, it 
remains less restrictive than the approach currently operating in New Zealand. If 
the recommended amendments are to make a real difference in practice, they 
must be supported with the use of social framework evidence in order to assist 
the criminal justice system in understanding why the primary victim believed 
that force was necessary (not necessarily immediate), and how the force used 
could be regarded reasonable (in light of the respective size of the parties) in the 
circumstances (namely, the history of abuse). It should also be borne in mind that 
amendments to self-defence alone will not always capture all deserving cases, 
and, for this reason, the introduction of a partial defence should form part of a 
comprehensive reform package.  
 
 Option 2: Amend section 48 to replace by statute the Wang concept of 
‘imminence’ with inevitability. 
 
The concept of inevitability tends to operate well in hypothetical situations 69, but 
there may not always be such clarity regarding the threats of a predominant                                                  
68 ibid 495 (citing Viscount Dilhorne). 
69 The example posited in Lavellee (n 31) (which fo llows) is designed to illustrate the absurdity 
of precluding mitigation in cases where the threat was inevitable, but it will not always be 
possible for the primary v ictim to demonstrate that she believed that her death would be the 
inevitable result of the predominant aggressor’s threats: ‘If the captor tells [the defendant] that he 
will kill her in three days’ time, it is potentially reasonable for her to seize an opportunity 
presented on the first day to kill the captor or must she wait  until the third day? I think the 
question the jury must ask itself is whether, given the history, the circumstances and the 
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aggressor. It may be difficult to ascertain whether or not the attack ought to be 
regarded as inevitable. The concept of inevitability might encourage the use of 
problematic stereotypes. For example, the prosecution might argue that the 
defence ought not to be available because, ‘he had threatened her with her life 
many times before, but had never gone through with it’ and/or that ‘Everyone 
says things they don’t mean in the heat of the moment. She knew that he didn’t 
mean it.’ Threats of this nature are clear warning signs that there is a high risk to 
the primary victim, but when the court assesses inevitability the potential is that 
the threat to the primary victim could be underestimated and misunderstood.  
 
The concept of inevitability could also be interpreted too widely. It is not clear 
how remote a threat will have to be before it is considered too remote. In 
disputes between neighbours, might it be enough to argue that violence was 
inevitable? Might a prisoner who has been warned that they are going to be 
attacked by another prisoner suggest that harm to their person was inevitable for 
the purposes of the defence? In gang-related violence cases, could members from 
one gang argue that it is inevitable that they would be attacked from members of 
the other gang? 
 
 Option 3: Introduce a new complete defence to extend the concept of self-
defence to victims of family violence who act out of necessity. 
 
It is not appropriate to introduce an entirely new defence for a discrete category 
of offender, when other vulnerable offenders may be placed in the same or a 
similar situation, barring the familial dimension (see comments in response to 
question 1). The introduction of a separate defence would run the bipartite risk of 
primary victims being treated more favourably in some circumstances than other 
victims of abuse, whilst simultaneously marking their response as being less 
rationale than that of an individual acting in self-defence. The focus of self-
defence should be on whether force was really necessary. As mentioned in 
response to option 1, the assessment should focus on whether the primary victim 
believed that force was truly necessary (not necessarily immediate). The                                                                                                                                     
perceptions of the appellant, her belief that she could not preserve herself from being killed by 
[the deceased] that night except by killing him first was reasonable’; 899 (Wilson J). 
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introduction of social framework evidence, jury directions and a comprehensive 
education package could assist in this context. 
 
Clarkson’s defence of necessary action tailored to the circumstances of familial 
violence 
Given that the assessment should focus on whether force was necessary, there 
may be a case for re-evaluating the current relationship between necessity, self-
defence, duress by threats, and duress by circumstances. Clarkson has cogently 
argued that the ‘clear demarcation’ between duress and necessity ‘is highly 
problematic and, further, distinguishing them from the defence of self-defence 
[is] equally problematic’. 70 A common thread runs through all of these defences; 
namely that ‘the defendant committed the crime because of pressure or 
danger’. 71  The actions of the defendant under each category, and where the 
defence is established, can be regarded as ‘morally involuntary’.72 Recognition 
that the same thread underpins each defence, combined with the suggestion that 
the focus in these cases is not specifically upon the acts of the defendant (in order 
to assess whether the defendant may be excused) or upon the actions of the 
aggressor (in order to assess whether the response may be justified) effectively 
blurs ‘the distinction between justification and excuse’.73 Clarkson suggests: 
 
In reality there is a continuum of pressurised conduct 
with it being impossible to distinguish clearly between 
the actor, who, in the situation, lives up to our 
expectation and ‘the standard to which our characters 
should minimally conform’.74 
 
                                                 
70 Chris Clarkson, ‘Necessary Action: A New Defence’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 81-95, 81. 
See, generally, Symonds [1998] Crim LR 280; Martin (1989) 88 Cr App R 343;  Re A (Conjoined 
Twins); Surgical Operation [2001] Fam 147; and, Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809. 
71 Clarkson ibid, 84. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid, 85. 
74  ibid. Quote with in quote; Clarkson citing John Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ [1998] 1 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575. 
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The theoretical basis for maintaining separate defences is therefore diminished.75 
In light of this observation, Clarkson advanced an entirely new general defence 
of ‘necessary action’, on the basis that ‘if defendants under extreme pressure, 
whether because of an attack, threats of circumstances, are in reality acting for 
the same reasons and under the same level of pressure, the case for collapsing the 
present defences into a single broader defence becomes strong.’76 Central to the 
proposed defence is the requirement that the force utilised is reasonable and 
proportionate. 77 The concept of imminence would simply be a factor to consider 
in assessing the reasonableness and proportionality of the defendant’s response, 
rather than being the determining factor that it is now. The departure from the 
concept of ‘immediacy’ recognises that an appreciation of the context of the 
defendant’s actions is essential in determining reasonableness and 
proportionality. This, as previously noted, is of fundamental importance in cases 
involving the primary victim: 
 
Under the new broad defence this issue would become 
rephrased: given her situation was it reasonable for her 
to take pre-emptive action and, given that situation, was 
the force used proportionate to the ‘danger’-with 
‘danger’ being given a broader timeframe than the 
current law.78 
 
Beyond assessment of the circumstances of the defendant, the proposed defence 
adopts an objective standard regarding whether the use of force is to be regarded 
excessive. 79 The effect is that physical characteristics (such as the respective size 
of the parties) may be considered, but psychological conditions cannot.80 In the 
context of the primary victim, this would send a clear message that it is 
inappropriate to psychologise the circumstances of the primary victim. It remains                                                  
75  ibid, 86. Clarkson also addresses further ‘(perhaps speculative)’ reasons for rejecting the 
argument that ‘the justification/excuse classification does not provide an adequate theoretical 
basis for distinguishing the defences’; ibid, 86. 
76 ibid, 89 and 82, respectively. 
77 ibid, 89. 
78 ibid, 90. 
79 ibid, 92. See also, DPP v Armstrong Braun (1999) 163 JP 271. 
80 ibid. See, generally, Canns [2005] EW CA Crim 2264; Press and Thompson [2013] EW CA 
Crim 1849; Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725. Cf. Martin [2002] 1 WLR 1. 
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important, however, that those circumstances are understood by the criminal 
justice system. 81 For this reason, the proposed defence should be combined with 
appropriate juror directions and a specific clause relating to the admissibility of 
social framework evidence (considered further below).  
 
The proposed defence draws duress, necessity and self-defence within its 
boundaries. The latter two may be most relevant to the primary victim, but the 
points made regarding human trafficking and ostensible gang membership (see 
response to qu 1) mean that there is a possibility that an individual in a family 
violence-type relationship may be particularly vulnerable to duress. Under the 
‘necessary action’ defence, the only enquiry relates to the ‘reasonableness and 
proportionality of the response to the threat or crisis’. 82 In light of this contextual 
assessment, the defendant’s prior fault does not preclude the availability of the 
defence, but it may cast doubt over the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
response. This contextual analysis is important because it circumvents the current 
approach which automatically precludes the availability of duress on grounds of 
the defendant’s prior fault in becoming involved in the gang; as previously noted, 
this is especially problematic for ostensible gang members.83 
 
There are, in limited circumstances, advantages to restricting defences based 
upon the actions of the defendant. The proposed defence ought to specifically 
exclude self- induced intoxication from the assessment of the circumstances.84 
This is arguably implicit from the objective test that requires that abnormal 
mental states should not be considered as part of the defence; an explicit 
statutory exclusion, however, would prevent unnecessary litigation in cases 
where the defendant is voluntarily intoxicated. This would not preclude the 
availability of the defence, but it would not allow intoxication to form part of the 
circumstances for consideration. The defence could also be excluded where the                                                  
81 As previously noted, in response to question 1, a rev iew of offenders who are vulnerable as a 
result of mental ill health ought to be undertaken in  New Zealand, but this is outside the 
parameters of the present review. 
82 Clarkson (n 70) 93. 
83 See response to question 1. 
84 In England and Wales, voluntary intoxication is excluded for the purposes of mistaken belief in 
self-defence; Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 76(5). See also, Hatton [2006] 
1 Cr App R.  
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defendant intentionally incited serious violence (a point explored further in 
response to question 16).  
 
If a new defence based upon necessity is considered, it ought to be of general 
application. A new defence of this nature is likely to emphasise the 
inconsistencies with the current defences, and, as such, Clarkson’s defence of 
necessary action, combined with the suggested additions, provides a viable 
option for reform: 
 
The present separate classifications of [duress, self-
defence and necessity] has meant that they have 
developed in differently-but the differences in the rules 
are not necessarily rational or sustainable. A new 
defence of necessary action would have the advantage of 
simplicity and, most importantly, would enable the focus 
to be on the true issue that unites the present defences: 
whether, given the pressure/crisis, etc., facing the 
defendant, the response, taking into account the context 
and all the circumstances, was a reasonable and 
proportionate reaction to that danger.85 
 
 
Question 9: Should option 1 be limited to situations where family violence is in 
issue or apply generally? 
 
Should Option 1 be recommended, the provision ought to apply generally. As 
previously noted, limiting the potential availability of an ostensibly broader self-
defence provision may have unintended consequences for defendants who find 
themselves in a potentially analogous situation to vulnerable family members, 
but for failing to fall within that category. For example, in the context of human 
                                                 
85 Clarkson (n 59) 95. 
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trafficking, third party abuse or other situations where ‘the threat is not 
immediate, but…more remote in time’ or arguably ongoing.86 
 
A similar approach to Option 1, which was limited to familial violence 
situations, was recently adopted in relation to self-defence in Victoria. Self-
defence in Victoria requires that the defendant believed force was necessary in 
self-defence and that the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances as 
perceived by the defendant. 87 Amendments under section 322M of the Crimes 
Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 specify that, in cases 
involving family violence, self-defence may apply even where the threat is not 
imminent, or the force used is excessive. The key difference between Option 1 
and the position in Victoria is that the extension of self-defence applies only in 
cases involving family violence, and in murder cases section 322K (3) mandates 
that the conduct was necessary in order to defend herself/another from death or 
really serious injury. Priest criticised the amendments as a ‘breathtaking 
extension’ of self-defence: 
 
Taken to their logical (or, perhaps, their illogical) 
conclusion, these new provisions suggest that a number 
of ‘trivial’ acts of ‘harassment’  (whatever the term might 
embrace) by a family member, which do not involve 
actual or threatened abuse, might permit a person to use 
disproportionate force to kill that family member even 
where ‘harm’ is not ‘immediate’.88   
 
If the provisions are interpreted too broadly, there is a real risk that the defence 
would be available in unmeritorious cases. If the provisions are interpreted too 
narrowly, the amendments are unlikely to assist the primary victim.  
Notwithstanding Priest’s reservations regarding the revised provision in Victoria,                                                  
86 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (VLRC, 2004) para 
3.61. 
87  Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) section 322K, as amended by the Crimes (Abolit ion of Defensive 
Homicide) Act 2014. 
88  P Priest, ‘Defences to Homicide’ (2005) 8 cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Family Violence: A National Legal Response (Australian Law Reform Commission No 114, 
2010). 
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the extent to which the amendments will make a significant difference is 
doubted. In Victoria, the Judicial College has suggested that the common law 
approach regarding immediacy and the reasonableness of force used will 
continue to apply.89 In practice, the provision reiterates that when acting in the 
‘agony of the moment’ the defendant does not need to ‘weigh to a nicety the 
exact measure of his defensive action’.90  
 
Similar concerns were voiced regarding amendments to self-defence in 
householder cases in England and Wales. The revised provision states that where 
a defendant is protecting herself/another against a trespasser, force will only be 
regarded as unreasonable if it is ‘grossly disproportionate’. 91 Elliott suggests that 
if ‘a literal interpretation is given to the legislation then disproportionate force 
would be interpreted as reasonable and therefore lawful’. 92 The problem with 
this approach is that it places the householder in a better position than every 
other case of self-defence, where the defence will fail if the use of force was 
disproportionate. The rationale is sound in principle: the defence is extended to 
include the circumstances of the defence. In order to be entitled to an affirmative 
defence, however, the defendant’s conduct ought to be a proportionate response 
to the perceived threat otherwise a partial defence would be apposite in terms of 
the defendant’s culpability level.93  
 
The specific focus on householders in England and Wales has the potential to 
breach the principle of equality before the law. 94  If it is appropriate to consider                                                  
89 Judicial College of Victoria, Bench Notes: Statutory Self-Defence (Judicial College of Victoria 
2014). 
90 Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514 [3]. 
91 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 76(5A), as amended by the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013, section 43. 
92 Catherine Elliott, ‘Interpreting the contours of self-defence within the boundaries of the rule of 
law, the common law and human rights’ (2015) Journal of Criminal Law 330, 331. Elliott 
observes: ‘Before the 2013 Act, the defence of self-defence was not available if a person used a 
disproportionate amount of force, as this was automatically an unreasonable violation of the 
sanctity of life. The amended s. 76 continues to limit the defence of self-defence to where 
reasonable force has been used but it adds that the amount of force used would be unreasonable if 
it were grossly disproportionate…the Act might be viewed as trying to change the very meaning 
of reasonableness to something different than proportionate’; 337. 
93  See, generally, Joshua Dressler, ‘New Thoughts about the Concept of Justification in the 
Criminal Law: A  Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking’ [1984] 32 University of 
California, LA Law Review 61. 
94 Elliott (n 92) 334. 
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the circumstances of the householder for the purposes of fact finder evaluation in 
self-defence cases, it is equally important, in terms of appropriate standardisation 
and distributive justice, to acknowledge the invasion of psychical and 
psychological integrity caused by domestic violence. 95  The Government of 
England and Wales also considered amendments to the law on self-defence to 
afford leniency to soldiers and the police, given the increased risk of threat 
towards them and the fact that they might be armed, although this was not taken 
forward.96 It is fundamentally important that the law applies equally to everyone, 
and that specific categories of vulnerable offender are not singled out for 
preferential treatment, notwithstanding the harrowing nature of individuated 
contextual analyses.  
 
Elliot suggests that the law in England and Wales ought to depart from a literal 
interpretation of the statute. The provision does not stipulate that ‘only grossly 
disproportionate force will be unreasonable. Judges are, therefore, entitled to 
conclude that while grossly disproportionate force is clearly unreasonable, 
disproportionate force which is not grossly disproportionate force can also be 
unreasonable.’97 A failure to do so, is likely to render the law incompatible with 
Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 98  Herring has also 
pointed out that the revision makes ‘little change to the law because the jury 
would, even under the standard approach, take into account the emergency of the 
moment when considering whether a householder was acting reasonably and 
would be likely to only find a grossly disproportionate amount of force to be 
unreasonable’. 99  In this regard, the clause has been heavily criticised as a 
‘triumph of rhetoric over reason’ and it highlights the dangers of enacting 
legislation that may do little to change the substantive approach. It also illustrates 
the problems associated with prioritising specific categories of vulnerable 
offender over others. 
 
A related problem arises where amendments to self-defence are viewed as                                                  
95 Wells (n 59). 
96 Elliott (n 92) 334. 
97 ibid. 
98 Elliott (n 92). 
99 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
646. 
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‘solving the problem’. It is clear that even with amendments to the present law 
on self-defence, there will still be deserving cases that remain outside the ambit 
of the provision (see the analysis of Clegg in response to qu 8); there remains a 
clear need for a partial defence (this is considered further in response to qu 15).  
 
Question 10: Should reforms be introduced to provide specific guidance on the 
admissibility of family violence evidence when self-defence is raised in the 
context of family violence? 
 
These specific reforms should not be limited to self-defence, but other 
defences/potential partial defences to which guidance on the admissibility of 
family violence evidence may be necessary. This would assist in addressing 
current misconceptions within the criminal justice system regarding the impact 
of familial violence. 
 
Question 11: Should such guidance be contained in the Crimes Act 1961 or the 
Evidence Act 2006? 
 
Given that the issue is a matter of evidence rather than a substantive law 
principle, it makes sense to include guidance on social framework evidence in 
the Evidence Act 2006. 
 
Question 12: Should reforms be introduced to provide for jury directions where 
self-defence is raised in the context of family violence? 
 
Social framework evidence and jury directions pertaining to familial violence 
should not be seen as either/or options, but rather part of a comprehensive reform 
package. Amendments to the current law ought to be complemented by new jury 
directions designed to assist jurors to understand the impact of abuse, and how 
this can evoke ‘possibly the worst behaviour from everybody in an unbelievably 
hot-tempered, violent home where domestic family violence is prevalent’.100 The 
trial judge ought to be required to provide a direction on family violence where it                                                  
100 Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 
2014 (Vic), second reading, 3 September 2014, Mr McCurdy, Murray Valley, 3138 and 3146. 
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is requested by counsel, unless there are good reasons not to. In cases where no 
request is made, but the trial judge is of the view that a direction on family 
violence ought to be issued, directions should be provided. Specific jury 
directions would assist in proactively tackling misconceptions regarding the 
impact of family violence. The trial judge should also be able to tailor the jury 
directions as they apply to each individual case.  
 
Question 13: Should any jury direction be focussed on addressing common 
misunderstandings of family violence (the Victorian model) or on directing a 
jury on how the concepts of imminence and proportionality apply in each 
individual case? 
 
In cases where a family violence direction is provided, it makes sense to also 
highlight the impact that family violence might have in the context of self-
defence. As previously noted, the focus should not be on whether the threat was 
imminent, but rather on whether the use of force was necessary, in the light of 
information provided, and in particular, where the defendant has acted in 
response to familial violence. In the context of whether force was proportionate, 
that familial violence should be considered in addition to the respective sizes of 
the parties, etc. As mentioned previously, what may be deemed proportionate in 
cases involving two strangers of comparable size and strength is likely to differ 
significantly from what may be deemed proportionate between two individuals 
of disparate size where there is a history of familial abuse. The jury directions 
ought to be flexible enough to address the issue of necessity and proportionality 
in the context of familial violence. 
 
CHAPTER 8: PARTIAL DEFENCES AND SEPARATE HOMICIDE 
OFFENCES 
Question 14: Should a new partial defence (or separate homicide offence)-
whether or general application or specific to victims of family violence-be 





Question 15: Would you support the introduction of a new partial defence or 
separate homicide offence if it applied only in circumstances where the victims of 
family violence commit homicide? 
 
There is clearly a need for a new partial defence (or homicide offence) for those 
who kill in response to a fear of serious violence, but are unable to claim self-
defence. As previously noted, the rationale for the defence should be that the 
defendant experienced a situation causing them to fear serious violence, and their 
conduct is either justified or excused on that basis, depending upon the specific 
nature of the partial defence (or homicide offence). The exclusion of individuals 
experiencing the same emotions, in potentially analogous situations, but for the 
lack of a familial link cannot be justified. There is added concern that a stigma 
will attach to a specific partial defence (homicide offence) suggesting that the 
primary victim has a licence to kill or alternatively that cases involving family 
violence will be shoehorned into the partial defence (on the basis that it is a 
family violence defence) in cases where self-defence ought to be available. 
Nevertheless, the current position is unacceptable and in the absence of a general 
partial defence (or homicide offence), a specific partial defence (or homicide 
offence) would be preferable to none at all.  
 
Question 16: If a new partial defence is introduced, would you favour a partial 
defence based on one of the traditional defences of excessive self-defence, loss of 
control or diminished responsibility, or a specific defence of self-preservation in 
the context of an abusive relationship? 
 
A brief assessment of each of the recommended defences is outlined below, 
followed by proposals for an entirely new defence. 
 
Excessive self-defence 
Excessive self-defence is problematic for the primary victim due to the 
requirement that the force used must be regarded necessary. In practical terms, 
this requirement will likely bar self-defence and/or excessive self-defence claims 
in cases of this context. This is because the threat will usually be anticipated, but 
not sufficiently imminent in order to justify raising either defence. As previously 
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noted, a reinterpretation of necessity is required in such cases. As the law stands, 
however, excessive self-defence in current iterations operating in other 
jurisdictions is often inadequate to accommodate this type of case. 
 
Diminished responsibility 
Diminished responsibility is usually not appropriate in cases involving primary 
victims who kill a predominant aggressor. This is because raising diminished 
responsibility potentially involves the psychologising of the primary victim.101 
Although familial abuse may induce mental ill health it does not always do so; in 
the absence of a recognised medical condition, it would not be possible for the 
primary victim to raise the partial defence. Furthermore, it is inherently unfair to 
label the primary victim’s response in killing a predominant aggressor irrational 
rather than understandable in the circumstances. 
 
Loss of control 
Loss of control is not an appropriate defence for the primary victim. The loss of 
self-control requirement is incompatible with a response motivated by fear. The 
term has been criticised as ambiguous, lacking a clear basis in science or 
medicine, and failing to appreciate the true reality of domestic violence.102 The 
loss of control requirement has always been a particularly difficult aspect of the 
partial defence for primary victims who kill, since a primary victim is much less 
likely to lose self-control when they know it is likely they will ‘come off worse’ 
as a result. 103 In reality, the loss of self-control requirement is more suited to 
angry altercations than instances where the primary victim responds in fear. As 
Fortson observes: 
 
The [loss of control] defence will (…) not benefit persons 
who, without losing their self-control, kill their abuser, 
                                                 
101 See, for example, Ahluwalia (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 (E&W). 
102 See, Alan Reilly, ‘Loss of Self-Control in Provocation’ [1997] 21 Criminal Law Journal 320, 
330; Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 3.28, ibid; NSW LCSC, 2013 (n 59) paras 4.97-4.118. 
103 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 3.28. 
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A preferable approach would be to introduce an entirely new partial defence 
based upon self-preservation. 105 This bespoke provision ought not to be limited 
to those who kill in the context of an abusive relationship for the reasons set out 
in response to question 1, above. An entirely new partial defence is 
recommended below. The novel provision draws upon earlier recommendations 
of the Law Commission for England and Wales, in addition to an in-depth 
review of the operation of sections 54 and 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, as enacted. A full draft of the defence, followed by detailed explanatory 
notes, is provided below:106  
 
1A (1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the 
killing of another (“V”), D is not to be convicted of 
murder if— 
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to 
the killing were in response to D’s fear of serious 
violence from V against D or another identified person, 
and 
(b) a person of D’s age, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of 
D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to 
D. 
(2) In subsection (1)(b) the reference to “the 
circumstances of D” is a reference to all of D’s                                                  
104 See, Rudi Fortson QC, 'Homicide Reforms under the CAJA 2009' (Criminal Bar Association, 
2010) para 184. 
105 See Wake, ‘Battered Women, Startled Householders and Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-
Australian  Perspectives’ (n 5). ‘Self-defence as a win or -lose-option…encourages the use of 
partial defences of [loss of self-control] and diminished responsibility when neither properly 
captures the nature of the dilemma in which battered women find themselves. A compromise 
move would be the development of a new partial defence based on physical or psychological 
aspects, or self-preservation;’ Wells (n 59) 275. 
106 This provisional part ial defence was outlined in  Wake, ‘‘His home is his castle. And mine is a 
cage’: a new partial defence for primary victims who kill’ (n 55).  
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circumstances other than those whose only relevance to 
D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s general capacity for 
tolerance or self-restraint.  
(3) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is 
adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence 
under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the 
defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that it is not. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), sufficient evidence 
is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence if 
evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial 
judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably 
conclude that the defence might apply. 
(5) A person who, but for this section, would be liable to 
be convicted of murder is liable instead to be convicted of 
manslaughter. 
 
1B Meaning of “fear of serious violence” 
(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 1A. 
(2) Whether D feared serious violence is entirely 
subjective. 
(3) The fear must be genuine but it need not be 
reasonable. 
(4) The term violence includes psychological, sexual, and 
physical harm. 
(5) For the purposes of subsection IA (1)(b) the effects of 
voluntary intoxication on the part of D are excluded.  
(6) Subsection 1A does not apply if, in doing or being a 
party to the killing D: 
(a) acted in a considered desire for revenge; and/or 
(b) intentionally incited serious violence from V. 
(7) Subsection IB(6)(b) does not apply where D’s conduct 
merely incited a response from V. D’s conduct must be 
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undertaken for the purpose of inciting serious violence on 




In cases where sufficient evidence is raised to demonstrate that the partial 
defence might apply, it is for the prosecution to disprove the defence beyond all 
reasonable doubt. The partial defence would operate to reduce a murder 
conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in response to a fear of 
serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identified 
individual. 108  The partial defence is qualified by appropriate threshold filter 
mechanisms designed to preclude the availability of the defence in unmeritorious 
cases. These include: a normal person test and provisions stipulating that the 
defence is not available where the defendant intentionally incited serious 
violence, acted in a considered desire for revenge, or on the basis that no jury, 
properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the partial defence might 
apply.109 
 
APPLICATION OF THE DEFENCE 
Fear of serious violence 
The proposed defence requires that the defendant feared serious violence from 
the victim against the defendant or another identified individual. This mirrors the 
‘fear trigger’ currently operating under the loss of control defence in England 
and Wales. 110 The defence is designed to be available where the defendant kills 
in response to an anticipated (albeit not imminent attack); and where the 
defendant over-reacts to what she perceived to be an imminent threat. 111 This 
circumvents the problem associated with establishing that force was necessary in 
the context of excessive self-defence, identified above. The fact that the threat 
may be targeted towards the defendant or another identified individual is 
particularly important, given that primary victims may act in defence of their                                                  
107 These explanatory notes are derived from Wake ibid. 
108 Provision included in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (E&W), section 54(3). 
109 See, generally, sections 54(5)-(6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (E&W). 
110 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(3) (E&W). 
111 Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform o f the Law 
(MoJ CP19/08, 2008) (E&W) para 28. 
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children as well as themselves. Whether the defendant feared serious violence 
engages an entirely subjective enquiry. 112 The fear must be genuine but it need 
not be reasonable. Arguably, it would be difficult to prove that the fear was 
genuine if it were not based on reasonable grounds. There is no need to extend 
the defence to circumstances falling short of serious violence, but social 
framework evidence should be utilised to explain why an ostensibly trivial 
incident might cause the primary victim to fear such violence. 113  The term 
violence should be broadly construed as including psychological114 and sexual 
harm, in addition to physical violence.115  
 
It is worth reiterating here, that the number of cases in which the primary victim 
kills an intimate partner is limited. It is more common for defences and partial 
defences to be invoked in cases involving male-on-male violence.116 This is not 
to say that in some cases, these defendants should not be able to avail themselves 
of a defence. It is clear, however, that any defence must be robust enough to 
exclude unmeritorious cases. Fortson posits the following example: 
 
Suppose D, who is engaged in a drug war with V, loses 
his self-control and (in fear of serious violence from V) 
kills the latter. If D’s conduct meets the requirement [that 
the defence raise an issue with which the defence might 
apply], his partial defence to murder seems likely to 
succeed.117                                                  
112 '[T]he reasonableness requirement is out of place when we are thinking of people who are 
acting out of fear or anger and are therefore likely to be in a somewhat emotional state'; Law 
Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) para 3.154. 
113 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006) (E&W) 
para 5.55. 
114 It might be worth including an  additional clause exp lain ing the nature of psychological abuse. 
For example, Psychological abuse need not ‘involve actual or threatened physical or sexual 
abuse’ and may include (i) intimidation; (ii) harassment; (iii) damage to property; (iv) threats of 
physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse; Crimes Amendment (Abolition of 
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), section 322J. 
115 See, Fortson (n 104) para 90. The Law Commission did not feel it necessary to include a 
clause exp lain ing the ‘fear of serious violence’ element of the partial defence; given the 
confusion around family violence, it might be useful to have a specific  clause, or, alternatively, to 
adapt the admissible social framework evidence in order to assist in interpreting the evidence in 
family violence cases; Law Com No 304, 2004 (n 113) para 5.55. 
116 K. O’Donovan, ‘Defences for Battered  Women Who Kill’ (1991) Journal of Law and Society 
18, 219. 
117 Fortson (n 104) para 164. 
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This category of case demonstrates how important it is that appropriate threshold 
filter mechanisms operate in relation to the advanced partial defence. The 
threshold filter mechanisms considered below would be capable of filtering out 
the type of case envisaged by Fortson. 
 
The ‘normal person’ test 
The proposed defence is qualified by the ‘normal person’ test, which mandates 
that a person, of the defendant's age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint, and in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the 
same or a similar way. 118 Critics have suggested that the ‘normal person’ test is 
problematic because it involves 'speculation about how a person might have 
reacted in the circumstances’. 119  This approach is necessary because it is 
impossible to say how a person would have reacted in the circumstances, 
particularly where there is evidence of familial abuse. 120 The proposed test is 
similar to the ‘normal person’ test operating in relation to the loss of control 
defence, with the exception that the term ‘sex’ is omitted. Use of the term ‘sex’ 
overstates the ‘role of sex and gender in explaining D’s reaction’. 121  In this 
respect, sex and gender are more appropriately to be considered by the judge and 
jury as part of the broader circumstances of the case. 122  Akin to the loss of 
control defence, circumstances in this context is a reference to all of the 
defendant’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to the 
defendant’s conduct is that they bear on her general capacity for tolerance and 
self-restraint. 123 In cases where the defendant has a recognised medical condition 
relevant to her fear of serious violence then that might, like sex and gender, form 
part of the circumstances for consideration. 124  A normal degree of tolerance 
means that, in evaluating the defendant's conduct, the jury cannot take into                                                  
118 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c) and (3). 
119  VLRC (n 86) para 3.84 [emphasis in the original]. 
120 Fortson (n 104) para 148. Although cf. Jo Miles, 'A Dog's Breakfast of Homicide Reform' 
Archbold News (2009) issue 6, 8. 
121 Neil Cobb and Anna Gausden, ‘Feminis m, “Typical” Women, and Losing Control’ in Alan 
Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) in Loss o f Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, 
Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) ch 7. 
122 ibid. 
123 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(3). 
124 Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157.  
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account irrational prejudices, such as racism, and homophobia. 125  A normal 
degree of self- restraint excludes characteristics such as bad temper, jealousy, 
irritability and intoxication. In England and Wales, the Court of Appeal have 
adopted a restrictive interpretation of the ‘normal person’ test, by intimating that 




The proposed defence specifically excludes self- induced intoxication from the 
assessment of the defendant's capacity for tolerance and self- restraint. 127  This 
statutory exclusion is designed to prevent unnecessary litigation in cases where 
the defendant is voluntarily intoxicated.128 
 
The defendant’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded in cases where the 
defendant intentionally incited serious violence. 129  The intentional incitement 
clause is different the loss of control defence operating in England and Wales 
which stipulates that the defence will be unavailable where the defendant incited 
something to be said or done for the purpose of using it as an excuse to use 
violence. In analysing the provision in England and Wales, the Court of Appeal 
in Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer, held that the mere fact that the defendant was, 
'behaving badly and looking for and provoking trouble' does not mean the 
defence is unavailable.130 This is because self- induced triggers are viewed in a 
narrow sense only for the purposes of the loss of control defence. 131  The 
exclusion will arguably only apply where the defendant has ‘formed a 
premeditated intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the victim, and 
incites provocation by the victim so as to provide an opportunity for attacking 
him or her’. 132  This approach was applied in Duncan 133 , where a defendant                                                  
125 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c).  
126 Gurpinar & Kojo-Smith [2015] EWCA Crim 178. 
127 ibid.  
128 Asmelash (n 124).   
129 ‘One may wonder (and the judge would  have to consider) how often a defendant who is out to 
incite vio lence could be said to ‘fear’ serious violence; often he may be welcoming it ’; Dawes, 
Hatter & Bowyer (n 5) [58]. 
130Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer (n 5)[58]. 
131 Law Com No 204, 2004 (n 3) para 3.139. 
132 ibid.  
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successfully claimed the partial defence after stabbing a love rival to death. 
Duncan was shopping with his two children when he saw the victim. As a result 
of seeing him, Duncan purchased a small bladed paring knife, removed the 
packaging and concealed it within a carrier bag. His explanation was that some 
days before the victim had confronted him in a similar location and threatened 
him with a knife. According to witnesses, Duncan then proceeded towards the 
victim shouting at him. A fight ensued, during the course of which, the victim 
slashed Duncan across the face and body with a knife. It was at that point, 
Duncan claimed to have momentarily lost self-control and stabbed the victim to 
death.  Duncan's loss of control plea was accepted by the Crown, Lord Thomas 
advocating that the case should be seen;  
 
As an acceptance of a basis of plea in a one-off case in 
circumstances which we have not gone in to. It should 
not be regarded as any precedent that where two people 
arm themselves and a wound is caused in the course of 
an intended knife fight, that that would ordinarily give 
rise to a loss of self-control.134  
 
Despite the warning of Lord Thomas, the case illustrates that the circumstances 
in which a defendant's conduct might be construed as having been done for the 
purpose of using it as an excuse to use violence are likely to be limited. The 
Commission opined that to exclude the defence ‘in the broader sense of self-
induced provocation would be to go to far’.135 Such an approach might exclude 
deserving claims where the incitement was induced by ‘morally laudable’ 
conduct, for example, ‘standing up for a victim of racism in a racially hostile 
environment’. 136 The Commission did identify that, ‘there is much to be said…in 
denying a defence to criminals whose unlawful activities expose them to the risk 
of provocation by others’. 137  The recommended intentional incitement clause 
                                                                                                                                    
133Duncan [2014] EWCA Crim 2747. 
134 ibid [11]. 




provides a via media between these ostensibly polarised approaches to self-
induced provocation. 
 
The provision would operate where the defendant intentionally incited serious 
violence. The defendant’s conduct must be done for the purpose of inciting 
serious violence. In this respect, the ‘mere fact that the defendant caused a 
reaction in others’ would not result in the defence being excluded. 138  The 
approach adopted in Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer, that provocative behaviour does 
not negate the defence is equally applicable to the new proposal. This ensures 
that confrontational circumstances do not automatically preclude the partial 
defence, but where the defendant intends to incite serious violence, the defence is 
precluded.139 This is important as the primary victim may feel responsible for 
inciting the aggressor's response, because she is aware that doing X makes him 
angry, but it cannot be said that it was her intention to have that effect. Contrary 
to the Law Commission’s (E&W) observation, judges and jurors would be in a 
position to ‘differentiate satisfactorily between forms of self- induced provocation 
in the broader sense which should, and which should not, preclude a defence’.140 
It is true that this would be a challenging task, given the potential variables, but 
the exclusionary clause operating in England and Wales serves little purpose 
when viewed in the narrow sense, particularly due to section 54(4). 
 
Section 54(4) provides that the loss of control defence is not available where the 
defendant acted in 'a considered desire for revenge'. This element of the defence 
forms part of the proposed framework.141 The clause operates to prevent the use 
of the defence in pre-meditated, cold-blooded killings, but it does not preclude 
the defence simply because the defendant was angry with the victim for conduct 
                                                 
138 Johnson [1989] EWCA Crim 289 (CA) (Watkins LJ.) The CA in  Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer (n 
5) noted that, ‘the impact of R v Johnson is now dimin ished, but not wholly ext inguished by the 
new statutory provisions’; [58]. 
139 This is in  line with the Law Commission's recommendation that the defence 'must not have 
been engineered by him or her through inciting the very provocation that led to  it';  Law Com No 
304, 2006 (n 113) para 5.20. See also, MoJ CP19/08, 2008 (n 111) para 27. See, generally, Law 
Com No 204, 2004 (n 3) para 3.139. 
140 Law Com No 204, 2004 (n 3) para 3.139. 
141 Coroners and Justice Act, section 54(4).  
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which engendered a fear of serious violence. 142  The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists noted that: 
 
Physiologically anger and fear are virtually identical, 
whilst many mental states that accompany killing also 
incorporate psychologically both anger and fear...[T]he 
abused woman who waits until the man is 'helpless' is 
likely, not merely to be angry but also fearful that he will 
eventually kill her, and/or her children and that there is 
no way of preventing it other than by the death of the 
man.143 
 
The word ‘“considered” denotes something over and above simple revenge,’144 
and, as such, the primary victim who claims ‘he deserved it!’ remains eligible to 
claim the defence because jurors are in a position to distinguish genuine cases 
involving an element of retaliation from disingenuous claims.145 Nevertheless, it 
may be difficult 'to determine whether the killing was one motivated by a 
considered desire for revenge or from other emotions', and, for this reason, social 
framework evidence should be used to explain why the primary victim may 
experience a complex array of emotions at the time of the fatal act.146 
 
The proposed legislative framework does not include the loss of self-control 
requirement, which is integral to sections 54-55 of the 2009 Act in England and 
Wales. 147  By avoiding this controversial requirement, the proposed partial 
defence is closely aligned with self-defence. In cases where self-defence fails, 
the new partial defence might apply. At present, in England and Wales, a 
defendant claiming self-defence may raise self-defence and loss of control. 148 In 
                                                 
142 Law Com No 204, 2004 (n 3) para 3.137; Law Com No 304, 2006 (n 113) para 5.11. 
143 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com CP No 173, 2003) para 3.99. 
144 Evans [2012] EWCA Crim 2 (Christopher Clee QC). 
145 Law Com No 204, 2004 (n 3) para 1.137.  
146 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 511. 
147 This approach was recommended by the Law Commission, but rejected by the government; 
Law Com No 304, 2006 (n 113) para 5.55. 
148 Wake (n 4) 434. It is possible to raise both defences simultaneously, but in Dawes, Hatter & 
Bowyer (n 5), the Court of Appeal advocated that it is preferable to consider self-defence first. 
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Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer 149 , Lord Judge CJ advised of the approach to be 
adopted: 
 
The loss of control defence is not self-defence, but there 
will often be a factual overlap between them. It will be 
argued on the defendant’s behalf that the violence which 
resulted in the death of the deceased was, on grounds of 
self-defence, not unlawful. This defence is now governed 
by s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008. In the context of violence used by the defendant 
there are obvious differences between the two defences 
and they should not be elided. These are summarised in 
Smith and Hogan, Edition, at p 135. The circumstances 
in which the defendant, who has lost control of himself, 
will nevertheless be able to argue that he used 
reasonable force in response to the violence he feared, or 
to which he was subjected, are likely to be limited. But 
even if the defendant may have lost his self-control, 
provided his violent response in self-defence was not 
unreasonable in the circumstances, he would be entitled 
to rely on self defence as a complete defence. S.55(3) is 
focussed on the defendant’s fear of serious violence. We 
underline the distinction between the terms of the 
qualifying trigger in the context of loss of control with 
self-defence, which is concerned with the threat of 
violence in any form. Obviously, if the defendant 
genuinely fears serious violence then, in the context of 
self-defence, his own response may legitimately be more 
extreme. Weighing these considerations, it is likely that in 
the forensic process those acting for the defendant will 
advance self-defence as a complete answer to the murder 
charge, and on occasions, make little or nothing of the                                                  
149 Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer (n 5) [59]. 
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defendant’s response in the context of the loss of control 
defence. As we have already indicated, the decision taken 
on forensic grounds (whether the judge believes it to be 
wise or not) is not binding on the judge and, provided the 
statutory conditions obtain, loss of control should be left 
to the jury. Almost always, we suggest, the practical 
course, if the defence is to be left, is to leave it for the 




The problem is that the defendant will have to revert from alleging that she was 
acting reasonably in the circumstances, to asserting that she lost self-control. 
This is apt to cause juror confusion. 150  Rejection of the loss of self-control 
requirement also avoids the inherent contradiction in requiring the primary 
victim to simultaneously fear serious violence and lose self-control.  For these 
reasons, loss of self-control does not form part of the proposed defence.  
 
The loss of self-control requirement was introduced by the government of 
England and Wales in order to prevent the defence from being used 
inappropriately in cases of cold-blooded, gang-related151 or honour killings.152 A 
review of jurisprudential authority suggests, however, that a significant number 
of loss of control claims are being filtered out unnecessarily by the loss of self-
control element. It is right that these claims are being rejected, but the loss of 
self-control requirement is unnecessary because these claims could be filtered 
out by the alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the partial defence. As 
previously stated, loss of control and the newly proposed defence are unavailable                                                  
150 ibid 438. See also, Fortson (n 104) paras 166-168. 
151  As noted in response to question 1, it is potentially problematic to assume that entire 
categories of individual are motivated for the same purpose. Individuals in  a gang may have 
become members unintentionally by becoming involved in a relationship with a gang member. 
Other vulnerable indiv iduals, who have been subjected to abuse and repeatedly let down by the 
system, may be promised protection by a gang only to realise that they are regarded as 
subordinates, indebted to the gang, and unable to escape.  This is not to suggest that gang-related 
killings should be accepted or condoned, but that there is an inherent danger in assuming that 
every ostensible gang member voluntarily jo ined the gang, with foresight of the potential 
ramifications of gang membership, particularly in the context of women who have been abused. 
152 MoJ CP19/08, 2008 (n 111) para 36. 
 45 
where the defendant ‘acted in a considered desire for revenge’. 153 Lord Judge CJ, 
in Evans, advocated that there ‘was no need to rewrite…the language of the 
statute’. 154 In all cases, ‘the greater the level of deliberation, the less likely it will 
be that the killing followed a true loss of self-control’. 155 The ‘considered desire 
for revenge’ exclusion is a more appropriate instrument for filtering out 
unmeritorious claims, because unlike the loss of self-control mandate, the ‘words 
“considered”, “desire” and “revenge” are not words of legal technicality. They 
are words of ordinary use’.156  
 
The trial judge, in Jewell157, refused to leave the partial defence to the jury where 
the defendant prepared firearms and a survival kit twelve hours before he drove 
to the victim’s home, armed with a shotgun and home-made pistol, and shot him 
without warning. 158  Jewell’s explanation was that he feared serious violence 
from the victim who had threatened to kill him the evening before. The killing 
‘bore every hallmark of a pre-planned, cold-blooded execution’. 159 There was a 
twelve-hour ‘cooling period’ between the alleged threat and the actual killing 
where Jewell could have sought an alternative course of action, but failed to do 
so. The defence, however, was negated not by virtue of section 54(4), but by the 
loss of self-control requirement. The trial judge considered the remaining 
elements of the defence ‘out of an abundance of caution’ but that assessment was 
‘unnecessary as a dispositive conclusion’.160 
 
The extent to which the loss of self-control requirement impacts upon the utility 
of the alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the defence was similarly 
highlighted in the case of Barnsdale-Quean. 161 The defendant had purchased a 
rolling pin and chain two weeks prior to the killing. On the day of the killing, he 
collected the chain from a flat in which he had stored it and the rolling pin from 
the kitchen. He tied two elasticated bands in a loop at the end of the chain, and                                                  
153 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(4). 
154 Evans (n 144) [131]. 
155 ibid [10]. 
156 ibid (Andrew Edis QC and Simon Waley).  
157Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 414. 
158 ibid [43]. 
159 ibid [43]. 
160 ibid [47]. 
161 Barnsdale-Quean [2014] EWCA Crim 1418. 
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carefully placed it over his wife’s head while she was subdued due to 
antidepressant medication. He used the rolling pin as a tourniquet to strangle his 
wife to death before stabbing himself in an attempt to make it appear that she had 
committed suicide after attacking him. Barnsdale-Quean claimed that he could 
not remember what had occurred following his wife’s alleged attack. The trial 
judge ruled that there was no loss of self-control on the facts or the defendant’s 
account. In the event that the defendant had lost self-control, the defence would 
be negated by virtue of section 54(4). The Court of Appeal advocated that it was 
unnecessary to reach a conclusion in respect of section 54(4), because there was 
no evidence of loss of self-control. These rulings demonstrate that section 54(4) 
is capable of filtering out unmeritorious cases in the absence of the loss of self-
control requirement. 
 
In all cases, should the outlined threshold filter mechanisms of the proposed 
defence be bypassed, the trial judge has the authority to reject a claim on the 
basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply.162  This aspect of the defence relates to sufficiency of evidence. The 
Court of Appeal in England and Wales has repeatedly advocated that there must 
be sufficient evidence of all elements of the loss of control defence, including the 
normal person test. 163This approach has been criticised on the basis that the 
legislation mandates that, ‘sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with 
respect to the defence’, and not that evidence must be raised in relation to all 
elements of the defence. 164  It is unclear how an individual might produce 
evidence as to whether they acted as a ‘normal person’ might have acted in the 
circumstances, and for this reason it has been argued that the defendant ought not 
to be required to provide evidence that a ‘normal person’ might act in the way 
                                                 
162 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54 (5)-(6). '[I]n  many mixed mot ive cases the judge 
might take the view that, even if there is no 'considered desire for revenge', it  is nonetheless a 
case where no reasonable jury would find that the defence applies. We regard it as significant that 
of the provocation cases studied...in the two involving honour killing both the accused were 
convicted of murder. We are confident that that result would be no different under our 
recommendations'; Law Com No 304, 2006 (n  113) para 5.27. See also, paras 5.11(5), 5.25-5.32, 
and 5.60. 
163 Clinton [2012] EW CA Crim 2  [45], Dawes, Hatter & Bowyer (n 5) [49] and [53]. Gurpinar 
(n 126)[12] and [22]. 
164 Tony Storey, Loss of Control: “Sufficient Evidence”. The Journal of Criminal Law (2015) 79 
(1) 6-8. 
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that the defendant did. 165  It is clear, however, that where the evidence raised 
demonstrates that an individual would clearly not react in the same or a similar 
way, the trial judge ought to reject the defence. 166  This was the approach 
envisioned by the Law Commission when it advanced proposals for reform: 
 
We would not, for example, want a partial defence to be 
available to criminal gangs who choose to deal with 
threats of violence from rival gangs by striking first. Our 
proposals regarding the role of the judge and jury would 
properly preclude such a defence from being left to the 
jury in those circumstances (on the basis that no properly 
directed jury could reasonably conclude that a gangster 




In cases where family violence is in issue, the trial judge will be charged to issue 
juror directions equivalent to those operating in relation to self-defence in 
Victoria (see Appendix C of the Issues Paper). The difference between the 
position in Victoria and the recommendations advanced is that these directions 
ought to be mandatory. This will ensure that appropriate directions are 
consistently provided in all cases, rather than relying on ad hoc requests made by 
counsel. 
 
In all cases where family violence is at issue, social framework evidence will be 
prima facie admissible. Again, the social framework evidence advanced ought to 
be based upon the provisions operating in Victoria. A caveat applies in that the 
trial judge has general exclusionary discretion to prevent the admission of 
evidence that unnecessarily demeans the victim, considered above. 
 
Procedural matters                                                  
165 ibid. 
166 Fortson (n 104) para 179. 
167 Law Com No 290, 2004 (n 3) cited in Fortson (n 104) para 164. 
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The loss of control defence in England and Wales have given rise to significant 
litigation where the trial judge has failed to leave the partial defence to the jury. 
In order to avoid unnecessary litigation, a plea under the proposed defence would 
be considered as part of a pre-trial hearing under case management processes. 
The implementation of an interlocutory appeal route would mean that the trial 
judge's decision (to reject the plea) could be challenged (only) before trial, 
thereby preventing unnecessary appellate court litigation.168  
 
Question 17: As an alternative, would you prefer the introduction of a separate 
homicide offence in circumstances where the defendant was acting defensively, 
but with excessive force? 
 
A separate homicide offence carries the significant benefits of more accurately 
labelling the actions of the defendant, and the availability of an alternative 
offence may reduce overcharging. Referring to defensive homicide, the Issues 
Paper suggests that, based upon the experience in Victoria, ‘if such an offence is 
to be publicly acceptable, it should be limited to victims of domestic violence 
who commit homicide.’ 169 A fundamental issue with the operation of defensive 
homicide was that its parameters were too broad. It is therefore essential that any 
separate homicide offence is appropriately restricted, but this does not 
necessarily mean that it should be limited to familial violence, for the reasons 
outlined in response to question 1. It should also be borne in mind that limiting 
any new offence to familial violence will not necessarily prevent the defence 
being used inappropriately. The terms ‘family violence’ and ‘family violence’ 
are broad terms, meaning that a wide ‘cohort of persons and circumstances’ may 
fall within the ambit of a new offence targeted towards these categories. 170 As 
previously noted, limiting any offence/defence to cases involving family 
violence does not mean that the offence/defence will not be invoked by 
individuals who should not be entitled to it; appropriate threshold filter 
mechanisms are required in order to ensure that future reforms are not abused. 
                                                  
168 Law Com No 304, 2006 (n 113) para 5.16. 
169 (n 20) para 8.33. 
170 Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 
2014, second reading, 3 September 2014 (Vic), Mr Morris (Mornington) 3135. 
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The homicide offence recommended by the commission 
As previously noted, there are significant issues with limiting an offence of this 
nature to a particular class of individuals. If an individual, in fear and 
desperation, kills an abuser, the rationale that there was no familial link between 
the individual and the perpetrator should not justify the exclusion of a separate 
defence/offence. Including dependents within the category of family members 
could ameliorate this issue, but it does not avert the problem that those in family 
violence type situations will potentially be left bereft of options in potentially 
analogous situations. 
 
The Issues Paper suggests that the defendant must be a victim of family violence 
in order to engage the new offence. It is unclear whether the victim will include 
those who witness family violence. It is clear that children are victims of familial 
violence, even in cases where they are not the direct targets of the abuse. It is 
important that any separate homicide offence is not interpreted in such a way that 
it would preclude children, parents or potentially other family members who act 
to protect one another.  
 
 
CHAPTER 9: OTHER OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Question 18: Do you think there should be any changes to sentencing law (for 
example, the introduction of further mitigating factors, or guidance on 
displacement of the threshold in section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002) to better 
provide for victims of family violence who commit homicide? 
 
It is clear that the law on sentencing in New Zealand needs to be developed, 
particularly in relation to cases involving family violence. The restrictive 
sentencing regime operating in New Zealand means that a murder conviction 
automatically attracts a life sentence, unless the nature of the offence and the 
circumstances of the defendant would render such a sentence ‘manifestly 
unjust’. 171 The minimum non-parole period on a life sentence for murder may 
                                                 
171 Sentencing Act 2002, section 102 (1). See, generally, O’Brien (2003) CRNZ 572 [19]. 
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not be less than 10 years or 17 years in the ‘most serious cases’.172 It is only in 
‘limited circumstances when a finite sentence may be imposed’. 173 In all cases, 
only ‘exceptional’ circumstances will result in the presumption of life 
imprisonment being overturned. This threshold is too high, and should be 
amended or, alternatively abolished in favour of sentencing guidelines and trial 
judge discretion.  
 
The introduction of further mitigating factors to section 9 of the Sentencing Act 
2002 to cover familial violence would be welcomed. These changes should be 
complemented by new sentencing guidelines. The New Zealand Law 
Commission previously recommended that new guidelines should be drafted to 
ensure that ‘full and fair account’ may be taken of provocative conduct and other 
mitigating factors during sentencing. 174  These recommendations were not 
advanced, and it is appropriate that the need for adequate sentencing guidelines 
in cases involving familial violence is reiterated here. 
 
Question 19: Do you consider the Prosecution Guidelines should include 
specific guidance on charging and/or plea discussions where family violence 
against a defendant accused of committing homicide is in issue? 
 
It is recognised that overcharging and plea bargaining practices can be 
problematic in cases involving familial abuse. A general lack of awareness 
regarding the nature of familial violence may result in overcharging. The primary 
victim may enter into a plea bargain in fear that a self-defence claim might be 
rejected at trial, or alternatively to protect other family members (particularly 
children) from the ordeal of a criminal trial. 175 For these reasons, inter alia, the 
recommendation to include specific guidance regarding charging and/or plea 
                                                 
172 Hamidzadeh (n 35) [5].  
173 ibid [4]. 
174 New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC No 98 2007) 
paras 2.04 and 2.08. 
175 See, generally, Asher Flynn and Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Bargain ing with Defensive Homicide: 
Examining Victoria’s Secretive Plea Bargain ing System Post-Law Reform’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 905. See also, Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the 
Provocation Defence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and, Danielle  
Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (Routledge, 2013). 
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discussions where family violence against a defendant accused of committing 
homicide is in issue is a welcome one.   
 
Question 20: Would you support further education or training on the dynamics 
of family violence for those operating within the criminal justice system, 
including lawyers, judges, police and jurors? 
 
A significant problem in cases involving familial violence relates to common 
misunderstandings and traditional stereotypes. Any amendments to the current 
legislation, the introduction of bespoke jury directions and specific guidelines 
pertaining to the admissibility of social framework evidence alone are incapable 
of reversing some of the engrained beliefs individuals have regarding the nature 
of family violence. If reform is to be meaningful, it is essential that amendments 
are supported by a comprehensive training package designed to assist those 
within the criminal justice system in understanding the nature and impact of 
familial violence, in addition to the import, interpretation and applicability of the 
new provisions.176 
                                                 
176 See Danielle  Tyson, Debbie Kirkwood, and Mandy Mckenzie (n 56) for a  compelling analysis 
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system. The matters with which these articles are concerned are important 
and timely, with the law relating to mental disorder and criminal justice 
in a state of flux across England and Wales, New Zealand, Australia and 
America. The articles offer an important and original comparative 
analysis of the law pertaining to the partial defences to murder, insanity, 
automatism, self-defence and intoxication across the aforementioned 
jurisdictions. Read together, these contributions form a coherent whole, 
connected by the overarching theme. To this end, there are cross-
references between the articles/chapters where appropriate. Not only are 
these contributions linked by an overarching theme, but they each offer 
valuable insight into the way in which the law might be reformed based 
upon an analysis of the law within comparable jurisdictions. In this 
respect, each contribution advances innovative recommendations as to 
how the law should be interpreted and how it could be enhanced. 
Publications (v), (vi), (vii), and (xi) were submitted as part of UoA 20 
under REF 2014. Chapter (viii) was submitted under the same exercise by 
the joint author. The average result for law was 2.48*.  Articles (i)-(iv) 
will form part of a selection of REF 2020 publications. In terms of 
impact, the published works will form the basis of a REF 2020 impact 
case study on ‘Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice’. The work has been 
cited extensively in academic texts at both national and international 
level. In particular, article (v) features on the Australian Government, 
Institute of Criminology website, and the Queensland Supreme Court 
website. The Law Commission for England and Wales has also cited the 
research underpinning these articles extensively. 
(c) List of published work on which the application is based: 
(i) Nicola Wake, ‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’: A new 
partial defence for primary victims who kill’ [2015] Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2) 149-175. 
(ii) Nicola Wake, ‘Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive 
Restriction Model and Abolition of the Provocation Defence’ in 
Ben Livings, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake (eds) Mental Condition 
Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law 
and Medicine (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 364-404. 
ISBN (10): 1-4438-7161-3; ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7161-7. 
(iii) Arlie Loughnan and Nicola Wake, ‘Of Blurred Boundaries and 
Prior Fault: Insanity, Automatism and Intoxication’ (2014) in Alan 
Reed and Michael Bohlander with Nicola Wake and Emma Smith 
(eds) General Defences: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2015) ISBN: 9781472433350.** 
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(iv) Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, ‘Potentiate Liability and Prevening 
Fault Attribution: The Intoxicated “Offender” and Anglo-
American Dépecage Standardisations’ (2014) 47(1) John Marshall 
Law Review, Chicago, 57-114. ISSN: 0270-854X.** 
(v) Nicola Wake, ‘Political Rhetoric or Principled Reform of Loss of 
Control? Anglo-Australian Perspectives on the Exclusionary 
Conduct Model’ (2013) Journal of Criminal Law 77(6) 512-520. 
ISSN 1740-5580. 
(vi) Nicola Wake, ‘Battered Women, Startled Householders and 
Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian Perspectives’ 
(2013) Journal of Criminal Law 77(5) 433-457. ISSN 1740-5580. 
(vii) Nicola Wake, ‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished 
Responsibility? A Comparative Analysis’ (2012) Journal of 
Criminal Law 76(1) 71-98. ISSN: 0022-0183). 
(viii) Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, ‘Sexual Infidelity Killings: 
Contemporary Standardisations and Comparative Stereotypes’ in 
Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and 
Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and 
International Perspectives on the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2011) 115-134. ISBN: 978-1-4094-3175-
6.** 
(ix) Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, ‘Anglo-American Perspectives on 
Partial Defences: Something Old, Something Borrowed and 
Something New’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss 
of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, 
Comparative and International Perspectives on the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (Ashgate Publishing, 2011) 183-206. ISBN: 978-
1-4094-3175-6.** 
 
** Contribution as joint author.  




